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Abstract
The overarching characteristic of the 2009 legislative elections lay in the legislative candidates’
politics of image. It stemmed from the amendment to the election Law no. 10/2008 article 214 that
ostensibly cut off the parties’ power in determining their candidates without the public’s “direct”
consent. The public was then given a direct opportunity to choose and vote for their preferred
candidates in the 2009 elections. This marked the emergence and proliferation of the candidates’
image construction, especially in the “outdoor” political arena. Billboards were chosen as the most
effective outdoor advertising medium to introduce the candidates and propagate their slogans and
platforms. However, at the same time, this mode of introducing and propagating reveals itself as an
ideological map that demonstrates the contestation and synthesis of the two major ideological
camps in the Indonesian political arena, i.e. the nationalist and Islamic. The candidates were coopted into and by this framework. They themselves could not escape as their political dispositions
were unconsciously defined by this framework. Their billboards speak loudly the ideological
contestation and synthesis.
The investigation of the contestation and synthesis needs Bourdieuan analytical tools, such as
capital, dispositions (habitus) and field. These are used not merely to show how the mechanism of
the contestation and synthesis operated and was defined by the rules of political “game”, but also to
show how this mechanism involves the intricate inter-relationships of various capitals, such as the
political, social, economic, cultural and symbolic, that reflect the candidates’ (read also: the parties’)
dispositions within the field of Pancasila discourse. Pancasila becomes not only an ideological basis
for the state but also the bastion of the contestation and synthesis. The twin roles arguably derive
from the dominant cultural root (Javanese) that highly values the concepts of harmony, tolerance
and appropriateness as the essences that allow the ideological contestation and synthesis of the
nationalist and Islamic strands as the dominant ideological markers in the Indonesian political arena.
This thesis aims to demonstrate how the candidates’ billboards represent ideological contestation
and synthesis as the billboards can also be perceived as the candidates’ visual “responses” which
reflect their political dispositions and the process of taking stances amidst the contestation and
synthesis. Therefore, this study was conducted in the form of a layered case study. Using a
Bourdieuan lens, the first layer explores the historical background of the contestation and synthesis,
their proliferation in the political arena and the mechanism of deploying these strands in the political
parties’ branding. Using a social semiotic lens, the second layer investigates how the billboards as
the products of the candidates’ political articulation represent not only these contestations and
syntheses but also their dispositions. I found that the system of representation (on the candidates’
ii

billboards) operates within the Javanese ideals of “equilibrium” in Pancasila discourse. These ideals
frame the power relations between the nationalist and Islamic factions in an ostensible “consensus”
in order to maintain the harmony and dilute ideological friction.
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PART I
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction
Following the downfall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, the Indonesian political arena has
experienced marked political resilience. Mietzner and Aspinall (2010, pp. 1-5) argue that Indonesia’s
success in transforming its democratic system from guided democracy (Soekarno’s era), through
authoritarian rule (Soeharto’s era or New Order regime) to electoral democracy (the Reform era)
marks the rise of democratic politics in the post-New Order period. Diamond (2010, pp. 30-32) notes
that when the 1997 Asian financial crisis hit, Indonesia successfully improved its democratic
performance. This can be seen from the trend in Indonesia’s score on political rights and civil
liberties based on the U.S-based leading think tank of Freedom House’s measurement that shows
Indonesia’s score gradually escalated reaching 2.3 in 2006-2009 from 6.4 in 1998. This is against the
numerical rating of 1 for highest degree of freedom and 7 for lowest degree of freedom. In
Diamond’s view, this achievement is far better than the achievements of Indonesia’s neighbouring
countries, such as Philippines (4.3) and Thailand (6.4) in 2008.
This outstanding result stems from Indonesia’s success in rectifying its democratic system, especially
in the Reform era (1998-present). Habibie’s government (1998-1999) was noted for “peacefully”
turning this transition era away from the authoritarian rule to the democratic system that paved the
way for freer democratic elections by employing the combination of district and proportional
systems. The baton was then given to Megawati after the elected President, Abdurrahman Wahid,
was impeached due to allegations regarding a financial scandal. Megawati’s administration (20012004) successfully initiated the first direct Presidential election in Indonesia’s history. However, prior
to the Presidential election, the parliamentary election conducted by her government employed a
new election system called an open-list system (a system that allowed the voters to directly read the
names of the legislative candidates on the ballot paper prior to their casting a vote) that reinforced
the party’s oligarchy. Haris (2005) argues that this system positions the parties as the determiners
that organise the positions of their cadres into the list of a ranking number on the ballot papers.
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) government annulled this system. On 23 December 2008 the
Constitutional Court acceded to a judicial review of Law no. 10/2008 article 214 which stipulated
that the decision to determine the elected legislative candidates based on the ranking number on
the ballot paper (as in the 2004 legislative election) was against the 1945 Constitution. This imposed
1

a necessity for the legislative candidates to present themselves directly to the public for the first
time. It also led to the construction of a new political culture which relies heavily on the politics of
image in Indonesia, in this case the billboard.
The billboard held a significant position in the 2009 Indonesia’s legislative election due to the fact
that during the campaign, streets all over Indonesia were dotted for the first time with the
candidates’ billboards. The billboard itself represents a convoluted web of representation which
involves the complexity of historical polarisations of Nationalist/Islamic and Javanese/non Javanese
strands1 in the political discursive practices. The research aims at addressing the following questions:
1. What does the billboard culture represent?
2. How is the complexity of the polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese
strands expressed on the billboard?
3. How much scope does the billboard’s genre give the candidates to express their political
dispositions?
As the historical polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese strands play a
dominant role in mapping the Indonesian political framework, these polarisations also significantly
influence the candidates’ dispositions. These dispositions can be seen from the candidates’
billboards on which these strands contest and synthesise. Thus, this thesis explores the mechanism
of how the candidates’ billboards represent the meanings’ contestation, as well as the synthesis of
these strands. This is conducted by examining the scope the billboard’s genre gives the candidates to
express their political dispositions. In other words, deciphering the representation of the candidate’s
billboard culture means tracing the signifying practices of these strands.

This thesis is organised into four parts and one concluding chapter. Part I addresses the historical
background underlying the operation of the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands
and discusses the methodology in order to unravel the candidates’ dispositions as represented on
their billboards. This part is organised into several chapters. Chapter one examines the Indonesia’s
political framework in which the aforementioned ideological dichotomies (Islamic/Nationalist and
Javanese/non-Javanese strands) are polarised and overlapped. This entails an elucidation of the
positioning of the Islamic and Nationalist strands2 in the Indonesian political realm that illuminates
1

The next chapters will elaborate the historical background of the polarisations that not only map Indonesian
politics but also influence the candidates’ political disposition.
2
An explanation about Javanese/non-Javanese strands positioning in the polical realm in a specific section is
seen to be unnecessary as their presence is arguably not as obtrusive as the Islamic and Nationalist strands in
the candidates’ image construction as represented on the billboards. However, their presence in the
ethnic/regional (political) domain not only colours Indonesian political realm, but also influences Indonesian
political disposition (habitus) in the political arena, especially as Javanese culture becomes one of the
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the convoluted web of these polarisations. Chapter two outlines the 2009 elections and the
significance of the candidates’ billboards in the legislative election not merely as the outdoor
advertising medium and cultural/visual artefacts, but also as the representation of the (candidates’)
branding. Previous related research will be discussed after the section that explores how semiotic
reading practices help to decipher the candidates’ image construction on the billboards’ narratives.
This is followed by the third chapter that discusses the methodology.

Part II illuminates the synthesis and contestation of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese
strands in Indonesian political arena. This is organised into two chapters, examining Indonesian
political history, the ideological debates surrounding the polarisations of these strands and the visual
representation of the parties’ logos based on their historical context. Chapter four delineates the
birth of Islamic and nationalist parties and the friction between them in the context of Indonesian
Islam. Chapter five elaborates how this friction (the ideological debate) is perpetuated and
proliferated based on the periodical division of the general elections in Indonesia (1955-2009). The
visual transformation of the parties’ logos exemplifies the ideological synthesis and contestation.

Part III discusses the political branding of the nine winning parties in the 2009 legislative election.
This is organised into three chapters. Chapter six elucidates the state ideology, Pancasila, as the
ideological basis that not only influences the candidates’ dispositions but also frames the ideological
framework of both the Islamic and nationalist parties (also read: factions). As Pancasila is highly
influenced by (Javanese) paternalistic culture, the branding of these parties (especially the
nationalist ones) cannot be dissociated from the political branding of their key figures. Within this
framework, how the parties’ branding is constructed is based on their vision and mission (as written
on their statutes) and framed by the image construction of their paternalistic figures. Chapters seven
and eight address the branding of these parties based on the factions they are affiliated with.

Part IV discusses the reading of the candidates’ billboards’ narratives and is organised into two
chapters. Chapter nine deals with the candidates’ billboards from the nationalist faction whilst the
chapter ten deals with the Islamic faction. This is followed by a section that compares the reading of
the nationalist and Islamic factions’ billboards and that examines the differences and similarities
between how the candidates in these factions express their dispositions in the Pancasila-based
political framework.
significant cultural elements that influence the formulation of the state ideology, Pancasila, which is seen as
the central ideological entity that unites Indonesian pluralism and multiculturalism (see chapter III). In this
sense, these ethnocentric strands implicitly pervade the political as well as socio-cultural arenas.

3

The concluding chapter sums up that the “neither-nor” philosophical basis of Pancasila opens itself
to inclusivity and ambiguity. This means the system of representation on the candidates’ billboards
operates on an unstable ideological basis.

4

Chapter One
Indonesia’s Political Framework
Mapping politics in Indonesia is a challenging task. There have been numerous instances of research
that endeavoured to map Indonesian political frameworks which have evolved prior to Indonesia
gaining her independence. However, from all the research that has been conducted, the dominant
political strands that emerge, circulate, and proliferate are around the historical polarisations of
Islamic/Nationalist (Baswedan, 2004; Fealy, 2008, 2009; Shihab and Nugroho, 2008; Bubalo, Fealy
and Mason, 2008; Platzdasch 2009a, 2009b; Mujani and Liddle, 2010; Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi,
2012) and Javanese/non Javanese strands (Suryadinata, 2002; King, 2003; Ananta, Arifin, and
Suryadinata, 2004; Geertz, 2004; Kingsbury, 2005; Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012). This chapter
aims to outline these ideological polarisations as the dominant markers that structure the
Indonesia’s political framework. This is organised by examining the Islamic/Nationalist strands and
their positioning in the Indonesian political realm. As in the Pancasila discourse, the operation of
these strands is closely related with the imperceptible ethnic polarisation of Javanese/non-Javanese.
The next section elucidates the historical background that illuminates the Javanese/non-Javanese
strands which heavily influence the political dispositions in the Pancasila-based state.
Islamic/Nationalist Strands
Discussing the Islamic3/Nationalist strands in Indonesa, we cannot detach this dichotomy from the
classic categorisation of Javanese (Muslim) society Geetz (1960) posited. Geetz (1960) classified
Javanese society into three religious groups: abangan, santri and priyayi. Many scholars (Hodgson,
1974; Koentjaraningrat 1975, 1985; Nakamura, 1984; Gaffar, 1992; Suryadinata, 2002; Assyaukanie,
2009; Azra, 2009; Pranowo, 2009) disagree with Geertz’s classification as priyayi denotes a social
group (Javanese aristocracy class), not a religious one. Azra (2009) argues that Geertz overlooks the
classification by focusing merely on “the conventional anthropological polarisation of big
tradition/small tradition” or the “pure” Islam/Javanese Islam as his theoretical basis and “treats the
phenomena merely within the socio-cultural context which is plausibly detached from the Islamic
3

I used the term “Muslim” to refer to the religious identity whereas Islamic, as the sociologist, Gole (2002, p.
173) argues, “is a social movement through which Muslim identity is collectively re-appropriated as the basis
for an alternative social and political project”. In this light Gole perceives Islamism as “a critique and even a
discontinuity with the given categories of Muslim identity; it is an endeavour to rename and reconstruct
Muslim identity by freeing it from traditional interpretations and by challenging assimilative forces of
modernism”. This perspective is challenged by Graham Fuller (2003), a political analyst, who defines the word
Islamic as referring to “anyone who believes and actively attempts to implement the notion that the Qur’an
and the tradition of the Hadith should be to help guide the ways societies and governments are run”. Based on
these, I regard the parties having political orientation with Islamic nuance as Islamic. However, since no parties
with Islamic orientation in the 2009 elections explicitly and/or (in)directly declare their objectives in
transforming Indonesia as an Islamic state, the word “Islamist” is seen as infelicitous analytical category.
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scriptures”. Geertz defines abangan as the group who strongly holds Javanese animistic elements
and seldom performs any religious formal practices. One of the abangan variants, abangan Muslim
or syncretic Muslim, is usually held by the peasants who live in the rural areas and perform animistic
rituals (Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012, p. 18). On the contrary, santri are the devout Muslims
who are mostly traders. However, as Kingsbury (2005, p. 28) contends, aside from this stark
distinction between abangan and santri which lies on their level of acceptability of Javanese
animistic belief, this accommodating act can arguably be seen as the capacity of Indonesian Islam to
adopt the local culture.
Notwithstanding this difference and common ground, Pranowo (2009) argues that Indonesian
Muslimness cannot merely be seen on the basis of being a Muslim. He found that one cannot
suggest that nominal Muslims (either fully or partially) contradict the devout Muslims on many
occasions (local, national or even private); simultaneously they preserve, perpetuate and develop
Islamic values. Javanese Islamic religiosity is not merely about the state of being (that A is a Muslim
and B is the nominal Muslim) but more to do with the religious state of becoming (although B is
reluctant to practise the Muslim’s five-time prayer, B will one day fulfil that religious obligation and
support all socio-cultural practices in developing Islam).
In the context of the development of political Islam in Indonesia, the notion of santri develops into
the Islamic faction whereas abangan becomes the nationalist faction. The transformation itself is
not rigid. Assyaukanie (2009, pp. 5-7) notes that the santri sphere then splits into Islamic and
nationalist in the second quarter of the twentieth century. The abangan transforms itself as
religiously neutral nationalist (Noer, 1973) or secular nationalist (Anshari, 1981). The notion of santri
then proliferates in accordance with the development of the socio-historical context in Indonesia:
from radical (Fealy, 2009, p. xii) or fundamentalist (Samson, 1972) or idealist (Hassan, 1980), through
traditionalist (Fealy, 2009, p.xii) and modernist (Fealy, 2009, p. xii), to neo modernist (Woodward,
2001). Hefner (2000) argues that these polarised notions can be seen in two general perspectives:
civil Islam (the Muslims who promote the concepts of democracy and civil society) and the opposite
group, regimist Islam, which was perceived as in line with Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, especially
in the 1990s.
Baswedan (2004, pp.669-690) argues that notwithstanding its lack of precision, Geertz’s dichotomy
still operates in Indonesian political life. He posits his version of Indonesian political dichotomy as
Islamic and the Islamic-friendly. The latter comprises the secular inclusive and the secular exclusive
parties. The Islamic party is the party which formally asserts Islam as its platform. The two secular
camps are identified through their willingness to accommodate the development of Islamic society.
6

The secular inclusive accommodates the development without having the necessity to transform the
country into an Islamic state for they all eventually come to believe in Pancasila’s compatibility with
Islamic values. On the contrary, the secular exclusive, which on one hand welcomes the Islamicinspired agenda, at the same time still conjectures that the government’s accommodating act
towards the Islamic society’s development will merely lead to the beginning of the Islamisation of
the state.
Not wanting to be trapped in the endless academic debate of these notions, Assyaukanie (2009)
proposes three Muslim utopianist models of polity in Indonesia which uphold the following notions:
Islamic Democratic State (IDS), Religious Democratic State (RDS) and Liberal Democratic State (LDS).
IDS emerged in Soekarno’s time, when the Islamic bloc wanted to make Islam the basis of the state
and urged the active participation and role of Muslims in social and political life. RDS, which
emerged at the end of Soeharto’s time, denoted the rising awareness of Pancasila in the Muslim
sphere and that it did not contradict the basic principle of Islam. RDS is perceived as the state model
that guards all religions in Indonesia. The model of LDS is inspired by liberal Muslim figures, such as
Nurcholish Madjid and Aburrahman Wahid or Gus Dur, who wanted to liberate religions from state
domination and proposed secularisation as its philosophical basis.
Positioning the Islamic and Nationalist Strands in Indonesian Political Realm
The polarisation of the Nationalist and Islamic strands within the major parties, especially since the
time Indonesia gained her independence, has defined the Indonesian political framework. Fealy
(2009, p. xii) argues that although this factional polarisation no longer gains “academic accuracy” in
the present day, it remains the dominant ideological marker to map the Indonesian political
framework. Sukma (2010, p. 65) and Platzdasch (2009b) argue that the status of accuracy has been
detached since each faction attempts to adopt the ideological values of its adversary which obscures
the ideological framework of the factions. At the same time, this obscurity validates the basis of
investigating the contestation and synthesis between the Nationalist and Islamic strands which are
reflected on the billboards of their legislative candidates.
The contention between the Islamic and Nationalist strands does not always reach a compromise
especially in the political arena. Their relation is invariably in a state of flux. The overt ideological
contestation in the 1945 to 1960s stemmed from the perennial disputes between the Islamic and
Nationalist camps over the state ideology, Pancasila. The Islamic faction wanted to stick with the
initial proposition to include the phrase “with the obligation to live according to Islamic law for the
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Muslims” in the first principle of Pancasila of the Jakarta charter4. Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 124-125)
notes that the act of effacing this phrase was seen by the Islamic faction as violating Pancasila’s
democratic principle of musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus). The Islamic faction
argued that the members who drafted the charter (the Investigatory Body for the Preparation of
Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI)), which comprised secular nationalists, Muslims, Christians,
Javanese and non Javanese elements, was regarded as representative. Due to this, the charter was
perceived as representing a political compromise, especially between the two dominant camps
(nationalist and Islamic). In this sense, amending the first principle of Pancasila was seen as
equivalent to disregarding the initial consensus and the Islamic faction’s aspirations. However,
although Mashad (2008, pp. 55-61) notes that the Islamic faction eventually agreed not to amend it
as they realised that it was too early to urge such notions as Indonesia had only recently gained her
independence, this, as Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 14, 125) further argues, fosters “cross-religious
suspicion” which “echoes the intrinsic position of shari’ah (Islamic law)-minded Muslims in the early
to mid-twentieth centuries”.
This shari’ah-minded-ness ostensibly ran parallel with the pan-Islamism propagated by IndianPakistani Abu al-A’la al Maududi and Sayyid Qutb. It found its channel in Indonesian polity in the
mid-twentieth century through an Islamic party, Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia or
Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), led by Mohammad Natsir. However, Platzdasch (2009a,
pp. 30-32) argues that the amalgamation of Islamic values with the western-concept of democracy
distanced Masyumi from pan-Islamism. He found that Masyumi believed in the compatibility of
Islam with the western democratic concept by coalescing the Paskitani “Islamic republic” model with
the “democratic and constitutional based state” which placed the state as the core institution to
uphold Islamic law (shari’ah).
Due to an allegation of mutiny made against Masyumi, Soekarno issued the Presidential Decree
number 200/1960 that dissolved the party in 1960. Aside from the popular perception that the
mutiny was triggered by the dissatisfaction of the Islamic faction towards the imbalance in

4

The Jakarta Charter ,which was signed in Jakarta on 22 June 1945, was the first design of the state philosophy
that the members of the Investigatory Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI)
produced prior to Indonesia’s Independence on 17 August 1945. Mashad (2008, p. 57) notes that Soekarno, a
member of BPUPKI who later became the first President of Indonesia, perceived the charter as a political
compromise between the nationalist and Islamic camps that would not make Islam into the state ideology
(which would turn the country into an Islamic one), but rather would be the result of the modus vivendi that
bridged the deadlock between the two camps.
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development between Java and Outer Islands, Mahendra [n.d.]5 adds that the ideological reason lies
in the fact that Soekarno’s administration oriented itself more to the leftist camp as PKI (Indonesian
Communist Party) dominated the government (see chapter five) which intervened in the nationalist
direction, which was dominated by Soekarno’s PNI (Indonesia Nationalist Party). Moreover,
Kingsbury (2005, p. 51) notes that Soekarno’s act of dissolution was due to his fear of the alleged
establishment of the counter-government initiated by PRRI (Revolutionary Government of Republic
of Indonesia) in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. Notwithstanding his suppression of this (the largest
Islamic party), Soekarno attempted to synthesise the nationalist, Islamic, and communists under one
concept NASAKOM (Nationalist, Religion, and Communist) in order to perpetuate the, and his, status
quo. In the present era, however, Platzdasch (2009a) found that the Masyumi tradition has been
perpetuated by Islamic organisations such as ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals),
MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council), HMI (Islamic Students Association) and Islamic parties such as the
defunct PBB (Cresent Star Party), PPP (United Development Party), and most possibly PKS. Fealy
(2001) views the perpetuation of the Masyumi tradition through Islamic organisations, such as ICMI,
as constituting the embodiment of Islamic proselytisation.
However, the downfall of Soekarno’s regime due to the so-called communist coup in 1965, according
to Mahendra [n.d], marked a new hope for the Islamic faction to rehabilitate its name. History
records a different reality. Instead of rehabilitating the Islamic faction’s name, Soeharto’s
administration attenuated the polarisation of Nationalist and Islamic strands under the slogan of
developmentalism. People’s freedom to actively participate in politics was circumscribed by
Soeharto’s regime for it was perceived as the source of a separatist movement and political turmoil.
The President deployed Golkar (the functional(ist) group)6 as his electoral machine and imposed
Pancasila as the sole ideology for all political parties. He held the same ideological belief as Soekarno
that Pancasila, which reflected the Indonesian soul, could unite the people. The fusion of Pancasila
and developmentalism muffled people’s opposition. The Islamic camp finally accepted Pancasila and
perceived Pancasila’s first principle (Belief in One Almighty God) could accommodate the Islamic
aspiration. This, as Kingsbury (2005, p. 86) argues, is possibly due to the Islamic faction’s view that
Pancasila’s secular (religious) notion is seen not as quite “illegitimate”, as it does not totally
contradict “Islam’s social and legal claim”.

5

See Mahendra. (n.d.). Kebijakan Orde Baru, Masyumi dan Islam [New Order Policies, Masyumi and Islam].
Retrieved from http://yusril.ihzamahendra.com/2008/01/31/kebijakan-orde-baru-terhadap-masyumi-danislam/.
6

See chapter seven for further elaboration of Golkar as a functional(ist) group.
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In the Reform era, the ideological contestation re-emerged during the Presidential election in 1999.
PDI-P had to concede to the Central Axis group’s (the Islamic faction) political maneuvers in putting
up Abdurrahman Wahid as the President although PDI-P won the assembly election. However, the
ideological contestation did not appear in the same form as in the period from 1945 to the 1960s. It
has been transformed and shifted into a pragmatic one due to the cartel system or the fluid coalition
that attenuated the ideological contestation (Ambardi, 2009).
Javenese/non Javanese Strands
As previously suggested, the political polarisation of Islamic/Nationalist strands in Indonesia
originated from Javanese culture. This phenomenon is quite judicious for there is no discernible
clear-cut explanation that a certain ethnic group (Javanese) occupies the hegemonic position in
Indonesia. However, the appreciable number of the Javanese population (41.71 per cent)7 or (42 per
cent)8 compared to other ethnic groups indirectly renders the possibility that the Javanese have
quantitatively a bigger influence in Indonesia. Kingsbury (2005, pp. 18-27) reinforces this domination
by presenting his argument that Indonesia is a “reinterpretation of traditional Javanese empire” not
by quantitative measurements, such as the number of Javanese descendants who occupied strategic
positions in the past and present governments or the number of Javanese people who migrated
from Java to Outer Islands. His argument was based on his research in which he found that
Indonesia’s (former) centralised governmental system was predominantly influenced by the
(Javanese) Hindu-Buddhist conception of mandala, “a circular figure symbolising the perceived
universe”, which made the concentration of power lie at the center and “diffuse at the periphery”
(Kingsbury, 2005, pp. 24-27). He further argues that people’s loyalty to “this mandalic conception of
the state” is bound up with “the participation of local functionaries, soldiers, and civilians in the
provinces” under a (unitary?) socialist conception coined by Supomo (one of the founding fathers of
Pancasila), i.e. the prime task of an individual is to serve society (see chapter six).
This conception was reinforced by the first President, Soekarno, who spread the belief that the
concept of nurturing between the father and the children in the family is in accordance with the
nurturing concept of Javanese kings towards their people: the father (the king or gusti) as the leader
nurtures the children (the people or kawula). At the same time the children are burdened by an
absolute obligation to obey the father (Adityawan, 2008, p. 81). This reinforces the glorification of
the (Javanese) paternalistic system which, according to Somantri (2006, p. 9), becomes the
7

See Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata. 2004. Indonesian Electoral Behaviour a Statiscal Perspective. Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 4
8
See Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi. 2012. Kuasa Rakyat Analisis tentang Perilaku Memilih dalam Pemilihan
Legislatif dan Presiden Indonesia Pasca-Orde Baru. Jakarta: Mizan Kronik Zaman Baru, p. 9.
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foundation for the socio-political/cultural basis of Indonesian society. Although Supomo (1952)
found that these family principles were also found in other ethnic groups’ social systems, Somantri
(2006, pp. 1-32) refuted this as he found that this cultural conformity does not mean that the roots
of Indonesia’s socio-cultural democratic system9 make Indonesian society completely familiar with
the notion of representative democracy (Pancasila’s fourth principle, see chapter six). The operation
of these principles arguably needs the guidance from a paternalistic figure. Soekarno brought in this
paternalistic system in the form of Guided Democracy (Somantri, 2006, p. 12).
The second President, Soeharto, preserved this system by way of positioning himself as the central
paternalistic figure who guarded and protected Pancasila10. Adityawan (2008, pp. 112-113) argues
that Soeharto’s policies in fusing the political parties into three and putting Pancasila as the sole
ideology of the state and parties11 represent the implementation of Soeharto’s Javanese ideals of
harmony and calmness (stability). Soeharto’s attempt to “Javanize” Pancasila continued, as Ramage
(1995, pp. 34-35) notes Soeharto’s controversial remark in his meeting with Komite Nasional
Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI) or Indonesian National Youth Committee on 19 July 1982 that tolerance
and appropriateness as the essences in Pancasila stemmed from Javanese spirituality and religious
belief. However, Ward12 notes that this meeting was controversial as Soeharto’s talk “was never
published in Indonesia but was surreptitiously recorded on tape and then transcibed”. Despite this
controversy, Geertz (2004, pp. 45-76) considers the tolerance and appropriatenss in Pancasila
position this state ideology as a “civil religion” that represents an Indonesian cultural (read:
Javanese) product coined by a Javanese leader (Soekarno) and imposed by Soeharto’s Javanesecentric government as the sole ideology for the state and political parties. He asserts that although
Pancasila is dominated by these ethnic nuances, Soeharto’s imposition successfully positioned
Pancasila as a “soft” reference that is able to revitalise other ethnic cultural (non Javanese)
sentiments due to its pluralist democratic notions (see chapter six). Due to this capacity, Geertz
further notes, Soeharto misused (if not exploited) Pancasila as an unbreakable “fence” that
ideologically fortified people’s apolitical attitude towards his government as he used Pancasila as his
political banner for developmentalism (see chapters five, seven and nine).

9

Reeve (1985) argues that the root of Indonesia’s democratic systems is largely based on Pancasila’s “family”
principles such as sharing burden/mutual assistance (gotong royong), deliberation (musyawarah) and
consensus (mufakat)
10
Reeve (1985) found that the five principles in Pancasila are influenced by its founding fathers’ Javanese
disposition, especially Ki Hajar Dewantara, Supomo and Soekarno (see chapter six)
11
See Part II for further elaboration.
12
See Ward, K. (n.d). Soeharto’s New Order and Its Legacy: Essays in Honour of Harold Crouch. Retrieved from
http://epress.anu.edu.au/apps/bookworm/view/Soeharto%E2%80%99s+New+Order+and+its+Legacy%3A+Ess
ays+in+honour+of+Harold+Crouch/5331/ch02.xhtml
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Even though the antinomy of Javanese/non Javanese strands never overtly unravelled, the issue still
continued during the 2009 political campaign and after the 2009 elections. The emergence of Sultan
Hamengkubuwono (HB) X, the Governor of Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY) province as well as the
King of Yogyakarta sultanate13 as one of the Presidential candidates from Partai Golkar (beside the
incumbent Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, a non Javanese), during Golkar’s political campaign
engendered an assumption from one member of the Partai Golkar elite that the true candidate that
suited the position was Sultan HB X merely because he is Javanese (Firmanzah, 2010, p. 236). The
assumption was reinforced as the political response from Ruhut Sitompul (non Javanese) in Santosa
(2011) 14, one of the Partai Demokrat15 politicians, who stated that the opportunity was nil for nonJavanese politicians who desired to be the Presidential Candidates to represent Partai Demokrat for
the next election.
However, this Javanese influence merely played a marginal role in influencing the voters’
preferences in choosing the legislative candidates, the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates
in the 2009 elections (Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012, pp 204-216). For instance, although some
parties have their power base outside Java such as Golkar (Partai Golongan Karya or Functional(ist)
Group Party) and PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional or National Mandate Party), Golkar obtained 35 per
cent of votes from Javanese voters, whilst PAN dominated Yogyakarta and Central Java (Mujani,
Liddle and Ambardi, 2012, pp. 208, 210). Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi also found that from the total
vote (7.89 per cent) PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party) obtained from Java
and Outer Islands, 46 per cent came from Javanese voters. This indicates that the element of
regionalism (Java/ Outer Islands) does not, without exception, correlate with ethnicity, although, as
Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi further note, the latter element is frequently perceived as one of classic
elements (besides religion) the parties use in determining the nomination of the candidates for
President and Vice President. This ostensibly reflects a political effort in embracing ethnic pluralism
in Indonesia under an ethnocentric dichotomy of Javanese/non Javanese as many Indonesian
political elites and analysts suggest (Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012, p. 213). This can be seen, for
instance, from this conventional ethnic-based formation of the President and Vice President
candidates, such as Jusuf Kalla (Bugis) and Wiranto (Javanese) representing a political coalition of
Golkar and Hanura (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat or People’s Conscience Party) in the 2009 Presidential
election, which proved to be unsuccessful. This failure arguably indicates the obsolescence of this
classic ethnocentric foundation in coupling the President and Vice President candidates. Mujani,
13

Yogyakarta province was formerly a Javanese kingdom.
Santosa, T. (2011, January 13). Ruhut Sitompul: Non Jawa Jangan Bermimpi Jadi Presiden. Retrieved from
http://www.rakyatmerdeka.co.id/news.php?id=14855
15
The winning party in the 2009 Legislative and Presidential Elections
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Liddle and Ambardi (2012, p. 215) further argue that this obsolescence is due to the imbalance in the
dispersion of Javanese and non-Javanese ethnicity throughout the archipelago which makes ethnic
sentiment into a “relatively constant variable” in influencing voters’ preferences and behaviours.

However, Javanese leaders’ domination in the Indonesian political realm will likely meet its
challenges, especially in the forthcoming elections in 2014. Aritonang (2013) notes that the
emergence of non-Javanese politicians as Presidential Candidates for the 2014 elections, such as
Jusuf Kalla (Bugis), Mahfud MD (Maduranese), Aburizal Bakrie (Lampung), Surya Paloh (Acehnese),
Hatta Rajasa (Palembang) opens the possibility for the non-Javanese to take over the Javanesecentric domination in the Indonesia political realm. However, this does not mean that Javanese
domination will soon be emasculated as these candidates still consider the ethic-based polarisation
as one of the significant elements in influencing voters’ behaviours. For instance, Aburizal Bakrie
from Golkar is considering choosing Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono (HB) X or Kristiani Yudhoyono, the
first lady, as his running mate (Aritonang, 2013). This indicates that this ethnic sentiment still holds a
major role in Indonesian politics. Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata (2004, pp. 367-368) reinforce this as
they perceive that the existing ethnic association (Javanese/non Javanese) reflects the popular
perception in Indonesian society. Dwipayana (as cited by Aritonang, 2013) argues that this
association is often used as a rallying call for the politicians to influence voters. However, this ethnic
association exists almost imperceptibly on the billboards as the candidates’ explicit textual
declaration of their ethnic orientation will impede them in gaining their ultimate goal.

These polarisations become the basis in outlining the mechanism of how the legislative candidates’
billboards represent the images of Islamic/Nationalist strands as well as the imperceptible ethnic
orientation in their politics of image. I argue that the signifying practices of the image construction
on the billboards not only show the contestation of these strands, but also obscure the polarisations.
I limit the analysis by examining the billboards of the nine political parties16 that won seats in the
2009 legislative election, not focusing on how voters respond to the billboards, but on how the
billboards narrate the polarisation and contest two dominant political camps as well as the
imperceptible ethnic orientation which obscure the construction of the parties’ and the candidates’

16

Partai Demokrat (PD) or Democratic Party, Partai Golongan karya (Golkar) or Functional(ist) Group Party,
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P) or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, Partai Keadilan
Sejahtera (PKS) or Prosperous Justice Party, Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) or National Mandate Party, Partai
Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or United Development Party, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) or Nation’s
Awakening Party, Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) or Greater Indonesia Movement Party and Partai
Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura) or People’s Conscience Party.
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identity. Prior to discussing this, an elucidation of the significance of the candidates’ billboards in the
2009 legislative election is needed and will be addressed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Two
The Significance of the Candidates’ Billboards in the 2009 Legislative Election
This chapter aims to discuss the candidates’ billboards in the 2009 legislative election as political
commodities, cultural/visual artefacts and the representation of (the candidates’) political branding.
This is conducted by analysing the mushrooming of the candidates’ billboards as a new
political/cultural phenomenon as the result of the aforementioned amendment to the election laws
in the 2008. However, prior to discussing this mushrooming we need to examine the significance of
the candidates’ billboards as political commodities, cultural/visual artefacts and the representation
of (the candidates’) political branding and outline the 2009 elections. This chapter is organised by
firstly discussing the political dynamic of the 2009 elections vis-a-vis the ideological polarisations of
Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands. The second and third sections respectively
discuss the positioning of the candidates’ image-building on the billboards as political commodities
and cultural/visual artefacts in the framework of (Javanese) paternalistic culture. The fourth section
discusses how the candidates’ billboards represent the political branding of the candidates and the
parties’ key figures as their images are used to support the candidates’ image construction. Previous
related research is incorporated in the fifth section as these figures indirectly position the
significance of this research in relation to the existing research that mainly concentrates on the
political branding of the parties’ paternalistic figures.
The 2009 Elections
As noted in chapter one, Indonesian democracy in the post-Soeharto era has improved quite
significantly. Mietzner and Aspinall (2010) note that this improvement positions Indonesia as one of
the countries in Southeast Asia region that successfully practised electoral democracy with some
defective implementation of individual rights and the rule of law, such as in the 2009 elections.
Sukma (2010) and Sardini (2011) argue that in the 2009 elections the defects lay in its technical and
logistical problems which led to flawed results. However, Mietzner and Aspinall (2010, p.7) argue
that the flaws were obscured by the triumph of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) from PD as the
current Indonesia’s President which stemmed from “his unrivalled success” in constructing his
personal popularity (see chapter seven). Such construction had been developed, especially since he
became the Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs in Megawati’s government (Haris, 2008).
Nothwithstanding SBY’s popularity as the key element of his victory (and PD’s), what was also
interesting to note from the 2009 Presidential election was that the victory of SBY (Javanese) and his
running mate, Boediono (Javanese), suggested the impracticability of the classic formulation that
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President and Vice President candidates represent Java and Outer Islands (Javanese/non Javanese).
However, SBY deployed this formulation in the 2004 Presidential election in which he paired with
Jusuf Kalla (non Javanese) from Golkar. This duo was frequently perceived as an “ideal” couple not
only because they represent Javanese/non Javanese as well as Nationalist (SBY) and Islamic (Kalla)
dichotomies, but that their personality traits (SBY is known as a very cautious person whilst Kalla is
known for his effective and efficient actions) which seemed to fulfill each other also enhanced this
perception (Takwin and Karim, 2004).
The political “divorce” between SBY and Kalla in the 2009 Presidential election might also suggest
the impracticability of the Nationalist/Islamic and Javanese/non-Javanese dichotomies. However, as
Mietzner (2009a) and Sukma (2010) found, the victory of SBY and PD in the 2009 Presidential and
legislative elections was primarily derived from the success of SBY’s image construction rather than
the impracticability of these ideological polarisations. SBY’s personal popularity made PD obtain
20.85 per cent in the 2009 legislative election compared to 7.45 per cent in the 2004 legislative
election, the first such election in which the party participated.
Other nationalist parties such Golkar and PDI-P found difficulty in competing with PD’s achievement
(read: SBY’s popularity). Golkar obtained a mere 14.45 per cent against PDI-P 14.03 per cent as the
second and the third runners-up17 in the 2009 legislative election (see chapter five). Golkar’s votes
declined quite significantly as this party obtained 21.58 per cent in the 2004 legislative election as
the first winner.18 As for PDI-P, the party suffered a drop of 4.5 per cent from the result of 18.53 per
cent in the 2004 legislative election or 19.71 per cent difference from the 1999 election (see chapter
five). The Islamic parties such as PAN, PPP, and PKB also respectively suffered a drop of 0.43 per
cent, 3.19 per cent, and 5.63 per cent in the 2009 legislative election as against the total votes they
obtained in the 2004 legislative election (see chapter five). Mietzner and Aspinall (2010, p. 10)
perceive this downward trend not as the representation of people’s trust towards the parties, but
more as fluctuated numbers that prove the parties’ strength in their longevity compared to other
parties in Indonesia’s neighbouring countries such as South Korea, Thailand and Philippines that
“often disappeared after one or two elections”.

17

See Yatim, S.S., Joyowardono, S., Supriatna, Krisna, A. (Eds). (2010). Pemilu 2009 dalam Angka (p. 30),
retrieved from http://www.kpu.go.id/dmdocuments/angka_26_30.pdf
18
Compared to its drop in the 2009 legislative election as against the 2004 election, Golkar experienced a
more drastic plunge in the 1999 election (22.44 per cent) from 74.51 per cent in the 1997 election, as people
perceived the party as the representation of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, especially in the beginning of the
Reform era (see chapter five).
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New (nationalist) parties, such as Gerindra and Hanura, emerged as the result of Golkar’s internal
friction (see chapters five and seven). They gained a mere 26 seats and 18 seats of the House of
Representatives at the national level in this election out of the total of 560 seats (see chapter five).
Candidates’ Billboards as Mobile Market Commodities
The downward trend in the parties’ votes previously mentioned did not run parallel with the
freedom the candidates received after the Constitutional Court decree liberated them from the
constraint that the candidates were not allowed to make individual promotions, let alone campaign.
This political constraint arguably restrained the candidates from articulating their platforms in
conjunction with the parties’ vision and mission. The phenomenon of the candidates’ billboards
mushrooming, as earlier mentioned, arguably marked this freedom as well as the candidates’
inadequate capabilities in expressing their platforms. This can be seen, for instance, from the way
the candidates present themselves on the billboards which are dominated by their close-up pictures
without sufficient visual/written expressions that illuminate their platforms (see chapters nine and
ten).
In order to conceal this insufficiency, the candidates used the parties’ key figures not merely to
support their image, but more importantly also to reinforce their position as nationalist and/or
Islamic candidates. In this sense, the candidates’ reliance on these figures indirectly perpetuate the
(Javanese) paternalistic hierarchical pattern of gusti and kawula. However, such reliance cannot be
seen as solely connoting the candidates’ passivity and/or submission to the parties’ key figures as
their appearance on the candidates’ billboards reflexively produce mutual benefit for both the
candidates and the key figures’ branding. In this light, symbolic mutual exchange operates.
However, this does not mean that all candidates deploy the key figures’ images on their billboards.
The absence of these figures on their billboards cannot be seen as a complete negation of the
candidates’ reliance as the key figures are perceived as the embodiment of the parties’ ideology (see
chapters seven and eight). Although this status arguably positions the key figures at the center, their
existence on the candidates’ billboards does not constitute a fundamental element for as long as the
candidates’ billboards are in accordance with the party’s ideology, the absence of these central
figures is permissible. In this sense, the candidates’ subservient position to the party’s ideology holds
sway on defining the position the candidates take. This taken position derives not necessarily from
the ossification of the party’s ideology as Pancasila, the ideology most parties adhere (especially the
nationalist ones), allows the candidates present themselves as nationalist and/or Islamic figures. This
position-taking process reflects the candidates’ political dispositions (as represented on the
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billboards) towards the contestation and synthesis of Nationalist/Islamic strands in the political
realm. In other words, these billboards narrate how the candidates position themselves in the
factional polarisation, which is possibly different from the ideological position the parties take in the
polarisation within Pancasila discourse.
The above notions in their entirety constitute the items that are transacted on the billboards. This
transaction implies the process of reifying the candidates’ platforms (which represent their
dispositions) and transforms them into commodities the candidates sell via the billboards (see
chapters seven and eight). In this sense, the billboards embody the art of constructing and selling
the candidates’ images. This research focuses on the construction phase of the candidates’ images
as the mushrooming of the candidates’ billboards in the 2009 legislative connotes a new billboard
culture.
This new culture implies the art of marketing the candidates’ image through billboards as outdoor
advertising mediums. Gudis (2004) argues that the challenge in the billboard marketing art lies in
how the billboards are able to capture the spectators’ attention during their rapid mobility. She
asserts that the logic of the candidates’ billboards operates like the mechanism of a mobile market
or the “buyway”. Not only does the billboard trespass the political boundaries of provinces,
municipalities and villages, but it also allows the spectators to conduct “self-analyses” towards socalled “street-level museum art paintings” (Gudis, 2004, pp. 50-58). However, due to the rapid
mobility of the spectators in the public space, the billboards merely hold a temporary psychological
status in the spectators’ minds that distract their attention. Furthermore, as a self-content narrative,
the candidates’ billboards visually communicate the messages quickly and silently. Their ubiquity,
especially beside the roads during election time, becomes a marker of habituation as people pass
the billboards at all times. This (un)consciously forges a certain impression on the spectators which,
according to Harrington (as cited by Gudis, 2004, p. 70), does not require any “intellectual
attention”. At the same time, this also reinforces the argument that Indonesian politics is more
symbolic in nature than substantive (Platzdasch, 2009a).
In alignment with Gudis, Cronin (2008, p. 110) argues that the spectators’ rapid mobility impedes the
spectators from seeing this symbolic representation on the candidates’ billboards in a semiotic
coherence. In order to prolong the spectators’ attention span, Cronin (2008, p. 103) suggests that
the billboards contain “contrasting colour schemes, noticeable ad colours, fewer rather than more
words, clear, concise branding and a simple proposition”. With these qualities, the spectators are
expected to view the billboards for longer. However, this longer glimpse does not guarantee a
complete transference of the intended message to spectators. Rapid mobility impedes such
18

transference. Thus, placing the ads in many different places and putting them in various modes
becomes the best possible ways to attract spectators’ attention.19
The billboards gained enormous public attention in the 2009 legislative elections as the result of the
aforementioned amendment of the election law which arguably put the candidates into a state of
political exaltation (if not euphoria). This can be seen from the ubiquity of the candidates’ billboards
in the 2009 elections and the clamorous, excited public response towards the billboards’
mushrooming all over the streets in Indonesia. This ubiquity seems to refute the common marketing
practitioners’ proposition that the billboards’ (specific) locations determine the market
segmentation and becomes the core factor for capturing potential voters (Cronin, 2008, pp. 99-101).
The candidates did not seem to consider these aspects as their billboards were scattered along the
streets (see the image below).

Source: author’s collection

They did not take into account that strategic locations contribute to determining the level of their
electability. They seemed to be trapped in a simplistic premise: the more you put your ads (the
billboards on the streets), the more likely the spectators are to be exposed to your image. This
disorderly visibility possibly produced a rebound effect on the candidates.

19

In this sense, television becomes the most likely preferable mode of advertisement. However, this medium
has its own lack, especially in regard to the way the candidates advertise themselves (read: their image) on
television through the use of various entertainment programs, such as a singing-contest-like program.
Heryanto (2010) found that when politics enters the domestic sphere in the form of television programs
similar to ‘Indonesian Idol’, the process of “domesticating” politics implicates it in the domestication of the
spectators themselves. The spectators are not aware that sending their opinions as an active response
regarding the political issues on television potentially “domesticates” their own participation. Billboard as an
outdoor advertising medium arguably liberates the spectators from this constraint.
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Candidates’ Billboards as Cultural/Visual Artefacts
The above subheading indicates that reading the candidate’s billboard not only can be seen from the
viewpoint of cultural theory in which many consider the visual artefact is embedded and conceived
as the same as the cultural text, but also from the lens of visual culture (Evans and Hall, 1999, p. 2).
However, seeing from the perspective of putting the candidate’s billboard as the centre or the point
of departure in order to study the political realm in Indonesia, especially during the recent election,
cannot be seen merely as transposing the theme of the analysis (from analysing the legislative
candidates’ billboards to the analysis of the legislative candidates’ billboards as the visual artefacts
which represent Indonesia’s political realm). This, at the same time, saliently affirms the significance
of the candidate’s billboard as a visual artefact to refer to the discursive practices in the political
world during the election. Therefore, the billboard is located within visual culture and vice versa.
They are stitched together with the political antinomies of Islamic/ Nationalist and Javanese/non
Javanese as a political advertisement.
Reading the candidate’s billboard entails reading the narrative of its visuality. It is about an
arrangement of signs as a “unit/narrative” to codify the knowledge of sight to power (Barthes, 1977;
Foucault, 1999, pp. 61-71) through a semiotic reading practice which results from the relation
between the candidates’ dispositions and position in a field within the 2009 assembly election as
the political arena. Barthes (1980, pp. 91-93) implicitly recognised that the practices of looking
represent the act of seeing the candidates’ dispositions, especially at the moment of transmitting
the social meaning through the candidate’s photograph on the billboard. It is transmitted through
deep motives, the style of life – the ideology – as reflected on the billboards. The mechanism of
reflection does not act mimetically. Through the system of signs we can decipher how the candidate
constructs her/his disposition as the embodiment of her/his desire, consciousness, perception,
thought and action, not to sell the political programs via the billboard, but more to influence the
voters’ disposition in perceiving her/his persona as something the voters are familiar with, such as
seeing the same likeness of herself/himself on the billboard. This is aligned with the Althusserian
notion of “interpellation” or “hailing”. How does this occur? Barthes continues that the photograph
is the ellipse of language, a condensation of the social whole, for it suggests not merely physical
fetishism, a way of dressing, a set of daily choices, a posture, the social setting but more saliently the
glorification of the photogenic20 which is capable of inviting the voters’ disposition to perceive the
candidate’s veritable physical transference as the act of delegating himself to plausibly reflect
voters’ aspirations.
20

The photogenic quality, according to Guy Cook (1992), can be seen from the visual text, such as the facial
expression, gesture, facial type, ways of dressing, which he calls paralanguage.
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Candidates’ Billboards as the Representation of the Political Branding
As political commodities, as well as cultural/visual artefacts, the candidates’ billboards also
represent the political branding of the candidates, of the parties’ key figures and most likely of the
parties themselves. The candidates’ and key figures’ images are sold as intangible, symbolic political
products, which according to O’Shaughnessy (2001, p. 1048), are value-heavy. Holts (2004, p. 3), on
the contrary, perceives them as empty markers that need to be filled with meanings. These two
discrepant views cannot be seen as contradicting each other. Holt arguably perceives the product
from a denotative level which makes the product appear as a signifier in the first level of signification
(denotation). O’Shaughnessy, on the other hand, transcends this step and directly perceives the
marker loaded with values. However, these perspectives go in the same direction. They both agree
that the product’s values play a significant role in transforming a product into a brand. The values
are not merely confined to the Marxist notions of exchange or added values, but also refer to the
quality of self-expression (or “identity value” in Holt’s term (2004, pp. 3-4)) derived from the process
of branding. The process starts by filling the product’s logo, symbol, and design with meanings. They
are filled with what Lee-Marshment (2009, pp. 111-112) calls “impressions, images, attitudes and
recognition”. The impressions, images, attitudes and recognition are constructed in the form of
narratives/stories on the billboards. And the stories narrate these through plots, characters and
settings on the billboards. These all form an identity myth.
Holt (2004, p. 9) asserts that in order to gain visual credibility, the identity myth constructed by
candidates’ billboards should be set in a populist world which illustrates the lives of real people who
share the same ideological belief (Pancasila). Many billboards, especially from the same faction,
however, adopt similar forms, patterns and content in the narratives. The candidates’ images
function as a differentiation factor in the stories which are heavily influenced by the parties’
ideologies. The process does not end in image construction. It reflects, as O’Shaughnessy (2001, p.
1048) further argues, the candidates’ dispositions which reflect their consciousness, desires, and
style of life. This identity construction contains in itself an ideological disposition that connects the
parties and the candidates with the voters.
This connection is established by the presence of the parties’ key figures as the presence of these
figures in paternalistic culture, not only supports the candidates’ image construction, but also
arguably signifies the candidates’ subservient position (as previously mentioned). These figures are
often perceived as the role models that represent the parties’/factions’ ideologies. However, the
presence of these central figures can be read as twofold. Firstly, the key figures’ presence is
designed to reinforce the image construction of the candidates because juxtaposing the key figures’
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images with the candidate’s image implies a symbolic exchange between the key figures’ identity
values, the vessel of self-expression, to borrow Holts’ term (2004, p.3), and the candidate’s values.
The juxtaposition enables correlating the key figures’ identity values with the candidates and
projects them on the billboards. This affirms a contingent status between the candidates and the key
figures. In a Bourdieuan lens, this contingency signifies a submissive code that reflects the
candidate’s disposition as they visually engage in the dominant ideological framework of the party as
represented on the billboard. Bourdieu (1991) argues that symbolic power operates due to one’s
acknowledgement and willingness to be involved and controlled in a dominant discourse. In this
sense, the candidates’ act of juxtaposing his/her image with the key figure’s image affirms the code
because they are willing to be controlled by the party’s ideology. This engaging process does not
follow a linear pattern for it works in the political arena where the rules of the game delineate the
process of position-taking and the position taken by the candidates (see chapters nine and ten). The
Bourdieuan principles (habitus/dispositions, capital and field) become the basis for this political
branding. Habitus constitutes a subjective structure that represents the candidates’ socio-historical
dispositions. Bourdieu (1977) asserts that habitus bridges the “objective” structure of the parties
and the subjective structure of the candidates’ actions and thoughts. This produces the candidates’
sense of self or subjectivity by correlating their images with the constructed images of the party’s
key figures. This also reflects the candidates’ understanding of their positions in the dominant
discourse. The key figures’ images are deployed as the visual capital that represents the candidate’s
disposition in the field of power (the political arena).
Secondly, another way of regarding the presence of the key figures on the billboard is to see it as the
candidates’ participation in symbolically underpinning the constructed image of the key figures. For
instance, the deployment of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s image (SBY), the key figure of PD and
Indonesia’s current President, on one of the candidate’s billboards from PD, can be conceived as the
candidate’s invitation to voters that by choosing him/her in the 2009 Elections they indirectly
support SBY. If the candidate succeeds in winning the ticket to the parliament, s/he will, without
exception, support SBY’s administration. The act signifies a symbolic exchange in that the candidate
is no longer trapped in a passive situation by relying heavily on SBY. SBY also needs his/her support
which makes his/her image significant to the PD’s (and SBY’s) success. On the other hand, the
candidate’s contingent success is heavily relied upon irrespective of how “skilful” the candidate is in
deploying SBY’s public persona as visual capital. However, this skilfulness does not guarantee the
success of the candidate because many factors need to be taken into account. The significant part of
analysing this political branding vis-a-vis the degree to which the candidates’ billboards represent
their political disposition is the mechanism of representation itself. The representation cannot be
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detached from the parties’ (and also the candidates’) slogans and the key figures’ images as they all
direct the narrative structure of the billboards.
Previous Related Research
Previous research specifically investigating the political branding of the nationalist parties (PD,
Golkar, PDI-P, Gerindra and Hanura) and the Islamic parties (PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB) via billboards is
scarce. A few examples can be found, such as Signifikansi Iklan Politik dalam Pemilu 2004: Analisis
Semiotika Iklan PDI Perjuangan Dalam Kampanye Pemilu 2004 (The Significance of Political
Advertisement in 2004 General Election: a Semiotic Analysis of PDI-P Political Campaign), by M. Edy
Susilo and Prayudi (2004, pp. 250-263), which offered a semiotic reading of PDI-P’s political branding
in the newspapers during the 2004 general election. They found that the ads did not offer sufficient
understanding for the voters to choose PDI-P. They merely sold Megawati’s (PDI-P’s key figure)
image as the woman who was believed to be inheriting her father’s (Soekarno) charisma. Van
Wichelen (2006) conducts a more in-depth investigation into Megawati’s image21 and finds that this
former President’s image was located in the intersection of nationalist, Islamic, and feminist
discourse. In the beginning of the Reform era, people perceived Megawati as the symbol of their
resistance against Soeharto’s regime. This made her become “the mother of nation”. In van
Wichelen’s view (2006, p. 53), this status de-sexualised her. However, when she was to replace
President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001, Indonesian Islamic conservatives challenged her nationalist
(secular) image by putting her in the debatable perspective of Islamic discourse that a female
Muslim cannot be the nation’s leader. Van Wichelen further views this challenge as the
representation of the Islamic conservatives’ attempt to emasculate Megawati’s image as a female
(Muslim) leader. She then appeared wearing kerudung, a loose headscarf22, to reinforce her religious
disposition.
Ajidarma (2009), on the other hand, offers an in-depth semiotic reading of the candidate’s billboards
in the 2009 legislative election and finds that they are merely about the morphology of structure
which represents the socio/linguistic erosion of what is untold in the social world (in order to
achieve the socio-moral status that co-exists in the political arena). As Ajidarma concentrates on
seeing the candidates’ billboards as a new phenomenon detached from the ideological polarisations
in Indonesia, he does not see that the socio-linguistic erosion represents the emasculation of the
polarisations. My research will explore this aspect.

21
22

not mainly through advertisement mediums
See chapter ten for the discussion about kerudung.
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While Ajidarma portrays the candidates’ billboards as a new phenomenon, Nugroho (2009) offers a
closer examination of SBY from the perspective of the fan and popular culture. He investigates SBY’s
corporeal/political body and finds that fans perpetually glorify SBY as the paternalistic figure who
represents the fusion of codes: power (military with civility); intellectuality (he earned a doctoral
degree); beauty (good-looking); and manner. In alignment with Nugroho, Haris (2008) suggests that
SBY’s politics of image entraps him (and his government) into ceaselessly constructing other images
in order to perpetuate his popularity.
Whilst the researchers mentioned above engage in exploring the politics of the parties’ central
figures’ image construction and mapping of Indonesian politics, Dienaputra (2010, 2011) offers an
investigation regarding the parties’ logos. He found that the dynamic of the visual transformation of
the parties’ logos to represent their political identities in General Elections from 1955 to 2004 was
due to the political constraints and amendment of government policies in accordance with sociopolitical changes. What Dienaputra has overlooked is the coding aspect of the logo. He does not
show explicitly how the similar Nationalist/Islamic codes contest and synthesise within themselves
and against one another. He also fails to consider how the symbols in Pancasila are reflected to
delineate the party’s ambiguous position. In order to fill this gap, this research will also explore how
the contestation and synthesis of the Nationalist/Islamic codes in the logo illuminate the ambiguity,
and possibly the covert Javanese domination.
Thus, the candidates’ billboards played a significant role for the candidates to promote themselves
during the 2009 legislative election. However, they are not aware that the strategic locations
determined their success in capturing voters as these locations indirectly defined the segmentation
of the voters. Seeing these billboards as street-level-art paintings, as Gudis (2004) argues, as
cultural/visual artefacts and commodities brings us to the reading of the billboards’ visuality in
Pancasila discourse which glorifies the (Javanese) paternalistic system. The next chapter will discuss
the research methodology.
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Chapter Three
Methodology
For the research for this thesis, I conducted a nested case study in two stages. The first stage
explored the historical background of the polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/nonJavanese strands as they significantly influence the candidates’ political dispositions. This
background will provide a descriptive analytical account that illuminates the ideological ambiguity in
the candidates’ image construction as the result of the historical contestation and synthesis of these
strands. The second stage will analyse what is represented on the billboard deploying social
semiotics in order to assess how far the billboard can express the candidate’s political dispositions
and contrast them with the political dispositions of the candidates in socio-political discursive
practices. The techniques of data collection and data analysis will be based on these two stages.
The examination of the first stage of the data analysis is primarily viewed with a Bourdieuan lens.
Bourdieu’s concepts of capital, (political) arena, dispositions (habitus) are deployed in order to
analyse the intricate relation of how the candidates’ dispositions are heavily influenced by the
Pancasila-based political framework which defines the Indonesian political arena. These dispositions
are seen as the product of chain reactions of the past (political) conditions vis-a-vis the candidates’
(current) position in the field (capital)23 within the state of play of the political arena. For instance,
examining the candidate from PDI-P requires us to check the historical political orientation of this
party as this element becomes the core point in PDI-P’s branding. This means we need to trace the
signifying practices of how the Islamic/Nationalist strands emerge, circulate, synthesise, contest and
proliferate as the construction of the party’s image shows that these strands no longer overtly
polarise. They synthesise and contest in the framework of Pancasila discourse. This makes the
candidate ostensibly free in expressing their ideological orientation. Thus, the way the candidates
express themselves on their billboards reflects their political dispositions. This leads us to the
reading of how these billboards’ narratives represent the candidates’ dispositions at the second
stage.
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Bourdieau (2006, pp. 105-106) defines the meaning of capital not solely referring to the economic exchange
that leads to the “maximation of the profit”. He relocates this conventional economic meaning by arguing that
the term of capital can also be perceived symbolically. This relocation does not produce variants of meaning
deducted from economic capital but rather “tran-substantiated forms”. This means that the economic capital
is seen not as fundamental value that conventionally perceives as defining the relationship between the
“bourgeoisie” and the subordinates. This relationship involves divergent dispositions and roles (of the
candidates) which are realised through the operation of other capital, i.e. the social capital (such as social
network), the cultural capital (such as language) and symbolic capital (such as prestige, acknowledgement,
recognition).
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Reading the billboard’s visuality at the second stage requires some further procedures. The focus will
be on the formation, relevance and function of the image in the discursive, political practice of the
billboard, as Barthes (1980) suggested. Jenks (1995, pp. 9-13) contends that the selection,
abstraction and transformation processes are the stages to dismantle visual practices, though the
risk in doing so will possibly result in the partial envisioning of the billboard. Notwithstanding the
risk, this procedure is needed to focus the analysis of the billboard on the particularly significant
elements. The selection involves the process of choosing, sorting and classifying by concentrating on
the particular aspects of the phenomena of the candidates’ billboards. The abstraction entails
extracting the essences that imply a removal of an element from one level to another, such as the
system of the image representation of the billboard in which it cannot dissociate itself from its
context. Due to the rhetorical qualities of an image in the system of representation, the image
transforms itself as a re-ordering of the vision into an interpretation.
Schirato and Webb (2004, pp. 21-24) developed narrative procedures as a more detailed technique
of reading in several stages: selection, omission, frame; signification and evaluation; arrangement;
differentiation and connection; focus and context. It begins with the selection of the raw material of
the candidate’s billboard (the object, angle, property, setting) whilst focusing on the chosen focal
part. When focusing, the omission process starts by disregarding the insignificant components. The
spectators will see this process within the frame of a narrative arrangement. At this stage the
evaluation process begins along with the process of signification. Barthes’s semiotic operates here.
As a unit of sign, a billboard comprises a plethora of signs, which is bound up with a relational and
contingent status. There is no arbitrariness since the sign is defined within cultures. However, since
the sign is characterised by the concept of difference and connection, the system of distinguishing
one entity from another, according to Schirato and Webb (2004), lies in the psychological level which
reflects spectators’ dispositions. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein, Schirato and Webb develop
this concept by focusing on its quality to distinguish one entity by differing it from its anomaly even
though the two entities are connected with, or belong to, the same family resemblance. In the
denotative level, due to the sum of denoted signs (diegesis) the spectators can choose and direct
her/his attention to focus on the particular aspects within the candidate’s billboard as the context
for the second level of reading, the connotative. Barthes (1977, pp. 46-51) called the latter level ‘the
rhetoric of the image’ in which myth is produced and consumed as the ideology. Schirato and
Webb’s technique stops at this stage.
The system of difference and connection in the process of signification which shows a systematic
choice and pattern indicates the mode of power production. The first through to the final stage of
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the procedure attests that the choice, sorting, classification, signification, evaluation, and
arrangement reflect how power upon sight operates. They are all selected, chosen, evaluated and
arranged in the manner in which visual capital operates in relation to power so that the symbolic
capital, prestige and recognition, can be achieved. However, since the focus of my research is on the
textual level, the mode of power production will be investigated based on how the procedure
operates within the framework of the polarisations. This leads to an argument that the borderlines
of the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands on the billboard are almost
imperceptible as these are woven so tightly together (see Parts II, III, and IV).
To investigate the function of the visual text, we need to identify the genre of the candidate’s
billboard as visual as well as written texts. Gripsrud (2002, p. 115) asserts that the genre of the
billboard contains a relative stable pattern of codes that regulate the group of signs within the
billboard. In alignment with Gripsrud, Schirato and Webb (2004, p. 91) add that this stable pattern
closely relates to the notion of intertextuality for they both secure the meaning of the text by the
ways in which genre corresponds intertextually with the familiar text we are already conversant
with.
Bernstein (as cited by Martin and Rose, 2008, pp. 18-19) develops the idea that by examining the
genre of the billboard, the ideological construction that “regulates, conditions our access to power
and control, and shapes our coding orientation” can also be revealed. They all configure in the forms
of register variables of tenor, field and mode (Halliday, 2004). These variables are constituted in the
genre and used to dismantle the myth. For instance, the billboard as a genre depicts the nature of
participants (tenor) in the social action taking place (field) and employs the symbolic organisation of
the text or the part the language is playing (mode). The participants (tenor) define the division of
labour in society which constructs the hierarchies of power, control, status, authority, and
prominence evolving in the social actions (field) as can be overtly seen in the part of language
(mode) involved in the text. The analysis of the social function or purpose of the billboard, its generic
structure24 and the lexico-grammatical features circulated in the durable set of social relations will
reveal how the billboard genre expresses the candidate’s dispositions.
In order to reveal the mechanism of how this genre analysis helps to reveal the candidates’
dispositions represented on the billboards, we need social semiotics (Hodge and Kress, 1988), or in
O’Toole’s (2011) Hallidayean terms “systemic-functional semiotics”, as the theoretical framework in
order to investigate the level of coherence and cohesion in the interplay of the visual and written
24

Schirato and Webb (2004, pp. 81-90) argue that the visual narrative follows the literary formula of narration:
plot, character, point of view, events, time and place.
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texts of the billboards. The coherence and cohesion of these two texts will demonstrate the textual
consistency of the candidates’ claimed positions and dispositions as Nationalist and/or Islamic
figures (see chapters nine and ten).
In order to conduct this investigation, we need to put our perspective into a proposition that the
grammar of the visual text reveals similar aspects as the written one (Hodge and Kress, 1988; Kress
and van Leeuwen, 1990, 2006; O’ Toole, 2011). The similarity is due, as Hodge and Kress (1988, p. 4)
argue, to the fact that they both are bound with the same logonomic system, i.e. the “set of rules
that prescribe the conditions for production and reception of meanings which specify who can claim
to initiate (produce, communicate) or know (receive and understand) meanings about what topics
under what circumstances and with what modalities (how, when, why)”. In other words, the
grammar of the visual and written texts express a similar system of meanings as they both refer to
the same textual entity (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 19), i.e. the candidates’ billboards. Based
on Hallidayean linguistic metafunctions25, Kress and van Leeuwen (1990, 2006) and O’Toole (2011)
posit that the visual and written texts share the same metafunctions, i.e. the ideational function
(what is being depicted or written about on the billboards), interpersonal function (ways in which
the billboards are engaged with the spectators) and textual function (ways in which the billboards
are composed). Thus, in reading the visual text of the candidate’s billboard we need to specify the
actions and portrayals of the represented participants involved on the billboard26 (representational
function), the gaze, perspective, angle (interpersonal function) and the frame, scale, colour of the
billboard (textual function). As for the written text, the candidates mostly used this text to illuminate
their slogans, platforms, names and nominations as candidates to become national or regional
parliamentary members (see chapters nine and ten).
Research Subjects
Two examples each of male and female candidates are taken from the nine winning parties. The
research will use these eighteen examples of the candidate’s billboards from the nine parties that
met the parliamentary threshold (2.5 per cent). This is due to the similar patterns in which the
candidates present themselves on the billboards. However, since 35.25 per cent of legislative
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Halliday (2004, pp. 29-30) argues that language construes meaning in three metafunctions, namely
ideational, interpersonal and textual functions. The ideational function is concerned with how the language
(read: grammar) represents our experiential “goings-on”. The interpersonal function deals with how the
language is used in the interaction (i.e. between interlocutors), whilst the textual function is concerned with
the cohesion and coherence of the text.
26
As my research focuses on the textual analysis of the billboards, the active participants, such as the
interaction between the sender/the addresser of the billboard (the candidates) with the addressees (the
spectators) will not be taken into account.
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candidates from all parties (44 parties)27 were female and only 17.49 per cent of them became
legislative members in the parliament (compared to 82.51 per cent of the male legislative
members)28 from the nine parties, it leads to the conclusion that the number of female candidate’s
billboards is less than the males. This results in the ratio (1: 4.7) between the female and male
legislative members. Therefore four examples of female legislative candidates from the total of
eighteen samples are considered representational.
Notwithstanding the similarities they possess, the differences between them show not merely the
individual style but also the candidates’ dispositions. In order to decipher how the candidates’
billboards represent their dispositions, several procedural steps need to be taken starting from the
phase of data collection to the phase of data analysis.
Techniques of Data Collection
In the first stage, the data pertaining to the 2009 legislative election, including the candidates’ and
their parties profiles, was collected from reliable sources, such as books, journal articles,
monographs, theses and mass media reports (national/local newspapers, magazines, political
parties’ official websites, national election commission websites and official websites of the House of
Representatives). Interviews with the candidates regarding their political dispositions in relation to
their billboard advertisement was considered unnecessary as the research focuses on investigating
the candidates’ political dispositions as represented on the billboards.
In the second stage, I identified the elements on each billboard to collect the data. This was
conducted in order to identify the similarities and differences between all the elements in the
eighteen billboards based on the visual and written texts. As a result, a picture of the billboard’s
variables which indicate the genre was obtained.
The visual elements’ identification started by tracing all the visual signs: the background colour, the
picture(s) of the candidate, the use of the party’s key figure(s), the use of other figures to support
the candidate’s image, the use of setting and props, the party’s logo, the background picture, the
candidate and the party’s number. It is mainly viewed horizontally from the left to the right of the
billboard. This mechanism was designed to determine the visual similarities and differences between
each billboard vis-a-vis the billboard’s genre.
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See Gianie. (2009). Tidak Ada Alasan Meragukan Caleg Perempuan. Retrieved from
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Media Center KPU. (2009). Retrieved from
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As for the written text, I identified the linguistic elements that denote the register variables of the
genre: tenor, field and mode. These variables later define the characteristics of the billboard’s genre
based on the social function or the purpose of the billboard, the generic or the schematic structure
and the dominant lexico-grammatical features of the billboard.
Techniques of Data Analysis
The data of the first stage was analysed by examining how the candidates took certain political
positions in the social and political discursive practices and was contrasted with the position taken as
represented on the billboards. Prior to this, tracing how the Islamic/Nationalist strands contest and
synthesise in the Indonesian political realm was conducted. In a macro lens, this historical
background contributes to defining the Indonesian political framework which leads to the
construction of the political dispositions circulating in the Indonesian political arena. These
dispositions were examined by seeing their representation through the parties’ branding. The
branding of the parties’ key figures was analysed in conjunction with the parties’ branding.
Paternalistic culture in Indonesia also significantly contributes to constructing this branding. The
examination of this branding was conducted by investigating the parties’ statutes as the point of
departure. These statutes reflect not only the parties’ vision and mission but also the parties’
dispositions which influence the candidates’ position-taking process. In a Bourdieuan lens, this
process represents not only the candidates’ dispositions but also the symbolic exchange of various
capitals in the Indonesian political arena. This exchange arguably defines the candidates’
dispositions.
In the second stage, based on the elements of the billboard genre (both visual and written texts), the
analysis started by examining the grammar of the visual and written texts. As they both arguably
share similar pattern of metafunctions, i.e. interpersonal, ideational and textual, the analysis firstly
classified the elements of the visual and written texts based on these three metafunctions. Based on
these, we needed to draw imaginary lines (mainly horizontal and vertical) on the billboards’ frames
to examine the interplay of the visual and linguistic elements. Based on these lines, the examination
started by concentrating our vision on the way in which the represented participants (mainly the
candidates and the key figures) gaze on the spectators. Their gaze, facial expressions and the light
define the level of interpersonal intimacy (function) the candidates build via their billboards. The
reading pattern then starts from left to the right. The symmetrical arrangement of the billboards
helps us to decipher the ideational function, i.e. the narrative themes. In examining these, we need
to check the gestures of the candidates (and the key figures) and re-examine their facial expressions
as these elements demonstrate their visual actions in conveying the written slogan. Besides these
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elements, the candidates’ attire, the setting of place, the party’s logo and other props also represent
the candidates’ dispositions and positions. They help to build the story lines the candidates use in
promoting themselves by disseminating their platforms on the billboards. The colours and space
proximity define the billboard’s textual function.
This reading practice continues with reading the vertical pattern of the texts. This is conducted as
the candidates mostly deploy this pattern in expressing their written slogans and platforms. The
written texts were scrutinized by focusing on the identified elements of register in the genre. How
are the dominant parts of the language played (mode) in constructing the tenor and field of the
billboard29? How can these critically show the nature of the participants (tenor) in the social action
(field) they are engaged in? In analysing the nature of tenor, the focus was on the status and the role
of the relationship every participant engaged in the billboard and what visual and written codes the
visual and linguistic capital represented in their correlation with the nature of their social action.
These determined the characteristics of the billboard genre: the social function, the generic
structure and the dominant lexico-grammatical features.
At this stage the intersection of the horizontal and vertical readings demonstrated the level of
synchronisation between what was represented on the visual actions with the written expressions.
Not only did this practice demonstrate the level of contradiction, as well as synchronicity, but this
also reinforced the scope the candidates’ billboards gave to express their dispositions.
These metafunctional readings were conducted based on the denotative and connotative levels.
The analysis of these two orders cannot be segregated for their interaction and cannot be detached
from one another due to the chain relation they have, such as the visual and the written texts of the
billboard. The strategies in deciphering signs (postulated by Schirato and Webb, 2004) was deployed
and developed in scrutinizing the image construction and the myth in the billboard at both levels.
For the first level of signification, I read the visual signs syntagmatically and paradigmatically to
check whether commuting the arrangement of sign in a sequence (syntagmatically) will alter the
image construction on the billboard or substituting the sign with another sign within its family
resemblance (paradigmatically) also produces an alteration. The syntagmatic test created the
shifting priority of the sign the candidate employed in order to construct her/his own identity in the
billboard.
As for the paradigmatic reading, it involved substituting the sign on the billboard. For instance, If I
were to substitute the key political figure (SBY) on one of the candidate’s billboard from PD with
29

The tenor and the setting of place are represented on the visual text.
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Megawati and juxtapose his image with Megawati, it would not produce an alteration in the image
construction, because substituting the image of SBY with Megawati or juxtaposing the candidate’s
image with Megawati merely effaces the characteristic transference the candidate tries to correlate
with SBY (well-mannered, diplomatic, and calm). This paradigmatic relation reinforces that SBY is
significant in the candidate’s billboard sign system. The analysis of juxtaposition cannot be
undertaken at the literal, or denotative, level. The comparison operates at the connotative plane for
the juxtaposition espouses the meaning transference as the candidate’s image correlates with SBY’s.
Thus, after revealing the myth in the connotative level, a question of why similar elements in the
genre produce different images arises. What causes the difference? What effects can be produced?
The interweaving of signs in the paradigmatic axis helped to explain it. The next questions will be
about the point of intersection of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations of the sign system on
the billboard and the results produced in the intersection. This was conducted by tracing the chain
relation of signs that correspond with one another in order to check whether intersecting the
borderlines of the dichotomies (Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese) affirm the
segregation or obscures them.
The interaction with other dispositions (read: on other billboards) also determined the inclination
towards using the billboard genre as the preferred propaganda medium in the 2009 legislative
election. Do all the billboards have the same quality in conveying the candidates’ dispositions? What
is the visual and linguistic capital that influences not only the candidate’s disposition as expressed on
one billboard but also the interaction with other billboards in the textual social field? Do the
candidates’ billboards of the same party show the same inclination to propagate the party’s
ideology? How do all candidates’ billboards interact textually in order to convey a similar message?
Does the interaction produce frictions or obscure the borderlines in the polarisations of
Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands? Do they really represent the political
dispositions or simply introduce the candidates to the public? In order to answer the above,
Bourdieu’s (1990a, 1990b) notion of capital will help to measure how far the linguistic and visual
capital represents the candidates’ dispositions in its field of interaction.
The above mechanism determined how the billboard’s genre represents the religious as well as
ethnic identity based on existing polarisations. Arguably at the same time it affirmed the obscurity of
the tenuous border in the polarisations of Nationalist/Islamic and Javanese/non-Javanese strands.
Thus, after classifying the candidates’ billboards based on the party, the ideological classification of
the billboards based on nationalist/Islamic antinomies was addressed. The ethnicity elements can be
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seen from the use of local language or other local attributes, such as the visual codes or linguistic
elements.
The following diagram sums up the analysis procedures of the second stage:
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PART II
Indonesian Political Arena: Contesting and/or Synthesising Islamic/Nationalist
and Javanese/non Javanese Strands?

Introduction
Analysing the candidates’ billboards in the 2009 legislative election in Indonesia means investigating
not only what’s inside the billboard, but also tracing what lies behind it. As mentioned in part one,
these billboards represent the historical polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non
Javanese strands in the political discursive practices, especially during the elections. The national
elections represent a battle field for the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese strands in
the Indonesian political arena. The election does not merely show the political practices that
espouse the relation between divergent dispositions and the role in the game, within the election
itself, but also subtly shows the mechanism of symbolic exchange within the political camps or
against one another. It means that investigating one single moment in the election, i.e. reading the
visualisation of the candidate’s billboard advertising, demands examining the interaction between
the stakeholder’s dispositions and the capital involved within the election. However, since I limit my
research by focusing on reading what lies behind the representation and symbolic politics of the
candidates’ billboards, a closer investigation into how the political parties position themselves in the
Indonesian political framework is needed. This investigation illuminates the background of the
polarisations of the political camps in relation to the ideological debates that leads to the positioning
of the parties and the candidates as represented on the billboards. For instance, the party’s logo on
the billboards can be seen as the visual medium which represents the ideological debates in
Indonesia’s political history. Tracing the visual (ideological) transformation of the logo leads to the
positioning process of the party which circumscribes the candidate’s image construction.
As a visual medium which was solely deployed, especially in Soekarno’s era, the logo signifies the
party’s political identity. As mentioned in chapter two, Dienaputra (2010; 2011) found that the visual
transformation of the parties’ logos was heavily influenced by the political constraints and
amendment of government policies. These resulted in a similar pattern of shapes and colours the
parties used in order to denote their political orientation. They adopted and adapted similar shapes
of a star to connote religiosity, a buffalo to Pancasila-based democracy, the colours of yellow for
nationalist prosperity, green for Islamic prosperity, and red for nationalist courage. The proliferation
of these shapes and colours exemplifies the contestation and synthesis of Nationalist/Islamic codes
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in the parties’ logos that illuminate ideological ambiguity in Pancasila, and possibly covert Javanese
domination.
This part discusses Indonesian political history, the ideological debates30, and the visual
representation of the political parties’ logos. It aims to demonstrate that these three strands are
interwoven and cannot be understood separately as the party’s logo visual transformation reflects
the ideological debates in Indonesia’s political history. The transformation also signifies the
contestation and synthesis of the Islamic/Nationalist strands, especially in the national elections.
This investigation becomes a foundation to understand what lies behind the ideological debates as
reflected in the visual transformation of the parties’ logos. A Barthesian lens is deployed to check
the signifying practices of the visual symbols.
This part is organised into two main chapters. The first chapter discusses Indonesia’s political
background based on how the distinctions and polarisations between Islamic/Nationalist and
Javanese/non-Javanese strands develop in the Indonesian political realm. These indirectly influence
the candidate’s political branding. The candidates’ branding cannot be dissociated from their parties’
image that delineates the contestation and synthesis of these ideological cleavages as they live in
the diverse context of Indonesian Islam, a moderately tolerant Islam with the leverage of the local
(Javanese) culture. This religious cultural context constitutes the first section of this chapter as it
functions as the background that illuminates the upheaval of the Islamic and Nationalist parties in
the political sphere. The next chapter outlines how the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/nonJavanese strands synthesise and contest in the first general elections (1955) to the most recent one
(2009). The synthesis and contestation of these strands can be perceived from the visual
transformation of the parties’ logos which will be discussed based on the periodical division of the
general elections. This discussion of the parties’ logos is embedded within the discussion of the
general elections as these two entities are intertwined in portraying the ideological debates of
Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands in the political arena.

30

especially surrounding the state ideology (Pancasila). Pancasila represents the contestation and synthesis of
Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese polarisations. How and why Pancasila represents the ambiguity
can be traced as this part develops.
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Chapter Four
Indonesia’s Political Background: the Upheaval in the Islamic/Nationalist Parties
This chapter aims to demonstrate how the ideological polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and
Javanese/non-Javanese strands synthesise and contest in the Indonesian political sphere. This is
arguably due to the form of Indonesian Islam which is heavily influenced and characterised by
Javanese tolerance and equilibrium (read: harmony). Not only does this inclusive notion open itself
to the synthesis and contestation of these strands, but it also leads to the upheaval of the
Islamic/Nationalist camps in the Indonesian political sphere, especially in the phase before Indonesia
gained its independence and the early phase of the independence. These two phases mark the
emergence of these strands. Thus, this chapter is organised by outlining Indonesian Islam, followed
by the discussion of the upheaval of the Islamic/Nationalist camps. The latter sections are divided
into three sub sections: the birth of the Islamic parties, the birth of the nationalist parties and the
Islamic/Nationalist friction.
Indonesian Islam31
The development of Islam in Indonesia since its emergence has constructed a new form of Islam,
Indonesian Islam. Azra (2010, pp. 83 – 91) asserts that Indonesian Islam indicates the blending of the
local wisdom (as represented in Pancasila32) with the Islamic teachings, which produces a moderate
tolerant Islam in Indonesia. It derives from the concept of ummatan washatan, i.e. the Islamic
society or the ummat functions as the balancing force to bridge the internal conflict between the
two extreme poles within Islam. However, Mulia (2010, pp. 98-99) argues this inclusive notion
merely appears at the (political) elites’ level for in practice (such as the case of Ahmadiyah, a sect
which believes in the existence of the other prophet after the last prophet, Muhammad) Indonesian
people are still not able to segregate religion (Islam) as the ethical basis from the political one,
especially when the case is brought to court. People are still confused when the pluralistic notion
collides with their Islamic belief that Muhammad is the sole last prophet. They need to respect the
different perspective in interpreting Islam, not seeing the issue as a blot on the pluralist principles

31

My focus is not on how Indonesian Islam emerged and developed in accordance with Indonesia’s sociocultural context, but more to investigate the mechanism of how the notion becomes the site of contestation
between Islamic/Nationalist parties interweaved in the political realm which is substantially influenced by the
Javanese culture.
32
Eklof (2003, pp. 26-40) argues that the concept substantially adopts the Islamic notions of Musyawarah
(deliberation) and Mufakat (consensus) as the embodiment of the basic principle in Pancasila, known as family
principle (kekeluargaan), for the people’s collective interest. Such notions represent Indonesian political
culture rooted from the local wisdom (Javanese) as the form of resistance against the Western (Dutch)
democratic model.
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(Indonesian) Islam upholds. Notwithstanding the debate and the confusion, Azra (2010, pp. 89-91)
still believes that the concept can be the archetype that mediates the internal conflict within Islam
(the extremist versus the liberal) and liberates Islam from the stigma of terrorism and radicalism,
especially after the 9/11 incident.
The classic example of the embodiment of Indonesian Islam is the assimilation between Islam with
the local culture, such as in the Javanese tradition, Slametan. Forshee (2006, p. 37) asserts that
Slametan is perceived as a sustainable method in preserving communal harmony while celebrating a
family event. The objective is to seek protection against evil spirits by offering food and reciting AlQur’an, the Islamic Holy Book. In slametan, all members of the community participate and assist
mutually (better known as gotong-royong) to help the host in the phases of preparing the ritual,
during the ritual and after slametan. Each person will feel that they owe something, not necessarily
in terms of money, but to the moral obligation of helping one another in any way. The tradition
indicates the Javanese concept of equilibrium. Presenting two different things at the same time, in
offering food while reading the holy Islamic scripture, can be seen as a Javanese way of life seeking
to maintain the harmony - balancing the yin and yang elements in life. This spirit is the basic
foundation of the Indonesian people and a salient part of the Indonesian Islamic (political) practices
which regard local wisdom highly.
Javanese culture has become deeply rooted in Indonesian political life, especially in the early
twentieth century. Dahm (1969) in his classic book, Soekarno and the Struggle for Indonesian
Independence, argues that in Soekarno’s period Indonesian political history was closely related to
the Javanese utopianist dream of the Javanese Messiah’s (Ratu Adil or the just prince) advent to
liberate the country from colonialism (Dahm called it alien domination). He found that the embryo
of the Islamic/Nationalist parties were in line with the fulfilment of the Jayabaya33 prophecies.
Jayabaya foresaw that Java would meet its ruin (the unjust age) and revive when the Javanese
Messiah34 came to the Island. This cultural feature should be taken into account for historians note
that the emergence of Islamic/Nationalist parties was centred in Java. This made the Javanese
culture a pervasive influence in Indonesia.

Arguably the notions of Islamic/Nationalist then

synthesise and materialise in Indonesian (Javanese-centric) political practices.Islamic. The synthesis
stems from the Javanese belief in the harmonious life all things should have. Eradicating the
33

Jayabaya was the Javanese King of Kediri, a kingdom which was closely related with Majapahit, the largest
and prosperous kingdom in Java. Kediri is located in East Java. Jayabaya ruled Kediri kingdom in 1135-1157.
34
Hisyam, et.al (2004) and Kaligis (2009) noted that the three Indonesian Presidents (Soekarno, Abdurrahman
Wahid, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) claimed to be the descendants of Majapahit kingdom. Kaligis (2009)
argues that the claim signifies their attempt to revive their Javanese romanticism, to seemingly bring back the
prosperity to the Indonesian people, in order to fulfill the Jayabaya prophecies.
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negative is forbidden because it will ruin the equilibrium. In other words, Javanese culture allows the
contestation, the assimilation, and the harmonious equality of the Islamic/Nationalist strands at the
same time. These cultural/political features represent the collective dispositions in the political
arena as the impetus for devising the Indonesian Islam construct. The coalescence of these notions
becomes crucial as their intersection forges an unstable construction.
The birth of Indonesian Islam follows the same path as the history of its emergence in the
archipelago. History records that commerce peacefully brought Islam to Indonesia by Indian, Chinese
and Arab merchants, reaching the coastal regions. It effaced the caste system and peacefully
dispersed in the twelfth and thirteenth century. In the 1920s and 1930s Islam grew primarily heading
in two directions: the traditionalist versus the modernist (Mashad, 2008)35. However, since all of
them represent pious Muslims, Geertz (1960) simplifies them into one category, santri. It is one of
Geertz’s findings in his investigation of what he called the religion of Java. As discussed in chapter
one, he found that Islam in Java constituted polar ideas: the pious Muslim (santri) and the nominal
Muslim, abangan36. Geertz fails to look deeper into what constituted the discrepancy, not between
santri and abangan, but within themselves. As noted in chapter one, the notions of santri/abangan
interweave in their proliferation. They intertwine as Indonesian Islam moved forward in its
development and diversify into ostensibly discrepant directions: the Islamic and nationalist (see
chapter one).
The Upheaval of Islamic/Nationalist Parties in the Political Sphere
The contestation between the Islamic/Nationalist camps does not always reach acquiescence in the
political sphere as they evolve in accordance within the socio-historical/political context in
Indonesia, especially during the elections. The election is the crucial democratic event that is not
merely significant for the circulation of the ascendancy but also for unravelling the identity of its
participants (in this case the political parties and the legislative candidates) from their politics of
image. How the Islamic/Nationalist strands contest and obscure the identity of the participants in
35

The modernist camp desires to purify Islam by returning to the Islamic scriptures and perceives the
traditionalist act of solely adopting the old Islamic tradition needs to be purified. However, a significant shifting
had been made by the traditionalist leader from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Abdurrahman Wahid, in the context of
pluralism, when his government in 1999 liberated the Chinese from their repression by allowing them to
practise their religion and culture publicly. Sonja van Wichelen (in Cara Aitchison, Peter Hopkins and Mei-Po
Kwan (eds.), 2007, pp. 96-97) proposes her five analytical categories of the Indonesian Islamic groups: the
modernist (such as Muhammadiyah), the traditionalist (NU), the Tarbiyah movement (campus-based
movement, such as KAMMI or Indonesian Muslim Student Association Front, PKS or Prosperous Justice Party),
the Mujahidin (the group that wants to fiercely implement the shariah law such as FPI, Laskar Jihad, Majelis
Mujahidin Indonesia, Hizb-al-Tahrir), and the Liberal left (such as Jaringan Islam Liberal or JIL that wants to
counter the radical Islam).
36
and priyayi (see chapter one).
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the elections deserves a close investigation. Prior to that, we need to check how the political parties
were born and how the friction occurred.
The Birth of the Islamic Parties
Prior to the first general elections in 1955, the map of Indonesian politics was marked by the birth of
Islamic parties. It was in 1911 during the Dutch colonial era that the first political (Islamic nationalist)
party/organisation, Syarikat Dagang Islam (SDI) or Islamic Trading Union37, in Indonesia was born. It
later changed its name into Syarikat Islam (SI) or Islamic Union. Raden Umar Said Cokroaminoto, the
most prominent SI’s leader, promulgated the idea of liberating Indonesia from colonisation as the
party’s campaign. Kahin (1997, pp. 23-24) asserts that this revolutionary mission became the shared
purpose that united Indonesian people, especially in Java. Dahm (1969, pp. 15-70) reinforces the
argument when he conjectured that SI’s highest membership (510,788 members) in 1918 was due to
the Javanese’ inadequate knowledge of Islam as they frequently associated themselves with the
word Muslim. Moreover, Indonesian people at that time perceived SI as the symbol of self-reliance,
anti-Westernism and anti-imperialism. Cokroaminoto was also perceived as the representation of
the Javanese Messiah. Dahm (1969) also noted that when socialist ideas penetrated the country, SI’s
leader amended his orientation by transforming the idea of national independence into a socialist
one of effacing the segregation between the rich and the poor.
The actual impetus of the Islamic parties was Majelis Islam ‘Ala Indonesia (MIAI) or Indonesian
Islamic Council, which was born on 21 September 1937. Seven Islamic organisations joined the
council and the number then rose to twenty one in 1941. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and
Muhammadiyah were amongst them. In the Japanese occupation, MIAI was transformed into
Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi) or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims. Almost
all Islamic parties and Islamicorganisations joined MIAI. They were bound with the same ideological
vision to fight against colonialism. The new Masyumi was born when it declared liberation of itself
from the Japanese colonial influence, as the corollary of 7-8 November 1945 Congress. It received
political support from all Islamic organisations in Indonesia and was led by the representatives from
NU (the traditionalist) and Muhammdiyah (the modernist).
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SDI had 50 branches all over Indonesia. It then transformed into a political party named Partai Sarekat Islam
Indonesia (PSII) or Indonesian Islamic Union Party.
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The Birth of Nationalist Parties
The birth of nationalist parties was marked by the establishment of Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)38
or Indonesian Nationalist Party on 4 July 1927 formerly known as Perserikatan National Indonesia or
Indonesian Nationalist Union. This aimed to struggle for Indonesia’s independence by resisting the
Dutch colonial practices with Marhaenism39 as its ideological basis. The self-help and noncooperative ideals adopted from SI was nourished in PNI. The adoption indicated that the
establishment of a nationalist party could not be dissociated from Islamic influence. Soekarno, one
of the party’s founders, learnt this non-cooperative ideal from Cokroaminoto, his former father-inlaw. However, the desire of Javanese culture to seek and maintain harmony through negotiation
made the non-cooperation concept collapse. Cokroaminoto’s negotiation with the Dutch triggered
friction inside the SI which allegedly led to the withdrawal of Semaun, the founder of the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI). Eklof (2003, p. 26) argues that the ideological differences made Indonesian
politics in 1920s fragment into two major political parties: Islamic and Communist40 with the latter
being banned in 1966 due to its rebelliousness. The PKI’s abolition triggered the unification of the
nationalist parties under PNI.
Fearing PNI’s radical movement, the Dutch captured its key figures: Soekarno, Maskun,
Mangunprojo and Supriadinata. During Soekarno’s imprisonment in 1931, PNI dissolved itself and reestablished into two parties: Partai Indonesia (Partindo) or Indonesian Party led by the former
founder of the old PNI, Mr. Sartono, and new PNI led by Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir and this
marked the split inside the nationalist camp. Soekarno was then perceived as the representation of
the Javanese (PNI) Messiah. Sjahrir (1947, p. 56) states that Soekarno frequently portrayed his
struggle as a holy one, conducted fasting as part of his habitual activities, and believed in jimat41 to
gain more (mystical) power. The new PNI was highly influenced by Marxist thought because the
38

It was established as the cadre party in which the cadres undertook courses and final examination in order
to become the trained members.
39
Dahmn (1969, pp. 143-154) and Eklof (2003, pp. 28-30) argue that Marhaenism reflects Soekarno’s socialist
conception which connotes the equation between the struggle for independence with the traditionalist
Marxist class struggle. Marhaenism promotes a classless society in order to gain a just social order through
social revolutionaries. Soekarno (as cited by Adams, 2011, p. 75 and ajaran Bung Karno II [module], 2011, pp.
29-37) believed that the class struggle was not needed as the ultimate goal of Indonesian struggle for
independence was to achieve freedom. In Soekarno’s view, Marhaenism represents Indonesia’s truest
nationalist/socialist identity because he found that 99 per cent of the population at the time were low class
peasants/groups who owned and worked on their land, but were incapable of having a decent life. He further
defined and refined the concept at Partai Indonesia or Partindo’s conference in 1933 and at the 30th
commemoration day of PNI in 1957, arguing that the Marxist egalitarian ideology positions the Marhaen as the
foundation of the Indonesian revolution against capitalism and imperialism.
40
It had a great influence over Soekarno. Like Cokroaminoto, Soekarno also attempted to maintain the
harmony by later propagating the concept of NASAKOM (nationalist, religion and communist) in his
administration (see chapter five).
41
A magical charm
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exponents, Hatta and Sjahrir, promoted the class struggle as the ideological instrument to liberate
itself from Ducth colonisation.
Approaching the first general elections in 1955 other nationalist and communist/socialist parties
sprang up. The ideological polarisations at this period did not primarily stick with the
Islamic/Nationalist camps, notwithstanding the fact that the two currents dominated the political
arena. The nationalist camp developed with the emergence of other nationalist parties such as
Partai Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia (Permai) or Indonesian Marhaen People Party, Ikatan Pendukung
Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI) or Indonesia Independence Vanguard Party. The communist/socialist
parties such as PKI, Partai Buruh (Labour Party), Partai Rakyat National (National People Party),
Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) or Indonesian Socialist Party, Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak
(Partai Murba), Partai ACOMA emerged as the parties who adhered to a similar ideological vision
that Soekarno promulgated: nationalist and Marxist/socialist. Having a similar vision as the
nationalist parties, other religious parties such as Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo) or Indonesian
Christian Party, Partai katolik (Catholic Party) later fused into the nationalist camp after the first
general elections.
The Islamic/Nationalist Friction
The Islamic parties’ harmony met its challenge when they had to determine Indonesia’s
philosophical foundation with the nationalist camp. Prior to independence, the Islamic and
nationalist factions debated the appropriate form of state ideology and the Constitution as the
Islamic camp suggested Islam be the foundation of the state. The debate eventually reached an
accord known as the Jakarta Charter on 22 June 1945 as the preamble of the 1945 Constitution. On
17 August 1945 Soekarno and Hatta, the two Indonesian nationalist activists who later became the
first President and Vice President, proclaimed Indonesia’s Independence. A day after independence,
the Nationalists demanded some amendments. They wanted to replace the phrase “with the
obligation to live according to Islamic law for the Muslims” in the Jakarta Charter with the phrase
“Belief in One Almighty God” as the first principle of Pancasila. The word “mukaddimah” in the 1945
Constitution which derives from Arabic language was amended into “pembukaan” (Indonesian
language), although the two words have the same meaning, i.e. preamble. Article 6 Section 1 of the
1945 Constitution was also amended by erasing the provision which stipulates that Indonesia’s
President be a Muslim. Mashad (2008, pp. 56-61) notes that the Islamic camp eventually assented to
the amendments considering the fact that it was too early to proclaim Islam as the state ideology in
the early phase of Indonesia’s independence. The incident later became the impetus for endless
conflict between them.
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The Islamic parties’ cohesion again met its challenge, especially when Indonesia transformed herself
into Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS) or the federation. This new form was the corollary of the Round
Table Treaty with the Dutch on 27 December 1949, when the Dutch acknowledged Indonesia’s
sovereignty. The negotiation forged the 1950 provisional Constitution. However, becoming a
federation instigated the internal conflict of the political parties for the federation required
positioning the group interest above others. The internal conflict inside Masyumi began. SDI (or later
PSII) decided to withdraw from Masyumi in July 1947 and joined the Amir Syarifudin Cabinet, which
was dominated by the leftist camp. In May 1952, NU followed PSII’s lead and obtained seats in Ali
Sastro Amidjojo Cabinet in mid 1953. NU’s withdrawal from Masyumi indicated the overt
fragmentation between the traditionalist and the modernist camps at that time. The traditionalists
feared the modernist’ domination over Masyumi and frequently felt that their roles was gradually
attenuated, especially when Masyumi’s highest advisory council (Majelis Syuro) dominated by NU
leaders no longer had the right to make the final decisions. Hakim (1993, p. 26) notes that Natsir,
Masyumi’s former leader, suggested these NU clerics mainly focus on religious matters instead of
political ones.
At this stage the emergence of Islamic and Nationalist parties cannot be dissociated from the
inclusive form of Indonesian Islam which is influenced by Javanese values (if not culture). The
upheaval of the Islamic/Nationalist camps in the early phase of Indonesia’s independence shows not
only the ideological contestation but also the synthesis of Islamic, Nationalist, and Javanese strands
in the inclusive framework of Indonesian Islam. The pervasive Javanese values in this ideological
framework arguably allow synthesis as well as contestation in order to maintain equilibrium. The
next chapter will investigate how both ideological synthesis and contestation circulated and evolved,
especially during the general elections (1955-2009).
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Chapter Five
The Synthesis and Contestation of Islamic/Nationalist Strands
in the 1955-2009 General Elections
This chapter aims to examine how the polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist strands in the
Islamic/Nationalist camps contest and synthesise during the phase of general elections. This is highly
important as not only do these mark the milestones of Indonesian politics, but these historical
episodes also demonstrate the fluidity of these strands as the result of the ideological synthesis and
contestation. Thus, this chapter is organised into one main section, i. e the general elections. This is
divided into five sub-sections: the 1955 elections (Soekarno’s era), the elections in Soeharto’s era,
the 1999 elections (transition era), the 2004 elections and the 2009 elections.
General Elections in Indonesia
Indonesia has had ten general elections from 1955 to 2009. The first one was during Soekarno’s
regime in 1955. The second to the seventh general elections (1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and
1997) were conducted in Soeharto’s administration, whilst the eighth to the tenth (1999, 2004, and
2009) were held in the Reform era.
I.

The 1955 Elections

The initiation of the first Elections came on 3 November 1945 when Mohammad Hatta, through
(Maklumat42 no. X), acceded to the emergence of the political parties prior to the establishment of
the People’s Consultative Assembly and the House of Representatives, which was initially planned in
January 1946. Ten political parties registered: Masyumi, PKI, Partai Buruh Indonesia (PBI) or
Indonesian Labour Party, Partai Rakyat Jelata (Commoner’s Party), Parkindo, Partai Sosialis
Indonesia (PSI) or Indonesian Socialist Party, Partai Rakyat Sosialis (PRS) or Socialist People’s Party,
Partai Katolik Republik Indonesia (PKRI) or Republic of Indonesia Catholic Party, Persatuan Rakyat
Marhaen Indonesia (Permai) or Indonesian Marhaen People Party, PNI. 43 The number of contestants
escalated to 172 parties in the first general election.
The first election in Indonesia was held by employing pure proportional with the closed list system
(adopted from the Dutch) in which one parliamentary seat represented a proportion of the
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Political annoucement
See Anwar, R.A. (2007, March 28). Soekarno-Hatta dari Dwitungal ke Dwitanggal; Telaah atas Peran
Mohammad Hatta sebagai Wakil Presiden RI Pertama. Retrieved from
http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=232&Itemid=76
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population. Suryadinata (2002), Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata (2004) and Sardini (2011) perceive
this election as the most democratic election in Indonesia due to its democratic liberal principles,
notwithstanding Indonesian people did not have any prior experience regarding the election. The
judicial laws underpinning the execution of the first election were frequently amended. The initial
Law for the election (Law no. 27/1948) was amended by the Law no. 12/1949 and later by Article 57
of the 1950 provisional Constitution. It was the Wilopo Cabinet that produced Law no 7/1953 which
later brought Indonesia to her first election.
The 1955 Election was conducted consecutively in Burhanudin Harahap Cabinet (from Masyumi) on
29 September and 15 December 1955, espousing 15 constituencies with the pure proportional
system. The first election aimed to elect the members of the House of Representatives, whereas the
second one was to elect the members of the Constituent Assembly. The result showed that PNI
obtained 22.32 per cent (57 seats), Masyumi 20.93 per cent (57 seats), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 18.41
per cent (45 seats), PKI 16.36 per cent (39 seats), PSII 2.89 per cent (8 seats) for the House of
Representative Election. As for the election of Constituent Assembly members, PNI received 23.97
per cent (119 seats), Masyumi 20.59 per cent (112 seats), NU 18.47 per cent (91 seats), and PKI
16.47 per cent (80 seats), PSII 2.80 per cent (16 seats).44 Setiawan (2008) notes that the total votes
of the nationalist camp were 46.86 per cent, whereas the Islamic camp was 43.71 per cent in the
election for the House of Representatives.45 Unlike Setiawan, Antlov (2004, p. 5) classifies the
winning camps into the four political blocks: modernist Muslim (Masyumi), traditionalist Muslim
(NU), nationalist (PNI) and communist (PKI).
Kristanto (2009) notes the pattern of the 1955 elections in Java and Outer Islands. He found that the
Islamic parties in Java merely obtained 39 per cent whilst the nationalist gained almost 50 per cent.
The Islamic camp dominated the Outer Islands whereas the nationalist obtained less than 20 per
cent. He noted that if one party were to win completely the votes all over Java, it would win the
election at the national level. The arguments are quite simple: Java is the place where almost 60 per
cent of the voters reside; it is the place where the government is centralised; Javanese culture
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See KPU. (n.d). Pemilu 1955. Retrieved from
http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39
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See Setiawan, B. (2008, September 15). Pergeseran Kekuatan Partai Nasionalis dan Islam, 1955-2004.
Retrieved from
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/09/15/00145877/pergeseran.kekuatan.partai.nasionalis.dan.islam.19
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dominates Indonesian politics; the dichotomy of Java and Outer Islands influences the determination
of the presidential figures46.
The visual construction of the political parties’ logos affirms the above polarisations. Dienaputra
(2011) found two frequent visual images in the election’s visual realm: the Indonesian buffalo
(Banteng)47 and the star and three colours (yellow, red and green). The nationalist camp mostly
employed the image of the buffalo and the red colour whereas the image of the star and the green
and yellow colours were commonly employed by the Islamic camp. The Javanese influence can
overtly be seen in the political parties’ logos of the 1955 elections. Dienaputra (2011, p. 114) notes
that the 1955 elections employed twenty eight visual variations in the logo. The image of Semar, the
Javanese mythical puppet, was deployed by two political parties: Partai ACOMA (Angkatan Comunis
Muda) or a communist youth group party and Persatuan Rakyat Desa (Village People Union).

the image of Semar employed by ACOMA party

the image of Semar by Persatuan Rakyat Desa

Source: Dienaputra (2010, p. 99; 2011, p. 97)

Semar signifies a peculiar combination of deity as well as worker, and of female and male in one
character. S/he appears in every wayang (Javanese puppet) show or story as the descendant of God
who comes to nurture the children of her/his own relatives. Semar’s face indicates that he is a male.
However, the large bosom signifies that she may be a woman. The Javanese perceives Semar as the
symbol of the selfless religious role model who guides them in conducting their everyday (religious)
practices.48 As a two-sided element in one body, Semar signifies the symbolic embodiment of
Javanese equilibrium and wisdom. By deploying Semar in its logo, ACOMA constructed its identity as
the communist youth group party which visually claimed to have Semar’s (Javanese) quality of
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Kristanto (2009) notes that the only non Javanese who succeeded in becoming the President was B.J Habibie
from South Sulawesi. He was the former Vice President (21 May 1998 – 20 October 1999) in Soeharto’s
cabinet. He became the third President (in the trasition era) after Soeharto’s downfall for one year and five
months. The other non Javanese figures (starting from Mohammad Hatta to Jusuf Kalla) merely occupied the
Vice President seats.
47

The Indonesian male buffalo.
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See “Semar” (n.d). Retrieved from http://www.karatonsurakarta.com/semar.html
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wisdom and neutrality as the character represents the religious model without certain religious
orientation49. The deployment of Semar to plausibly represent the neutral side of ACOMA does not
correlate with the party’s name which indicates its ideological (communist) orientation. However, it
seems that its deployment is intended to construct the party’s neutrality by providing a character
that is familiar to the visual memory of Indonesian society. At the same time, the image of Semar not
only indicates the party’s orientation to a certain ethnicity but also indirectly shows its visual
acknowledgement of Javanese hegemony. The ACOMA party obtained a mere 0.17 per cent of votes
for the House of Representatives election and 0.15 per cent for the Constituent Assembly.50
The meaning construction of Semar then shifted when Persatuan Rakyat Desa (PRD) employed it.
The party’s name indicates socio-nationalist orientation. Since PRD gained 0.21 per cent from the
total votes in 1955 and did not participate in the next elections, the record for the party was
extremely poor. However, the name indicates the possibility that the party is one of Soekarno’s
Marhenism variants for the phrase “Rakyat Desa” (village people) is aligned with Marhaenism which
puts the peasants/villagers as the motor that actuated the revolutionary movement of
independence. With a similar perspective, Semar is exploited to represent the religious neutrality
and wisdom of the communist/socio-nationalist camps. In this sense, the adoption of thisJavanese
symbol on the parties’ logos demonstrates the political attempt to synthesise local wisdom with the
parties’ ideologies (in this case communism and Marhaenism). This also suggests that the party
wanted to exploit Semar’s popularity. However, at the same time, this synthesis signifies ideological
dilution as this synthesis arguably does not operate in an arbritary manner.
This visual ideological dilution coloured the ideological contestation in the multiparty system of the
1955 elections. This system then met its end, especially when Soekarno decided to deploy the
guided democratic system by issuing the Law PnPs no. 7/1959. He constrained the political parties
that wanted to amend Pancasila and dissolved Masyumi in 1960 based on the Presidential Decree
no. 200/1960. Soekarno also reduced the number of the parties from fifty two to ten. These
maneuvers were perceived not as his attempt to appease the ideological friction in the multiparty
system, but as a political scheme to perpetuate his status quo (1959-1965). This was conducted by
synthesising the nationalist, Islamic, and communists under one concept NASAKOM (Nationalist,
Religion, and Communist) in his government. As noted in the previous chapter, it proved to be a
failure as his government oriented more to the communist side as Soekarno embraced PKI and the
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Semaun, PKI’s former chairperson, in Dahmn (1969, p. 74) stated that the party was neutral to religion
although it was formerly assimilated in Syarikat Islam.
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See KPU. (n.d). Pemilu 1955. Retrieved from
http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39
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military in his administration and this ruined the (Javanese) equilibrium. This was clearly seen in
1956-1959 when the 1945 Constitution was to be amended51 but met a deadlock in terms of
determining Pancasila as the state ideology for the Islamic parties opposed the idea. They disagreed
with the implementation of separating religion from the state as implicitly stated in Pancasila (van
Wichelen in Cara Aitchison, Peter Hopkins and Mei-Po Kwan (Eds.), 2007, p. 95). Instead of seeking
an alternative solution to the problem, Soekarno, in fact, affirmed his actions by returning to the
1945 Constitution due to the Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959 which dissolved the People
Consultative Assembly. This act gave him tremendous power for it contained the flaws of
Presidential system. The entire power of the state was centralised in the President (Nasution in Azra
and Hudson, 2008, p. 17). He then designated the parliament members, named as MPR/DPR Gotong
Royong. This led to totalitarian government.
The so-called communist coup on 30 September 1965 marked the fall of Soekarno. Soeharto began
his era, known as the New Order, by setting up an obscure political organisation, Golkar (Golongan
karya or Functional(ist) Group) which represented the political arm of the Indonesian army.
II.

General Elections in Soeharto’s Regime

Political scholars (Eklof, 2003; Haris, 2004a; Rizkiyansyah, 2007; Antlov and Cederroth, 2004; Antlov,
2004; Suryadinata, 2002; Crouch, 2010) are of the same opinion that the six national elections
conducted in Soeharto’s era were systematically manipulated. This was initially due to a grand
scheme to liberate the country from its socio-economic and political crisis of Soekarno’s legacy by
establishing and maintaining the social order and economic development employing an
authoritarian approach.
As previously noted, Soeharto gained his power not by national elections. However, his government
promised to hold the next election on 5 July 1968 as stated in the provisional People Consultative
Assembly’s provision no. XI/1966. Rizkiyansyah (2007, p. 30) and Haris (2004a, p. 20) note that
Soeharto) felt the need to stabilise the condition of the country prior to the general elections and
believed that the social unrest, the threat of national disintegration, the unstable cabinet, and
economic decline52 in Soekarno’s administration, stemmed from the people’s freedom to actively
participate in politics, which were alleged as the source of the separatist movement and political
turmoil. Antlov (2004, p. 7) notes that Soeharto then deployed Golkar53, which was the socio-
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It was the mandate stated in the 1950 provisional Constitution.
The inflation reached 600 per cent.
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In 1964, Soeharto’s government established the Joint Secretariat of Functional(ist) Group (known as Golkar)
as the embodiment of the 1945 Constitution which stipulated the existence of the functional(ist) group
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political organisation that consisted of military and bureaucrats, as his political machine to stabilise
the dynamic forces in Indonesia.
Haris (2004a) and Rizkiyansyah (2007) note the systematic procedures to promote Golkar in securing
its seats with the espousal of the state/administrative and repressive apparatus. They found that
Golkar (central advisory) members had penetrated the election system from national to village level.
The Minister of Home Affairs, the member of Golkar’s Central Advisory Board, as the head of
Lembaga Pemilihan Umum (LPU) or the Institute of General Election and Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia
(PPI) or Indonesian Election Committee, acted as the political parties’ tutor. The Governors, District
Heads, Mayors, Village Headmen, who were Golkar cadres and functionaries, headed the election
committee at their respective levels (province, district and village). The election monitoring
committee from the national to the village level was chaired by government officials (from Golkar).
The regulation continued in the screening process in which the legislative candidates of other parties
needed an official clearance from the armed forces to participate in the election. Haris (1997)
further found that this procedure was intended to ostensibly screen the candidates from PKI’s
influence, whilst the fact was that they prevented the participation of the outspoken candidates.
However, it indicated Soeharto’s fear of the remaining influence of PKI. Dienaputra (2010, pp. 95101) notes that Soeharto prevented the use of the visual symbol for the PKI as the Law no 15/1969
promulgated a ban on employing communist countries’ (such as the former USSR) national symbol,
hammer and sickle, in conjunction with the PKI’s logo (hammer and sickle) during his regime.
The procedure then continued in minute detail. Eklof (2003, pp. 48-54) notes Soeharto’s strategies
to emasculate his opponents prior to the 1971 election. He deployed the repressive apparatus (such
as the military intelligence body Special Operation (Opsus or Operasi khusus) headed by Brigadier
General Ali Moertopo) to intimidate the PNI’s Semarang congress54 participants to choose
Hadisubeno Sosrowerdjojo, Soeharto’s associate. A decoy was also set up to shift the position of
Mohammmad Roem55, as the elected chairperson of Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi) or
Indonesian Muslim Party56 by having Djaelani Naro, the member of the party’s central board who
had a close relationship with Moertopo, to rule Parmusi. Naro claimed that he had taken over the
party. The government then interfered in this conflict and made M.S. Mintaredja, the Minister of
Home Affairs, the party’s appointed general chairperson.

representatives. Under the Military support, the establishment aimed to attenuate PKI political influence
(Mackie, 1974, p. 66).
54
In April 1970
55
He was associated with Masyumi mutiny in 1950s.
56
The Islamic party which represented the defunct Masyumi.
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Adityawan (2008) dismantled Soeharto’s propaganda and found that it reflected Soeharto’s
Javanese57 militaristic58 disposition which affirmed his image as a Javanese king with Pancasila as the
ideology he deployed to maintain his power. The People Consultative Assembly (MPR) in Soeharto’s
era issued a provision no. II/MPR/1978 regarding the elaboration of Pancasila’s five principles (Eka
Prasetya Pancakarsa/Pedoman Penghayatan Pengamalan Pancasila or Guidance for Understanding
and Practising Pancasila) as the sole interpretation of the state ideology. It became the ideological
means for Soeharto to coerce the political parties to adopt Pancasila as the sole ideology59 based on
Law no. 8/1985. Ideological uniformity was also applied to all (government) sectors including Korps
Pegawai Republik Indonesia or KORPRI (Indonesia’s Civil Servants Corps) established in 1971 and
Ikatan Dharma Wanita. Ikatan Dharma Wanita is an organisation of the civil servants’ wives which is
deployed to provide guidance and counselling services to the housewives through Pendidikan
Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK) or Family Welfare Education program. While giving the services, they
promoted Golkar (read: government’s programs) and persuaded housewives to vote for the party in
the elections.
In a Foucauldian60 lens, the guidance the government provided in order to interpret Pancasila
signifies not only the reduction of meaning in Pancasila but also shows how power relations define
the constructed meaning. Imposing Pancasila is conducted not merely by promulgating the law to
legalise the act but also organises it systematically so that coercion appears as normalisation.
Pancasila was taught at all levels of education, from primary to tertiary education. The systematic
57

Adityawan (2008, pp. 74-132) found that Soeharto adopted the Javanese values from the 18th century
Javanese kings of Mataram Kingdoms (Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat and Surakarta Hadiningrat). He adopted the
Javanese values: a leader is the symbol of truth for he reflects God’s will based on the divine inspiration
(wahyu) the leader receives (Soeharto learnt Javanese mysticism, meditation and Islam from Kiai Darjatmo);
the leader’s task is to protect and maintain (social) harmony through musyawarah (deliberation), mufakat
(consensus) so that social order and justice can be achieved (see chapter six); showing excessive emotion is
forbidden; the communication pattern between Gusti (the ruler) and Kawula (the ruled) should be in one
direct hierarchical line (kromo inggil, kromo ngoko); Respecting the elders is conducted in accordance with
Javanese philosophy, i.e. mikul dhuwur, mendem jero (memikul setinggi-tingginya, memendam sedalamdalamnya) or valuing/respecting the elders by not revealing their flaws (see Soeharto Pikiran, Ucapan dan
Tindakan Saya Otobiografi, Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H (1989, pp. 165-169)).
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Soeharto (cited in Roeder, 1976, p. 170) perceived his coming to military life by becoming KNIL (Royal
Netherlands East Indies Army) soldier during Duth colonisation as the moment “that opened the door to his
happy life in the future”.
59
Adityawan (2008, pp. 77-113) argues that in Javanese perspective, the sole ideology reflects the
embodiment of social harmony (kerukunan) which is needed to maintain stability of the country. The social
harmony is not seen as an active notion in Javanese culture but more like a process of not disturbing the preexisting harmony.
60
The discussion does not fully concentrate on deploying a Foucauldian lens. This sub section merely aims to
show how Soeharto attempted to control the ideological interpretation of Pancasila with an expectation to
prevent the proliferation of meaning within the ideology itself. Thus, it is not necessary to elaborate on how
Soeharto’s ascendancy produces resistance as one of the focuses of this chapter is to show how visual
transformation reflects the ideological debates within the Islamic/Nationalist camps in Indonesia’s political
arena which is heavily influenced by Javanese culture.
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procedure Soeharto deployed also signifies the use of the surveillance mechanism. The discipline
was dispersed within the framework of Pancasila. Adityawan (2008, p. 95) notes that in muffling his
opponents, Soeharto frequently depolyed “Indonesian way”, i.e. musyawarah (deliberation), to
handle the contention. Euphemism was dominantly deployed in this disciplinary discourse, for
Soeharto wanted to maintain his image as a calm (Javanese) leader that did not want to show an
excessive emotion (anger) which merely violated his Javanese values. When he deployed military
force, he directly attached his act with the euphemistic jargon pemulihan keamanan dan ketertiban
(restoring security and order).
This deployment of Pancasila to gain people’s consent for the government proved to be successful in
gaining Soeharto and Golkar a series of wins in the elections. With all the government’s (read:
Soeharto) support to Golkar, it would not be a surprise to find that Golkar won 62.82 per cent61 of
the total votes in the 1971 Election.62 However, it failed to win in Aceh and Maluku for the former
was the domain of the Islamic front whereas the latter was that of the Protestants. Golkar also failed
to dominate Jakarta due to the domination of the minor parties over the capital city, although
Golkar claimed itself as the representation of the modernised development-oriented party (Mackie,
1974, p. 70). The operation of the kawula-gusti concept (see chapter six) as reflected in Pancasila
possibly influenced Golkar’s victory63.
In this election, the parties deployed the image of star as the dominant symbol (Dienaputra, 2011,
pp. 99-210). Dienaputra found that the image of the star dominated the Islamic camp (except for
Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (MURBA) or People’s deliberation64), the image of buffalo was solely
employed by PNI front Mahaernisme, whereas the image of the candle, pine tree, and rosary
represented the Catholic and Christian parties (Partai Katolik and Partai Kristen Indonesia or
Parkindo). The Joint Secretariat of Golkar deployed the image of a banyan tree, conjoined with rice
and cotton plants to illuminate its nationalist orientation. Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia
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KPU. (n.d). Pemilu 1971 [the 1971 Elections]. Retrieved from
http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=40
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Sardini (2011, pp. 15-16) asserts that the proportional system in the 1971 Election based on Law no 15/1969
became the effective tool to reduce the number of seats the parties obtained. Further elections (1977-1997)
employed the same proportional system as in the 1971 election.
63
Golkar was perceived replacing the position of PNI as the government party. Bourchier (1997, pp. 157-185)
argues that the essences of Pancasila (Musyawarah or deliberation, Mufakat or consensus and Gotong Royong
or mutual assistance) as “the product of diverse customary law in Indonesia” especially Java, stemmed from
“the traditional ethos of the inseparable entities of kawula (ruled) and gusti (ruler) with the total obligation of
the ruled to the ruler”. The words kawula and gusti are Javanese. Thus, according to Mackie (1974, p. 71), “it
would be unwise for the peasant not to follow the government party”.
64
Murba is considered as the national-communist party propagated by Tan Malaka. The party then joined the
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) in 1977.
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(IPKI) or Indonesia Independence Vanguard Party employed the image of conjoined rice and cotton
plants and also the image of a tower in the middle of the paddy and cotton. In this sense, the visual
attributes the parties deployed in the 1971 Elections indicated their religious political orientation.
For instance, MURBA’s deployment of the image of the star signifies that although this party was
perceived as a national-communist party, its logo (the star) visually demonstrated the party’s
religious side compared to its political (communist) orientation, which was generally represented by
hammer and sickle. This visuality shows that MURBA attempted not only to show the party’s
religiosity, but also indicates that a visual attempt had been made to integrate/synthesise
communism and Islam as Tan Malaka, the party’s prominent figure, was known as the one who
promoted socialist Islam.
In 1975 the government issued Law no 3/1975 to fuse nine parties into three (except Golkar) based
on the ideological polarisations (Islamic/Nationalist): the Islamic parties such as NU, Partai Muslimin
Indonesia (Parmusi) or Indonesian Muslim Party, Partai Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti) or Islamic
Education Party and Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) or Indonesian Islamic Union Party, were
merged in Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or United Development Party, the nationalist
parties (PNI, Parkindo, Catholic Party, IPKI, Partai Murba) were fused into Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia (PDI) or Indonesian Democratic Party, and Golongan Karya (Golkar). However, prior to this
law enactment, Islamic parties had already fused under PPP in 1973.
Below are the logos of the parties’ fusion (PPP, Golkar, and PDI):

Image 1: PPP, Image 2: Golkar, and Image 3: PDI (Source: Dienaputra (2010, p. 101)

The party’s fusion has implications for the visual transformation of the parties’ logos. The images the
parties deployed show their ideological orientation of Islamic/Nationalist and reflect the nationalist
vision as the images correlate with the five principles of Pancasila65. The deployment of ka’bah as
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Except for PPP. PPP later amended its party’s logo to star to correspond with the government coercion to
implement Pancasila as the sole ideology in Indonesia.
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the image of PPP indicates that the party desired to be the centre of Muslim political aspirations for
it implies the centre of Mecca, the Muslim holy city and also the direction for all Muslims to pray.
Ka’bah also represents the cohesion of the four Islamic parties under one central direction. The logo
above demonstrates Soeharto’s strategy to fuse the Islamic faction’s heterogeneity into a
homogeneous Islamic entity to emasculate the Islamic power. This disposition stemmed from the
fact that Soekarno indirectly taught him that the ideological cleavage potentially became a latent
danger and a political fusion would be the best solution before it gnawed at his ascendancy. On the
other hand, the logo can be perceived as a code of resistance since it does not completely signify
submission, for the party decided not to adopt the religious symbol from Pancasila, i.e. the star.
Golkar deploys the images of the banyan tree and the conjoined rice and cotton plants to correlate
with the third and the fifth principles of Pancasila, viz. nationalism and social justice, the two
overarching visual elements which represent the party’s ideological vision. The tree is perceived as
the Indonesian symbol of the nation’s integrity, whereas the conjoined rice and cotton plants signify
the mutual assistance (gotong royong) and the family principle (kekeluargaan) to establish social
justice. This visuality demonstrates that the party’s deployment of the ideological ideals of gotong
royong and kekeluargaan is to achieve its main goal, the nation’s integrity66. The absence of the
democratic nationalist sign (the buffalo’s head) in Golkar’s logo can be perceived as Golkar’s
symbolic act of accentuating the symbolism of collective harmony67 (the banyan tree) which is
achieved by upholding social justice within the framework of the nation’s integrity. The buffalo’s
head that signifies the democratic principle does not need to be explicitly visualised in the logo as
the nation’s integrity is achieved by democratic means of kekeluargaan and gotong royong ideals.
Kleden (2009) argues that these concepts operate artificially. Gotong royong has been transformed
from the former notion of cooperation into the notion of working together following the pattern of
patron and client. This visual symbol implicitly reinforced Golkar’s contingent status over Soeharto,
the party’s patron in the New Order era, and defined the concept of social justice within the
framework of the nation’s integrity based on the patron’s (family) instruction (kekeluargaan).
The presence of the buffalo’s head appears in PDI’s logo. PDI employed the images of the buffalo’s
head as the centre, the conjoined rice and cotton plants encircled the head, and the imperceptible
image of the banyan tree behind the head connected with the rice and cotton. The head is perceived
as the symbol of musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus) which represents the
Indonesian model of democracy. The deployment of the images visually affirmed PDI’s image as the
party which upheld democracy imbued with the almost complete Pancasila values of democracy and
66
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The banyan tree is positioned at the center.
The nation’s integrity (persatuan Indonesia) demands a collective harmony of the diverse ethnic groups.
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social justice (musyawarah, mufakat, kekeluargaan, and gotong royong), except for the nation’s
integrity (the banyan tree), which is covertly present on the logo. The obscure employment of the
banyan tree as the background became a differentiation marker of PDI from Golkar. Latif (2011, pp.
45-46) argues that the combination of the fourth and the fifth principles of Pancasila position them
in the line with the deliberation (musyawarah) and consensus (mufakat) as these factors of
rationalism and wisdom became the centre of PDI’s ideological vision, encircled by the principle of
social justice which values the fulfilment of balancing “the civil rights of politics, law, economics,
social and culture” through the notions of gotong royong and kekeluargaan. In other words, the
banyan tree’s imperceptible image as the logo’s background indicates that PDI adopts the
democratic notions of the fourth and the fifth principles of Pancasila and signifies that the adoption
is to sustain the integrity of Indonesia.
If we look closer at the similar nationalist ideals the two parties uphold above, we will find that the
absence/obscurity of the nationalist symbols (the buffalo’s head and the banyan tree) renders
almost the same result. They both accentuate the notion of integrity with a different emphasis.
Gotong royong and kekeluargaan appear at the same time in Golkar’s and PDI’s logos encircling the
center visual symbol of both parties. Gotong royong shifts its meaning into the mutual system of
patronage as in the case of Golkar. Kekeluargaan (family principle) also gradually shifts its meaning
in PDI, especially when Megawati Soekarnoputri, the first President’s daughter, joined the political
arena in 1992. Megawati then formed the politics of dynasty inside PDI, which later amended its
name to PDI-P not long after Soeharto’s resignation.
The government’s coercion to fuse the parties at the visual level had a significant ideological effect,
especially when the nationalist parties had to emerge under PDI. They (especially Parkindo and
Partai Katolik) could no longer present their religious orientation in the logo and had to accept that
PDI’s logo represented their nationalist side. Almost the same thing happened to the Islamic parties.
PPP as the representation of the Islamic parties at Soeharto’s era had to amend its logo from ka’bah
to the star in 1986 to resonate with the first principle of Pancasila that reflects (nationalist)
religiosity. This agitated the party ideologically.
Haris (2004b, p. 32) also found that the fusion impacted on the escalation of votes for PPP (from
27.21 per cent in 1971 election to 29.29 per cent or an increase of 2.08 per cent in 1977 election) as
it obtained votes from the former adherents of Masyumi, especially in Aceh and Jakarta. PDI still
obtained the same number of votes as in the 1971 election (8.6 per cent) whereas Golkar’s votes
descended slightly to 62.11 per cent. The result slightly fluctuated in the 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997
elections especially for Golkar as it averaged 70 per cent of the votes.
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The following is the results of the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 elections after the parties’
fusion:
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The chart shows that PPP obtained its lowest votes (15.97 per cent) in the 1987 election. The
government policy of ideological uniformity, Pancasila, as the sole ideology of the political parties
was conjectured to be one of the causal factors. The party was obliged to amend its logo from
ka’bah to a star to reflect the first principle of Pancasila which correlated with the religious
orientation prior to the 1987 election. The amendment of PPP’s logo is as follows:

PPP’s logo in 1982 election

PPP’s logo in 1987 election

(Source: Dienaputra, 2010)

The image of the star which represents religiosity seems to attenuate the religious nuance for it
signifies the neutral religious sense compared to ka’bah which eminently connotes the Islamic
vision. The visuality also dilutes the visual leverage for the image of the star fails to distinguish PPP’s
identity as the historic representation of the Islamic parties’ struggle to return to the basic Islamic
principle inscribed in the Jakarta Charter. NU’s withdrawal prior to the 1987 election which broke
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the Islamic front’s votes also affected PPP’s votes. The number then rose gradually and reached
22.43 per cent in 1997 as the party received the benefit from PDI’s internal conflict.
PDI also amended its logo in 1987 as follow:

(source: Dienaputra, 2010; 2011)
(PDI’s logo in 1977 and 1982 elections)

(PDI’s logo in 1987, 1992 and 1997 elections)

The omission of the conjoined rice and cotton plants and the obscure banyan tree in PDI’s logo
indicates that the party no longer adopted the same principles as Golkar, the government political
machine. It signifies that the reinforcement of PDI’s different position(ing) from Golkar by solely
upholding the democratic notion from Pancasila. The efficacy of the third and the fifth principles
accented that social justice and integrity can be achieved as long as Pancasila democracy is upheld.
The visual transformation also shows that not only PDI’s new logo marks a distinctive visual
nationalist expression to differ itself from Golkar, but also indicates the party’s endeavour to ossify
its Pancasila democratic stance which visually defines the party’s identity. The focus on the buffalo’s
head which represents the Indonesian democratic notion is chosen as the sole symbol that signifies
that the nationalist stance PDI takes is different from the nationalist Golkar which highly regards the
integrity of the nation. PDI’s logo distinctively demonstrates that Indonesian democracy should be
the core ideological basis for the integrity of the nation.
Although this visualisation did not seem to have a direct correlation with PDI’s success in the 1992
elections, this party gained stronger support, especially when Megawati Soekarnoputri and Guruh
Soekarnoputra, Soekarno’s children, joined the party in 1992. PDI’s votes increased from 10.87 per
cent in 1987 election to 14.89 per cent in 1992 election. The condition agitated the government
(read: Soeharto). With the Military’s support Soeharto then backed Soerjadi, the elected chairperson
of Medan congress, to oust Megawati from her position as PDI’s chairperson at the 1993 Surabaya
congress. PDI then merely obtained 3.6 per cent in 1997 Election. On the other hand, Golkar
received the benefit from PDI’s internal conflict as the party obtained its highest percentage of votes
(74.51 per cent) in the 1997 election. However, the party experienced a slight fall in 1992 (68.1 per
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cent) after its gradual escalation from 62.11 per cent in 1977 election to 73.16 per cent in 1987
election.
The cleavage between Islamic and Nationalist camps in Soeharto’s era was not highly visible
compared to Soekarno’s because the government policies diluted the polarisation. The ideological
uniformity and the construction of a collective phobia in Indonesia plausibly engendered the
obscurity. Haris (2005, pp. 20-21) contends that the government jargon, such as anti-politics, antiparty, and anti-ideology (except for Pancasila) attenuated the ideological polarisation of
Islamic/Nationalist dichotomies, for Soeharto in the mid-1960s deployed the student activists’
slogan,of ‘politics no, development yes’ which brought him to power (Mahasin, 1989, p. 30), to
attract people’s attention solely to the prosperity of the nation. In line with Haris, Adityawan (2008,
p. 222) asserts that the above factors made Soeharto successfully construct his image as the father
of Indonesia’s development. “Developmentalism” became the new ideology that could effectively
muffle people’s opposition, but failed to synthesise the dichotomies of Nationalist/Islamic and
Javanese/non Javanese.
However, when Soeharto felt that the power of his opponents and the military under the leadership
of General LB. Moerdani became stronger, he approached the Muslims as his new ally during the
1990s, and established ICMI (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia – Indonesian Association of
Muslim Intellectuals) and put B.J. Habibie, his later Vice President, in the chairmanship. Crouch
(2010, pp. 131-136, 178) found that the two ostensibly discrepant mainstreams (the “red-and-white”
and the “green”) inside the military institution did not correspond with either the nationalist or
Islamic factions because the military officers were busy securing their own patronage network. The
“red-and-white” which associates with the colour of the national flag represents the nationalist
faction whereas the green associates with the Islamic one. However, the Islamic faction inside the
military did not correlate with the Islamic line they underpinned as they had to secure their position
especially when the institution was under the Javanese Catholic General Moerdani. In 1993 Soeharto
dismissed Moerdani (especially after Moerdani questioned Soeharto’s family business (Conboy,
2004, p. 217)) and appointed General Feisal Tandjung, a non-Javanese Muslim, to fill in the position.
What Soeharto did cannot be completely perceived as his shifting towards Islamic or non Javanese
poles69 because he still kept the factional balance between the “red-and-white” and the “green”
inside the military. Thus, instead of appeasing the dichotomies through his slogan “politic no,
development yes”, he, in fact, sought security in the polarisation that benefited him to perpetuate
his status quo.
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Soeharto’s maneuvers cannot also be solely seen to affect the failure of Islamic parties’ cohesion.
Haris (2004, pp. 61-76) found that the root of its failure lies in the sharp political and leadership
polarisation among the Islamic parties themselves as their leaders have a narrow sense of
understanding the diversity of the Indonesian Islamic community. They are still bound up with the
historic euphoria in which Islam played the cardinal role in constructing the national identity as well
as the struggle for Indonesia’s independence, and dreamt of dominating the power structure. This
cohesion is also challenged by the nationalist parties to ostensibly embrace (if not co-opt) the
Muslim voters by establishing the Islamic institution to plausibly represent the party’s religious
orientation,70 and by Soeharto’s actions in deterring the development of the Islamic political
pluralism in Indonesia, as previously implied. The perennial abuse of religious teaching by the Islamic
elites to justify their political maneuvers in order to undermine their rivals is seen to exacerbate the
fragmentation. Haris (1991) notes how the chairperson of Nahdlatul Ulama amended his fatwa or
‘Islamic ruling’ from suggesting the obligation for NU’s adherents to vote for PPP in 1977 election
(NU joined PPP) to the pragmatic action of permitting its adherents to vote for Golkar and PDI in
1987 (NU withdrew its political support for PPP).71
Like NU, Soeharto also employed a pragmatic cultural strategy to secure his tenure. Antlov (2004, p.
6) found that the introduction of the term pesta demokrasi or the festival of democracy in 1982 was
part of Soeharto’s political, yet cultural maneuvers, to divert people’s attention. The deployment of
the term which merely signifies the people’s festival (people were allowed to join the public crowd
with the local/national celebrities espousal sponsored by the political parties during the campaign
days) indicates the systematic effort to forge a ritual/cultural hoax to dupe and herd the people into
the hegemonic political hocus-pocus.72 Thus via all political means, Soeharto successfully held his
tenure for 32 years.
Suryadinata (2002, p. 45) outlines the downfall of the Soeharto New Order regime as being the
result of his own product of a poor political and economic management system: “a large foreign
debt, poor economic management, poor financial regulation, authoritarianism and cronyism”.Hadiz
(2005) perceives that Soeharto’s downfall did not merely stem from this mismanagement. Rather it
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For instance, Golkar employed its Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah (MDI) or Islamic Missionary Council as the
Islamic institution to reflect the Islamic nuance vis-a-vis its nationalist identity.
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In 1999 election the abuse was heated when both the Islamic and nationalist factions deployed their own
Islamic religious argument to justify the extent Islam permits the existence of female leader, at the time
Megawati Soekarnoputri was nominated as the President from PDI-P.
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This later marked the beginning of the emergence of politician celebrities in Indonesia, especially in the 2004
and 2009 elections. They would imitate the way celebrities enchanted the people in their campaign and
alluringly present themselves as having a fresh, smart and inspiring appeal. Their billboards in the 2009
election represented this constructed image.
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derived from the state domination, or “state capitalism” (Hadiz, 2005, p. 118), a system which was
operated by a complex coalition Soeharto forged between the state and the dominant class73 in
order to boost the so-called country’s economic progress, so that law and order could be
maintained. The economic and financial crisis in 1997 eventually brought Soeharto’s administration
into downfall. On 21 May 1998, Soeharto announced his resignation which put B. J. Habibie, the Vice
President, into the chair.

III.

The 1999 Election (Election in Transition Era)

The fall of Soeharto’s regime commenced the Reform era. B.J. Habibie as the third President was
considered as the President in Transition. He was stigmatised by his image as Soeharto’s former
confidant. It was in his era that Pancasila was no longer imposed as the sole ideology of the political
parties as the result of the Special Session of MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People’s
Consultative Assembly)74 in November 1998. It annulled the Law no. 8/1985.
After the fall of Soeharto, political parties were mushrooming and 145 parties were formed. Only 48
parties were allowed to participate in the 1999 election due to administrative requirements.
Suryadinata (2002, p. 77) contends that after the emasculation of the ideological cleavage in
Soeharto’s regime, the old polarisations re-emerged when 48 parties participated and represented
the Islamic/Nationalist camps. Golkar, PDI, and PPP transformed themselves. Golkar revealed its true
identity as a political party which was comprised of nationalist figures and moderate Muslims.
Golkar was fragmented into Partai Golkar, Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (PKP or Justice and Unity
Party) and Partai MKGR. At almost the same time PDI was diffused into five parties: PDI, PDI-P
(Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle), PNI-Massa Marhaenis, PNI-Front Marhaenis and PNI-Supeni.
NU in the post-Soeharto’s era established PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or Nation Awakening
Party), Partai Nahdlatul Ummat, and Partai Suni. New parties were born, such as PAN (National
Mandate Party headed by Amien Rais, the former chairperson of Muhammadiyah75), PBB (Partai
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They were the government officials, Soeharto’s family members and their business allies. They controlled
the strategic departments such Department of Forestry, Department of Commerce, State-Owned Enterprises
(such as Pertamina), and Indonesia logistics bureau (Bulog). They also had privileges in the protected sectors of
non commercial goods.
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It is the Indonesia’s supreme sovereign body which drafts the state outline and amends the Constitution.
The President was formerly elected by the MPR members. In the Soeharto’s era, MPR was seen as equal to the
1945 Constitution but after the amendment of the constitution, the sovereign body is placed equally with the
Executive branch, Judicial branch and Supreme Audit Agency. Nasution (2008, p. 17) contends that MPR lost
its power as the manifestation of the people’s sovereignty, for in the amendment article 1, paragraph (2)
reads: “[t]he sovereignty is vested in the hands of the people and will be executed according to the
Constitution”.
75
Muhammadiyah is the second largest Islamic modernist organisation.
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Bulan Bintang or Crescent Star Party), and Masyumi Baru (New Masyumi) and PK (Partai Keadilan or
Justice Party).
Habibie’s government accelerated the period for the election to gain stronger legitimacy from the
people by appointing the Team of Eleven to draft the laws of the political party, the election, and the
legislative structures. The team wanted to adopt the district system but lost its battle with the
majority of new parties still favouring the proportional system because the district system would
wipe out the small parties. The election system itself could not be called a pure proportional system
as it combined some elements of the district as well as proportional systems. It also employed the
ranking system of the candidates on a closed list which was previously determined by the political
party. The system not only implies a covert mechanism of prioritising certain candidates, but also
indicates the efficacious domination of the (large) parties in determining the election system. This
system arguably marked the beginning of the party’s oligarchy in the Reform (transition) era.
The outcome of the 1999 general election resulted in the victory of wong cilik or the grassroots. It
was shown that PDI-P led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of Soekarno, was preferred by
33.74 per cent of Indonesian citizens, especially at the grassroots, after the party suffered from the
long and continuous repression of the Soeharto regime. Golkar secured a mere 22.44 per cent, a
drastic decline compared to the 74.51 per cent of votes it obtained in the 1997 election. PKB
obtained 12.61 per cent, whilst PPP and PAN gained 10.71 per cent and 7.12 per cent.76
The following are the logos of the five winning parties:

1.

2.

3.
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See KPU. (n.d). Pemilu 1999. Retrieved from
http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=42
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4.

5.

(source: Kompas, 14 July 2008)

The employment of the buffalo’s head (PDI-P) and the banyan tree and the conjoined rice and
cotton plants images (Golkar) affirms that these two major nationalist parties consistently retained
their historic adoption of the nationalist expression of Pancasila. The consistent images on the
Golkar’s logo affirm the visual ossification of the party’s nationalist concepts as previously discussed.
Dienaputra (2011, p. 211) notes that the pentagon which frames the logo represents the five
principles of Pancasila. Unlike PPP and PDI, Golkar never amended its symbol and frame. It reflects
Golkar’s visual expression of a consistent position, although that its former patron (Soeharto) lost his
power.
PDI-P’s logo, on the other hand, almost resonates with the former PDI’s. PDI’s fragmentation in
Soeharto’s regime marked the inception of PDI-P led by Megawati Soekarnoputri. The party was
born on 1 February 1999, with the ideological principles of Pancasila (nationalism and social justice)
as stated in the party’s charter. The party’s symbolic affinity between PDI-P and PDI77 (PDI-P also
employed the buffalo’s image), connotes the same ideological ideal that reflects Pancasila
democratic model, especially the fourth principle (musyawarah and mufakat). However, the absence
of the banyan tree and the conjoined rice and cotton plants to complete the nationalist symbols in
Pancasila did not necessarily signify the party’s desire to comply with the legal ban as stated in Law
no 12/2003 Article 8 Letter (e)78. It demonstrates PDI-P’s attempt to differentiate its identity from
other nationalist parties, such as Golkar and PDI. PDI-P’s buffalo appears differently. Its focus is not
solely on the head but also on the buffalo’s position, which according to Dienaputra (2011, p. 199),
connotes the party’s alertness. The focus is still on the head in the centre of the logo with the red
eyes and white mouth of a black buffalo. Triawan Munaf (as cited by Dienaputra, 2011, p. 201) from
EURO RSCG Adwork advertising, the designer of PDI-P’s logo, states that the white and red colours
were chosen to resonate with the socio-political climate of the time. The white mouth signifies the
purity of the party to speak its ideals, whereas the red connotes the party’s bravery to fight for the
aspirations of grassroots. This visuality makes the buffalo in PDI-P’s logo look aggressive compared
77
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See the image of PDI in Soeharto’s era.
It is prohibited to employ similar images and names to other parties.
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to PDI’s buffalo’s image of Soeharto’s era. At this stage, it can be argued that as the party employs
this advertising company to define and design its logo, PDI-P gives political authoritisation to this
advertising agency to frame and “circumscribe” the ideological meanings of its logo.
The visual reading of the nationalist camp represented by Golkar and PDI-P in the 1999 Election
produces different results. PDI-P substituted the pentagon with the circle to frame its democratic
image (buffalo). However, this substitution of geometric shape cannot be seen as an act of disloyalty
by the party towards Pancasila. The circle can also be perceived to represent a holistic frame for
Pancasila democracy, as well as a symbolic attempt to break the New Order policy that prompted
the adoption of the geometric shape of the pentagon to represent the five principles of Pancasila.
Golkar’s visual fidelity towards the policy indicates that the party still keeps Soeharto’s legacy as part
of its identity. The visual transformation shows the (visual/ideological) contestation within the
nationalist camp.
Visual contestation also occurred in the (inclusive) Islamic parties’ logos (PPP79, PKB, and PAN) which
attempted to resonate with the conventional (Indonesian) Islamic associations, ka’bah (the symbol
of Mecca) for PPP and the star for PAN and PKB80. Dienaputra (2011, pp. 204-210) argues that the
star is no longer associated with the nuances of Indonesian Islamic culture and religion. He found the
star as the most frequent symbol in both Islamic and Nationalist/Socialist parties’ logos in the 1955,
1971, 1999 and 2004 general elections and that the Islamic association can be made if the presence
of the star appears at the same time with the crescent. However, the first principle of Pancasila
represented by the star, without exception, reflects the code of Indonesian religiosity, although the
other religious (such as Protestant or Catholic) parties never employ the symbol of the star. PPP
decided to return to its former logo (ka’bah) as they felt that the employment of that star merely
diluted the Islamic spirit within the party.
The inclusive Islamic/Nationalist party, such as PAN, employs the image of a white sun. Dienaputra
(2011, pp. 205-206) categorises the sun as belonging to the same group of celestial bodies as the
star and perceives the sun representing the party’s vision as the one that brings Indonesia into its
era of enlightenment81. It signifies PAN’s inclusive dual positions as both nationalist and Islamic,
especially when the party officially declared its position as an inclusive nationalist party. However,
based on what Dienaputra (2011) found that the white sun also resonates with the symbol of
Muhammadiyah; the party cannot solely claim to represent the nationalist camp. The logo’s
79

In the Reform era, PPP returned to the Islamic ideological symbol, ka’bah, as the party decided to re-adopt
Islam as its ideology.
80
PKB also employs a globe with the image of Indonesia’s map as the centre.
81
PAN’s statute chapter one article one.
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visualisation affirms the dominant influence of modernist Islam, represented by Muhammadiyah
which reinforces PAN’s ambiguous position.
Like PAN, PKB also shares NU’s elemental influence. PKB claims to be an inclusive party and the
party’s statute elucidates how the logo is designed to resonate with the inclusivity and the party’s
idealism. The espousal of the nine stars surrounding the globe in the logo’s image represents the
notions of freedom, justice, truth, honesty, democracy, equality, simplicity, balance and
brotherhood. The image of Indonesia’s archipelago, as the party claims, connotes PKB’s basis of
struggle in Indonesia in order to achieve the prosperity for the nation and a pure democratic
national order. On the other hand, the deployment of green as the background colour correlates
with the Islamic notion of prosperity. PKB’s logo also resonates with NU’s logo in which the two
employ the symbol of nine stars, a globe, and Indonesian map. These visual elements indicate the
party’s (visual) act in perpetuating Islamic notions and affirm ambiguity in the coding system.
The above discussion of the logos demonstrates the contestation of the religious signs within the
Islamic camp. PPP as the party that declares itself as the Islamic one refuses to adopt the star
because they feel that it merely represents the New Order coercion of the party. PAN adopts
Muhammadiyah’s organisation logo (the sun)82, whereas PKB adopts NU’s logo (the nine stars)
omitting the Arabic words (Nahdlatul Ulama or the revival of Muslim Clerics), the image of rope
circling the globe, and accenting of Indonesia’s map as the centre of the globe. The proliferation of
meaning in the image of the star at one stage affirms Dienaputra’s argument that the star is no
longer associated with the nuances of Islamic culture and religion. However, the inclusive Islamic
parties’ deployment of the symbol shows that the sign’s fluidity of meaning attests the visual
correlation with the Indonesian (Islamic) religiosity.
The fluidity of meaning of the logo shows that the obscurity of ideological orientation within the
Islamic and nationalist camps is influenced by their political disposition. The state ideology,
Pancasila, which is embraced by PDI-P, Golkar, PKB, PAN, does not immediately position them as
nationalist. The historical background of PKB, for instance, constructs a perception that the party
belongs to the Islamic pole, as well as the Javanese and Java-based pole, due to PKB’s connection
with NU. As for PAN, Amin Rais’ (one of the key figures in PAN) background as the former
chairperson of Muhammadiyah makes the party appear on both sides of the antinomies: nationalist
and Islamic and non-Java base except for Yogyakarta, PAN’s power base. PDI-P and Golkar are
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PAN does not deploy the green sun as Muhammadiyah. This probably is due to the dual positions it
embraces. White is chosen as a neutral colour to represent the ambiguity.
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perceived as the nationalist parties with a Java and non-Java base. PPP, on the other hand, is
perceived as the consistent Islamic party.
The contestation manifest between the Islamic and nationalist parties re-emerged at the time MPR
had to elect the President and Vice President. Habibie’s success in conducting a “free” general
election with the support of many parties did not guarantee him success in his nomination as
President. Habibie withdrew his candidacy after MPR rejected his accountability speech, although he
successfully “liberalised” the country by restoring press freedom and releasing political prisoners.
Crouch (2010, pp. 132-136) argues that Habibie’s policy in allowing an East Timor referendum, which
humiliated the military, triggered his rejection along with the stigma previously mentioned. Although
Megawati’s party won the election, the election system did not allow her to become the President
immediately because Golkar’s and its later allies’ (the Central Axis Group led by Amien Rais, which
represented the Islamic parties such as PAN, PK, PBB) seats in the parliament outnumbered the PDIP’s. This event shows the clear-cut political map of Indonesia between the Nationalist/Islamic fronts,
especially when the Muslim legislative members at that time did not support Megawati as the
President due to her secular image. The choice then fell to Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) from PKB
who was perceived as a moderate Islamic nationalist but ambivalent in positioning himself either to
support Megawati or to accept his nomination. Megawati then became the Vice President (see
chapters seven and eight for further elaboration).
Gus Dur’s tenure was relatively short-lived. Suryadinata, (2002, p. 191) concluded that the allegation
of Gus Dur’s involvement in the scandals of Bulog83 gate and the donation from Sultan Brunei as well
as his perennially inconsistent political behaviour were the causal factors for his short-lived
administration. This is supported by Crouch (2010, pp. 136-140) who contends that the political
bargaining, especially between Gus Dur and the Central Axis Group which brought him into the
presidency, proved to be frail; his commitment to reform the military did not meet the majority of
military aspirations; and his dependence on his close associates and his unpredictable character
aggravated the situation (see chapter eight). These all led to critical contempt towards his
government. On 23 July 2001, MPR impeached Gus Dur and elected Megawati Soekarnoputri as the
fifth President to complete the remainder of Gus Dur’s term (up to October 2004).
IV.

The 2004 Election

The overt ideological contest between the Islamic and Nationalist fronts which re-emerged
especially during the Presidential Election in 1999 seemed to gradually disappear. The focus of the
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political parties was no longer on the ideological issues as in the 1950s but more on pragmatic
reasons for securing their position (especially for the large parties) as the 2004 election system
perpetuated the party’s oligarchy. It can be seen in the proportional system with the open list of the
candidate’s names on the ballot paper. Megawati’s government employed the system to
differentiate itself from the election law in Habibie’s era which used the proportional system with a
closed list. In the open list proportional system, any eligible person can nominate as the legislative
candidate. However, it does not mean that the large party’s domination is nullified because the
party still determines which candidate occupies the best ranking number on the list. This actually
was the pragmatic response to the Law no 12/2003 article 107 section 2 letter (b) which stipulates
that the decision to determine the elected candidate will be based on the requirement for the
candidate to achieve the minimum votes (minimum 30 per cent of Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih (BPP)
or the number of legal votes divided by the number of seats contested in one constituency). If s/he
cannot meet this requirement, the decision will be based on the ranking number in the list system
set by the political parties. Not only does this produce legislators who merely obey the party’s elites
(Haris, 2005; Kleden, 2005, p. xiii), but also reveals the similarities between the closed list and the
open list systems (Crouch, 2010, pp. 63-64).
Another slight modification was introduced in the voting system. In 1999 election, the voters
perforated the party symbols on the ballot paper using a nail provided in the voting booth. However,
in 2004 they were allowed to perforate the candidate’s number above the candidate’s photo and
the party’s symbol. If the electorate did not recognise any candidate on the list, s/he would be
allowed to perforate the party symbol on the ballot paper. If s/he only perforated the candidate’s
number, not the party symbol, it would be considered illegal. This slight difference was used to show
the hegemonic endeavour to plausibly accommodate democratic aspirations in the Reform era.
Megawati’s government perceived this as the representation of a (slightly) ‘transparent’ method.
Unfortunately the party’s actions in declining to open the temporary list of the candidates to the
public amplified the public’s skepticism regarding the governing bodies. This mechanism indicates
that the political parties and Megawati’s government not only half-heartedly reformed the system
but also attempted to perpetuate the system which represented the mode of power production in
the oligarchy of political parties.
The result of the 2004 general election was beyond Megawati’s expectations. The result of the
assembly election which was conducted on 5 April 2004 showed that Golkar obtained 21.58 per
cent, followed by PDI-P 18.53 per cent, PKB 10.57 per cent, PPP 8.15 per cent, Partai Demokrat (PD)
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7.45 per cent, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS84 or Prosperous Justice Party) 7.34 per cent, and PAN
6.44 per cent85. The result indicates that the nationalist parties still dominated the political realm.
The ratio between the Islamic and nationalist camps is (1: 1.5). This means that if three persons
chose the Islamic parties, then there would be five persons voting for the nationalists. Beside the
nationalist domination, Luwarso, et al. (2004, pp. 1-8) perceives Golkar’s victory over PDI-P as a
pragmatic, manipulative, yet meticulous political product. He further argues that Golkar astutely
observed the political arena in order to rehabilitate its image. It grabbed the moment when people
started to outgrow their interest in the utopianist promises of the so-called reformed parties. It
plausibly offered a secure place away from the fear of the re-emergence of “primordial” and
religious-based politics86. Golkar revived the New Order’s ideological jargon (security and prosperity)
and rebuilt its image by attaching the old negative image of the New Order to Soeharto’s family, its
former patron. Having the mass media tycoons as the party’s cadres such as Surya Paloh87 and
Aburizal Bakrie, Golkar largely utilised the mass media to rebuild its democratic image88 through
ceaseless live TV coverage. The party also used PDI-P’s political stagnation when PDI-P declared that
it would perpetuate the politics of Soekarno’s dynasty and nominate Megawati Soekarnoputri as the
party’s ultimate Presidential candidate. On the other hand, Golkar used a different strategy from
Megawati’s party. It ostensibly provided the opportunity for anyone who wished to become the
party’s Presidential candidate.
The two-round Presidential elections amplified Megawati’s loss in her battle. Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono (PD, Javanese) and Jusuf Kalla (Golkar, non Javanese), her two former ministers, beat her
and her running mate, Hasyim Muzadi, the former chairperson of Nahdlatul Ulama, in two
consecutive rounds. She gained a mere 26.24 per cent while Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono obtained
33.58 per cent in the first round. Since none of the two pairs obtained more than 50 per cent of the
votes, the second round of the Presidential election was conducted on 20 September 2004. The
result showed that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla gained 60.62 per cent whereas
Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi only obtained 39.38 per cent.89 It also indirectly supported
84
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Suryadinata’s claim (2002, p. 172) that the Indonesian people perceived Megawati’s image as similar
to Corazon Aquino, the former Philippine President, as the woman who suffered a long repression
from the prior government. People then turned aside after watching her poor achievements in
governing the country.
The second round of the 2004 general election also indicated the same thing. SBY-Kalla gained their
additional votes from Wiranto-Salahudin Wahid’s previous supporters and from Amien Rais-Siswono
Yudhohusodo’s supporters except for North Sumatra and Central Java who suddenly shifted their
support from Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi to SBY-Kalla. Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi gained additional
support from the Outer Islands of Maluku but lost their support in Java (Central Java) and Outer
Island (North Sumatra).
The 2004 election result especially indicated the ideological contest within the nationalist parties.
However, the party’s logos maintained the visual ideological contest. The following illustrates the
logo of the seven winning parties. However, since I have discussed Golkar, PDI-P, PKB, PPP and PAN’s
logos, I will concentrate on PD and PKS’ logos to indicate the contestation between the nationalist
and Islamic parties. It is seen as follows:

(source: Kompas, 14 July 2008)

Unlike the other winning nationalist parties (Golkar and PDI-P) which adopt the visual symbols from
Pancasila, PD designs its logo with blue colours to illustrate the party’s doctrines (nationalism,
humanism, and pluralism), represented by the three red and white points of the star. PD provides
guidance (the party’s statute article nine) on how to read the visual symbol. This indicates the
party’s attempt to direct and control the spectators to decode the intended meaning. The light and
dark blue colours are used to represent the party’s utopianist dream of Indonesia’s nation-state
building, which is depicted as fresh and peaceful (light blue). The dark blue is deployed to signify the
depth of the party’s struggle in achieving a democratic, just and prosperous society. The colours of
red and white correspond with the colours of Indonesia’s national flag. They connote the bravery
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and purity of the Indonesian struggle for independence. The deployment of these ‘sacred’
Indonesian colour qualities ostensibly coats the party’s struggle in upholding its doctrines and shows
an attempt to attach the ‘sacred’ quality to the party’s struggle. The red and white three pointed
star which represents the notions of nationalism, humanism, and pluralism does not arguably
succeed to connote the party’s doctrines as it does not completely resonate with the symbols of
Pancasila, PD’s ideology. The deployment of red and white colours which resonate with the national
flag became the sole visual attributes which seemingly associate with the party’s nationalist vision.
The official visual symbol that Pancasila90 employs to represent the humanist and pluralist spirit (the
second principle) is the seventeen-gold-ring chain. It represents not only the date of Indonesia’s
independence but also the humanist/pluralist concept of the people’s equality (the chain signifies
the equal position and the seventeen connotes the date of the independence). The star which is
conventionally referred to as the Indonesian notion of religiosity fails to acknowledge the pluralist
and humanistic elements of the party’s ideology. Thus, the image of the star is deployed to
represent PD’s nationalist notions of nationalism, humanism and pluralism, although it does not
resonate with the official symbol of Pancasila.
Unlike PD, PKS, as an Islamic party, deploys the visual logo which almost resembles the image of
ka’bah91 PPP employs. The visualisation of two four sided shapes (square and rectangle) which
contain the golden yellow written and visual texts of the party’s name and the Islamic and prosperity
symbols of the crescent and rice that are claimed to be associated with ka’bah, the central symbol of
Mecca. PKS’ ka’bah appears slightly obscured (ka’bah is perceived as a black shield) compared with
the overt ka’bah image of PPP. The black colour as the colour of the cloth that covers ka’bah in
Mecca is used to reinforce the party’s Islamic connection. However, unlike the inclusive Islamic
party, PKB, and the Islamic party, PPP, which deploys the green colour to signify Islamic prosperity,
PKS employed the golden yellow colour to represent the nation’s prosperity. Like the nationalist
party, PKS also deploys the rice plant to signify the notion of prosperity. The central position of a
string of golden rice signifies the central goal the party wishes to achieve. The rice stands alone with
the absence of the cotton’s image (much like the nationalist’s). It indicates PKS’ similar desire in
achieving the nation’s prosperity, but within an Islamic framework. The rice lies at the centre
between the golden yellow crescents inside ka’bah. The word sejahtera (prosperous) below the
image of the rice and crescents reinforce the notion of prosperity the party tries to inculcate.
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PD’s statute chapter 1 article 2 stated that ideological foundation of the party is Pancasila.
Article four of PKS’ statute depicts the party’s logo as the image of the two gold crescents with the upright
gold string of paddy lies in center of a black squre shield to represent ka’bah. Inside the top black rectangle is
the written gold text Partai Keadilan, whilst the word Sejahtera which is also written in gold lies inside the
ka’bah square.
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The image of ka’bah proliferates inside the Islamic camp. It no longer solely means representing the
cohesion of the Islamic camp (as in the case of PPP). It transforms it into an Islamic shield imbued
with the PKS (Islamic) image of prosperity (the golden rice and cotton). However, these two Islamic
parties cannot be seen as having a harmonious relationship. Febriyan (2012) notes that PPP’s
chairperson, Suryadharma Ali considered PKS and PAN not as “Islamic” parties and stated that PPP
attempted to unite the ummat under one roof at the commemoration day of PPP on 19 February
2012 at Istora Senayan, Jakarta92. The Islamic cohesion represented in ka’bah then emasculates the
signifying practices of Islamic religious symbols.
V.

The 2009 Legislative Election

The politics of images in the 2009 Election was marked by the judicial review of Law no. 10/2008,
article 214, concerning legislative elections for the House of Representative at the national,
provincial and municipal levels. Sudibjo (2009, pp. 5-21) argues that the decree brings a fundamental
change for it alters the design in the proportional system which reflects the mixture of the ranking
system of the legislative candidates set by the political parties to a system that is designed to give an
opportunity to the candidates who obtain the highest votes to win the chair. The new design
primarily focuses on the latter notion, i.e. the candidates who obtain the minimum 30 per cent of
votes of Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih (BPP) gets the ticket to parliament. This indicates the dilution of
the political party’s oligarchy since they seemed no longer determine who could occupy a seat in the
parliament.
This amended law is oriented towards the construction of the legislative candidates’ political
branding for it requires the candidates to present themselves directly to the public. Priyadi (2009,
pp. 22-29) argues that it also produces the politics of image construction which makes politicians
elude the substance of democracy. He found that the political parties’ tendency in disseminating
their messages circulates around their claims of achievement through the use of the following
mechanisms: their political messages are conveyed through the employment of statistical data to
reach the urban educated voters or symbolic narration to influence the voters’ emotion; they
promulgate the spirit of collectivism to affect the public’s disposition through the notion of
togetherness (which resonates with the family principle). It constructs a new set of cultural
meanings, especially in political advertising. The deployment of billboards for the first time marked
the emergence of the candidate’s politics of image in an outdoor media advertisement. It involves

92

See Febriyan. (2012, 19 February). Ajak Partai Islam Bergabung, PPP Tolak PKS dan PAN. Retrieved from
http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/02/19/078384965/Ajak-Partai-Islam-Bergabung-PPP-Tolak-PKS-danPAN

68

the strategy of appearance by masking themselves through the system of representation in order to
promulgate their ideology93.
The amendment of the law also brought to bear the phenomenon of celebrities and key party
figure’s siblings, relatives, and children as legislative candidates. Firmanzah (2010) and Tim Litbang
Kompas (2010) note the involvement of celebrities is used to boost a party’s votes. From 150
legislative members of PD in the 2009-2014 parliament, nine celebrities and key party figure’s sons
became legislative members. Among 106 legislative members of Partai Golkar, two celebrities
became legislative members. While from 94 legislative members of PDI-P, two celebrities and the
key party figure’s sibling, daughter, niece and husband became members. From 27 members of
Gerindra, two celebrities are noted as the legislative members. Of the total number (672 people)
nominated as the candidates to represent PAN, 5 per cent were celebrities. However, PAN gained 43
seats in the parliament and two celebrities are noted among the list. PPP or United Development
Party (37 legislative members) only has one celebrity in the cabinet. No celebrity occupies the seats
to represent PKB (27 members), PKS (57 members) and Hanura (19 members).
The celebrity’s participation itself cannot merely be perceived as a strategy to boost the votes for it
implies the value transfer in the utilisation of the celebrities’ social capital in order to affirm and
challenge the cornerstone of the party itself. The participation hopes to determine the party’s
success in the field of voting as it represents the success of the political advertising transaction.
However, this political espousal which constitutes the right and obligation as part of the game’s rules
in the political arena should also be followed by selecting and screening the right candidates to
construct and boost the party’s image. As previously noted, no standard rules are set on how to
select and screen the celebrities or the party’s members to be candidates. The ostensible political
closeness and appointment between the celebrities and the party’s elites seems likely to be the
determining factor in their nomination. However, it does not guarantee the existence of a fixed
recruitment pattern. For instance, Marissa Haque94, the legislative (celebrity) candidate from PPP in
the 2009 Assembly Election, admitted in her blog that her prior political involvement as the PDI-P’s
legislative member in 2004 was due to SBY’s implicit suggestion. It was suggested that as Megawati’s
former minister of political affairs, she be involved in the government ruling party. The suggestion
was made when she pursued her degree at Ohio University and became a reporter for the American93

See the discussion of this mechanism in chapters nine and ten.
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See Fawzi, M.H. (n.d). Marissa’s Political Activities. Retrieved from http://www.marissahaque.net/political/.
She was formerly known as an actress who later decided to pursue her master degree and later doctoral
degree. PDI-P’s discharge of her, according to her claim, was due to the plausibly unreasonable grounds.
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Indonesian Chamber of Commerce in New York. The implicit proposal from the government
representative indicates the plausible mechanism of targeting celebrities from a broad political
perspective. However, this proposition is not entirely accurate for if we scrutinize the background of
each celebrity who succeeded in winning a ticket to parliament, we will find that no overt
academic/social/political background strongly supports the argument. Even if it exists, the
candidates’ political background does not completely guarantee success. In the 2009 legislative
election, Marissa Haque, who claimed to be proposed by many parties, chose to join PPP as the
Islamic party’s legislative candidate. This shifting from the nationalist to the Islamic party indicates
not merely an ideological transformation and her strategy to regain her prior political power in the
legislative assembly arena, but also the degree of her astuteness in reading the political map in
Indonesia95. The proposal and ideological transformation indicates this affirmation and challenges
the party that seemingly positions itself as the cornerstone for the legislative candidates. Their
social/political relation, thus, is heavily defined by contingencies.
Santoso (2010, pp. xxiv-xxxvi) found that the iconic figures from the familial aristocracy who line up
beside the celebrities dominate the Indonesian political arena, especially at the national level. They
were from Soekarno’s, Wahid Hasyim’s96, Soeharto’s, and Sarwo Edhie’s97 clans. As for the local
(aristocrat) politicians, several families were noted to regulate several provinces/regencies. Yasin
Limpo’s family, one of Golkar’s doyens, controlled the South Sulawesi province for three
generations. R. Sugito Wiryohamijoyo’s family, the former PNI activist in Kendal, has dominated the
Central Java province’s politics for three generations. Tubagus Chasan Sochib’s clan, the chairperson
of Pendekar Banten98 and Banten Chamber of Commerce and Industry dominated this relatively new
province. Mulyadi Jayabaya’s family, the former chairman of Lebak Chamber of Commerce and the
recent head of Lebak regency in Banten, also dominated the region. Santoso (2010, pp. xxxvii-xxxix)
also found a slightly higher percentage of the legislative members (2009-2014) were from the
aristocracy line compared with the celebrities. The celebrities constitute about 3 per cent of the
House of Representatives while the figures who have aristocratic relation with either the former or
recent ex officio government officials and/or the key party’s figures in the House of Representatives
are around 4.8 per cent. However, this slight difference does not indicate the power contrast
between these two iconic groups. The aristocrats still control the arena while the celebrity legislative
members eminently rely on their political astuteness in order to retain their political status.
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She lost her nomination.
The founder of Nahdlatul Ulama.
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SBY’s father-in-law.
98
A communal martial art organisation in Banten.
96
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This familial aristocracy that produces social/political capital offers a more solid ground for political
perpetuation in Indonesia. It also operates as the celebrity’s social capital value transfer. The
symbolic exchange occurs when the big names they inherit become the determining factor in the
party’s success. A classic example can be drawn from the PDI-P phenomenon in its incapacity to
detach the party’s image from Soekarno’s clan. As previously noted, in the 1999 election Megawati
benefitted from her father’s name as a revolutionary figure and as the people’s collective symbol to
counter Soeharto’s regime. She also enjoyed a plausible and solid hegemonic position, especially
when the party declared that the chance to replace Megawati as the party’s presidential candidate
with the other candidate was nil. However, as the euphoria of overthrowing Soeharto’s dictatorship
gradually diluted, this symbolic value transfer and exchange seemed to lose its social enchantment.
PDI-P’s votes gradually declined in the 2004 and 2009 elections.
The 2009 legislative assembly election was conducted on 9 April 2009 and 171 million people
participated. Thirty eight political parties participated in the Election but only nine parties met the
parliamentary threshold (2.5 per cent). They were PD (20.85 per cent or 150 seats), Golkar (14.45
per cent or 107 seats), PDI-P (14.03 per cent or 95 seats), PKS (7.89 per cent or 57 seats), PAN (6.01
per cent or 43 seats), PPP (5.32 per cent or 37 seats), PKB (4.94 per cent or 27 seats), Gerindra (4.46
per cent or 26 seats), Hanura (3.77 per cent or 18 seats). These groups fought over the 560 seats in
the House of Representative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or People’s Representative Council), 132
seats for Regional Representative Council (DPD – Dewan Perwakilan Daerah), and Regional People’s
Representative Council (DPRD – Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah).
PD obtained its highest votes from five provinces in Java, except Central Java. In Jakarta PD obtained
31.59 per cent from the total number of 521,735 voters. In East Java province, the province with the
highest number of the voters (29,514,290 voters), PD gained 21.99 per cent. PD also secured its
place in West Java province (24.82 per cent), the second largest province with 29,002,479 voters. In
Banten (6,581,587 voters) and Yogyakarta (2,751,761 voters), PD secured its place 22.65 per cent
and 18.7 per cent consecutively. PDI-P dominated the third largest province of voters (26,190,629
voters), Central Java. It also dominated Bali (30.08 per cent) with the total number 2,667,065 of
voters. The second winning party, Golkar, obtained its highest votes (25.1 per cent) in South
Sulawesi which has 5,630,977 voters. This former ruling party dominated the Outer Islands such as
Sumatra, Kalimantan, Papua and Maluku and also Nusa Tenggara Timur. The resulting percentages
seem to prove the simple proposition that the one who dominates Java will likely win the election.
The result shows that the amount of the total support for the nationalist bloc (57.56 per cent from
PD, Golkar, PDI-P, Gerindra, and Hanura) escalated 21.03 per cent from the 2004 Assembly Election
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whereas the decreasing number for Islamic parties’ total support (24.15 per cent) reached 25.7 per
cent. The ratio between Islamic/Nationalist is (1:2.4). However, the result cannot be inferred to
assume that the phenomenon guaranteed the re-emergence of the overt ideological cleavage as in
previous elections. It can be argued that the 2009 election heavily exalted the politics of image. The
Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese polarisations seemingly found a new channel for
image construction, especially for the party’s key figures. The PPP’s Vice Secretary General,
Romahurmuziy argues in Kompas (“Golkar Optimis Partai Berbasis Islam Tak Terganggu Partai
Baru”, 2011) that the politics of the party’s key figures was the far-reaching factor for winning the
election. Papua and Sulawesi were examples where the religious-based parties no longer became
the determining basis for voting. This was due to the local culture which exalted the local community
figure. People would follow the party in which their figure was involved (Sugiya, 2009 and
Nainggolan, 2009). The result also indicates that Golkar dominated these two Outer Islands.
Although the cleavages seemed to attenuate in the 2009 election, they still existed in the party’s
logo. No alteration in the content of the Law no 10/2008 Article 10, which regulates the visualisation
of the party’s logo, was made in order to differentiate itself from the previous law in the 2004
general election (Law no. 12/2003 Article 8). The same rule is still enacted due to Soeharto’s
successful obliteration of the visual political threat in the party’s logo. The parties employ the slightly
different visual pattern in their logos to connote their identity. As noted previously, the (inclusive)
Islamic camp consistently deploy the Islamic (nationalist) visual elements such as the stars, ka’bah,
sun, globe, Indonesia’s map, blue, green, yellow/gold and black colours. The nationalist camps (PDI-P
and Golkar) also adhere with the Pancasila visual symbols. Gerindra seems to follow suit by exerting
the national emblem, Garuda, as part of the visual elements in Pancasila. PD deploys a different
strategy (the three-pointed star and blue colours) in demonstrating its nationalist identity. Like PD,
Hanura deploys the visual elements by not adopting them from Pancasila. They are as follows:

(source: Kompas, 14 July 2008)

Unlike Golkar and PDI-P, which employ the visual symbols illuminating the third and the fifth
principles of Pancasila (Golkar) and the fourth principle (PDI-P), Gerindra deploys the upper part of
Garuda (the head and neck) to signify its identity. The underlying philosophy of this national
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emblem derives from Hinduism. The bird which denotes Wisnu’s vehicle, the Hindu God of
preservation, connotes benevolence/beneficence, knowledge, power, bravery, loyalty and
discipline. In employing this symbol, it can be argued that these are the values that the party wants
to incorporate. In Indonesia, the colour of gold is conventionally used to signify the notion of
prosperity. At this stage, we find a similar usage of gold as the prosperity colour in Gerindra, the
nationalist party, and PKS, the Islamic party. This visual iconography shows not only the crossroads
of the party’s prosperity symbol but also elucidates the same conventions in perceiving the concept
of national prosperity. Like the national emblem, Gerindra’s bird also faces to the right. As the
direction of right is conventionally perceived as indicating the “positive”/”correct” direction, the
position of Gerindra’s bird bears the meaning of the consistent struggle to achieve the quality the
symbol represents . Adopting the red and white of the national flag which connotes bravery and
purity, the white background colour the party uses signifies the pure/sincere/clean struggle to
achieve national prosperity. Gerindra’s statute provides the written guidance in reading the party’s
visual symbol. The seventeen feathers in the neck denote the date of Indonesia’s independence.
The crest feathers (eight feathers) define the month of the Independence whereas the four-side
square and five-side pentagon denote the year. It thus configures 17-8-45. This visuality reinforces
the nationalist identity (as with Pancasila) the party constructs.
Hanura deploys the image of an arrow to connote the linear left to right movement in which the
party wishes to progress. Using a similar perspective to Gerindra’s, as Hanura’s slogan becomes the
core part of the party’s name, i.e. people’s conscience, the horizontal movement of the arrow (to
the right) indicates that the party will arguably bring the conscience to the “correct” progress of the
nation (determined by the party). The light brown colour, which signifies the colour of the soil,
becomes the target of the arrow. This can also be seen as Hanura’s target of achieving the people’s
prosperity through a consistent linear regularity in progress. It resonates with the chronological
structure of the military99 which indicates a rigid pattern to achieve progress. Thus, in order to
achieve prosperity as the main goal, one should adhere to rigid chronological procedures. Any
deviation will jeopardise this targeted progress. As in Pancasila discourse, the colour of red signifies
bravery, the red colour in the arrow’s body in which the name of the party is written affirms the
embodiment of military bravery inside Hanura. Furthermore, the absence of a vertical line seems to
connote the absence of the first principle in Pancasila, Belief in One Almighty God. The omission of
transcendence not only indicates the party’s negation of the notion of God’s transcendence in the
progress towards the national prosperity, but also demonstrates that the efforts in achieving the
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Wiranto, Hanura’s key figure, was the former Soeharto’s adjutant and commander-in-chief of the Armed
Forces (see chapter seven for further elaboration).

73

progress must come under one straight command. However, although at this stage the absence of
the vertical line in this reading suggests the negation of the transendence notion, this does not mean
that it indicates the absence of the notion itself. The notion emerges in the party’s doctrine (see
chapter seven, Hanura section). Hanura also uses the white background colour of the arrow to
connote the pure, clean struggle of the party.
Some points can be drawn as a conclusion in illuminating the Indonesian political arena. First, the
arena (in this case the symbolic one, such as the parties’ symbols) offers a signpost of which
direction the political parties take in the process of position-taking and the taken position. It is a
road sign that directs the parties to the multiplicity of courses which represent the proliferation of
meanings due to the contestation and synthesis of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese
binaries as the two dichotomies intertwine with one another. Not only does the pervasive Javanese
culture (Pancasila is heavily influenced by Javanese paternalistic culture, see chapter six) arguably
allow the synthesis as well as the contestation in order to maintain the equilibrium, but it also puts
the parties in a position of ambiguity. They cannot claim themselves as belonging to one camp solely
because, as the signifying practices in the party’s logo show, the free-play of signs (such as
Islamic/Nationalist) not only contest but also proliferate in the discursive ideological debate
especially surrounding the state ideology, Pancasila. Thus, we cannot perceive Golkar, for instance,
as representing the nationalist camp per se, as reflected on the logo, for the party built Majelis
Dakwah Islamiyah (Islamic Missionary Council) as a wing organisation that represent its Islamic
(nationalist) orientation.
Secondly, transformation of the party’s logo delineates the proliferation as well as the fluidity of
meaning. From this, we can infer that both nationalist and Islamic camps are in ambiguous positions
in their symbolic exchange. The nationalist faction, which appears to deploy the nationalist visual
images mostly adopted from Pancasila (the banyan tree, buffalo’s head, rice and cotton, garuda),
cannot completely detach itself from the star-shapes image that conventionally connote the
Indonesian notion of religiosity, generally the Islamic one. PD’s logo avers to be one of the examples
that deploy the star-shaped image to illuminate its three nationalist pillars: nationalism, humanism,
and pluralism. As Dienaputra (2011) argues that the image of star the parties used in the first
election up to the 2004 elections closely correlated with the notion of religiosity, having the starshaped image PD positions itself as a nationalist-religious party as written in the party’s statutes.
The (inclusive) Islamic camp is also entrapped in the ambiguity of its political position. PKB and PAN
are the ones that indirectly state their ambiguous position. However, the inclusive notion they
deploy as the party’s characteristic overtly put them in an ambiguous situation. Their logo affirms
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such positioning as they both visually represent the nationalist notion within an Islamic framework.
The Islamic party, PKS, encapsulates the visual ambiguity. The presence of rice and cotton in PKS’
logo seem to be analogous to the nationalist notion of prosperity, gotong royong and kekeluargaan.
The gold colour of the rice and cotton images signifies not the Islamic nuance, but more so the
nationalist one (the colour of gold is within the family resemblance of the yellow rice in Golkar). PPP
seems to be the solid one that is able to detach itself from such (visual) ambiguity.
Thirdly, Pancasila becomes an ideological tie that not merely synthesises the Islamic/Nationalist and
Javanese/non Javanese strands, but also encapsulates the multiplicity of meanings which can be
seen from the signifying practices of the visual signs in the parties’ logos. Both Islamic/Nationalist
camps adopt the (nationalist/religious) values from Pancasila to represent their political identity and
positioning. This cultural strategy aims to reinforce the visual credibility of the party’s
visual/ideological representation, i.e. through the logo. However, the credibility dilutes itself
because Pancasila arguably represents not only the local wisdom but also the ideological ambiguity
of the nationalist/religious sides.
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PART III
THE POLITICAL BRANDING OF THE NINE WINNING PARTIES

Introduction
Part II portrayed the ideological debate within Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese
polarisations as reflected in the parties’ logos. The debate continues to circulate on the billboards,
especially in the slogans the parties and the candidates employ (represented by the visual and
written expressions). The slogans reflect forms of branding as they constitute brand markers. Part III
goes on to discuss the branding the parties construct via the slogans and platforms as stated on their
statutes. Firmanzah (2008, pp. 74-82) argues that the statutes represent the party’s blueprint as
they explicate the vision and mission as the party’s cardinal objective and the background behind
the party’s establishment. The blueprint offers an in-depth look at the party’s ideological
characteristics and framework. Positioning the statutes at the centre or at the point of departure to
investigate the parties’ political branding affirms the significance of the statutes’ own right as
intangible and as symbolic political products to referring to the discursive practices in the political
world. The analysis of the political branding will demonstrate the fluidity of the ideological (textual)
constructions in the parties’ statutes as grand narratives. The analysis will be organised not based on
the order of winning of the party in the legislative election of 2009, but on the factions they belong
to (see chapter five). The discussion will lead to position the nationalist and Islamic parties in
regards to how they construct their political branding. The branding will demonstrate how the
parties from the nationalist faction distinguish themselves from the Islamic one by analysing the
identity markers they used. Prior to that, I will analyse each party’s branding and later compare and
contrast them.
Firmanzah (2008, pp. 35-43) argues that positioning the statutes as the point of departure will
position the voters as mere research objects. He equates the way the political elites disseminate the
party’s ideology to society (top-down communication pattern) with the pattern the political
marketing research uses when it chooses to concentrate solely on the party’s ideology. They both
marginalise and position the voters as mere political (research) objects. Conversely, if the basis of
the discussion is on the work programs, the voters will be the subjects. However, since my research
is not about political marketing and as few billboards are found stating the work program of the
candidates/the parties as written expressions (see chapters nine and ten), the discussion will not
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position the voters as objects. The voters do not play important roles in this study because it aims to
assess how the candidates’ billboards represent their dispositions and parties’ ideologies.
Below is a summary of the political parties’ slogans and platforms adopted from Firmanzah (2010)
that illustrates the nine parties’ different branding. They are also the products of the parties’
statutes translation.
Name of
the party

PD

Golkar

PDI P

PKS

PAN

PPP

PKB

Gerindr
a

Hanura

Slogan

Continue!

Giving
Evidence
not
Promises,
The
Sooner
the Better

The
Grassroot
s’ Party

Caring,
Clean,
Professio
nal

Life is
Action

Together
revive to
make a
change

Defendi
ng the
Right
One

Towards
a Better
Change

People’s
Conscie
nce

Platform

Reducing
poverty
and the
country’s
debt

Law
supremac
y,
ekonomi
kerakyata
n,
nationalis
m,
pluralism

supervisin
g BLT,
people’s
prosperity
, cheap
price of
the staple
foods,
creating
millions of
jobs

Clean
governan
ce

“educati
on for
free”
program
and 1.5
trillion
rupiah
for the
underde
veloped
villages

Reinforcin
g UMKM,
“educatio
n and
public
health
services
for free”
programs,
the draft
of Halal
Assurance
Law,
Custom
and
Tradition
Law, and
Islamic
banking

“easy
and
comfort
able
access
to
public
services
” and
“prospe
ring the
people”
program
s

ekonomi
kerakya
tan,
fighting
against
poverty,
accentin
g smallscale
business
,
indepen
dence
for the
energy
sector,
educati
on and
health

the
econom
ic
reform,c
heap
but
good
educati
on

The table indicates that the nine winning parties employed similar themes in their campaign. All of
them were about how to reduce poverty and increase the prosperity of the same sectors: economic,
social, education, and political. For instance, a similar construction of the Indonesian economic
system under the banner of ekonomi kerakyatan was employed by both Nationalist and Islamic
factions in their platforms. An examination of the similarities and differences between the parties’
platform (such as the platform of ekonomi kerakyatan) and slogans in the statutes are needed in
order to assess the textual construction of the parties’ blueprints.
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This similar economic platform, which reflects the ideological ambiguity of the factions, does not
connote that the candidates from the same faction, let alone the party, share the same position as
they have to establish differentiation markers in their image (read: identity) construction. Although
Foucault (1989) argues that the same group bears a similar coherence and affinity in structures,
identities and rules, this does not mean that the similarities put them in an ossified position. The
similar visual/written expression on the billboard reveals different tactics. The use of logos and the
parties’ role models as the brand markers in the same factional line/position on the billboards, for
instance, forge an unstable relation as they need to establish differentiation in their position in order
to create visual credibility. The logos and key figures cannot be seen as correlating with one fixed
ideological meaning (the representation of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese camps).
The interrelation of meanings in the signifying practices produces the variants in the polarisations. It
indicates that the position-taking is not always consistent with the position taken.
Returning to the compliance of the candidates’ slogans with the party’s vision and mission, the
examination of the form of branding is also conducted by limiting the discussion to how the
Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands in the party’s vision and mission stated on
their statutes circulate. The presence of ethnocentric (Javanese/non-Javanese) polarisation barely
exists on the statute as it reflects the parties’ visionary plans which are arguably free from ethnosymbolism and/or ethno-orientation. However, although Pancasila is influenced by Javanese culture
(see chapter six) and the parties from both factions arguably adopt Pancasila democratic values on
their statutes, the overt presence of Javanese/non Javanese polarisation emerge primarily
embodying cultural political elements that colour the socio-political practices of the parties, the key
figures and the candidates.
Part III aims to analyse these forms of branding. This is conducted by examining the mechanisms by
which the parties’ image constructions operate, deploying the Bourdieuan lenses of dispositions
(habitus), field and capital. The analysis aims to assess how the symbolic exchange occurs based on
the parties’ slogans and platforms. This is thus organised by scrutinising Pancasila, the image of the
nine winning parties and their key figures. As Bourdieu (1977, 1986, 1990a, 1990b, 1993) suggests,
the examination of the key figures’ images begins by investigating the elements of habitus:
education, experience, history and past and present socio-political practices. These subjective
elements will show how the parties’ and the key figures’ identity constructions are moulded. This
will later define the scope of how these images influence the candidates’ position-taking and the
position taken. However, since not all parties completely rely on their key figures (due to the
absence of paternalist role models inside the parties or the pragmatic ideals they uphold, the
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analysis is confined to the political branding of the parties in relation to their key figures (if any) in
the 2009 legislative election.
The procedure starts by investigating what lies behind Pancasila to delineate the political
dispositions of Nationalist/Islamic parties. The two factions perceive Pancasila quite differently. The
former adopts it as ossified values while the latter sees it as an accommodating entity representing a
political compromise (Wahid, 1994, pp. 151-155) that can bridge the ideological discrepancy
between the Islamic and nationalist camps. Pancasila itself, according to Reeve (1985), Bourchier
(1997) and Mulder (1994), represents Indonesian (Javanese) “personality” or “soul”.
Thus, Part III is organised into three chapters. The first one addresses Pancasila not merely as the
state ideology but more importantly as the ideological framework that “regulates” the synthesis and
contestation of the Islamic and Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands in the politics of
image of the nine winning parties and their central figures. The second one examines the political
branding of the nationalist parties whilst the third one the Islamic parties. The last section of the
third chapter compares the political branding of the nationalist and Islamic parties.
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Chapter Six
Pancasila
This chapter aims to outline Pancasila’s ideological principles that encapsulate Indonesian
(nationalist) ideals of religiosity, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy and social justice. These
principles became the ideological basis of the parties, the key figures, and the candidates in their
image construction. As an inclusive ideological framework, Pancasila’s principles allow them to be in
an ambiguous and fluid position as these principles operate based on a “neither-nor” ideological
basis (Somantri, 2006). Pancasila neither negates nor fuses the ideological differences/similarities of
the Islamic/Nationalist factions. The state’s motto of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity), which
is placed under garuda’s image, represents that Pancasila provides a shelter for ideological
differences and similarities to live side by side. Below is the image of Garuda Pancasila and the
state’s motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.

Source: http://ideologipancasila.files.wordpress.com/2007/06/garuda-indonesia.jpg

Latif (2011) argues that the bird (Garuda Pancasila) symbolically represents the Indonesian code of
civic nationalism in that it becomes the static foundation (represented by the shield) of the dynamic
five guiding principles underpinning the concept of Indonesia’s nation-state. This means that the bird
represents a solid ground containing five ideological principles of Pancasila. The visual symbols in
the shield, as discussed in chapter five, represent the dynamic characteristic of the principles that
allows ideological ambiguity to exist in both Islamic and Nationalist factions. In other words,
Pancasila functions as the code of nationalism that ideologically regulates the politics of image of
the parties, the key figures and the candidates within this inclusive/ambiguous nationalist
framework.
As this chapter does not aim to position Pancasila as an ideological site that represents the sociopolitical dynamic in Indonesia, it is not organised based on the historical moments of its birth to the
present day (the Reform era). Rather it explores the ideological meanings of each principle that
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illuminate the mechanism of how these principles work as the model for democracy. By this, the
discussion is organised in a narrative form outlining these principles.
As noted in chapter five, Pancasila constitutes the model of democracy that synthesise musyawarah
(deliberation), mufakat (consensus), gotong royong (mutual asistance), and kekeluargaan (family
principle), collectivism, and kerukunan (social harmony) as the national wisdom. The wisdom reflects
a nationalist idea for the Indonesian model of the nation-state together with the fervent Javanese
socialist influence of its founding figures. Reeve (1985, pp. 1-57) contends that the family principle
and collectivism as the essences of Pancasila stem from the four founding figures: Ki Hajar
Dewantara, Supomo, Soekarno, and Mohammad Hatta. He found that these figures’ thinking forged
a concentric pattern illuminating the democratic values behind Pancasila. As part of a family
structure one is bound with family principles. Due to Dewantara’s position as the prince of the
second royal house which influenced his disposition, he used Javanese priyayi (aristocrat)
paternalistic family principles as the basis of his proposition. As mentioned in chapter I, the nurturing
concept between the father and the children in the family is parallel with the nurturing concept of
Javanese kings towards their people: the obligation of the father (the king) to nurture the children
(the people) are transacted with the absolute obligation of the children to obey the father
(Adityawan, 2008, p. 81). As each family member has the same rights with different tasks, it makes
putting the common interest above the individual inalienable for it represents ‘the unity of interest,
strengths and soul’ (Dewantara, 1967, p. 167). It is achieved through democratic means of sharing
burden/mutual assistance (gotong-royong), deliberation (musyawarah), consensus (mufakat) in
order to achieve kerukunan (family/social harmony). The family principle also indirectly defines
Indonesia’s humanistic values (like the above family/social just) that equate with the union of
kawula (the servant/the ruled/the children) and gusti (the master/the ruler/the father)100 in order to
achieve peace and order. The union indicates that the king (gusti) bears people’s mandate which
legitimises his transcendent power (in Mulder’s term (1994, p. 63-64) “the quasi-religious status”)
based on the divine inspiration (wahyu) he received.
Supomo (1952) supports the argument by asserting that these “domestic” principles are embedded
in the local traditions for he found a systematic conformity amongst ethnic groups in Indonesia.
Supomo (in Reeve, 1985, p. 22) asserts that “[i]n adat law it is not the individual who is primary, but
society...the life of an individual is a life whose primary purpose is to serve society...[that] is not felt
as the burdens...[because] the social obligations are no other than the most appropriate functions of
human life”. Society as a unit regulates its members who are circumscribed by the same ideological
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bond. Their positions in the unit structure enable them to acquire legal power to exercise their
function and to gain free rights within the limit of their function and situation. Due to their position,
their obligations to society are not seen as burdens but as appropriate responsibilities. Gotong
royong (mutual assistance) is exercised in order to share the burden so that kerukunan (harmony)
can be achieved. Deliberation and consensus will resolve disputes resulting from exercising those
rights. However, Mulder (1994, pp. 57-71) argues that this regal doctrine makes the country a
“family” institution in which it codifies not only the absolute obligation to obey the parents (the
father/the king/gusti) as the caretaker and guardian of the family/the nation/kawula but also
protects the common interest from those who do not comply with the family code.
Soekarno (1963, p. 187) developed Supomo’s and Dewantara’s ideals of the family principle or
collectivism into the concept of socio-nationalism which values gotong royong as the essential
character in Pancasila. Latif (2011, p. 19) notes that the term socio-nationalism stems from
Soekarno’s viewpoint that the five principles in Pancasila lead to one cardinal goal, i.e. achieving
collective harmony (kerukunan) and prosperity by upholding gotong royong ideal in Pancasila’s five
principles. Gotong royong is embodied in the first principle, which reflects the concept of Indonesia’s
religiosity, in the form of religious tolerance among different religious adherents. Gotong royong
resides in the humanitarian principles of the second principle as anti-imperialism and anticolonialism. The motto of “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” (Unity in Diversity) which reflects the essence of
the third principle (the nation’s integrity) foregrounds the spirit of mutual assistance. Gotong royong
is also reflected as the ideal that upholds musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus) as the
essential characters of Pancasila’s democratic principles (the fourth principle). Gotong royong
resides in the fifth principle that reflects Indonesia’s principle of upholding social justice and the
nation’s prosperity. Thus, Soekarno’s socio-nationalism arguably demonstrates interdependency of
the ideological notions which are cemented in mainstream Indonesian society.
Latif (2011, p. 17) also found that the etymology of Pancasila was strongly influenced by Soekarno’s
disposition. The words “Panca” and “Sila” derive from Sanskrit which mean five principles. The
language used does not merely connote an indication of certain cultural influence (in this case
Indian) in the country, but also shows that its usage later signifies a mixture of cultural influences. In
1945 Soekarno especially associated the word “panca” (five) with the other five religious/cultural
principles which greatly influence Indonesian culture. He started associating panca by juxtaposing
the concept with five Islamic pillars, five fingers of human hand, Pandawa Lima (five Javanese
wayang pupets/pandavas adopted from Mahabharata, an Indian epic), Javanese tradition of five
bans (Mo-Limo: maling (stealing), madat (consuming illegal drugs), main (gambling), minum
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(intoxication), madon (womanising), and Panca Dharma (five actions/obligations of Chuo Sang In or
Central Advisory Council in Japanese occupation and of Taman Siswa or Javanese educational
movement initiated by Ki Hajar Dewantara). The association does not merely indicate that Soekarno
perceived panca as a “sacred” number which is closely correlated especially with Islamism, Javanese
culture, Hinduism, and possibly Indian culture. It also demonstrates that associating Pancasila with
other cultural/religious values gives a degree of flexibility in interpreting this shared belief. Pancasila
cannot be seen as a close rigid system because the association implies a correlation with nonarbitrary cultural/religious constructs. This also indirectly affirms a pervasive Javanese and/or
religious influence within the concept of socio-nationalism in Pancasila. When Soekarno formulated
this ideal as the basis for his nationalist concept, Hatta developed the ideal as the basis of
Indonesia’s socialist economic concept known as ekonomi kerakyatan. Reeve (1985, pp. 36-40) notes
that Hatta draws the concept from Indonesia’s village democratic principle of mutual cooperation.
This principle is adopted and translated especially in Article 33 of the amended 1945 Constitution,
that stipulates: the system concentrates on people’s power based on the family principle
(kekeluargaan); the state controls all productive enterprises that are essential to the lives of the
majority of people; and the economic principles of collectivism, sustainability, justice, efficiency,
independence, environment-oriented, and equilibrium are upheld. This Article indirectly means that
Indonesia’s economic system is seen as a collective attempt with the family principle as its
ideological basis. Swasono101 argues that the family principle does not equate with a kinship system
for the term reflects the spirit of social solidarity and collectivism to empower people (especially the
middle-lower class). He found that kekeluargaan was deployed by the founding fathers as the
antithesis of individualism, the basis of the Dutch colonial economic system. The state’s control of
productive enterprises does not directly indicate state domination of economic means. Mubyarto
(1994) perceives the state control of essential economic enterprises as an attempt to empower
small-middle scale businesses to compete with conglomerates. People who own small to middle
scale businesses are encouraged to expand their business by using government initiatives through
UKM (Usaha Kecil dan Menengah or small and medium sized enterprises) programs. This
empowerment will encourage people’s emancipation in developing and managing economic
resources. By this mean, it is expected that social prosperity can be achieved and equally distributed.
Ekonomi kerakyatan is thus seen as the embodiment of Pancasila’s economic system.
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See Swasono, S.E. (n.d). Pasal 33 UUD 45 Harus Dipertahankan, Jangan Dirubah, Boleh Ditambah Ayat.
Retrieved from www.bappenas.go.id/get-file-server/node/8578/
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In an alignment with the founding fathers, Latif (2011) and Rahardjo (2011) assert that the Pancasila
democracy is arguably perceived as similar to “impersonal” public and state laws. Pancasila does not
refer to any religious law and system because it functions as an ideological compass that constructs
the nation’s identity as previously noted. Latif (2011, pp. 42-43; 55-121) found that the first principle
of Pancasila, which represents Indonesia’s religiosity, positions the state and religion, not as
separate entities, but as an inclusive one. It means that the state and the religion are in dual
positions in which the state does not dominate or fuse with religion, but sustains pluralism and
multiculturalism within a religious context. The second principle (kemanusiaan yang adil dan
beradab or just and civilized humanitarianism) encapsulates egalitarian humanistic notions that
uphold the shared socio-morality of Indonesian society. The third principle represents Indonesia’s
integrity which, according to Latif (2011, pp. 358-368), reflects a melting pot conception and which
represents a political nationalism rather than a cultural one. Indonesia as a state was built with a
united spirit to fight against colonialisation. It does not represent a certain ethnic consciousness, let
alone domination of one by another. However, if we perceive the solidity of the ethnic groups in
Indonesia as melting in one imaginary pot called the nation’s integrity, we will find that the
dissolving process in one pot merely dilutes the essence of the state’s motto itself, Bhinneka Tunggal
Ika (Unity in Diversity/Diversity in Unity). Although Latif (2011) considers that Pancasila’s melting pot
concept contained cosmopolitan and pluralist values, the concept does not show an integral sense of
acknowledging ethnic groups’ distinctive rights in the public sphere because the melting pot merely
leads to the fusion of ethnic and cultural diversity in the framework of hybrid identity. Pancasila
stands on both sides. It affirms the pluralist notion of distinctive rights of each ethnic group (the
egalitarian ideal) while acknowledging the hybridity of cultural identity. The fourth principle
(kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan or
popular sovereignty arrived at through deliberation and representation or consultative democracy)
represents Pancasila democratic notion which encapsulates harmony between two governing
aspects: politics and economy, as previously discussed. Latif (2011, pp. 458-459) argues that the
family principle (kekeluargaan) is needed to balance the pluralist aspects of the socio-cultural with
the socio-economic which is achieved by democratic processes of musyawarah (deliberation) and
mufakat (consensus). The fifth principle (keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia or social
justice for all Indonesia’s people) reflects the concept of an equitable socio-economic democracy as
discussed earlier.
These notions in their entirety become the basis for the politics of image for the nine parties and the
candidates as they, without exception, adopt Pancasila on their billboards. The billboards
demonstrate that Pancasila democratic principles appear in all forms of visual and written
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expressions of the billboards, including the images of the parties’ key figures. The key figures
represent not only their personal images but also the images of the parties. These images narrate
the system of representation that is framed in Pancasila as the working ideology of the state. The
next chapter will demonstrate how Pancasila operates in the branding of the parties which is heavily
relied upon in the politics of image of the key figures.
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Chapter Seven
The Political Branding of the Nationalist Parties
This chapter focuses on how the socio-political practices of the nationalist parties and their key
figures represent Pancasila as the form of their political branding. This chapter analyses the branding
of PD, Golkar, PDI-P, Gerindra and Hanura. This organisation is based on the vote percentage of
these nationalist parties. Gerindra and Hanura occupy alternately in the last two places, below the
Islamic party’s votes, PKB. However, the analysis based on the parties’ factions will elucidate the
subtle differences in their political branding as nationalist parties.
Partai Demokrat (PD) or Democratic Party
As the party of the incumbent President, PD’s political branding has never been dissociated from the
image of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the “well-mannered General” (Denny, J.A., 2006, pp. 5356). This can be seen from PD’s history from its establishment. This stems from the loss of SBY, the
former Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs under Megawati’s administration, to become
the Vice Presidential candidate in the 2001 MPR session, even though his popularity rose in the
public. On a mission to make this retired General the President, PD was established as his political
machine. SBY’s date of birth (9 September 1949) was deployed to mark the date of the party’s
establishment. On 9 September 2001 (9/9 2001), forty six political elites out of ninety nine (99)102
who declared themselves as the party’s founders, signed the party’s establishment certificate in
front of a notary at Graha Pratama Building 9th floor, Jakarta. The perennial deployment of this
number (9 or 99) arguably affirms that the cardinal objective of PD is to become SBY’s political
machine; and that the number(s) can also be perceived as a representation of the party’s heavy
reliance on SBY’s Javanese image and also Javanese mysticism103. SBY’s date of birth is a marker of
the party’s fortune and life path (Hisyam, 2004, p. 142-143).

Besides this Javanese influence, the polarisations of Muslim/non-Muslim and Javanese/nonJavanese circulated as they became the core criteria in deciding the candidates for PD’s chairperson
(Javanese Muslim) and secretary general (non-Javanese Christian) in the phase of PD’s
establishment104. This can arguably be seen as the embodiment of the party’s pluralist (inclusive?)
102

The law on political party stipulates that minimum 50 people are needed to sign a party’s establishment
certificate. However, instead of 50, 99 people were willing to be the party’s founders. The number of people
(99) was designed to align with SBY’s date of birth.
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In Javanese culture, it is believed that every (special) occasion should be held based on tanggal baik, a
numerical key in form of a date that will sketch one’s fortune and influence one’s life path.
104
See sejarah pembentukan dan berdirinya partai demokrat (the history of the democratic party’s
establishment) at http://www.demokrat.or.id/.
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ideals along with PD’s core ideological notions of nationalism, humanitarianism, and
internationalism on the basis of believing in one God (the first principle of Pancasila).105

PD’s history records that the establishment of the party was based on the political intention to make
SBY President, the preamble of the statutes does not demonstrate the same understanding. It shows
that PD was established as a political reaction against the chaotic situation during Soeharto’s
downfall. The situation was construed as a misappropriation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution
though Soeharto made Pancasila the state’s sole ideology (see chapter five). PD perceives that the
situation can be restored by upholding the three ideological notions of nationalism,
humanitarianism, and pluralism. These three notions, according to the party, became the ideological
characteristics that distinguish PD, especially from other nationalist parties.

As noted in chapter five, PD’s nationalism is constructed as congruent with Pancasila’s nationalism.
It is arguably aligned with the second princple (humanitarianism), the third principle (the nation’s
integrity) and the first principle (religiosity) of Pancasila. Article 3 of the statute stipulates PD’s
ideology (“nationalist-religious”) which indicates PD’s ambiguity in defining its political identity. This
is reinforced by Article 9 sub section (c) that defines pluralism as closely related to nationalism and
that reflects the concept of Pancasila’s socio-cultural hybridity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). However, this
hybrid identity positions nationalist and religious notions as having a parallel (if not equal) emphasis.
This can be seen from the word order in the phrase “nationalist-religious”. Putting the word
“nationalist” before “religious” indicates the priority of order in PD’s ideology. The accent can be
seen as raising the pluralist notion of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika into a nationalist value of how to love
one’s country in order “to achieve, sustain and immortalise the identity, integrity, prosperity and the
spirit of the nation” (Soekarno as cited by Kirbiantoro and Rudianto, 2009, p. 13). This nationalist
homogeneity, however, does not prevent pluralist aspects from growing. It merely stipulates that
these aspects go through an ideological channel (nationalism) so that the national aspirations as
stated in the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution can be achieved.

PD’s religiosity is represented in the phrases such as “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (One Almighty God),
“ridha Allah Yang Maha Besar” (Blessing from Allah Almighty), “bermoral agama” (having religious
morality), and “kepercayaan kepada Tuhan Maha Esa”106. The words “Tuhan” and “Allah” have the
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PD’s statutes can be retrieved from http://www.demokrat.or.id/.
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The phrase “Kepercayaan kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” emerged especially as a term deployed by
Soeharto’s administration to accommodate Javanese belief of kebatinan. Mulder (1994, p. 66) indirectly
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same meaning, i.e. God. However, as the word “Allah”, which derives from Arabic language, has a
strong correlation with Islam, its usage is mostly deployed by Muslims in Indonesia in order to
differentiate their religious identity from others. The Indonesian word “Tuhan” has more a neutral
sense in referring to God in all religions. The phrase “Yang Maha Esa” (the One Almighty) is
employed as a phrase that invariably goes with the word “Tuhan”. This is especially important in
Pancasila discourse as it represents the Indonesian collective shared belief in One Almighty God (the
first principle). The phrase arguably transcends religious boundaries in Indonesia. Adopting the first
principle of Pancasila can be perceived as the party’s attempt to represent itself as a nationalist yet
religious party that tries to embrace all religions. This also indicates the party’s fluid identity and
position as the response to the circulating ideological polarisations. This, at the same time, signifies
PD’s attempt to attract voters from different factions. By this, the party arguably positions itself in a
similar ideological manner to Golkar as a “catch-all party” (see Golkar’s sub section). However, no
information on the statutes can be found that indicates the mechanism by which the party faces
political challenges from other parties. It simply correlates the notion with humanitarianism as the
second cardinal ideological entity.

Humanitarianism is seen as an element that is closely related with Soekarno’s ideal of
internationalism. Soekarno (in Ajaran Bung Karno II [Module], 2011, pp. 126-137) argues that
humanitarianism stems from our consciences that become the basis for humanitarian evolution.
Soekarno’s concept of nation is deployed to explain this evolutionary process. It starts from the
proliferation of ethnic groups in nations which later effaces the boundaries between the nations due
to the development of technology. He calls this as a historical paradox: when a nation politically
establishes, it sets up its own boundaries to differentiate itself from others. However, as technology
develops, it trespasses these boundaries which arguably opens a space for colonisation. Soekarno
develops this raw concept into the notion of equal rights among people and nations. Colonisation
and imperialism had taught Indonesia to uphold humanitarian values as the foundation of one of the
nation’s ultimate aspirations, i.e. to maintain the world order as written in the fourth paragraph of
the preamble of the 1945 Constitution and the first paragraph of the preamble of PD’s statute. In
this sense, PD’s ideological characteristics are seen as attributes close to Pancasila’s nationalist
principles of the nation’s integrity (third principle), religiosity (first principle) and humanitarianism
(second principle).

defines kebatinan as “the cultivation of...a man inner life...that becomes the centre of experience and truth”,
which is achieved by believing in One Almighty God.
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If we relate these three aspects to the party’s decision about the requirements for the party’s
Chairperson and Secretary General in the phase of the party’s establishment, we will find that the
nationalist and religious values in PD’s ideology arguably seem to dilute. The decision can be
perceived as PD’s political translation of its ideology (nationalist-religious). Determining a Javanese
Muslim candidate as the party’s Chairperson and a non-Javanese Christian candidate as the
Secretary General107 demonstrates a political affirmation of the dominant ideological polarisations in
Indonesia’s political discourse. It also further shows that the significance of presenting these two
camps in the party’s structure during the establishment reflects the mode the parties interpret the
third and first principles of Pancasila. As the phrase “ridha Allah Yang Maha Besar” (arguably
indicating PD’s inclination towards Islamic religiosity) comes before “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa”
(indicating the party’s neutral religious position) in the last paragraph of the party’s statute, the
phrase’s position reaffirms the party’s inclination in Indonesia’s religious discourse. The statement
can be seen below:
“Meyakini bahwa perjuangan itu hanya dapat berhasil dengan ridha Allah
Yang Maha Besar, Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, serta usaha-usaha yang sungguhsungguh, kerja keras, penuh kebijaksanaan, dan berkelanjutan dan
berkesinambungan, seraya memohon ridha Allah, Tuhan Yang Maha Esa,
pada hari Minggu tanggal 9 September tahun 2001 didirikan Partai yang
modern dan terbuka bagi segenap warga bangsa dengan nama “PARTAI
DEMOKRAT”, untuk masa waktu yang tak terbatas dengan Anggaran Dasar
dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga sebagai berikut:” (the fourth paragraph of the
Preamble of Partai Demokrat’s Statute, my own emphasis)
“Believing that the struggle can merely be attained with the blessing from
Allah Almighty – One Almighty God [Tuhan]– and sustainable conscious efforts
and wisdom, whilst invoking Allah’s Blessing, One Almighty God [Tuhan], on
Sunday the 9th of September 2001 a modern inclusive party was established
for all Indonesian people, by the name of “PARTAI DEMOKRAT”[Democratic
Party], for infinite time with the statutes as follows:” (The fourth paragraph of
the Preamble of Partai Demokrat’s Statute, my own emphasis)108
The quotation above shows that two pairs of phrases: “ridha Allah Yang Maha Besar” (“blessing
from Allah Almighty”) and “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (“One Almighty God”) and “ridha Allah” (“Allah’s
Blessing”) and “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (“One Almighty God”), are deployed to represent PD’s ideal
of religiosity. The word “Allah” has a stronger connotation with Islam than the word “Tuhan” as
earlier discussed. However, Christianity in Indonesia also employs the word “Allah” to signify God.
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See sejarah pembentukan dan berdirinya partai demokrat (the history of the democratic party’s
establishment) at http://www.demokrat.or.id/.
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I attempt to keep the sentence structure as intact as possible which possibly causes meaning
fragmentation. It is conducted in order to keep the phrase “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” as the modifier of the
phrase “Allah Almighty”.
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This arguably shows assimilation in Indonesia’s Christianity between the Christian word (“Allah”)
which derives from the Old Testament (Lewis, et.al, 1977, p. 32), with the concept of the Trinity
which stems from the New Testament. This amalgam arguably constitutes the way in which
Indonesian Christians deploy the word “Allah” as a religious term to refer to God as one entity. The
linguistic difference of its usage in Islam and Christianity lies on its pronunciation: “Allah” is
pronounced |ˈŞŹŢ:h |for Indonesian Muslims, while Indonesian Christians/Catholics pronounce it as
|ˈŞlŞ:h|. The similar meaning of “Allah” signifies not only the shared linguistic term Islam and
Christianity employ. Its usage in PD’s statute also positions this word as a political term that
represents religious tolerance in the party, especially of Islam and Christianity
However, if we examine this closer, we will find that the sentence structure of the quotation shows
that the phrase “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (One Almighty God) merely functions as a modifier of the
preceding phrase “Allah Yang Maha Besar” (Allah Almighty). This means that “Tuhan Yang Maha
Esa” (One Almighty God) as a religious neutral term functions as an attribute that controls the
meaning in “Allah Yang Maha Besar” (Allah Almighty). This linguistic “control” arguably signifies that
the religious “egalitarianism” of PD is not merely limited to Islam and Christianity (Protestianism and
Catholicism), but also embraces the three other official religions (Hinduism, Buddhism,
Confucianism). Thus, the order of these two religious phrases reinforces the ambiguous position in
PD’s politics of image.
PD’s inclusive notion as a political signifier does not stop at its religiosity. It continues to correlate
with the party’s name which reflects the political branding it constructs. The democratic values
reflected in the name “demokrat” (democratic), which connotes freedom and equality, can be seen
from the party’s pluralistic conception that is clearly defined in Article 9 sub section 2 (c) on the
statute. It states as follows: “[p]luralisme bermakna mengakui dan menghargai serta merangkul
berbagai ras, suku bangsa, profesi, jenis kelamin, agama, dan kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang
Maha Esa, serta keberadaan ciri khas setiap daerah yang menyatu sebagai bangsa Indonesia”
(“[p]luralism refers to acknowledging, appreciating and embracing diverse races, ethnicity,
professions, gender, religions, faith in One Almighty God and the distinctive characteristics of ethnic
groups that unite in one nation, Indonesia). This definition emphasises the relating verbs
(acknowledging and embracing) and thinking verb (appreciating), to borrow Hallidayian systemic
functional linguistic terms which shows PD’s attempt to reinforce its inclusive image. These relating
verbs show not only the party’s attempt to frame its socio-cultural-political aspects under the
inclusive and/or pluralist notions. They also demonstrate the quality of relation in the definition
between the word “pluralism” which acts as a carrier of the attributes “diverse races, ethnicity,
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professions, gender, religions, faith in One Almighty God and distinctive characteristics of ethnic
groups”. This quality is constructed by means of recognising and carrying the socio-religious
elements within the concept of nation-state in the definition. The mental process represented in the
thinking verb “appreciating” indicates that the party at this stage attempts to display its emotive
essence in representing its ideology. The coalescence of these pluralist elements operates in the
nationalist framework of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.

The last sentence of the third paragraph of the preamble states that “[a]uthoritarian thoughts and
actions, power abuse, deprivation of people’s freedom and rights that result in injustice, social
imbalance and economic collapse should be effaced with directed, planned, organised, smart and
collaborative struggle”. It arguably reflects democratic values in PD’s discourse on pluralism.
However, this pluralism is circumscribed by the deployment of the adjectives “directed, planned,
organised, smart and collaborative”. Not only does this indicate that the adjectives function as the
modifier of the word “struggle”, but they also connote that the party’s struggle needs direction in
form of guidance so that it can be planned and organised. Well-planned strategy and collaboration
will produce a smart struggle. However, a close examination of the qualities of the struggle shows
that the party constructs a contingent struggle regarding guidance. Guidance as an intangible
product is arguably constructed by heavily relying on the chairperson of the Advisory Council. This
can be seen from the structure of the party’s organisation as follows:
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DPLN

Source: adopted from Democratic Party’s Statute (Article 12 sub section 1)
VSG = Vice Secretary General
VT = Vice Treasurer
VED = Vice Executive Director
PPSK = Pusat Pengembangan Strategi dan Kebijakan (Centre of Strategy and Policy Development)
KPP = Komisi Pemenangan Pemilu (Party’s Election Commission)
DPD = Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Council) or Provincial Branch
DPLN = Dewan Perwakilan Luar Negeri (Overseas Branches Council)
= coordinating line of the party’s Supreme Council and the party’s Central Board (the party’s chairperson and other governing
bodies/entities in the third and fourth levels of the organisation chart: from vice chairperson 1 to region coordinator)
= coordinating line of the Region Coordinators with DPD and DPLN

The chart shows a hierarchical line of power which positions the Supreme Council at the top.
Although the position indicates that the Supreme Council holds the highest power, a close
examination of the structure shows an overlapping situation. The horizontal line, which indicates
equality, normally puts the governing bodies/entities in parallel positions (the Advisory Council, the
party’s chairperson and Board of Honours). However, Article 13 sub section (2) allows the positions
of the chairpersons of the Advisory Council and the Supreme Council to be held by the same person.
Article 15 sub section (3) also allows the chairperson of the Supreme Council and Supervisor Council
to be the chairperson of the Board of Honours. At this stage it can be argued that the organisational
chart not only indicates a centralised position of the party in one single person, but also contributes
in affirming that the organisation of the Democratic Party is heavily dependent on its patron, i.e.
SBY, the chairperson of the Advisory Council and Indonesia’s current President.
The patron controls the strategic positions of the party. As the chairperson of the Supreme Council,
for instance, he, together with the council members109, determine strategic policies at the
national/local levels, such as appointing the candidates for President and Vice President for the
Presidential election; the chairperson and faction members for the House of Representatives; the
members of the parties’ coalition; the members of the Local Council; and the Governor and Vice
Governors for the direct election for local leaders (known as Pilkada). The Supreme Council also
determines strategic policies for the party’s five-year programs and the design of the party’s
statutes. As the statutes reflect the party’s ideological values, Article 14 sub section (3) states that
the duty to guard the implementation of the party’s ideological values is that of the Advisory
109

Article 13 sub section (1) stipulates that the Supreme Council consists of one chairperson, one vice
chairperson, one secretary and six members.
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Council. This “ideological” task cannot be seen as having an “obscure” responsibility. The action verb
“guard” implies the power of the Advisory Council. Not only does the task mean to protect but also
indicates subtle surveillance activities as this action verb bears the meaning of “to watch someone
and make certain they do not escape from the place” (Walter, et al., 2008). The nominal group, “the
duty to guard the implementation of the party’s ideological values”, arguably reflects the absolute
power of the Advisory Council, which acts as the ideological state apparatus in Althusserian terms,
because the party’s political practices cannot be dissociated from its ideology. The choice of words
reflect the soft power the party (read: SBY) deploys (see SBY’s section).
Survelliance activities are officially conducted by the Board of Honours which is also chaired by SBY.
Article 15 sub section (5) stipulates the duty and task of the Board of Honours, i.e. to “investigate,
determine, and give sanctions to ethical misconduct, violations against the party’s rules and
regulation conducted by the party’s cadres, who are assigned in the Executive and Legislature at the
national and provincial levels, based on the reports issued by the monitoring board or other parties.”
Article 23 sub section 2 (a) and (b) about the duties and tasks of the Monitoring Commission position
the commission as a body that executes/implements the investigation under the coordination of the
Board of Honours. The Monitoring Commission supervises the performance of the party’s cadres
assigned in the Executive and Legislature at the national and provincial levels and investigates and
verifies alleged ethical, moral and law violations against the cadres. No written rules or regulations
on the statutes explicate the procedures of the surveillance.
However, Syarafani (2007, pp. 100-101) found the surveillance mechanism to be operating at DPD
(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or Regional Representative Council) level. Badan Penelitian dan
Pengembangan (Balitbang or Research and Development Department) at DPD level has the role of
supplying an “accurate” analysis of Indonesian society’s social condition and verifies the party’s
internal conflicts. The procedure is conducted by analysing the causes of the problems, scrutinising
them, and recommending appropriate solutions. This plausibly shows that not only has the party
established its monitoring apparatus at the regional level, but also indicates that surveillance
activities are ostensibly conducted in minute detail. However, as Syarafani (2007, p. 101) argues the
detail is still at the preparation stage: “Balitbang still formulates its framework”.
At the national level, the power of the chairperson of the Supervisory and Supreme Councils and the
Board of Honours does not stop at the surveillance stage. Article 14 sub section (5) stipulates that
“the authority, duty, mechanism and relationship between the party’s Central Board (under the
coordination of the party’s chairperson) and the Advisory Council shall be controlled in a regulation
stipulated by the chairperson of the Advisory Council.” This sub section clearly demonstrates the
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hierarchical relationship of the General Chairperson and the Advisory Council Chairperson. The
General Chairperson (formerly held by Anas Urbaningrum)110 acts as the Vice Chairperson of the
Supreme Council and Board of Honours (Article 13 sub section 3; Article 15 sub section 4). This dual
role positions the chairperson of the party as the partner of the Supreme Council and Board of
Honours’ chairperson in its day-to-day practices.
As the chairperson of the Supreme Council, the Advisory Council and the Board of Honours,
Yudhoyono arguably holds absolute power in the Democratic Party. However, this power cannot
directly be seen as representing an individual power, as the deployment of the word “council” on
represents collectivism. A direct assumption about the party’s decision of an issue cannot be made
and referred solely to as SBY’s political decision. PD’s “indecisive” decision on Nazaruddin’s case111,
for instance, cannot be considered as SBY’s sole political response. Every decision the party makes
reflects a mixture of the political attitudes of SBY (as the core figure) and the party itself. However,
as the mixture contains a heavy political element of SBY, correlating PD’s decision as SBY’s is
arguably incontrovertible. In this sense, the word “council” is deployed as a linguistic marker to mask
SBY’s absolute power.
However, the discussion of PD’s statutes merely portrays the form of ideological image PD
constructs. Syarafani (2007, pp. 85-116) offers a micro investigation which focuses on how PD sets
up its apparatuses at DPD level in order to construct a solid foundation of the party with an
ostensible expectation that the party’s dependence on SBY can be reduced. His investigation is
concentrated on DPD Central Java. He argues that the visible way for PD to detach itself from SBY is
to become a cadre-based party. He found that as a new party, PD’s regional apparatuses are still
trapped in their internal consolidation problems. The problems stem from the absence of tiered
membership, irregular cadres’ trainings, and popularity-based criteria for the legislative/executive
110

At the time this chapter is written, the post of the party’s chairperson is currently vacant. This is due to PD’s
internal conflict between Anas Urbaningrum’s camp and SBY’s camp that ends up in SBY’s attempt to sack
Anas from his post which arguably violates the party’s statutes (see the elaboration of the tasks and
authorities of the Supreme Council). Anas is alleged to have involved in a corruption case known as Hambalang
(see the analysis of Herlambang’s billboard in chapter nine for further elaboration), which is seen by SBY’s
camp as the source of plunge in PD’s popularity from 21 per cent in 2009 to 8.3 per cent in 2012 (see
Haryanto. (2013). Kecerdasan Anas vs Citra SBY [Anas’s intelectuality versus SBY’s image]. Kompasiana.
Retrieved from http://politik.kompasiana.com/2013/02/17/kecerdasan-anas-vs-citra-sby-535075.html).
However, Anas’ camp perceives this allegation as politically designed by SBY’s camp (also known as Cikeas).
111
Muhammad Nazarudin was the former PD’s treasurer (2010-2011) who is currently alleged on several
corruption cases, such as the building construction of Wisma Atlet (Athletes’ Village) in Palembang, South
Sumatra, for Southeast Asian (SEA) Games in 2011. The case brought Angelina Sondakh, PD’s Vice Secretary
General I, into KPK’s (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or Corruption Eradication Comission) investigation.
Nazaruddin also mentioned Anas Urbaningrum, PD’s former chairperson, and Andi A. Mallarangeng, Secretary
of the Advisory Council and the former Youth and Sports Minister, as the persons who also allegedly received
money regarding the case, at the court.
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candidates and the party’s inability to mobilise their masses. However, Syarafani also notes that PD’s
success at the regional level is mainly based on the party’s community-service projects, such as
leasing chairs and sunblinds, selling clean cheap water to the people in dry areas and the provision
of public ambulances. These services are seen as more effective in promoting the party as this mode
of branding can reach the grassroots’ level. The projects are supported by PD’s wing organisations,
such as Perempuan Demokrat Republik Indonesia (PDRI or Democratic Women of Republic of
Indonesia), Angkatan Muda Demokrat Indonesia (AMDI or Indonesian Democratic Youth Group),
Komite Nasional Pemuda Demokrat (KNPD or National Committee of Democratic Youth Group) and
Persaudaraan Istri Anggota DPR RI Fraksi Partai Demokrat (Association of Democratic Party
Legislative Members’ Wives).

In a macro lens, the position of PD as a nationalist-religious party not only indicates an ambiguous
identity but also places the party at the intersection of ideological crossroads. Platzdasch (2009b)
found that the crossroads has been adopted and adapted not only by PD but also by the other eight
major parties. He argues that the nationalist parties have gradually moved towards the Islamic
mainstream to accommodate the Muslim voters, while the Islamic parties have attemped to reshape
themselves by becoming more inclusive to attract both non-Muslim and Muslim voters112. However,
the movement does not indicate the state of becoming but more represents the state of
accommodating. For instance, inside PD, the emergence of Majelis Dzikir Nurussalam SBY (SBY
Nurussalam Dhikr113 Council) in 2000, a foundation which was alleged by George Aditjondro in his
controversial book Membongkar Gurita Cikeas (Dismantling “Cikeas” Octopus114) as SBY’s
political/money machine115, can be seen as a religious political means to accommodate the Islamic
aspiration of PD’s Muslim voters.

The inclusive characteristic PD promotes does not guarantee the party’s durability. Mietzner (2009a)
predicts that PD’s heavy reliance on SBY’s persona will trap the party in a situation where no figures
in the party seem to be able to equal the President’s popularity. Although SBY’s family members
such as Edhie Bhaskoro Yudhoyono (SBY’s son), the current PD’s Secretary General, Hadi Utomo

112

Mujani and Liddle (2010, pp. 76-77, 97) argues that sociological factors of voters such as their religious,
ethnic, regional, and social class inclinations play an insignificant role in determining their voting behaviour.
They find that today’s Indonesian voters are more concerned with the government’s achievements, which
explains how SBY won his re-election in 2009.
113
An Islamic way to remember God by repeating His names silently or loudly.
114
Aditjondro (2009) employed an octopus wearing a Javanese crown as an image especially to criticize SBY in
relation to Century Bank Scandal. Cikeas is the name of the region in which SBY resides.
115
See Hermawan, B. (2010, January 1). Majelis Dzikir SBY – istimewa. Inilah.Com. Retrieved from

http://nasional.inilah.com/read/detail/254601/struktur-majelis-dzikir-sby
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(SBY’s brother-in-law), the member of the Advisory Council or even SBY’s wife Kristiani Herrawati
Yudhoyono actively engage in the party, they are seen as being far from reaching for let alone
gaining the same popularity. Mietzner further argues that the reliance on SBY merely forges a
generation gap and makes the party institutionally weak.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Partai Demokrat)
Representing the nationalist party, SBY also represents the Javanese camp. His name reflects
Javanese subtlety (Susilo – the well mannered) and connotes the Javanese notion of aristocracy as in
the concept of kawula-gusti (see Pancasila’s section) or the ruled and ruler. His middle name,
Bambang, denotes literally a knight who equates with gusti or the noble person who wins the battle
or war (yudho means war while yono means victory)116 against kurawa117. Hisyam, et.al. (2004, p. 28)
argued that SBY’s Javanese subtlety stemmed from his reading wayang books in which he learnt the
Javanese way of paying respect, observing hierarchy and behaving with good manners. Furthermore,
he was born as priyayi on 9 September 1949118 in Pacitan, East Java. People often called him “Dik
Sus” or “Mak Sus” to honour his social status (see Tempo magazine, “Lolos dari Persimpangan
Jalan”, 2009). SBY’s status as the son of a priyayi constitutes the social capital which defines his
position within the local community.
However, this social capital does not correlate with the economic capital of SBY’s family. As the
military commander of a poor subdistrict in Pacitan, the first Lieutenant Soekotjo, SBY’s father, could
not provide a fancy life for his only son from his marriage with Siti Habibah, a daughter of Tremas
Kyai119 family. He was then raised by his uncle, Sastro Suyitno, the head of Ploso village in Pacitan,

116

See Hisyam, et.al. (2004). SBY Sang Kandidat Mini Biografi SBY (a magazine edition). It is a Javanese name
which means the well mannered knight whose victory in the war is always in his hand.
117
The war is inscribed in Mahabharata, the Hindu (Javanese) epic book, which represent the war between
good (Pandawa) and evil (Kurawa). The conflict between Anas’s camp and SBY’s camp has been depicted in
alignment with this war. Anas deployed the word “Sengkuni” (Kurawa’s uncle that provokes Kurawa to fight
against Pandawa) to indicate SBY’s accomplices to purge him. However, according to Suud (2013), if we draw
an analogy between this war and the Javanese concept of harmony, we will find that the conflict between
Anas’s camp and SBY’s camp will reach “the nadir point” prior to the state of “equilibrium”. (see Suud, D.
(2013, February 20). Sengkuni dan Togog Demokrat [Sengkuni and PD’s Togog]. Detiknews. Retrieved from
http://news.detik.com/read/2013/02/20/143652/2175100/103/sengkuni-togog-demokrat).
118
The Javanese social status/group to connote the aristocracy. His father, Raden Soekotjo is the son of Raden
Imam Badjoeri, the grandson of Raden Kasanpuro, the headman of Arjosari subdistrict. The last feature in
SBY’s mini biography (Hisyam, 2004, pp.142-143) entitled Terawang or foreseeing shows an indication of
equating SBY as the embodiment of Javanese Messiah as his birth is perceived to be the date of a born leader
who represents the Javanese priyayi. He is said to be the descendant of Ki Ageng Buwono Keling and Sultan
Hamengkubuwono III from Yogyakarta sultanate. The date of birth which denotes number nine is believed
representing the drive to achieve mental and spiritual stability with the noble personality traits (based on
Javanese mythology): compassionate, just, peaceful, discipline, and honest.
119
A muslim cleric
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during his schooling. Takwin and Karim (2004, pp. 239-247) contend that the region’s poor
geographic conditions, his father’s military discipline, and his status as the only child shaped SBY’s
personality as a typical only child who wants to get attention from his parents and peers. His wellmannered personality was needed for he had to maintain the affection he received. However, his
parents’ divorce when SBY was in grade ten of Senior High School made him a bit unkempt for he
had not been well taken care of. The divorce became the turning point which stimulated him to
leave Pacitan and later joined the military.
SBY’s military life becomes the significant milestone which not only influences his disposition but
also (re)defines his identity. In 1970 SBY entered the military academy in Magelang. He successfully
received seven awards during his study, including Bintang Adhi Makayasa, the highest award for the
military’s best graduate in 1973. His achievement was embodied as the cultural capital elevated
SBY’s social relation. His potential arguably made Lieutenant General Sarwo Edhie, the former
Governor of the military academy, give his blessing to SBY to marry his third daughter, Kristiani
Herrawati, in 1976. The marriage not only narrowed the social gap between the two families but also
became the strategic milestone that plausibly influenced his military career. However, according to
Tempo magazine (“Dari Bandung ke Yogyakarta”, 2009), this new status did not mean that SBY
earned any privileges as his commander, Agus Widjojo who led the Seroja operation in East Timor
(1976), said that SBY never committed any mistake during the operation.
Besides the military academy in Magelang, the American military academy shaped SBY’s educational
experience. He attended the Airborne and Ranger Course in 1976 and Infantry Officer Advance
Course in 1982-1983, at Fort Benning. In 1983 he had an On-Job-Training at 82nd Airborne Division
at Fort Bragg, USA. A year later he joined the Skill Qualification Test at the US Army Infantry School.
He attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1990-1991. He
undertook Belgium and Germany military studies when he attended the Antitank Weapon Course in
1984 and Jungle Warfare School in Panama in 1983. With this overseas educational capital, SBY’s
career was sky-rocketing. He started his career as the Commander of a platoon 3/A Bandung (19741976) to the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs (in Gotong Royong Cabinet) under
Megawati’s administration (10 August 2001 – 12 March 2004).
As a Javanese military officer, SBY was perceived as a gentle commander. He fulfilled the benevolent
image of a Javanese leader who executed power through perintah halus or “gentle hints” (Keeler,
1985), as a mask to display power (Antlov and Cederroth, 1994, p. 13). This is a Javanese style of
subtlety that makes the subordinates fulfil orders without making commands direct and being harsh.
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SBY considered “gentle hints” as the reflection of a soft power120, at a dinner reception held in
Washington DC on 25 May 2005 by USINDO (The United States-Indonesia Society). He argues that
soft power lures the public. SBY deployed tolerance and patience to exemplify his soft power. He
asserts that tolerance is above freedom because it controls diversity, especially in Indonesia, so that
true peace can be achieved. He also believes that patience is needed for a nation to progress. This
soft personality had been predicted by Takwin and Karim (2004, pp. 239-243) in their psychological
analysis of SBY’s personality. They found that SBY’s choice of words reflected his cultural disposition
towards harmony, appropriateness, and cooperation, which were arguably in line with Javanese
spirituality (see chapter six).

However, like a two-side of coin, these (plausible) positive personality traits have their negative side.
Haris (2008, pp. 222-243) argues that SBY’s ceaseless attempt to construct a positive image has
entrapped him in endless image-building. His investigation focuses on SBY’s image-building in his
administration with Jusuf Kalla (JK), his former Vice President (2004-2009). He argues that not only
SBY’s positive personality determine the success of PD (as investigated by Mietzner (2009a) and
Sukma (2010)), but also the negative traits contribute to the construction. He found that SBY’s
image-building was constructed in alignment with his policy making. For instance, he argues that
SBY’s act in reshuffling the cabinet in 2005 and 2007 was construed as a worthy entertainment for
the public because SBY conducted fit and proper test for the candidates, a test that has never been
conducted by his predecessors. SBY astutely employed the moment to demonstrate his
government’s serious commitment in forming a strong cabinet. In fact, as Haris further notes, the
reshuffle merely shifted, added and reduced some ministers’positions from political parties. Haris
further accentuates SBY’s indecisiveness and disposition to embrace all parties in order to maintain a
harmonious relation with the parliament became his major weaknesses that entrapped him in an
unstable relationship with the Parliament.

Conversely, Ambardi (2009) perceives this not completely as a weakness, as he found that the
“cartelized party system” in the first SBY’s Cabinet, known as Kabinet Indonesia bersatu I (United
Indonesia Cabinet I), which espoused the political parties elites that joined the coalition, arguably
helped to minimise the unstable relationship between the President and the Parliament. Instead of
refuting this, Haris (2008, pp. 236-237) supports Ambardi for he sees that the lack of SBY’s
government is the absence of a political “communicator” who can bridge the deadlock between the
120

See Yudhoyono, S.B. (2005, May 25). Address by H.E. DR. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono President of the
Republic of Indonesia at a Dinner Tendered by USINDO. Retrieved from
http://www.indonesianmission-eu.org/website/page772839164200505276432481.asp#top
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President and the Parliament. Backroom deals are frequently deployed as an effective lobby to
overcome the problem. The coalition and backroom deals represent not only the soft power SBY’s
government employs but also indicate the political disposition of the President.

SBY’s image building does not stop at his astuteness in solving political tension. Mietzner (2009a)
and Sukma (2010) note that his astuteness in utilising the global economic crisis to produce social
welfare programs, such as a direct cash assistance program for the poor (Bantuan Langsung Tunai),
the compensation for fuel price hikes and schooling allowances, significantly contributed to the
success of his re-election and also the party’s triumph, beside the political stability and the improved
economic performance. However, Tomsa (2010, p. 148) and (Mietzner, 2008) find that in the law
sector the corruption eradication program (one of SBY’s prioritised programs), surmounted by
Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK or Corruption Eradication Commission), entrapped the political
elites of all parties, especially the ones that were engaged in “illicit fundraising activities”.

Beside the increasing success of SBY’s government in the legal sector which also acts as a
boomerang for PD’s elites (such as Nazaruddin’s corruption case), SBY also constructs his image
through composing songs such as “Like the Wind”, “Coming Home”, “Mother Earth”, which were
sung at Jakarta International Java Jazz Festival in 2012121. His song “Majulah Negeriku” (“Go My
Country”) was also noted as one of the songs sung at the commemoration of the 63th Independence
Day. These songs contribute to SBY’s politics of image-building not only because they represent the
President’s cultural capital but also amplify the President’s soft power image. It can be seen
especially at the time when “Majulah Negeriku” was sung by school students’ choir at Merdeka
Palace, which was broadcast nationally. The lyric of “Majulah Negeriku”, which invites Indonesian
people to unite and to live a harmonious life, not only represents SBY’s invitation but also arguably
reflects a subtle inculcation of his gentle image through songs that reinforces his “soft” (if not
melancholy) personality . Heryanto (2010, pp. 191-195) perceives these songs as the representation
of SBY’s “empty rhetorical style” that lures Indonesian people into his influence.

121

it is an annual International Jazz festival which aims to promote peace and harmony through music
(Silitonga, L. T. (2012, March 02). Java Jazz: Lagu SBY Dibawakan Musisi Dunia. Bisnis.com. Retrieved from
http://www.bisnis.com/articles/java-jazz-lagu-sby-dibawakan-musisi-dunia)
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The lure continues as SBY watched the most successful Islamic romance film in Indonesia entitled
“Ayat-Ayat Cinta” or “The Verses of Love”122 in a cinema together with his cabinet ministers and
foreign ambassadors in 2008. These public appearances indicate a series of public staging in order to
cement SBY’s popularity. They connote a myth making mechanism which espouses SBY’s cultural
capital into the narrative that is designed to amplify his popularity. SBY “seduces” the public with his
public appearances and possibly his creative work123 that signify his commitment and dedication to
(popular) arts. This visual exposure becomes SBY’s self-expression which is expected to generate
public impressions towards this PD’s paternalistic figure. As the expression is designed in a series of
public appearances, his acts can be perceived as a series of events in his political branding. This
public appearance (watching “The Verses of Love”) was conducted a few hours after JK, his former
Vice President, watched the same film. Whether his appearance aimed to follow suit or counter JK’s
public performance124, the action shows an event which is part of boosting SBY’s and/or JK’s image.
This also demonstrates that the design of boosting SBY and/or JK popularity is based on the public
performances in order to reflect the personality, not the character.

However, SBY’s popular image building was challenged especially when a series of books about him
were circulated and consumed by primary and secondary students in West Java, Central Java and
Banten provinces. Sugiharto (2011)125 suggests that the circulation and consumption of these books
cannot be merely perceived as a political act designed to inculcate SBY’s image. It can be deployed
as a means to challenge teachers in treating these textbooks in order to sharpen students’ critical
thinking by examining the content and relating them to the socio-political practices of the
government. Notwithstanding the way the teachers use them, the books’ content cannot escape
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The film was noted as having 3.58 millions of viewers in Indonesia, the second highest number in
Indonesian film history. See “Data Penonton 10 Film Indonesia Peringkat Teratas dalam Perolehan Jumlah
Penonton pada Tahun 2008 Berdasarkan Tahun Edar Film”.[n.d]. Retrieved from
(http://filmindonesia.or.id/movie/viewer/2008#.T7Ni01LujIU
123
SBY has released four song albums (Putro, H.D. and Suprihadi, M. (2011, November 15). MerekamBahasa
Musik SBY. Kompas.com. Retrieved from

http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/11/15/19521076/Merekam.Bahasa.Musik.SBY)
124

See Noorastuti, P.T. (2008, March 28). SBY Nonton Ayat-Ayat Cinta [SBY Watched The Verses of Love].
Okezone.com. Retrieved from http://news.okezone.com/read/2008/03/28/1/95336/sby-nonton-ayat-ayatcinta.
125

See Sugiharto, S. (2011, December 2). Should Books about SBY be Withdrawn?. thejakartapost.com.
Retrieved from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/02/12/should-books-about-sby-be-

withdrawn.html
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from the widely constructed perception that the books act as an ideological tool to inculcate the
ideology SBY promotes.

Partai Golkar
As an attempt to fix its political image, Golkar does not explicitly state its ideology on its official
website. It narrowly states that the party avoids an ideological orientation for this will lead to
primordialism126 and sectarianism. The notion karya kekaryaan or “functional” is chosen as the
political doctrine which focuses on the political programs with the basis of problem-solving. Golkar’s
cardinal principles are to regard highly the supremacy of law, ekonomi kerakyatan, nationalism, and
pluralism in an all inclusive conception.127 However, a popular perception has been constructed; that
the party’s ideology is Pancasila; it orients to either nationalist or Islamic blocs; it is a non Javanese
party with its loyalist majority coming from the Outer Islands (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata, 2004,
pp. 6-8). Golkar’s logo reinforces this positioning (see chapter five).

Golkar’s statutes, which reflect the party’s identity, indirectly confirm the perception pertaining to
the party’s position. The employment of the phrase, “persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa”, or the
nation’s unity, in the first sentence of the second paragraph of the statutes’ preamble seemingly
indicate its nationalist orientation towards the Islamic/Nationalist polarisation as it resonates with
the third principle of Pancasila. Golkar perceives that the cardinal objective of the country128 as
stated in the fourth paragraph of the 1945 Constitution can be achieved if Indonesian people uphold
Pancasila’s third principle (represented by banyan tree)129, i.e. the nation’s unity. Stating the
country’s cardinal objective in the first paragraph of the statute is seen as imperative for the
nationalist parties, such as Golkar and PD.

126

Geertz (1973, p. 259) perceives that the connection based on ethnicity, religion, social practices, language
and custom will trap one into subjective glorification of one’s group as they are embedded in the way one
perceives the world.
127
See “Visi dan Misi Paradigma Baru Partai Golkar”.[n.d]. retrieved from http://www.golkar.or.id/pagestentang/23/visi-misi/
128
The Ministry of Information in 1989 published a provisional version of the 1945 Constitution. It translated
the cardinal objectives of the country (paragraph four of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution)as follows:
“subsequent thereto, to form a government of the state of Indonesia which shall protect all the people of
Indonesia and their entire native land, and in order to improve the public welfare, to advance the intellectual
life of the people and to contribute to the establishment of a world order based on freedom, abiding peace
and social justice, the national independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a constitution of sovereign
Republic of Indonesia which is based on the belief in One and Only God, just and humanity, the unity of
Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations among representatives and the realisation
of the social justice for all the people of Indonesia.”
129
See chapter five
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Golkar perceives that the concept of unity needs to be materialised in a functional form. The party
calls the form “masyarakat karya dan kekaryaan” or functional group (third paragraph of the
statutes’ preamble). The phrase “karya dan kekaryaan” or “functional” which modifies the noun
“masyarakat” or group,130 demonstrates Golkar’s attempt to identify itself as the representation of
the group. This social group (Golkar) is construed as an idealist one as it becomes the political power
that is able to enhance the prosperity and intellectual life of the people, democracy and social justice
(third paragraph of the preamble). A close examination of the concept shows that Golkar harnesses
the ideological meaning of functionalism and positions it as the party’s core value, especially when
the party’s name (Golongan Karya or functional group) reflects the party’s pragmatic value of
functionalism. Pope (1975, pp. 361-379) and Calhoun (2002, pp. 179-180) argue that the notion
“functionalism” derives from Emile Durkheim who percieves that the social structure is analogous to
a biological organism in that the party's divisions cannot be perceived as separate entities as they
are interrelated and function as a "skeleton" of the organisation (Golkar). What is overarching in
functionalism is the actions of agents of the party rather than avowed ideology, though, of course,
functionalism itself is an ideology to which they unwittingly adhere. The actions are of highest
importance as they actuate the operation of the party. However, this does not solely mean glorifying
the actions as a means to win against the competition. As the actions represent the significance of
the contributions of the party’s divisions in maintaining the equilibrium of the party’s system, the
actions should be present in the form of consensus as the basis of social order (Pope, 1975, p. 361).
In this sense, as O’Sullivan, et al. (1994, pp. 124-125) view, the functional notion operates by
smoothing over conflict as gusti (the patron) functions to maintain the party’s equilibrium and
ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the party’s constituent parts. Maintaining the
effectiveness and efficiency is conducted by performing practical actions that represent the party’s
cohesion (equilibrium) as reflected on its logo. By this, the party’s actions are designed to underpin
the system that represents the third principle of Pancasila. At this stage, the logo signifies the
party’s dual system of sustaining the equilibrium through practical actions whilst positioning
practicality as the modus operandi. Thus, the notion of "functionalism", which highly regards the
functionality of each division in the party, has been shifted into pragmatic actions as deploying the
"karya kekaryaan" or "functional(ist)" notion arguably positions Golkar as a "catch-all" party.

The fourth paragraph of the statutes’ preamble, which briefly explains Golkar’s history, can be seen
as the party’s attempt to rehabilitate its image. The paragraph shows the process of the
rehabilitation starting from narrating the embryo of the party’s establishment to its current shape.
130

The reason for translating the word “masyarakat” as “group” rather than “society” is due to its usage in the
statutes that represents the existence of a social group that is bound with the common interests.
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The paragraph opens with a statement that adumbrates the functional group’s initiation in 1945
prior to its official establishment: “masyarakat karya dan kekaryaan sesungguhnya sudah ada dan
lahir...bersamaan dengan Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945, namun akibat perkembangan kehidupan
sosial politik di Indonesia, masyarakat karya dan kekaryaan belum sempat menghimpun dan
mengorganisir diri dalam satu wadah” (“the functional(ist) group existed as it born ...at the time
Indonesia proclaimed its Independence on 17 August 1945. However, due to the development of
socio-political life in Indonesia, the functional(ist) group had not had the opportunity to organise
itself in an organisation”). The paragraph delineates the moment of initiation that stemmed from
Soekarno’s thinking. However, the party’s claim for its presence in 1945 was arguably dubious as
Reeve (1985, p. 116) noted that Soekarno suggested the conception (Joint Secreatriat of Golkar)131 in
1956 as a political organisation that intended to uphold Soekarno’s NASAKOM (nationalist, religion
and communist) ideology (see chapter five). The employment of the existential verb “existed”
above, arguably represents a political fallacy. This fallacy is obscured in a sentence that succeeds it:
“...due to the development of socio-political life in Indonesia, the functional group had not had the
opportunity to organise itself in an organisation”. The opportunity had not yet arrived until Soeharto
came to power and used Golkar as his political machine. Thus, catering the information about the
party’s embryo in the opening statement of the paragraph is necessary. Not only does it explicate
the milestones of Golkar’s history, but also functions as the point that leads to the recounting events
in the narrative of Golkar’s image rehabilitation.

The events continue in the third to the fifth sentences of the fourth paragraph, which state as
follows:
“[b]ahwa dengan terjadinya penyelewengan-penyelewengan terhadap cita-cita
Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 maka lahirlah
tatanan baru yang menghendaki agar seluruh kehidupan bangsa dan negara
Republik Indonesia diletakkan dan dilandaskan kepada kemurnian pelaksanaan
Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Dengan demikian hakikat tatanan
baru adalah sikap mental yang menuntut pembaharuan dan pembangunan
yang terus menerus dalam melaksanakan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang
Dasar 1945....[D]alam rangka mengemban hakikat tatanan baru tersebut
maka masyarakat karya dan kekaryaan yang berhimpun dalam organisasi
Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya memantapkan diri dalam wadah
organisasi kekuatan sosial politik yang bernama Golongan Karya.”
“That the deviations from the country’s cardinal objectives and the 1945
Constitution have called forth a new order that requires the life of Indonesia’s
nation-state be based on the ideal implementation of Pancasila and the 1945
Constitution. Therefore the nature of the new order constitutes the mental
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Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya or Joint Secreatriat of Functional(ist) Group was officially established
on 20 October 1964.
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attitude that demands a renewed ceaseless development in implementing
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution....In order to achieve the nature of the
new order, the functional(ist) group, which was formerly constituted in an
organisation called Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya, then solidified in a
political party by the name of Golongan Karya.”
The quotation shows the mechanism of reconstructing Golkar’s image – transforming its image as a
“new” political party. With the transformation, the party is expected to rectify the country’s
unstable conditions as the legacy of Soeharto’s administration. Golkar perceives that the instability
derives from the corrupt implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The image
transformation is labelled under the nominal group “new order” which represents Golkar’s “ideal”
mental attitudes which are based on the true implementation of Pancasila and the 1945
Constitution. Thus, this identity reconstruction signifies Golkar’s act to be a resilient party. The
employment of the relating verb “solidify” reinforces the process of resilience and cements its
transformed image. This is conducted by effacing the label “political organisation” under the name
Joint Secretariat of Golkar in Soeharto’s era. Moreover, the adjective “ideal” in the sentence “...[i]n
order to achieve the ideal implementation the functional(ist) group, which was formerly constituted
as a Joint Secretariat, has solidified in a political party by the name of Golongan Karya
[Functional(ist) Group]”, functions as the modifier that connotes the utopianist quality of
implementation the “new” Golkar needs to achieve. This utopianist goal is constructed as a
differentiation element in Golkar’s new image. The new image/identity was officially declared on 7
March 1999.

A closer examination of the image reconstruction demonstrates that the clause “that the deviations
from the country’s cardinal objectives and the 1945 Constitution have called forth a new order”, is
deployed as a means to justify that the financial and economic crisis in 1998 as Soeharto’s legacy,
was, in fact, the result of all practices that deviated from the 1945 Constituton and the country’s
cardinal objectives. This can be viewed as Golkar’s attempt to overwrite the perception that the
party was the prime political “suspect” behind the crisis. However, as noted in chapter five, Golkar
managed to distance itself from this stigma by solely attaching the negative attribute to Soeharto’s
family.

The image reconstruction does not touch the religious side of Golkar. Unlike PD that employs the
word “Allah” and “Tuhan” to indicate its inclusive religiosity, Golkar as a nationalist party in which
many Islami(c/st) modernist figures from ICMI132 joined, merely employs the word “Tuhan” in its
132

Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (see chapter five)
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declaration statement as follows: “...dengan rahmat Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, Partai Golkar
menyatakan diri sebagai Organisasi Partai Politik, dengan Anggaran Dasar sebagai berikut...” (“...by
the grace of God Almighty One, Golkar declares itself as a political party, with the statutes as
follows...”). This is possibly due to Golkar’s attempt of not wanting to be trapped in the image of
obscure religious-based party (see chapter five). However, Golkar’s current chairperson and also
Indonesian business tycoon and the former Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare (2005-2009)
in SBY’s cabinet, Aburizal Bakrie, recently stated at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies’ Public
lecture at the University of Western Australia on 23 May 2012, that a characteristic of Golkar
resembles PD’s and PDI-P’s of being “religious-nationalist”. The presence of many Islamic figures
from ICMI in Golkar, as discussed in chapter five, was initially due to Soeharto’s politics in subtly
confronting the growing power of the Catholic General, L.B. Moerdani. These Islamic figures do not
transform Golkar’s position as an Islamic one. The pragmatic notion “functional(ist)” arguably
prevents it.

The functional notion is also deployed as an ideological means to differentiate Golkar from other
nationalist parties. When the other nationalist parties claim that they uphold the democratic values
such as equality, prosperity, freedom of rights, justice, independence, egalitarianism, Golkar adds
the ideological ingredient of functionalism in its branding. However, the ingredient has been
deployed as the differentiation factor in the party’s branding since its establishment. To restore
Golkar’s image especially at the village level, Aburizal Bakrie launched a socio-political program in
the late 2010 which plausibly aims to empower the grassroots. The following billboard narrates a
testimony of a female vegetable grower named Khairiyah that indirectly indicates the success of
Bakrie’s (also read: Golkar’s) program.

source: author’s collection
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The billboard illustrates a collective expression of gratitude for Aburizal Bakrie and Golkar party from
small-scale enterprise entrepreneurs, represented by Khairiyah, a small-scale vegetable grower, due
to Bakrie and Golkar’s “real” efforts in helping them. What is interesting from this billboard is the
absence of Khairiyah, the agent that expresses the testimony. This indicates that the accentuation of
this billboard, not on the portrait of the entrepreneurs, but on their collective statement of
gratitude. The gratitude itself indicates the success of Golkar’s (Bakrie’s) ekonomi kerakyataan
program, i.e. Kredit-Mikro Golkar or Golkar’s micro-credit. The program, which was perceived as the
embodiment of Golkar’s real efforts, was launched under the banner of PT Bakrie Micro Finance
Indonesia on 15 December 2010133, owned by the Bakrie Group. It offers soft loans without collateral
requirement for small-scale enterprise entrepreneurs, especially female entrepreneurs. The
company and Golkar consider that placing women as their business (read: campaign) target not
merely elevates and restores Golkar’s image but also indicates their strategy for ostensibly reaching
at a domestic level. Women are perceived as more careful and disciplined than men in managing
cash flow.134 In this sense, this socio-economic program has its dual targets: women who are placed
at the centre of domesticity and their small-scale enterprises. Van Wichelen (2006, pp. 52-53) argues
that these positions put women in dual gender roles: they are bound to so-called “female destiny”,
i.e. domesticity (mothering), and the constructed notion of a careerwoman – a notion that is used,
according to Brenner (1999), to signify Indonesian “public womanhood” at the end of the New Order
regime. However, the absence of Khairiyah, as the representation of a female entrepreneur,
emasculates not merely the billboard’s visual credibility but also demonstrates that this
philanthropic act is merely a political campaign, not a long term program. The campaign slogan
“Bersama Bangkitkan Usaha Kecil” or “Together Empower Small-Scale Enterprises” on the billboard,
which linguistically indicates that their social act is free from gender inclination, engenders
ambiguity. This is deployed as a campaign tactic, not to create gender discrimination, but more
plausibly to embrace the grassroots’ level through utilising women as the figures that are able to
penetrate the domestic as well as business domains.

Anderson (1996, p. 14) contends that this domestication reflects “the direction to the logic of
electoralism”. It represents the Janus face of Golkar’s politics: the party’s political campaign is
133

See Icalbakrie.com, (2010, December 16). Adopsi konsep Grameen Bank, Bakrie Micro Finance digulirkan
dari Karawang. Retrieved from http://icalbakrie.com/?p=1046
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See Golkarkedamean, (2011, February 11). Ketua Umum Partai Golkar Luncurkan Lembaga Kredit Mikro
Tanpa Agunan Untuk Masyarakat Miskin. Retrieved from

http://golkarkedamean.blogspot.com.au/2011/02/ketua-umum-partai-golkar-luncurkan.html
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enveloped with the social welfare program with the hope that the voters remember that they owe
Golkar for its help to empower them. In a Bourdieuan lens, Golkar’s social action involves not only
the economic capital (the business fund from PT Bakrie Micro Finance) and social capital (the party’s
networks at the village level), but also the cultural capital (skill competences, forms of knowledge
and the symbolic content of the program) of Golkar’s cadres (including Aburizal Bakrie). It is
conducted to gain symbolic capital, i.e. the people’s recognition of the party’s philanthropic acts.
Prior to gaining this capital, a doxic relationship between the people and the party needs to be
established. That is why Aburizal Bakrie in his public lecture further claimed that these acts have
been conducted regularly. Creating this social “debt” as the mechanism to subtly make people cast
their votes for Golkar/Bakrie should be conducted as normally as possible. However, the program’s
sustainability itself is still questionable. In other words, selling Bakrie’s image to the grassroots needs
a process to reify Bakrie’s appeal as a high-end, reachable, and familiar commodity. His appeal needs
to solidify in an image as a philanthropic yet empowering figure. By this, it is hoped that Bakrie’s
familiarisation process will result not merely in the elevation of his (and Golkar’s) popularity but also
ultimately in winning the Legislative and Presidential elections. Thus, the loans from PT Bakrie Micro
Finance equates with the commodification of Bakrie’s appeal by assigning the socio-economic
political values to this corporeal body. The loans also signify the design to make Bakrie’s appeal as a
fetish object. This fetishism is constructed not by means of “seducing” the grassroots to this
philanthrophic political praxis.

On the other hand, it is not surprising to find a larger font used in the written expression of the
name of H. Aburizal Bakrie and Golkar party than the font used in the statement that indicates
Khairiyah’s identity. The title Hajj in front of his name (H.) indicates another tactic used in Bakrie’s
image-building. Not only does it reflect his religious identity (Muslim) but also indicates his use of
the code of religiosity through this title. If we relate the deployment of Bakrie’s religious code of hajj
with the religious code in Golkar’s statute, we will find that the religious code is embodied in two
discrepant signifiers: “Tuhan” and “Hajj”. The title hajj in front of Bakrie’s name becomes an
elemental part of his image-building as it represents what Ajidarma (2009) calls “socio-moral status”.
In Indonesia this title represents one’s social and religious status as the cost of going to Mecca is
relatively expensive. At the same time, this also connects to the populist perception that when one
attaches the title “hajj” in front of one’s name (after conducting a pilgrimage), consequently people
will perceive him as pious Muslim. However, as the title is now exploited in everyday
(socio/religious-political) practices, the degree of piety is no longer completely seen as representing
a comprehensive understanding of Islam or reflecting Islamic morality, but arguably indicates a social
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status. In this sense, deploying this title connotes that Bakrie places himself in the ambiguity of the
religious code in order to penetrate the grassroots.

Stating Aburizal Bakrie’s name before the party’s name in the testimony (the billboard) indicates the
patron-client relationship between the party and its General Chairperson. At the same time the
word order in the phrase demonstrates a priority pattern in which the written expression of
gratitude firstly refers to Bakrie as the representation of his company’s community services and
secondly to the party. However, as the leader of Golkar, Bakrie astutely wraps this service and
projects it to Golkar. This is plausibly conducted to rehabilitate his image for people perceive him
(Bakrie’s group) as the one who is responsible for the mudflow disaster in Sidoarjo, East Java135. Thus
this linguistic “order” demonstrates the contingent status of the party towards its patron. Golkar
cannot directly claim that the program belongs completely to the party’s since the money comes
from Bakrie’s family.

However, equating Golkar’s image with Aburizal Bakrie’s solely would be an improper correlation.
Since the resignation of Golkar’s chief patron (Soeharto) in the New Order era, Golkar attempts to
detach itself from any association regarding its patrons. Moreover, Harjanto (2010) found that
Golkar’s characteristic as catch-all party plays a cardinal part in its survival in the post-Soeharto era.
Harjanto (2010) and Mietzner (2009a) argue that the party’s strong institution significantly secures
Golkar’s position in the Reform era. Harjanto (2010, pp. 260-261) argues that the key elements of
Golkar’s success lie on its contingency on “the patronage network at national and local levels; its
linkage with mass organisation; and its ability to maintain its potential cadres such as businessmen,
bureaucrats, or local oligarchies”. Tomsa (2010, p. 147) supports Harjanto by asserting that
businessmen dominated Golkar, especially at the national level. These made the party able to secure
its success: Golkar held the second place in the elections of 1999 (120 parliamentary seats); the first
place in the legislative election of 2004 (129 parliamentary seats); and the second place in the
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The biggest shareholder of Lapindo Brantas, Inc. was owned by Bakrie Group. The company has been
alleged as the one that is responsible for the disaster as it did not follow the standard procedure of drilling.
However, Aburizal Bakrie claimed that he had used his own money (nine trillion rupiah or 950 million
Australian dollar) not as compensation to the victims (for the court ‘s verdict stipulated that the company was
not guilty) but as the embodiment of his family social responsiblity. They bought the lands and buildings
which were buried in the mud eruption area (see Amri, A.B and Aquina, D. (2012, May 3). Aburizal Bakrie:
Masalah Lumpur Sidoarjo Tuntas 2012, Retrieved from http://us.politik.vivanews.com/news/read/310225aburizal--masalah-lumpur-sidoarjo-tuntas-2012). However, this philanthropic action of buying merely offers a
short-term solution. It does not solve the social problems entailed, such as empowering Sidoarjo people, as
the mudflow is said as being inexorable.
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legislative election of 2009 (106 parliamentary seats)136. Although Golkar won the legislative election
in 2004, its Presidential candidate (Wiranto) did not win the Presidential elections. This is due, as
Harjanto further argues (2010, p. 266), to the fact that “the party did not prepare for individual
popular contest in the Presidential elections.”

Although Golkar did not win in the Presidential elections in 2004 and 2009, the party held its power
both in the parliament and government in 2004-2009, especially after Jusuf Kalla (JK), Golkar’s
former chairperson, succeeded in becoming the Vice President. However, as Vice President, JK
(Golkar) cannot be directly perceived as completely dominating or controlling the parliament and
the government. JK’s power was gradually increasing especially when SBY urged him to be the
Chairperson of Golkar. The urging was due to SBY’s realisation that his political machine, (PD),137 had
limited power in controlling the parliament in 2004-2009. This act had its political consequences: SBY
had to give additional cabinet seats to Golkar which meant he was surrounded by Golkar’s elites,
both in the government and parliament. However, SBY’s political move had its side effect on Golkar
in form of internal conflict that arguably weakened the party institutionally (Harjanto, 2010, pp. 266278). Kalla’s nomination not merely shook Akbar Tandjung’s group, Golkar’s former chairperson
(1998-2004), but also triggered internal splits, especially when Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto
decided to withdraw and formed their own nationalist parties. Wiranto formed Hanura whilst
Prabowo Subianto formed Gerindra.

Harjanto (2010, pp. 271-278) further argues that the major causal factor of Golkar’s decreasing
number of votes (from 21.62 per cent in 2004 to 14.45 per cent in 2009) was JK’s leadership beside
the party’s internal conflicts. Unlike his predecessors who mainly played a passive role as the Vice
President, Kalla was busy constructing his image as an active one. He successfully surmounted the
socio-economic and political problems, such as three-time fuel price hikes; socio-religious conflicts in
Ambon, Molucca and Poso, Central Sulawesi; and socio-political conflicts between the government
with Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM or Free Aceh Movement). However, these achievements could
not be solely claimed by JK, as people perceived them belonging to the success of SBY’s
administration. In line with Harjanto, Mietzner (2009a, p. 9) adds that Golkar’s lack of a charismatic
figure contributed to its drop in votes.
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See “Bab V Hasil Pemilu” [Module]. (n.d). Retrieved from
http://www.kpu.go.id/dmdocuments/modul_1d.pdf
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PD had a mere 7.46% of parliamentary seats (55 seats).
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On the other hand, JK’s relationship with SBY was not always harmonious. Haris (2008, pp. 197-201)
notes that the success of SBY-JK government carried internal conflicts between them. JK was
perceived as the representation of the combination between businessman and politician, the image
that made him look impatient and want to rush into making decisions. Conversely, SBY was well
known as a considerate person who was cautious in making decisions. The situation was worsened
with the limited explanation in the Constitution regarding the authority of the Vice President. At this
stage, we can see SBY’s astuteness in securing his popularity and administration. Not only did he
utilise JK to secure his position in the parliament but also to take credit for JK’s efforts in
surmounting the socio-ecomonic political problems and projected them to maintain his popularity
(Mietzner, 2009a, p. 9).

As the party that supported SBY’s government (2004 to 2009), Golkar employed a similar political
campaign surrounding the government’s achievements in the 2009 legislative election. To
differentiate itself from PD, Partai Golkar employed its political jargon known as “Memberi Bukti
Bukan Janji” or “Giving Evidence not Promises” and “Lebih Cepat Lebih Baik” or “The Sooner the
Better”. The latter is mostly believed to criticise SBY’s slow, diplomatic approach in contrast to the
bold, open, fast and handy Jusuf Kalla, the incumbent Vice President from Sulawesi (Firmanzah,
2010, p. 180, pp. 234 – 237).

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan (PDI-P) or Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle)
The establishment of PDI-P derived from the internal strike on 27 July 1996 between two camps of
PDI in Soeharto’s era: Megawati’s PDI (Megawati was the elected chairperson as the corollary of the
PDI National Congress in Surabaya) and Soerjadi’s PDI (the elected chairperson based on PDI
Congress in Medan). Soerjadi’s PDI loyalists attempted to take over PDI’s headquarters (which was
governed by Megawati’s PDI) in Jalan Diponegoro, Jakarta, with the help of TNI, Indonesia’s National
Army. The event elevated and affirmed Megawati’s image as the government opposition.
Megawati’s PDI then transformed itself as PDI-P prior to the 1999 Election, i.e. on 1 February 1999.
By declaring Pancasila as the party’s ideology and asserting the continuous fight for the grassroots’
aspiration as stated on the party’s charter, PDI-P, which was formerly composed of five secular
parties (consisting of Nationalist, Catholic, and Protestant, see chapter five), positions itself as a
secular nationalist party, which claims not to orient to any religion (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata,
2004) but is friendly to Islam (Baswedan, 2004). Unfortunately the PDI-P’s claim as the
representative of the grassroots merely appears on the ideological level, for in practice Megawati’s
administration produced unpopular policies, such as selling state assets and arguably ignoring the
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people’s suffering especially when the government took sides with capitalist interests (Mandan,
2009, pp. 441-442; Firmanzah, 2010, p. 119).

The image of PDI-P as the representation of “wong cilik” or the grassroots can be traced from its
statutes, vision, mission and charter. The party claims that its cardinal objective is to fulfill the
people’s mandate. The phrase used to describe the mandate is “amanat penderitaan rakyat” which
literally means the mandate resulting from people’s suffering. This means that the party positions
this suffering as the core selling point in its image-building as the party feels an obligation to fulfill
this mandate (to erase the suffering). However, a close examination of the phrase shows that the
phrase is deployed to represent the country’s cardinal objectives as stated in the fourth paragraph of
the 1945 Constitution (see Golkar’s section). Whilst Golkar perceives that the realisation of these
cardinal objectives can be achieved especially through upholding the third principle of Pancasila,
PDI-P positions the objectives as the reflection of the suffering (first paragraph of PDI-P Charter). Not
only does it signify different identity values between Golkar and PDI-P in their branding, but it also
shows the deployment of discrepant markers in constructing their nationalist “identity myth” (Holt,
2004). PDI-P perceives that the party’s objectives as the spirit (“roh”) that actuates the political
movement in the post-authoritarian era or better known as “gerakan reformasi” or the reform
movement. Whilst Golkar and PD consider the movement as deviations resulting from the corrupt
implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, PDI-P’s move in paralleling the objectives as
the reflection of the suffering represents the party’s attempt to return the objectives to their
utopianist position.

Returning to the discrepant markers, this discrepancy is found especially when PDI-P equates the
word “suffering” with the adjective “lofty” in the phrase “cita-cita luhur [bangsa]” ([the nation’s]
lofty ideals)138 of the party’s charter. Not only does this reinforce PDI-P’s position as the grasroots’
party, but also attempts to revive Soekarno’s nationalist/populist manifesto139. Adian (2011, p. 33)
argues that by imitating her father and following his footsteps, Megawati, attempts to change the
present political systems that have been constricted recently in their pragmatic practices and/ or
politics of image. She especially asked PDI-P’s cadres to return to the party’s basic characteristic as
an ideological-based party in her opening speech at the third PDI-P congress in Bali (6-9 December
138

This phrase is also used by PDI-P to signify the country’s cardinal objectives
As discussed in chapter four, Soekarno (as cited by Adams, 2011, pp. 75-76) coined the term Marhaenism to
represent Indonesian symbolic discovery of their national identity at the colonial time in 1920s. It represents
all Indonesian people regardless of ethnicity, race, religion, gender, and social status. Adian (2011, pp. 36-37)
asserts that in contemporary Indonesia, Marhaenism becomes the working ideology of PDI-P. It no longer
merely signifies the people’s suffering at the (post-)colonial time. Its usage currently deploys to represent the
people’s struggle to fight against economic-political oppression.

139

111

2010). The invitation reinforces the differentiation marker to distinguish PDI-P from other nationalist
parties. At the same time, it indirectly criticises other (nationalist) parties which heavily relied on
their pragmatic values.

The phrase “wong cilik”, which is used to represent the grassroots in the party’s slogan, denotes a
Javanese language borrowing. Arguably, this borrowing seems to neither connote the party’s ethnoorientation nor acknowledges Javanese hegemony (although Mujani and Liddle (2009a, p. 588)
argue that Java has been PDI-P’s political base) for the phrase can be seen as the linguistic borrowing
that is deployed to represent PDI-P’s identity. At the same time, the adoption signifies the existence
of the primordial tie of the party with Javanese culture. This can be traced from the party’s historical
record which shows a strong ideological relation between PDI-P with Soekarno’s (Javanese)
nationalist thinking (see chapters one and six). Soekarno’s concept of Marhaenism operates in
parallel with the phrase “wong cilik”, as the Marhaens are perceived as encapsulating the nationalist
ideal of uniting all Indonesian people regardless of class in order to achieve freedom and prosperity
(see chapter four). Nuryanti (2007, pp. 176-177) notes that based on the historical record, the term
“Marhaen” was coined as a substitute for the phrase “orang kecil” (literally refers to Indonesian
lower class community) – a term used by Javanese priyayi to address the proletariats in Indonesia.

Claiming to be the representative of the “wong cilik”, PDI-P constructs a series of ekonomi
kerakyatan programs as reflected in the party’s ten ideological directions (Dasa Prasetiya). The
directions are perceived as the cadres’ pledge of allegiance that accentuates PDI-P’s nationalist
platforms. The party perceives the peldge as representing a precis of the party’s efforts to empower
the people and equally distribute welfare140. The pledge itself has been revised. It formerly
constituted eight ideological directions which were called Hasta Prasetya Perjuangan. Nuryanti
(2007, p. 165) argues that based on this pledge, PDI-P ideologically solidifies its cadres by binding
them with a declaration stating that their commitment is the same as the party’s. The platforms are
seen as follows:
1. upholding unity of the Repubic of Indonesia, Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and protecting
the nation’s pluralism;
2. strengthening people’s spirit of mutual assistance (gotong royong) in order to solve
communal problems;
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3. strengthening ekonomi kerakyatan programs141 by restructuring production systems,
reforming the agrarian rules and regulations, providing protection (pemberian proteksi), and
expanding the market and capital access;
4. providing healthy, nutritious food and housing for the poor;
5. waiving medical and schooling expenses for the poor;
6. providing proper (pasti)142, fast yet cheap public services;
7. preserving the environment and natural resources and consistently applying the regulations
of strategic environment planning;
8. reforming the bureaucracy in order to achieve good governance which is free from
corruption, collusion and nepotism;
9. upholding the principles of participatory democracy in decision-making processes, and;
10. enforcing the law by upholding the principles of justice and human rights.143

The list indicates that the party’s platforms are designed to encompass the socio-economic and
political aspects. What seems to directly reflect the party’s social welfare programs especially for the
poor, are statements number four, five and six. However, if we examine these statements by
comparing them with previous versions as quoted by Nuryanti (2007, p. 165), we will find that the
phrase “in accordance with the local government’s financial capacity” has been deleted in statement
number five. This deletion indicates that the local government’s financial capacity cannot completely
be relied on to waive medical and schooling expenses for the poor. The phrase, in fact, shows the
party’s dependence on local government power which would lead to the party’s attempt to
dominate the local government. At the same time, this also indicates PDI-P’s weakness, especially
when there is no guarantee that the party can win seats in the local leaders’ elections. Thus,
incorporating the phrase would emasculate the platforms and the need to delete the phrase was
arguably necessary.

The statement denoting ekonomi kerakyatan programs is also obscure. Although statement number
three, “strengthening ekonomi kerakyatan programs through restructuring production systems,
reforming the agrarian rules and regulations, providing protection (pemberian proteksi), expanding
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I translated the phrase ekonomi rakyat into ekonomi kerakyatan as the phrase closely related with the
concept of ekonomi kerakyatan as previously discussed.
142
I translated the adjective “pasti” (literally means exact or precise) into “proper” because the literal
translation of the phrase into “the exact public services” obscures the meaning.
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Adopted from Dasa Prasetya PDI-P,
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the market and capital access”, seems to directly represent ekonomi kerakyatan programs, but the
programs are framed in procedural steps that do not completely focus on small-sized enterprises.
The procedures are presented in specific material actions, as seen in the following sub clauses:
“restructuring production systems; reforming agrarian rules and regulations; providing protection;
expanding the market and capital access”. They are ostensibly designed to empower small-sized
enterprises as the pledge is claimed as representing the party’s real efforts to empower the people.
However, the nominal groups “production systems”, “agrarian rules and regulations”, “protection”,
“the market and capital access” after the material actions (restructuring, reforming and providing),
do not overtly indicate the empowerment. They merely denote the areas that need to be improved.
Hence, the nominal groups can be seen as reflecting both big and small sized industries.

However, a close examination of the nominal groups in the pledge shows that their usage creates
meaning fragmentation. For instance, the sub clause “providing protection” as one of the steps in
empowering small-sized enterprises obscures the “protection” as it can be interpreted in different
ways, such as protecting the domestic markets from imported goods or providing protection in the
legal sector or any other sector. Another example can be seen in statement number six. The
deployment of the word “pasti” as the adjective that qualifies public services in the phrase “proper
(pasti), fast yet cheap public services”, obscures the meaning of the party’s public services. The
adjective “proper” to translate the word “pasti” arguably represents more the public services’
quality than its literal translation. In short, not only does this create meaning fragmentation but also
represents PDI-P’s act of presenting the precis in a loose manner. If this is deliberately designed, the
pledge arguably fails to produce the intended meanings of the platforms.

The pledge also reflects a simple representation of the party’s commitment to empower the people.
As earlier noted, three of the statements directly reflect social welfare programs (four, five and six).
The first, second, ninth and tenth statements represent sequentially the third, the fourth144, and the
second and fifth145 principles of Pancasila. Statement number seven reflects the party’s values of
environmental preservation whilst the eighth statement accentuates the party’s platform of ideal
bureaucracy. As discussed earlier, statement number three ostensibly shows the procedural steps in
improving the economic well-being of the people. In other words, out of ten statements, three
statements (thirty per cent) focus on social welfare; forty percent represent Pancasila’s nationalist
principles (except Pancasila’s principle of religiosity); ten per cent describe the party’s economic
principles; ten per cent relate to environmental planning and another ten per cent is about the
144
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Both the second and the ninth points represent the democratic principles of Pancasila.
Point number ten indicates the humanity and social justice principles of Pancasila.
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party’s cardinal principle of governmentality146. Based on this fact, the party’s pledge largely
concentrates on paraphrasing Pancasila’s principles, whilst the social welfare programs become the
second priority. The other three articles of ten per cent each reflect the socio-economic sectors the
party focuses on. In this sense, reiterating Pancasila’s principles is seen as more crucial in the pledge
than catering to pragmatic programs. This means that the content of the pledge cannot be
completely seen as the representation of the party’s programs.

The reiteration also indicates PDI-P’s order of priority in positioning Pancasila’s principles.
Positioning the nation’s cohesion as the first declarative statement in the pledge shows that the
party shares a similar nationalist value with Golkar and PD. At the same time, this also indicates the
party’s acknowledgement of the significance of other nationalist parties’ accents (Golkar and PD) in
accentuating the nation’s integrity as their core ideological value. However, the acknowledgement
merely indicates that these three parties share similar nationalist characteristics. As discussed in
chapter five, the party’s logo reflects PDI-P’s identity as Pancasila democratic party as part of its
branding. As discussed, the deployment of Pancasila democracy (the fourth principle of Pancasila)
indicates a differentiation marker to distinguish PDI-P from other nationalist parties (see chapter
five). This identity marker is reinforced by the statements number two and nine of the pledge that
adumbrate gotong royong (mutual assistance) and participatory democracy as the core principles of
Pancasila.

On the other hand, the absence of reference to religious code in the pledge is an interesting aspect
to be examined. It arguably indicates the possibility that PDI-P put little emphasis on religiosity or
that it de-emphasises its religious side in order to reinforce its secular image. However, such
assumptions are not completely valid as the party presents its religious code on the statutes’
preamble. The presentation itself emerges, not in the form of a direct declarative statement, but
rather in an adjective form of “berketuhanan” (religious). The word “berketuhanan” is deployed as
part of a series of adjectives that qualifies the country’s objectives, i.e. actualising Indonesia as a
free, sovereign, united, democratic, just, prosperous, civilised and religious147 country. Occupying
the position as an adjective, the word “berketuhanan” functions as an attribute that defines the
noun “country” (Indonesia). The last sentence of paragraph two of the charter exemplifies this
146

Governmentality in Foucault’s view (1991, pp. 102-103) espouses the play of the triangle of “sovereigntydiscipline-government”. Foucault defines sovereignty and discipline as governance which embodies in a form
of bureaucracy – a system that exercises control and surveillance in order to achieve “the apparatuses of
security” or stable population.
147
I do not keep the literal translation of berketuhanan into belief in God, as it will create meaning
fragmentation.
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aspect as it defines Indonesia as a religious country: “Indonesia yang berketuhanan adalah Indonesia
yang menghargai keberagaman dan toleransi beragama dalam semangat ketuhanan Yang Maha
Esa” (“as a religious country, Indonesia values pluralism and religious tolerance in the spirit of
believing in God Almighty One”). By this, PDI-P constructs the religious branding of the party by
upholding the notions of pluralism and tolerance in the framework of Pancasila’s first principle.

However, the first principle is not the only factor that shapes the branding. The explication of the
party’s history as stated in the charter indirectly shows the rationale behind PDI-P’s religious
branding. As noted in chapter five, PDI-P was established as the extention, as well as fragmentation,
of PDI. PDI itself was forged as the fusion of two Christian parties (Parkindo and Catholic party) and
of three nationalist and socialist parties (PNI, IPKI and Murba). The process of this political merging
was started on 9 March 1970 with the establishment of kelompok demokrasi pembangunan or the
democratic group of development consisting of these five parties. They officially declared the
establishment of the group on 28 October 1971 and agreed to completely unite in one party (PDI) on
17 January 1981.148 PDI transformed itself as PDI-P in 1999 after the downfall of Soeharto’s regime.
Adopting Soekarno’s nationalist conception, the party declares itself as an ideologically-based party
with nationalism, kerakyatan (democracy?), and social justice as its main characteristics. Based on
these historical characteristics, it is not surprising to find that PDI-P put little emphasis on religiosity
in its political branding.

A declarative statement indicating PDI-P’s religiosity is found in the opening phrase of the charter:
“Dengan Rahmat Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” or “By the grace of God Almighty One”. As previously
discussed, the word “Tuhan” is used as a code word that can embrace religious pluralism in
Indonesia. A similar greeting is also found in Megawati’s speech at the third PDI-P Congress (6-9
December 2010) at Denpasar, Bali. She employed, at the same time, the Islamic greeting
(Assalamualaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh), the Indonesian greeting (Salam Sejahtera bagi
Kita Semua), and the (Balinese) Hindu greeting (Om Swastiastu) in her opening speech. Roughly,
these greetings have similar meaning of wishing peace upon the addressee. They signify a pluralist
notion in that the party plausibly wants to embrace all religious groups 149. At the same time, the
greetings also specifically address PDI-P’s Muslim and (Balinese) Hindu constituents. Bali is known as
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See Piagam PDI Perjuangan. (2010, July 20). Retrieved from

http://www.pdiperjuangan.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=136&Itemid=98
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The Indonesian greeting “Salam Sejahtera Bagi Kita Semua” is seen as a neutral greeting that is able to
embrace all religions as it does not refer to any religious references.
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PDI-P’s political base as Megawati has strong Balinese cultural ties150. Van Wichelen (2006, p. 46)
notes that this cultural disposition was contested prior to the 1999 election. Megawati’s image as
the symbol of New Order resistance was contested by A.M Saefuddin, the former Minister of Food
and Horticulture under the Habibie government, who argued that Megawati’s praying at a Hindu
temple in Bali attenuated her Islamic credentials. This reinforces Megawati’s secular image. This
character assassination received severe critiques, especially from the Balinese. However, Megawati’s
cultural and political background becomes an unbreakable tie that represents political and cultural
capital other (nationalist) parties lack.

What is also interesting from this branding is PDI-P’s secular nationalist image with Muslims as its
supporters. The characteristic of Indonesian Muslim society can arguably be seen as one of the
actors that influence Muslims to cast their votes for PDI-P. Adopting Geertz’s (1960) classical
categorisation of Indonesian Muslims, van Wichelen (2006, p. 44) argues that although Indonesia is
known as having the largest Muslim population in the world, its community is dominated by its
nominal Muslim or abangan. In order to find the correlation between the degree of piety of nominal
and pious Muslims with Muslim voters’ preferences, Mujani and Liddle (2009b) conducted a survey
which was based on the frequency Muslim voters practise their everyday religious rituals. Mujani
and Liddle found that the percentage fluctuated slightly. In 1999, 53 per cent of Muslims stated that
they regularly performed the Islamic five-time daily prayers. The number slightly increased in 2004
when 58.1 per cent claimed that they regularly conducted prayers. The number dropped slightly in
2009 reaching 55.2 per cent. Not only does this percentage indicate a slight fluctuation in the ratio
between pious and nominal Muslims in Indonesia, but also indirectly reflects the characteristics of
Indonesian Muslims.

This is reinforced by Mujani and Liddle’s (2009b, pp. 589-591) further survey. They found that 33 per
cent of Muslims supported the Islamic values whilst the vote for secular parties (PD, Golkar and PDIP) in 2004 elections reached 48 percent. The percentage of support for secular parties (PD, Golkar,
PDI-P, Gerindra and Hanura) increased (57 percent) in 2009. This factor, however, does not directly
correlate with the fact that Muslims support PDI-P, a secular party. The preferences in choosing PDIP, especially in the 1999 election (see chapter five), was primarily due to Megawati’s image as the
symbol of people’s resistance against Soeharto’s regime (Mujani and Liddle, 2010, p. 96). They were
“hailed” by her image and felt that supporting Megawati would contribute to the country’s
development. Hence, the degree of Muslimness cannot be seen as representing Muslim voters’
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Soekarno’s mother or Megawati’s grandmother is a Balinese.
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behaviours, as Mujani and Liddle (2010, pp. 75-99) argue that the sociological and cultural factors
such as religion, regionalism, and social class play little part in influencing contemporary Indonesian
voters.151 They now evaluate the party/the candidates’ performance and achievement. However, in
the 2009 legislative election PDI-P gained merely 14.1 per cent of votes. This was arguably due to the
poor achievement of Megawati’s administration (2001-2004) which made people lose confidence in
her and her party (Suryadinata, 2002).

To rectify the situation, PDI-P amended its branding strategy. Instead of retaining its secular image in
a rigid manner, PDI-P attempted to capture more Muslim voters by establishing an affiliate called
Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (Bamusi) or Indonesian House of Muslim in 2011. Although Megawati in
her speech at the inauguration of Bamusi’s Central Board on 13 October 2011 claimed that the
cardinal objective of this wing organisation is to ward off Islamic radicalism in Indonesia, Mujani and
Liddle (2009a, p. 578) argue that this affiliate’s establishment reflects PDI-P’s activities in adopting
the same pattern of its predecessor (PNI) that also had Islamic affiliates in the 1950s and 1960s.
Bamusi’s establishment is also seen as an attempt to make this party appear less secular, or arguably
more Islamic.

As previously implied, PDI-P’s secular image stems from Soekarno’s PNI with Javanese nominal
Muslims as its main supporters. Soekarno’s family influence is seen as the party’s core brand marker.
Mietzner (2009a, pp. 10-12) asserts that this heavy reliance on the party’s patron (Soekarno’s and/or
Megawati’s) charisma or gusti in Javanese framework152 will bring the party to the same problem of
leadership succession as PD. He notes that the potential candidates as Megawati’s successors, such
as Andreas Pareira (PDI-P’s legislator on the defense and foreign relations commission), Ganjar
Pranowo (PDI-P’s rising star), Budiman Sudjatmiko (leftist political activist), and Pramono Anung
Wibowo (former PDI-P’s Secretary General) are not in the familial circle of Soekarno dynasty. Puan
Maharani (Megawati’s daughter) and Puti Guntur Soekarnoputri (Megawati’s niece) are seen as too
151

However, Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi (2012) rectified their research findings. They found that from the
total percentage of Muslim in Indonesia (88 per cent), most of them are santri (they do not include the exact
ratio that compares the number of santri against the abangan). Their finding is based on their survey that
identified the correlation between the Muslim voters’ behaviours and preferences and the frequency of their
practising religious rituals (and obligations) such as performing five-time daily prayers, Ramadhan fasting, and
reciting Al Qur’an. They adopted Geertz’s conception in distinguishing santri and abangan by positioning santri
as the one who adherely performs Islamic religious practices whereas abangan as the Muslim who mixes the
animistic rituals such as making a devotional visit to the grave of a religious leader, with the Islamic orthodoxy,
such as reciting Al-Qur’an verses (whilst visiting the grave). Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi (2012, p. 201) further
argue that the elements such as religions, Muslim voters’ characteristics, the voters’ involvement in Islamic
organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah and the Islamic ideological orientation play a limited (if not
marginal) role in determing the voters’ behaviours and preferences.
152
See the discussion about Kawula-Gusti in chapter six
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young and inexperienced to be Megawati’s successor. However, as Kingsbury (2005, p. 313)
contends that the greatest political asset of the party is Soekarno’s charismatic image. PDI-P has to
maintain this capital in its branding as the 2014 elections are approaching.

Megawati Soekarnoputri
As the greatest asset of the party, PDI-P’s branding is heavily reliant on the image of Megawati. Van
Wichelen (2006) investigates the representation of Megawati as the party’s icon that represents the
intersection of the codes of nationalism, secularism and feminism in the 1999 and 2004 Elections.
She found that Megawati’s body has been de-politicised for boosting PDI-P’s votes by selling her
image as the symbol of Soekarno’s daughter, the mother of the nation (or in Suryakusuma’s term
(1996, p.101) “state motherism”), (Muslim/secular) female leader and the resistance of the New
Order regime. The de-politicising process of Megawati’s corporeal body was begun with the
mechanism of exploiting woman’s traditional stereotypes (in this case as a mother and a daughter)
as the symbols of innocence and virtue (Sreberny and van Zoonen, 2000, p. 2). Bearing these
symbols, Megawati’s image becomes potent capital in PDI-P’s branding as she is seen as
representing the “incorruptibility” of the Reform era (or in van Wichelen’s (2006, p. 50) language, “a
clean figure”), with the combination of her status as the daughter of the founding father, Soekarno.
Indonesian people perceived her as a mothering figure that could dilute the chaotic condition at that
time by offering “security and comfort” (Aspinall, 2001, p.24). This image-building also reflects a
reification of Megawati’s corporeal body as a political commodity in PDI-P’s branding. Since the
commodity (Megawati’s image) is labelled under the secular notion of PDI-P, the selling of her image
was challenged by the Islamic faction when she was nominated as President, especially in the 1999
Election. Her opponents sparked a (religious) debatable issue on whether Islamic teachings allow a
woman to be President. However, according to van Wichelen (2006) the issue did not represent a
religious block between Islamic and Nationalist factions, but more as a commodity that reflects a
political “re-position of nationalist Muslim and Muslim santri”.

Returning to Megawati’s image as a female leader, Megawati ostensibly represents a feminist figure.
Being the first Indonesian female Muslim President, Megawati’s image was designed to represent
woman’s emancipation. I have noted previously that Cosmopolitan magazine in Indonesia
(September 2001 edition) utilised Megawati as a commodity to represent the magazine’s ideology,
i.e. “fun fearless female” – an ideology that ostensibly runs parallel with the notion of women’s
emancipation (Leiliyanti, 2009, pp. 116-117). Her appearance in this woman’s magazine represents
her “public womanhood” (Sen, 2002) that plausibly underpinned gender equality. This ubiquity is
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signified by the plethora of public images showing her with her father. On almost every billboard,
Soekarno appears standing behind his daughter. Van Wichelen (2006, pp. 49-54) argues that
Soekarno’s appearance with Megawati signifies the party’s (also read: Megawati’s) attempt to revive
the romantic past of Soekarno’s charisma. At the same time this also connotes a heavy reliance on
this female leader, who had been married three times, and on Soekarno’s masculine charisma. In
short, fetishising Megawati’s womanhood means returning to Soekarno’s masculinity.

Blitar exemplifies the return of Soekarno-ism. Rider (2001, p. 3) found that the glorification of
Megawati’s (read: Soekarno’s) image as a nationalist icon has become a social norm in Blitar,
Soekarno’s place of birth. People in Blitar decorated their houses with Megawati and Soekarno’s
portraits in their front window. Their portraits became the sign that represents people’s loyality to
Megawati and Soekarno (read: PDI-P). However, Rider’s interviews with PDI-P supporters revealed
that the foundation of people’s support was largely based on the “personalistic leadership” (Mujani
and Liddle, 2010, p. 97) of Soekarno, who represents “charismatic traditionalist authority”
(Kingsbury, 2005, p. 24). They were indifferent to the party’s platforms and simply see themselves as
“the people of Megawati’s father” (Rider, 2001, p. 3). This claim indirectly shows the characteristic of
PDI-P’s followers, which according to van Wichelen (2006, p. 48), resembles the notion of a floating
mass – the term used by the New Order regime to indicate that this lower class community needs
“guidance in articulating their political aspirations”.

In relation to the branding process, Megawati’s image can be seen in the framework of representing
Megawati as a cultural icon. As discussed previously, Holt (2004, pp. 8-11) asserts that in order to
become a cultural icon, Megawati needs to construct an “identity myth”, i.e. a myth-making process
which is based on “everyday life narratives set in the populist worlds that resolves contradictions”.
As implied, the process is conducted by projecting Soekarno’s image onto Megawati so that the
projection of Soekarno’s image as the (Javanese) Messiah can be transmitted. The projection, as well
as the inculcation of Megawati’s image, can be overtly seen in a short advertisement entitled “Teguh
Berjuang Membangun Negeri” (“Determined to building the country [Indonesia]”), which is found in
the party’s official website153. The ad opens with a scene showing the party’s chairperson recounting
the time when she governed the country. She is depicted sitting on a chair looking at a beautiful
garden while saying “seni membangun negeri ini ibarat menyatukan berbagai sisi dalam sebuah
rangkaian yang selaras” (“the art of building this country [Indonesia] is like bringing together various
elements in harmony”). This scene marks a differentiation strategy in PDI-P’s branding. Although,
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PDI-P deploys a similar ideological jargon as PD and Golkar, Megawati’s position as the narrator
arguably legitimates the party’s conception of its “art” in building the country. The art itself is
presented in a simile, “like bringing together various elements in harmony”, which is symbolised by a
scene showing Megawati arranging flowers in a vase. Flowers are used as signs to connote different
elements personified as flowers. The arrangement of flowers in a vase represents the harmonious
elements that resembles Golkar’s equilibrium, which requires that every part of the plant (read:
Indonesia) work together to actualise the common goal.

However, the next scene depicting Megawati reading a book reiterates her image as Soekarno’s
daughter. Her statement “ketika saya membangun negeri, saya belajar langsung dari pendiri
republik ini” (“when I developed this country, I directly learnt it from its founding father [Soekarno]”)
reflects the same tactic PDI-P used to sell Soekarno’s charisma. The action verb “directly learnt”
indicates not merely the juxtaposition, but also the claim on Soekarno’s legacy as if it is solely hers.
Megawati is noted as the first member of Soekarno’s family who decided to enter the political arena
with the consequence of breaking the family’s commitment of not entering the political arena after
Soekarno’s death. This political act is then perceived as the return of Soekarno(’s family) into the
Indonesian polity. Having been the first to revive the nostalgia, Megawati utilised this position to
claim her father’s legacy solely as hers/PDI-P’s. In short, the status signifies the strategy and its tactic
of claiming and reifying the legacy as the party’s best commodity.

Another compelling part in the ad is the voice over of Puan Maharani, Megawati’s daughter, in the
closing scene. Maharani’s statement “konsistensi sikap kita akan selalu dicermati dan disikapi secara
terbuka oleh rakyat Indonesia” (“the consistency of our attitude will always be observed and openly
addressed by Indonesian people”) illustrates the scenes depicting PDI-P’s masses, Megawati’s
smiling portrait and Maharani’s picture with Megawati. The statement was taken from Maharani’s
speech at the plenary session of the Parliament. Her position as the one who closes this
advertisement can be seen as twofold: first, PDI-P cannot dissociate itself from its own branding
construction, relying solely on Soekarno’s family. Secondly, this duo (Megawati/Puan Maharani or
mother/daughter) becomes the addressers who disseminate Soekarno’s ideology. Their
performances also indicate Megawati’s endeavours in preparing her successor.

Aside from her reliance on Soekarno, Megawati is also noted as a character who is known for her
“reticence and aloofness” (Aspinall, 2001, p. 23). Her poor communication skills in delivering
government policies publicly and Megawati’s domination over the party (Nuryanti, 2007, p. 179)
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were alleged as the factors that influenced the decline in PDI-P’s votes, especially in the 2004
elections. On the other hand, as Megawati’s former coordinating minister of security and political
affairs, SBY, compensated for Megawati’s weakness in communicating government policies. Their
relationship deteriorated, especially when SBY wanted to be the Presidential candidate in 2004
without Megawati’s consent. SBY was alleged to be utilising his position for his own advancement,
especially when the ministry of security and political affairs launched a public service ad about a
peaceful election. SBY then resigned from his position, which was in Megawati’s view SBY’s act of
running away from his reponsibilities154.
This uneasy situation continues especially when PDI-P decided to become the opposition party. It
frequently criticised SBY’s policies, such as the government’s social initiative, Bantuan Langsung
Tunai (BLT) or direct cash assistance program for the poor. The party viewed that the program would
merely escalate people’s dependency on the government. However, when the counter attack from
the government hit the party stating that PDI-P merely hampered the poor to receive BLT, PDI-P
then abruptly shifted its position from criticising to supervising the program. PDI-P campaigns
circulated through the issues of supervising BLT, fighting for people’s prosperity and for cheap prices
for staple foods, and creating millions of jobs (Firmanzah, 2010, p. 240).

Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) or Greater Indonesia Movement Party
Like any other nascent (nationalist) party such as PD, Gerindra’s branding is heavily reliant on its
patron (Prabowo Subianto), the former Commander of Army Strategic Reserve or Pangkostrad, the
chief of Kopassus (Special Forces), and Soeharto’s former son-in-law. Having the similar pattern of
branding with Megawati, Prabowo represents the intersection of codes of (“regimist”) Islam
(borrowing Hefner’s term, 2000), militarism and nationalism/socialism. As Gerindra is established in
order to be the electoral machine of Prabowo, dissociating the party from its patron’s image is
impracticable. Thus, this sub section analyses the image construction of Gerindra by focusing on the
image of Prabowo Subianto, especially his political disposition vis-a-vis the party’s statutes, slogan,
and platfroms, in order to assess the party’s nationalist/socialist image that arguably runs parallel
with the other nationalist parties. This sub section is organised by examining the coalescence of this
patron’s image: from representing Soeharto’s Islamic/military faction (at the end of Soeharto’s
administration) to his resilient (?) image as a nationalist/socialist figure.
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Prior to his being purged from the military by Wiranto, the former Chief Commander of Indonesian
Armed Forces or TNI under Habibie’s government, Prabowo was formerly known as Soeharto’s
“future family guardian” (McBeth, 1994). His military career sky-rocketed especially when he
married Soeharto’s daughter, Siti Hediati Harijadi (better known as Titiek Soeharto). McBeth further
notes that Prabowo’s familial background155 played a significant role in his military career. Aside
from this marital and familial background, a series of military training exercises and operations
Prabowo undertook cannot be seen as minor elements in his career. He was known as the leader of
Mapenduma Operation156, which succeeded in releasing twelve researchers (from Britain,
Netherland, Germany and Indonesia) who were Free Papua Movement’s hostages in 1996. However,
as Hefner (2000, p. 201) notes, a popular perception of Prabowo’s militaristic image has been forged
since his first military operation in East Timor in 1976. Not only was this due to the assassination of
Nicolao do Reis Lobato, the President of Fretilin, by Prabowo’s troops, but also at the same time, as
Hefner further notes, Prabowo was also alleged to have organised “civilian vigilantes to commit acts
of rape, torture, and murder against villages sympathetic to the pro-independence opposition”.

This callous image is reinforced by the fact that Prabowo was also known as the representatitive of
the Islamic faction (or the green faction) of the military (Ecip, 1999; Hefner, 2000; Kingsbury, 2005,
p. 12; Plaztdasch, 2009a, pp. 122, 274). Platzdasch (2009a, p. 122) points out that Prabowo had a
close relationship with Islamic hard-line organisations such as Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas
Dunia Islam or KISDI (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of Islamic World) and Dewan Dakwah
Islamiyah Indonesia or DDII (Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council) in the mid 1990s – the
organisations, in Platzdasch’s view, inherited the Masyumi tradition. In an alignment with
Platzdasch, Hefner (2000, pp. 151-152) argues that Prabowo’s Islamic disposition cannot be
perceived as running in line with the mainstream of Indonesian Islam which is represented by the
two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (see
chapters four and five). The establishment of the Centre for Policies and Development Studies
(CPDS) as “regimist leading” think tank inside ICMI by Prabowo with the other military “green”
supporters such as Syarwan Hamid, Feisal Tandjung and Hartono, and non military “regimist”
Muslims such as Din Syamsuddin, Amir Santosa, and Fadli Zon, reinforces their stigma. Hefner
further points out that the aim of this hard-line camp inside ICMI is not to dilute ICMI but to build a
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Prabowo is the third child of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Soeharto’s leading economist and the founder of
the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) in Soekarno’s era. Djojohadikusumo funded a counter government known
as PRRI (Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) in 1957 as Soekarno’s government was alleged
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“bridge” between ICMI “regimist” and the military “green” faction. In alignment with Hefner, Ecip
(1999, pp. 130-132) argues that Prabowo’s closeness to the (regimist) Islamic faction can be seen as
twofold: firstly, following the path of his former father-in-law, Prabowo forged an alliance with the
Islamic camp as he disliked the growing power of the Catholic General, L.B. Moerdani. Secondly, he
wanted to rehabilitate the relation between the Armed forces with the Islamic camp, especially after
the 12 September 1984 Tanjung Priok tragedy when General L.B. Moerdani was alleged to have
ordered the massacre of hundreds (or around 400- 500157) of Muslims (Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003, p.
140). Ecip also further notes that Syafrie Syamsuddin, the current vice minister of defence, was the
one that played an important role in shaping Prabowo’s Islamic credentials. He consistently
reminded Prabowo to perform morning’s prayer.

Prabowo himself comes from a religiously mixed family: his father is a Muslim whilst his mother,
brother and sisters are Christians. The military traits run deeply in Prabowo’s family. Tempo
magazine (“Jejak Militer dalam Tubuhnya”, 2009) notes that his military bloodline derives from his
parents’ lines. Prabowo’s uncles, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo’s late brothers (Lieutenant Subianto
Djojohadikusumo and Sujono Djojohadikusumo), were the Indonesian soldiers who died not long
after the Japanese surrendered to the Dutch in January 1946, while his grandfather from his mother
side, Major Sigar, was a Dutch Colonial soldier. Although Prabowo was his mother’s favourite son
(see Tempo magazine, “Sepotong Mimpi Anak Pelarian”, 2009), his closeness to his mother and the
family religious background does not plausibly influence Subianto’s religious-political disposition.
Hefner (2000, p. 151) contends that Soeharto was the figure that moulded Prabowo’s (regimist
Islam) disposition.

Having this “regimist” military background, Prabowo was stigmatised by an allegation of his
involvement in the abduction and disappearance of students and political activists at the end of
Soeharto’s downfall. The May 1998 riot marked the fall of Prabowo’s military career. Defending his
father-in-law’s regime158, Prabowo was alleged to “exceed” or “misinterpret” (borrowing the term
of the Army Chief of staff, General Subagyo H.S, as cited by McBeth (1998) and Djarot, et al. (2006,
p. 74)) the command of his chief in restoring the stability of the capital city. Ecip (1999) and Djarot,
et al. (2006) conjecture that General Feisal Tanjung, the former Commander-in-chief of the Armed
157

Kontras[attachment].(n.d). Kronik Advokasi Priok. Retrieved from
http://www.kontras.org/data/kronik%20Priok.pdf
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Prabowo’s loyalty to Soeharto at the end of his former father-in-law’s tenure was questionable. Eklof (1999, p.
219) argues that the downfall of Soeharto was conjectured as a conspiracy which involved his former confidants
such as Habibie, Prabowo and Wiranto, rather than the result of “people’s power”. In alignment with Eklof, Lee
(2009, p. 655) further notes that during the students’ demonstration in May 1998, the Armed Forces’ wives club
“distributed food and snack to the protestors”.
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Forces, and President Soeharto, were the two figures who had a direct command line to Prabowo as
the Commander of the Strategic Army Reserve. Hefner (2000, pp. 205-207) argues that although the
initiator behind the abduction and disappearance remained unclear, the evidence suggested
Gerindra’s patron’s involvement in funding and mobilising the Islamic ultraconservative groups such
as KISDI to face the pro-democracy demonstrators in May 1998 was evident. Facing the allegation of
the abduction and disappearance, Prabowo claimed that he was ready to be responsible “if his men
were found guilty” (Djarot, et al., 2006, p. 12; McBeth, 1998). Eventually, Prabowo was honourably
discharged from his position due to an allegation of coup d’etat over the government in 1998.
However, as Ecip (1999, pp. 42-48) notes, four of Prabowo’s allies: the late Achmad Soemargono
(the former chairperson of KISDI), Fadli Zon (the director of Institute for Policy Studies or IPS159),
Farid Prawiranegara (the son of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the Prime Minister of PRRI), and Yanus
Hutapea read Prabowo’s rebuttal. He stated that the security operation in the capital city, which
included the residences of President and Vice President during the May 1998 riot, was in the
accordance with security procedures. He also claimed that the allegation of his troop besieged
Habibie’s residence on 21 May 1998 was a mere misinterpretation.

The purge of Prabowo from the military not only (plausibly) marks the end of his lineage with
Cendana (read: Soeharto’s) family160, but also, according to Lee (2009, pp. 656-659), reflects
Habibie’s pragmatism. He notes that Habibie considered Prabowo’s military capital as the
Commander of Special Forces and Strategic Army Reserve that controlled the Army Headquarters
and the “strategic positions in and around the capital city”, was insufficient to narrow the gap
between Habibie and the military compared to Wiranto, who “dominated the Armed Forces
Headquarters”. After his discharge, Prabowo then moved to Jordan. He rejected the offer of
citizenship from the Jordanian government and returned to Indonesia three years later.

The return of Prabowo arguably showed his political resilience. In order to rehabilitate his image and
achieve his political ambition, he used Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia (HKTI) or the Indonesian
Harmonious Farmer Union as his vehicle to represent and mobilise the grassroots. He became HKTI’s
chairperson in 2004 replacing Siswono Yudhohusono, the former minister of transmigration during
the New Order period. This new image is reinforced by his success in penetrating Kontak Tani
159

Hefner (2000, pp. 195-196) argues that the establishment of IPS in 1996 derived from Soeharto first daughter’s,
Siti Hardiyanti Rukamana (Mbak Tutut), ambition as her father’s successor. In order to realise this ambition, she
called a truce with KH Abdurrahman Wahid, NU’s former chairperson, and along with her aide, General Hartono, she
suspended her support for CPDS. Dissatisfied with the condition, the other Islamic green military supporters
(Prabowo Subianto, Feisal Tanjung, and Syarwan Hamid) established IPS as a rival think tank to back up Habibie and
confront Tutut and Wahid.
160
The divorce between Prabowo and Titiek Soeharto not long after Soeharto’s resignation remains a mystery.
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Nelayan Andalan (KTNA) or the Association of Integrated Farmer and Fisherman and Indonesian
Traditional Market Merchant Association (Asosiasi Pedagang Pasar Seluruh Indonesia or APPSI).
Employing the reason that he could not represent the grassroots’ aspiration optimally,161 Prabowo
then resigned from his position as the member of Golkar’s advisory board on 12 July 2008. This can
be perceived as Prabowo’s motive to overtly engage in a new party (Gerindra) constucted by his
tycoon brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, and Fadli Zon, on 6 February 2008. Not only does this
denote Golkar’s internal spilt (Harjanto, 2010, p. 277), but also represents Prabowo’s political
disposition in perceiving Golkar not as the right vehicle to represent the grassroots. This position
marks Prabowo’s first political move to dilute Golkar’s nationalist image at the time of his
resignation. At the same time, this also reflects his attempt to differentiate the branding between
Golkar and his new electoral vehicle, Gerindra.

Although Prabowo’s attempt to differentiate Gerindra’s branding from any other party, this party’s
branding appears to be similar to any other (nascent) nationalist parties. The similar features can be
traced, for instance, from Gerindra exponents who claim that the ideological reason behind the
establishment of the party derived from the phenomenon that Indonesian democracy has been
hijacked and exploited by the elites, which victimised the people.162 This same ideological pattern is
also deployed by all nationalist parties in the post-Soeharto era. However, the most striking
resemblance between Gerindra and Golkar lies in the word-for-word account of their statutes. It can
be seen from the exact copy of the following statements (paragraph four of Gerindra statutes’
preamble and the third and fourth sentences of paragraph four of Golkar statutes’ preamble):

“[Bahwa] dengan terjadinya penyelewengan-penyelewengan terhadap cita-cita
Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 maka lahirlah
[yang selanjutnya melahirkan] tatanan baru yang menghendaki agar seluruh
kehidupan bangsa dan negara Republik Indonesia diletakkan dan dilandaskan
kepada kemurnian pelaksanaan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945.
Dengan demikian hakikat tatanan baru adalah sikap mental yang menuntut
pembaharuan dan pembangunan yang terus menerus dalam melaksanakan
Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945.”
“That the deviations from the country’s cardinal objectives and the 1945
Constitution have called forth a new order that requires the life of Indonesia’s
nation-state be based on the ideal implementation of Pancasila and the 1945
Constitution. Therefore the nature of the new order constitutes the mental
161

See Dwiwedhaswary, I. (2008, July 14). Prabowo: Saya Keluar dari Golkar. Kompas. Retrieved from
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/07/14/1156520/prabowo.saya.keluar.dari.golkar
162
See Sejarah Partai Gerindra (the history of Gerindra). [n.d]. Retrieved from

http://partaigerindra.or.id/sejarah-partai-gerindra
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attitude that demands a renewed ceaseless development in implementing
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.”
The only differences from the quotation between Gerinda and Golkar are the employment of the
phrases “maka lahirlah” (Golkar) and “yang selanjutnya melahirkan” (Gerindra)163 and the omission
of the word “bahwa” or “that”. Aside from the fact that these statements merely indicate
plagiarism, they, however, demonstrate the same (imitative) ideological principles of Golkar and
Gerindra. When Golkar deploys the phrase “mental attitude” as the signifier of the party’s resilience,
Gerindra simply imitates it to indicate that they both share the same perspective that Soeharto’s
period constituted nothing but deviations from Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. At this stage
the differentiation tactic Prabowo deploys on the statutes merely represents banality in the
framework of Pancasila’s nationalism. The preamble does not elaborate the mental attitude and
simply returns to note the governments’ failure in eradicating poverty since 1945; that the economic
and political systems have enlarged the gap between the rich and the poor; and thus, a strong
leadership (Prabowo) is needed to lead Indonesia to achieve fairness in prosperity.

If we examine these three points closely, we will find what Gerindra accentuates on its preamble is
the glorification of socialism. Heywood (2002, pp. 105-117) argues that socialism positions the
principles of collectivism, cooperation, equality, classless society and common ownership as the
foundation to attain sovereignty and equal prosperity for all (Indonesian people). This runs parallel
with Pancasila’s socio-nationalist principles: collectivism (kebersamaan), cooperation or mutual aid
(gotong royong), equality (keadilan sosial), classless society (Soekarno’s Marhaenism), and common
ownership164 (koperasi/ekonomi kerakyatan). In order to achieve this, Gerindra views that a strong
leadership (Prabowo Subianto) is needed to regulate the economy and power, so that, as Heywood
further argues, the state becomes “the instrument through which wealth can be collectively owned
and the economy rationally planned”. However, in today’s Indonesia, the state neither completely
plays its role in controlling the market nor becomes the sole determiner of the market. Marketbased economics is at play in the framework of this socio-economic system.

In the party’s manifesto, Gerindra criticises the present economic system, which according to the
party adopts a neoliberal system. This system is alleged as the main factor that plunges Indonesia
163

Since both phrases refer to the same exact meaning, I do not make any amendment in the English
translation.
164
Arguably, the concept of common ownership in Indonesia does not completely run paralell with state
ownership. The notion of collectivism in ekonomi kerayaktan put the ownership in the form of collective
cooperation that empowers its members (see the discussion about Pancasila and Hatta’s ekonomi kerakyatan
in chapter six).
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into the situation where foreign investors dominate the economy in the Reform era. This is largely
due to IMF’s formulation in restoring Indonesia’s economic system through privatisation of the
state-owned enterprises and elimination of subsidies and protection. This critique reflects Gerindra’s
position as the party that opposes such a system. The party exemplifies the everyday practice of
neoliberal system through the image below:

source: Minimarket Ekonomi Neolib vs Ekonomi Rakyat, retrieved from
http://partaigerindra.or.id/2012/01/05/minimarket-ekonomi-neolib-vs-ekonomi-rakyat.html

The photograph above depicts a street vendor who stands in front of a convenience store named
“Indomaret”, carrying a box of candies and medicine, in order to represent the grassroots. His
presence in the photograph is deployed as a comparison with the convenience store, the
embodiment of the everyday practice of the so-called neoliberal economic system. This pictorial act
is deployed to reinforce Gerindra’s concern over the mushrooming of convenience stores that would
gradually kill traditional merchants. Presenting this image on its official website reinforces the
reification of the concept of ekonomi kerakyatan as Gerindra’s high-end commodity. This positioning
arguably stems from Prabowo’s image – resilience as a successful businessman, most notably in the
pulp and paper industry. However, a close examination of Gerindra’s platfroms reveals a close
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similarity between the platforms and Hatta’s concept of ekonomi kerakyatan. Halida Hatta, the
daughter of Muhammad Hatta, contributed to shaping Gerindra’s manifesto.165

However, the party’s propagation of ekonomi kerakyatan is arguably emasculating, especially when
Prabowo decided to become Megawati’s running mate in the 2009 Presidential election. Megawati’s
government was noted as the one that privatised many strategic state-owned enterprises, such as
Indosat and Telkom, which led to her defeat in the 2004 Presidential election. People at that time
began to question PDI-P’s concept of ekonomi kerakyatan. Tribune News166 notes that Prabowo’s
support for Megawati in 2009 stemmed from PDI-P’s (Megawati’s) deal to support Prabowo in the
2014 Presidential election. This shows that although Gerindra realised Megawati’s track record,
pragmatic deals became the key factor. Having claimed to share similar ideological platforms 167,
Megawati and Prabowo chose Bantar Gebang, waste disposal center, as the place for their
declaration as the President and Vice President candidates in 2009. This place was chosen to signify
and plausibly rehabilitate Megawati’s image as the one that ostensibly represents the grassroots.
However, as Megawati’s popularity has gradually decreased since 2004 and Prabowo has not gained
sufficient popularity, they lost their candidacy.

What is also interesting to note from Gerindra’s (Prabowo’s) image-building is the accentuation of
poverty as the commodity to be sold to foster public sympathy. Such sympathy is needed to divert
people’s attention from Prabowo’s stigma. This can overtly be seen from a series of Gerindra’s TV
commercials that exploit poverty as its prime theme in the party’s socio-nationalist framework.
However, unlike Megawati’s short ad on her party’s official website, Gerindra’s ads are not directly
(if not ostensibly) centred on Prabowo. He mostly appears on the ads in the closing scenes delivering
the final yet most important remark of the advertisements or at the opening scene propagating the
party’s (Prabowo’s) socialist economic platforms. This strategy reflects the party’s tactic to
rehabilitate Prabowo’s militaristic image and diverts people’s attention to the issue of poverty. This
165

See Halida Hatta: Saya Keluar dari Partai Gerindra bukan karena Cekcok dengan Prabowo. (2012, July 8). Harian
Rakyat Merdeka. Retrieved from http://www.rmol.co/read/2012/07/08/70081/Halida-Hatta:-Saya-Keluar-DariPartai-Gerindra--Bukan-Cekcok-Dengan-Prabowo166

See Hidayat, R. (2011, December 20). Prabowo Menunggu Janji Megawati. Tribune News.com. Retrieved
from http://id.berita.yahoo.com/prabowo-menunggu-janji-megawati-030149268.html
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Such claim needs to be re-examined for if we trace the history back to the time when Sumitro
Djojohadikusumo’s (Prabowo’s father) party (PSI) was dissolved by Soekarno due to an allegation of Sumitro’s
involvement in PRRI.This shows that the similar socio-nalitionalist ideology adopted by PSI and PNI (Soekarno’s
party, see chapter four) did not guarantee any ideological alignment of these two parties. As PDI-P is seen as
the contemporary embodiment of PNI and Gerindra arguably adopts the socio-nationalist ideology of PSI,
Prabowo and Megawati’s alignment seems to be a tenuous and pragmatic one.

129

image-building seems to yield good results as Republika online168 notes that based on a survey
conducted by Soegeng Soerjadi Syndicate, Prabowo’s popularity (25.8 per cent) is higher than
Megawati and Jusuf Kalla. However, Kompas online169 notes that according to Saiful Mujani Research
and Consulting (SMRC), Prabowo’s popularity (78.8 per cent) is below Megawati Soekarnoputri (93.7
per cent) and Jusuf Kalla (88.9 per cent), whilst Lingkar Survei Indonesia (LSI) found that Prabowo’s
popularity (18 per cent) is below Megawati (18.3 percent).

Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura) or People’s Conscience Party
As earlier discussed, the establishment of Hanura on 21 December 2006 by Wiranto, the former
Commander-in-chief of Indonesia’s Armed Forces (TNI) and the Coordinating Minister for Politics
and Security Affairs in Gus Dur’s administration, marked a split within Golkar. However, what was
more interesting to note prior to the split was Wiranto’s political maneuvering, especially during the
May 1998 riot and the 1999 election. Tracing Wiranto’s track record will unravel the image
construction of both Hanura and Wiranto, as Syukur (2010, p. 3), Vice Secretary General of Hanura,
argues that the party largely relies on its patron’s persona. This also arguably reinforces the
perception that nascent nationalist parties in Indonesia are mostly established as the electoral
machine of their elites and thus make them institutionally and ideologically weak. This sub-section
discusses the branding of Wiranto as the representative of the Javanese “red and white”
(nationalist) military faction and as Soeharto’s former adjutant, as well as his civil image as Hanura’s
patron. This is structured by examining the familial and historical background of Wiranto in order to
check the elements that shape his socio-cultural (Javanese) and political disposition for his decision
to forge his own party.

Similar to SBY, Wiranto also represents the code of (Javanese) militarism. Tempo magazine (“Satu
Ayunan di Pintu Mercy”, 2009) notes that not merely did Wiranto’s (Javanese) militaristic disposition
stem from his educational background170, but also significantly from his experience as Soeharto’s
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See Faqih, M. (2012, June 6). Survei: Prabowo Menang dari Megawati dan JK. Republika.co.id. Retrieved
from http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/12/06/06/m56szh-survei-prabowo-menang-

dari-megawati-dan-jk
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See Gatra, S. (2012, July 9). Popularitas Gerindra Jauh Lebih Kecil daripada Prabowo. Kompas.com.
Retrieved from

http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/07/09/19531285/Popularitas.Gerindra.Jauh.Lebih.Kecil.dari
pada.Prabowo
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Due to the poor economic condition of his family, Wiranto decided to enroll at National Military Academy,
as entering the academy merely required a small amount of money. His military achievement in the academy
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former adjutant for four years (1989-1993). Coming from a Javanese aristocratic but modest171
family, Wiranto was educated in Javanese manners. However, he most notably learnt these
hierarchical manners especially from the time he became Soeharto’s adjutant – a prestigious
strategic position which later led Wiranto to the position of Indonesia’s Armed Forces Chief
Commander. Tempo magazine empoyed the title “Satu Ayunan Di Pintu Mercy” (“One Swing at
Mercedes Benz’s door”) as a metaphor to depict the methods Wiranto used in order to win
Soeharto’s heart. Wiranto’s way of closing the Mercedes Benz’ door (the Presidential car’s door)
signifies the way of how a (Javanese) soldier served and honoured his superior: at first, the door was
swung slowly, and a little pressure was then given to the door before it was completely closed. This
style of swinging was culturally and politically important. The slow motion in closing the car’s door
represents a Javanese style of “halus” or subtlety. However, this subtlety does not correspond with
weaknesses, as pressure is then applied. This act arguably runs parallel with Soeharto’s Javanese
philosophy, Mikul Dhuwur Mendem Jero (memikul setinggi-tingginya, memendam sedalamdalamnya) or valuing/respecting elders by not revealing their flaws (see chapter five). This Javanese
servitude and subservience can be perceived as a mode of gaining Soeharto’s trust, so that a higher
position will later be in Wiranto’s possession. At this stage, the power relation between Wiranto and
Soeharto can also be seen as twofold: it runs parallel with the socio-political relation between Gusti
and Kawula; whilst at the same time, it also arguably reflects a “culturally correct” maneuver for
political purposes. When Wiranto successfully became one of Soeharto’s confidants, he started to
build a political network with Soeharto’s guests and associates and learnt Javanese philosophy from
Soeharto that “a leader should learn from nature in order to become a “role model”172. In 1998
Wiranto successfully became the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.

As earlier noted, Wiranto’s position as the Army Chief Commander was considered as representing
the “red and white” (nationalist) faction (Eklof, 1999; Hefner, 2000; Lee, 2005, 2009; Kingsbury,
2005). This positioning seems to be closely related with his rivalry with Prabowo Subianto, who
represented the (regimist) Islamic faction (or green faction) of the military, especially after Soeharto
attempted to build a close relationship with the Islamic faction in the 1990s by establishing ICMI. At

was noted to be poor. The noun “rumput” (literally means grass) was deployed by his friends to indicate his
mediocrity in the military (see “Awalnya Hanya’Rumput’”. (2009, June 29-July 5). Tempo Edisi Khusus
Pemilihan Presiden 2009, pp. 102-104).
171
Although Wiranto’s family was noted as a poor family, Tempo magazine (see “Wiranto: Pemilu Bukan
Menang-Menangan Survei”, 29 June-5 July 2009 edition, p. 106) notes Wiranto’s Javanese aristocratic (priyayi)
title, Kanjeng Pangeran Wiranto Wirowijoto.
172
See Satu Ayunan di Pintu Mercy (One Swing at Mercedez Ben door). (2009, June 29-July5). Tempo Edisi
Khusus Pemilihan Presiden 2009, p.99
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this point, Wiranto’s position plausibly contradicts his patron’s political maneuvering. Lee (2005, p.
97; 2009, p. 656) notes that to counter the growing influence of ICMI inside the military, Wiranto
approached Yayasan Kerukunan dan Persaudaraan Kebangsaan or the Foundation of National
Brotherhood Harmony in order “to draw support from nationalist-minded officers.” However, the
establishment of ICMI could not arguably be seen as the only tactic Soeharto deployed to secure his
power. Soeharto put his pawns not only in the Islamic faction, such as his former son-in-law,
Prabowo Subianto, amongst the Islamic hard-liners, and Habibie in ICMI, but also in the nationalist
(military) one, such as Wiranto. This strategy seemed to be ineffective, not only because the
establishment of ICMI caused overarching dissent inside the Islamic173 and the military174 camps, but
also the political ambition and rivalry of these three figures could not later shield Soeharto from the
people’s demand for his resignation in mid 1998, as earlier discussed.

The political contestation between Wiranto, Prabowo, and Habibie arguably culminated in the May
1998 riot. As previously noted, Prabowo claimed that he had followed all the security procedures to
secure the capital city during the riot. However, Lee (2005, 2009) notes that Prabowo, as the
Commander of Special Forces and Strategic Army Reserve, was alleged as the person who
orchestrated the riot at the time Wiranto, as the Army Chief Commander and the Minister of
Defence and Security, wanted to implement a soft approach to the protestors. At the same time,
Soeharto requested Wiranto to implement martial law – a request that was subtly rejected by
Wiranto. On the other hand, Prabowo’s covert involvement, according to Berfield and Loveard
(1998), was conjectured, especially when Wiranto ordered Syafrie Syamsuddin, the operational
Commander of the capital city and also Prabowo’s close associate, to send troops to handle the riot.
Having claimed that Wiranto’s order was equivocal, Syamsuddin’s troop dispersed not in the
targeted locations. Seeing this, Prabowo then offered his help to Wiranto, but was repudiated. This
repudiation ostensibly stemmed not only from their old rivalry but also from a conjecture that
Prabowo wanted to indirectly show Wiranto’s incapability of tackling the riot, especially in front of
Soeharto. Besides, another conspiracy theory also unfolds: employing Soeharto’s pattern in
overthrowing Soekarno, Prabowo was alleged to be planning a similar scheme to topple his own
father-in-law. Prabowo and Habibie were also conjectured to have had a backroom deal to make
Prabowo the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, especially when Soeharto’s health started to
173

Muhammadiyah supported the establishment whilst NU (represented by Abdurrahman Wahid) and
Nurcholish Majid perceived ICMI as “sectarian” organisation that violated pluralism in Indonesia (Lee, 2009, p.
658-659; Hefner, 2000, p. 128).
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The green (Islamic) faction versus the red and white faction. Hefner (2000) classified the green military
faction (such as Prabowo Subianto, Feisal Tanjung) as regimist Islam (see chapter one and Gerindra’s section)
in contrast to civil Islam, represented by NU (Abdurrahman Wahid) and Nurcholish Majid.
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deteriorate in 1997. As the situation of the country became worse, Wiranto persuaded Soeharto to
resign while assuring him that the military would continue protecting him and his family after his
resignation. However, prior to that, Wiranto also made a backroom deal with Habibie. He requested
that when Soeharto resigned, Habibie would retain Wiranto as the Commander-in-chief; reform
bureaucracy; and dismiss Prabowo from his current position (Lee, 2005). On 21 May 1998, Soeharto
announced his resignation and the people’s mandate was directly given to the Vice President,
Habibie. Berfield and Loveard (1998) notes that not long after Soeharto’s resignation, Habibie
diverted his support from Prabowo to Wiranto after hearing from Feisal Tanjung, Prabowo’s former
associate in the regimist group (Hefner, 2000, p. 151; Mietzner, 2006, p. 7), that Prabowo was too
dangerous to be the Commander-in-chief. Besides, Hadiz (2005, p. 231) further notes that Habibie’s
stance on Wiranto was also based on the guarantee Wiranto gave that he would protect Habibie
against any attempt to oust Habibie from the Presidency.

The contestation above shows not merely the political scheming and intrigues behind the riot, but
more importantly discloses Wiranto’s position towards the nationalist/Islamic polarisation. A closer
investigation of the scheme shows that Wiranto’s inclination towards the nationalist camp is
primarily based on his rivalry with the “regimist” Prabowo. As McBeth (1997) and Lee (2005, pp.
656-657) note that as the son-in-law of Soeharto, Prabowo ignored “the military chain of command”
and attempted to depose Wiranto in 1998 – a struggle which in the end was won by Wiranto. Lee
(2005, p. 658) further notes that in order to confront Prabowo, Wiranto also sought the Islamic
camp’s support from Gus Dur, as he knew that Gus Dur, his “long-standing business partner”
(adopting Lee, 2005, p. 658), also opposed to ICMI. However, their relationship cannot be
completely perceived as marking Wiranto’s disposition towards the Islamic camp (civil Islam,
following Hefner (2000)). Mubarak (2007, pp. 117-118) conjectures that Wiranto was probably
involved as the patron of one of the Islamic hardliners (Front Pembela Islam (FPI) or Islamic Defender
Front)175 due to FPI’s demonstration against the National Commission on Human Right’s
investigation of the 1999 East Timor massacre. As the Chief Commander of the Army during the
1999 East Timor referendum, Wiranto was indicted as the one who was responsible of the massacre
of 1,400 people (McBeth and Hiebert, 2004; EIU ViewsWire, 2004). However, Wiranto denied such
responsibility.

Instead, he was then reported releasing a love songs recording, auctioning the album and donating
the money to violence victims across Indonesia, including the East Timorese (Adams, 2000). In a
175

FPI was established on 17 August 1998. Collins (2004, p. 114) notes that in September 1999 FPI was
mobilised to confront students’ demonstration against Habibie’s presidency.
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Bourdieuan lens, not only does Wiranto’s act signify an attempt to rehabilitate his name (reputation)
but also indicates an inequitable symbolic exchange: charity with reputation. At this stage, Wiranto
ostensibly attempted to compensate the agony of the victims and families with money with the
objective to ease their economic burdens after the massacre. In this sense, he simply equates his
charity with all of the loss the victims and families suffered. However, as the symbolic exchange is
conducted by gathering his powerful associates in one social event with the purpose of showing his
concern towards the victims of violence, Wiranto indirectly shows not only his social capital (his
relationship with “senior military and government officials”, Adams, 2000), but also ostentatiously
the level of power connection he has. Inviting and involving his business acquitances and associates
in the event were politically important. Not only did they support his so-called philanthropic action,
but also more importantly become the ones that legitimised his action176. At the same time, this
gathering becomes the site of publicity gimmickry as releasing and auctioning the albums and giving
charity were conducted at a time when he was nominated as a Vice President for the 1999 election.
This is possibly also intended to demonstrate his compassionate side177 that softens his militaristic
image.

Shari and Prasso (1999) note that on 7 and 8 July 1999, thus during the 1999 election, Wiranto
invited a number of generals, excluding the ones from the green faction, to hold a secret meeting at
the military headquaters in order to discuss a coalition government. At that time, his name was
mentioned as one of the strongest candidates for Vice President. Shari and Prasso (1999) argue that
Wiranto’s position during the 1999 election as the Commander-in-chief positioned him as the
kingmaker, based on several factors. First, the 38 seats of the military in the parliament became one
of the keys that determined military strategic position178 at that time. Second, Wiranto’s position as
chief Commander of the Armed Forces enabled him to be the director of Indonesia’s “political
drama”179 (read: Indonesia’s next government), especially during the election, for history records
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Adams (2000) also notes the comment from one of Wiranto guests: “I really do not understand why he's
singled out, why he's being accused. He's supposed to protect Indonesia, and that's what he did.”
177
Priyambodo RH (2008) from Antara, Indonesia’s News bureau, notes that approaching the 2009 election
Wiranto used the same branding strategy showing his compasionate side by eating nasi aking (the left-over
dried rice) in Serang, Banten. This act is intended to demonstrate that he is not reluctant to go and observe the
poor people and their villages and eat their staple food as this is similar to the poor conditions in which his
family used to live. This public performance plausibly helps him to construct a populist image. However, this
demonstration merely shows the same branding strategy as Wiranto once again shows a similar compasionate
social act (such as auctioning his song album and donating the money to charity) leading to publicity
gimmickry.
178
As the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, Wiranto determined which military officers who could
occupy the seats.
179
Shari and Prasso (1999) argue that the word “drama” seems to suit Indonesia’s political condition at that
time, especially as Wiranto and his accomplices seemed to pre-determine Indonesia’s next government. In this
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that the winning party, in this case PDI-P (Megawati), always need the military’s support. Megawati
was aware of this. Besides, with Gus Dur’s willingness to support Megawati’s candidacy and
students’ acceptance of the military involvement in the next government as long as Megawati
became the President made Wiranto’s position as the future Vice President feasible. However, as
noted earlier, this nationalist coalition eventually had to admit the Central Axis group’s maneuvering
(the Islamic camp) in winning the election.180 Wiranto then became Minister of Security and
Defence. In January 2000, he became the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security affairs only
for three months.

Wiranto’s relationship with Gus Dur gradually deteriorated as Wiranto declared martial law because
of the political unrest in Aceh whilst at the same time Gus Dur suggested holding a referendum for
the independence of this province. The military camp viewed this suggestion merely as Gus Dur’s
private request, not in his capacity as the President. This then marked political tension between Gus
Dur and Wiranto, as Wiranto seemed to hold a firm grip on the military. Using International pressure
about Wiranto’s alleged involvement in the East Timor massacre, Gus Dur asked Wiranto several
times to step down from his position. Wiranto refused to do so arguing that if he agreed to resign,
this would mean he admitted his involvement. However, as McBeth (1999) notes, amid the political
tension between them, Gus Dur still allowed Wiranto to suggest a list of military officers to be
promoted in his new cabinet. Prior to his retirement as the chief Commander of the Army, Wiranto
reshuffled the military putting forward the most potential successors as the Army Chief Commander,
Let. Gen Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the teritorial affairs chief, as the Mining Minister, and Let. Gen.
Agum Gumelar, National Defence Institute Governor, as the Minister of Transport. McBeth further
argues that Gus Dur’s ambivalent stance towards Wiranto arguably derived from his need for
Wiranto’s help to “counterbalance the influence of Amien [Rais]” (the Central Axis group) that
dominated the Parliament. Deputy Admiral Widodo A.S replaced Wiranto’s position as Army Chief
Commander. Gus Dur then sacked Wiranto from his Cabinet.

Wiranto’s next political maneuver was to dominate Golkar. McCawley (2004) argues that Wiranto’s
victory in Golkar’s internal election over Akbar Tandjung, Golkar’s former chairperson, as Golkar’s
Presidential candidate for the 2004 election, signifies the beginning of a new political trend in
choosing its Presidential candidate. Wiranto’s victory came as quite a surprise as Akbar was known
drama, following the Javanese tradition of seeking blessing from the respected elder, Wiranto was reported
asking his former patron’s (Soeharto) blessing for the scenario he was playing.
180
Unexpectedly, Gus Dur accepted the Central Axis’s proposal to nominate him as the candidate for
President. Gus Dur’s nomination pushed Wiranto’s ambition aside for Megawati would occupy the seat of Vice
President. This abrupt political change was intended to appease Nationalist and Islamic camps.
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to be the figure who successfully restored Golkar’s image in the Reform era. However, the graft
charges laid against Akbar in 2002 possibly impeded his path to victory. Golkar’s support for
Wiranto’s Presidential candidacy for the 2004 election then split. This can overtly be seen from
Akbar’s statement that he was ready to be nominated as Megawati’s running mate in the 2004
election. Although Wiranto was defeated in the election, Golkar dominated the parliament in 2004.
Jusuf Kalla then became Golkar’s chairperson.

With this disappointment, Wiranto established his own electoral vehicle, Hanura, on 21 December
2006. Firmanzah (2010, p. 249) contends that the employment of the phrase Hati Nurani Rakyat
(People’s Conscience) reflects Wiranto’s satirical statement about the government elites who work
without conscience. This can be seen from the party’s doctrine181 that employs the phrase
“kesadaran Illahiyah” (divine conscience) to contradict the elites’ corrupt performances which
violated their own conscience. This, according to the doctrine, becomes the party’s basis for
struggle. At this stage, the party perceives that the only way to fight against the elites’ corrupt
practices is by returning to a divine conscience in order to listen and understand the people’s
conscience. This denotes a personal transcendental reflection in order to carry the people’s
mandate. Thus, not only does this reflection equate with divinity but also suggest an indirect
parallelism of the party’s name with the sacredness of people’s mandate. With this equation, Hanura
(read: Wiranto) constructs a political branding that the party’s struggle is a holy one as it represents
the code of collective morality, i.e. the people’s conscience. However, this branding implies a vertical
relation between the party and its constituents as Wiranto states in the doctrine that the way to
rectify the country’s present condition is by choosing the right man as the leader (Wiranto). In short,
Wiranto endeavoured to solidify the party’s reliance solely on him. Wiranto’s definition of the terms
“sukses politik” (political success) dan “sukses kepemimpinan” (successful leadership) reinforces this
solidification. Wiranto as cited by Syukur (2010) defines “sukses politik” as a collective success based
on the charisma of the party’s central figure (Wiranto), whilst “sukses kepemimpinan” reflects the
managerial skills of the chairpersons of provincial and municipal branches to run the organisation
effectively. Thus, the achievement indicator of these collective works lies on the capability of all the
party’s components and system to bring Wiranto to the Presidential seat.

181

Doktrin Hati Nurani Pedoman pengabdian bagi Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat atau siapapun yang masih merasa
memiliki Hati Nurani serta kepedulian terhadap rakyat (Doctrine of Conscience Guideline for People’s
Conscience Party or whomever who has conscience and concern for people) , Retrieved from

http://www.wiranto.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=148:doktrinhati-nurani&amp;catid=4:tulisan&amp;Itemid=5
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The party’s vertical power relation arguably contradicts its logo (see chapter five). The image of an
arrow in the logo connotes a horizontal line of the party’s movement in order to carry out the
people’s mandate (Hanura’s statutes, chapter II, paragraph 3b). Like all nationalist parties, Hanura
perceives the people’s mandate as the fulfilment of the country’s cardinal objectives, which is
written in the first paragraph of the statutes’ preamble. However, paragraph two of the preamble
indicates Hanura’s reliance on its key figure in order to achieve its objective. This can be seen as
follows:
Bahwa setelah memperhatikan kondisi lingkungan global, regional dan nasional
selama ini, bangsa Indonesia belum secara sungguh-sungguh mewujudkan citacita tersebut, maka dibutuhkan semangat untuk lebih memahami hati nurani
rakyat melalui kepemimpinan yang bertakwa, jujur, tegas, berani dan
berkemampuan.
Having observed global, regional and national condition over the time, the
Indonesian people have not completely attained the country’s cardinal objectives.
This needs a spirit to better understand people’s conscience through a pious,
honest, resolute, brave and competent leader.
This paragraph indicates an attempt to cement the party’s reliance on its key figure. Stating the
party’s reliance on its patron in paragraph two182 can be seen as inculcating a belief that without the
guidance of the right leader, the country’s cardinal objectives (which reflect people’s conscience)
cannot be attained.

182

The opening paragraph of the nationalist parties’ statutes contains a replication of the country’s cardinal
objectives.
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Below is Wiranto’s billboard that examplifies the inculcation.

Source: author’s collection

Celebrating the year of 2012 and Chinese New Year, Hanura (Wiranto) placed its billboard on Lingkar
Luar Selatan Street, East Jakarta. Like any streets in Jakarta, this street is known for its heavy traffic
especially in the morning and afternoon. It is near the toll roads and next to a gas station. This
strategic location enables the spectators to glance up and gain a temporary impression, which
according to Harrington in Gudis (2004, p. 70), does not require “intellectual attention”. From the
written expression of the billboard, the party attempts to address the spectator by the greeting of
“Selamat Tahun Baru 2012 dan Tahun Baru Imlek 2563” (Happy New Year 2012 and Happy New
Chinese Year 2563), written on the top of the billboard. However, the taglines “Hanura tak kan
Khianat” and “Hidup Mati Bersama Hanura” (Hanura will not Betray and Live and Die with Hanura),
which are written in larger font than the new year greetings, cannot be simply perceived as ordinary
new year greetings. These become a reminder to spectators that welcoming this year, Hanura
solemnly pledges not to betray (people’s trust?), and reminds its constituents of their loyalty.
However, another way of reading this narrative is without abbreviating the name of the party, i.e.
“Hati Nurani Rakyat tak kan Khianat” and “Hidup Mati Bersama Hati Nurani Rakyat” (People’s
Conscience is not treasonous and Live and Die with [People’s] Conscience). This alternative reading
brings a different meaning. These can be read as bandwagon as the slogans contain a highly valued
concept (read: people’s conscience) that every individual subject cannot refute for it represents the
code of collective morality. Thus, Hanura’s pledges can be seen as twofold: firstly, they represent the
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party’s attempt to declare that Hanura still commits to its political vows. Secondly, these pledges
demonstrate a political hijacking of this highly valued phrase “people’s conscience” as Hanura’s
propaganda expression. In addition, a special greeting for the Chinese New Year indicates Wiranto’s
attempt to capture Sino-Indonesian voters, as it, at the same time, represents his pluralist imagebuilding.

Beside the written slogans and greetings, the most important aspect this billboard accentuates is the
smiling image of Wiranto, who is depicted putting his right hand on his left chest. Wiranto’s image
occupies three quaters of the billboard. This party’s chairperson acts as the addresser of the slogans:
pledging that Hanura will not betray its constituents and that the life and death of the party depends
on their loyalty. As the addresser, the position of Wiranto’s hand connotes the solemnity of the
party’s (Wiranto’s) pledges. However, this solemnity is delivered along with Wiranto’s smiling
expression. Although his smile is intended to soften his stern face, it appears to contradict the
solemnity of its pledges. At this stage, this pictorial act signifies Hanura’s attempt to communicate
these pledges through this outdoor advertising medium quickly and silently. Wiranto’s appearance
in almost all Hanura’s billboard marks the party’s act of glorifying Wiranto’s photogenic expression
and is seen as capable of inviting the spectators’ disposition to perceive Wiranto’s physical
appearance as plausibly representing their aspiration. Due to the rapid mobility of the spectators
passing along this street, Wiranto’s ubiquitous presence becomes a marker of habituation as people
pass this billboard at all times. Thus, Hanura gradually inculcates its ideology through its key figure’s
public persona.

Hanura’s chairperson’s persona is also constructed with the employment of peci (a Muslim cap) and
the title “haji” in front of his name on this bilboard. As discussed, above the title “haji” represents
the code of Islamic religiosity. Peci, on the other hand, is also used to be perceived as one of the
pieces of attire for the Muslim man to wear whilst praying. Its meaning then shifted as Soekarno (as
cited in Adams, 2011, p. 61) declared that to differentiate Indonesian people from the colonial
Dutch, peci is worn as one item of Indonesian national attire. Peci then represents the mixture of
nationalism and religiosity which reflects socio-moral status (Ajidarma, 2009). Thus, although Hanura
belongs to the nationalist camp, the employment of peci and hajj on the billboard connote the
ambigious position of the party (read: Wiranto). This ambiguity, however, is aligned with Hanura’s
statutes (chapter four article twelve about the characteristic of the party as an inclusive nationalist
religious party). In short, Hanura becomes one of the nationalist contenders to win “the cake of
political power” using similar strategies. This is conducted especially by claiming that the party

139

struggles to actualize economic reforms to empower people and establish cheap but high-quality
education as its platform. Hanura then succeeded in placing nineteen of its candidates in the House
of Representatives in 2009.
To conclude, the nationalist parties are heavily reliant on their paternalistic figures. This reliance is
primarily established as the nationalist parties are mostly utilised as the patrons’ electoral machines.
Pancasila as the ideology the nationalist parties adhere to allow this clientalism to operate in the
form of fetishising the parties’central figures as the core factor in the parties’ branding. The next
chapter will examine the branding of the Islamic parties in order to see how much scope Pancasila,
as the state ideology, influences their branding.
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Chapter Eight
The Political Branding of the Islamic Parties
In contrast to the nationalist parties that are largely reliant on their charismatic leaders’ branding,
the Islamic parties arguably go beyond this fetishism. Saiful Mujani in Damarjati 183 (2012) affirms this
by arguing that the absence of key figures in the Islamic parties impedes the parties’ development,
for the paternalistic culture still plays an important role in influencing the voters’ behaviours.
However, this does not mean that the Islamic faction does not have role models. PAN (National
Mandate Party) and PKB (Nation Awakening Party), for instance, their key figures, Amien Rais and
the late Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), emerged not only as the leaders but also as the paternalistic
figures whose thinking was deeply rooted in their respective parties. However, when Amien Rais’
term of office as PAN’s chairperson ended, his influence also arguably started to decline. Amien Rais’
image cannot also be perceived as completely representing Islamic aspirations. Mujani further
argues that although Amien Rais attempts to construct an inclusive Islamic image, he is still
perceived as heavily representing Muhammadiyah. Similar to Amien Rais, people perceived Gus
Dur’s image as largely representing NU. Since his conflict with Islamic parties became exacerbated
and internal conflict hit his party (PKB), his influence gradually declined. Gus Dur’s death on 30
December 2009 possibly contributed to this emasculation.

This chapter discusses the branding of the Islamic parties, which in Tomsa’s view (2012, p. 488)
mainly positions Islam as a symbolic ideology. This is arguably due to the parties’ aim to “expand
their constituency” (Shihab and Nugroho, 2008, pp. 233-267), which make both factions quickly
(re)brand themselves in the framework of ideological ambiguity. This ambiguity is not necessarily in
the form of an ideological synthesis of Nationalist and Islamic strands, as the ideological contestation
occurs at the same time as the synthesis meets the mainstream ideology of the parties. As Tomsa
(2012, pp. 486-498) argues when the parties synthesise these strands in order to achieve their
pragmatic goals, the contestation between these strands shows a degree of ideological
“moderation”. By this, and developing Schwedler’s thesis (2006), Tomsa (2012) posits that we need
to focus our attention on ideational and behavioural change within the party (in this case the Islamic
ones) that will justify its pragmatic actions. Thus, this chapter focuses on how the Islamic parties
position themselves within this ideological crossroads in Pancasila discourse by examining its

183

Damarjati, D. (2012). Tak Punya Tokoh, Partai Islam Sulit Berkembang. Retrieved from

http://news.detik.com/read/2012/10/19/030339/2066621/10/tak-punya-tokoh-partai-islam-sulitberkembang?9922032
141

ideological blueprint against their everyday political practices (in this case as reflected on their
billboards). This position defines the way they market themselves, not by heavily depending on
selling the image of their key figures, but more on catering to their non-religious actions in
supporting democracy.

This chapter is organised into five sections. The first four sections discuss the political branding of
the Islamic parties: PKS, PAN, PPP and PKB. This discussion is organised on the basis of the number
of votes the Islamic parties obtained in the 2009 legislative election. Section five compares the
political branding between the nationalist and Islamic factions.

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) or Prosperous Justice Party
The focus of my investigation into PKS’ image is on the shifting of the party’s branding from an
exclusive Islamic party to its moderate stance, especially towards the issue of shariah
implementation. The branding of PKS has evolved in the polarised notions of a “hardline” (Shihab
and Nugroho, 2008) versus “moderate” (Tomsa, 2012), or “normalised”, party (Bubalo, Fealy and
Mason, 2008). However, as Bubalo and Fealy (2005, p. v) argue, this polarisation potentially traps us
into perceiving that it represents an act of endorsing an ostensible simplistic dichotomy of “the
western stereotyping of good versus bad Muslims”, which will simply lead to the reduction of
ideological complexity behind it. Thus, the act of attaching certain labels to PKS indicates that an
investigation into the ideological complexity behind this Islamic party’s branding is urgent. The
investigation is primarily based on two phases: the party’s inception in 1980s and its name
transformation from Partai Keadilan (PK) or Justice Party to Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)
Prosperous Justice Party. Not only do these two phases mark the party’s ideological transition (from
exclusive Islamic party to an inclusive one), but also shows a process of ideological moderation or
“normalisation” (Bubalo, Fealy and Mason, 2008).

The inception of PKS stems from the LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus or University Student’s Board
for Islamic Predication) as the embodiment of the tarbiyah movement (a campus-based movement
which aims to educate and give religious guidance to Indonesian students), that emerged in the early
1980s (van Wichelen, 2007, p. 96; Baswedan, 2004, p. 673). Shihab and Nugroho (2008, pp. 236-238)
and Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, pp. 51-57) note that adopting the model of Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin) founded by Hasan Al Banna, this movement represents an
ideological closeness as the result of importing and adapting the application of this model into the
Indonesian context. Sembiring (as cited by Hisyam, 2012) asserts that this model which resembles
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the “multi-level marketing” system184, especially in terms of proliferating the party’s cadres number
and loyalty, helps to strengthen the party’s social and cultural capital of competent human resources
and a strong institution. Similar to the pattern in “multi-level marketing”, the model follows the
Muslim Brotherhood’s cell system of recruitment and training called usrah (family). The primal
strength of this system lies in its core activity of a discussion group (halaqah) or religious circle which
consists of one trainer (murabbi) and five to ten trainees (muratabbi)185. The system in halaqah also
resembles the method of training the trainer (ToT), as Sembiring (cited in Hisyam, 2012, p. 39) notes
that after three years of training the trainees are seen as competent in becoming murabbi and are
obliged to recruit their own muratabbi. Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 54) and Shihab and
Nugroho (2008, pp. 237-238) argue that this systematic training and recruitment becomes the
determining factor in the party’s institutional strength for not only does the system proliferate the
number of the party’s cadres but it also guarantees the cadres’ competences in coordinating and
“expanding its support base” (Hamayotsu, 2011, p. 972).

This training and recruitment system does not work in a static mode. Although campuses are chosen
as the central sites of preaching and proselytisation, the mode of preaching and teaching students
move not only from campus to campus, but also from mosque to mosque. These sites were chosen
as they were seen as relatively free, especially from Soeharto’s policy of banning Islamic predication
in the public sphere, at the outset of this tarbiyah movement. Tracing the background of this ban
reveals the ideological bond between PK(S) and Masyumi. As discussed in chapter five, both
Soekarno and Soeharto saw Islam as a political threat following Masyumi’s (read: Muhammad
Natsir’s) mutiny in Soekarno’s guided democracy era. Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 52) and
Shihab and Nugroho (2008, pp.235-236) note that instead of reconstructing this former Islamic
party, Natsir chose the path of education by establishing Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII) or
Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council in 1967, a year after he was released from gaol. DDII then

184

In Indonesia, this system is often associated with independent people who work without offices. It works
like a web-cell system where every single component is connected and related. This system relies heavily not
on selling the product solely, but more on how it creates a network which places loyalty and attachment to the
system (and also the product) inexorable. It starts with introducing the product’s benefits while persuading the
potential buyers to become the product’s members. As members, they will get additional financial benefit not
only in a common form of discount but more importantly additional income, only when they are able to recruit
new members, which are usually called as “downliners”. When the new members buy the products, the one
that recruit them is entitled to earn certain credit points, which can later be converted into money. Thus, not
only does this marketing system proliferate the number of members, but it also binds them in a net where
loyalty and attachment are measured by money.
185
There is a slight different record about the number of mutarabbi in one halaqah. Machmudi (2006, p. 134)
notes that each cell consists of five to ten students, whereas Sembiring, the former president of PKS, as cited
by Hisyam (2012, pp.37, 44, 87) contends that the number of students in the halaqah (five up to twelve
students) follows the number of Prophet Muhammad’s close companions (twelve) .
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became the embryo of tarbiyah movement, as it adopted and developed the Muslim Brotherhood’s
usrah system. Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 52) note that Hilmi Aminuddin, Imaduddin Abdul
Rahim, Rakhmat Abdullah and Abdi Sumaithi (Abu Ridho) were Natsir’s leading successors in
developing this cadre system on campuses and mosques. However, among these figures, Sembiring
(cited in Hisyam, 2012, pp. 45-46) asserts that Hilmi was the one who approached Suripto, a former
government secret intelligence agent and a deputy minister in the Ministry of Education and Culture,
in order to secure the tarbiyah movement from Soeharto’s surveillance. This, according to
Machmudi (2006, pp. 3-4), marks their stance as a group that distance themselves from (direct)
confrontation with the government as their cardinal focus was on Islamic purification.

This apolitical tarbiyah movement was then consolidated and institutionalised on 28 July 1998 as a
political party named Partai Keadilan (PK). Not only does this institutionalisation signify an attempt
to transform Islamic ideological “guerrilla” tactics into political ones, but also marks an overt
immersion of the group’s political resistance against Soeharto’s repression. Based on this Islamic
puritanical background, Shihab and Nugroho (2008, pp. 233-267) regard PK as a hardline186 Islamic
party, especially as the party’s platforms heavily focus on upholding Islamic law (shariah) in
Indonesia. They argue that in addition to the party’s ideological affiliation with salafi Muslim
Brotherhood187, the absence of the state secular ideology, Pancasila, and the phrase NKRI (Negara
Kesatuan Republik Indonesia) or “(Pancasila-based) Unitary Republic of Indonesia” (borrowing
Fealy’s translation of the term, 2004) on its 1999 platforms strongly indicates PK’s political agenda
which was conjectured as transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state. Beside the absence of state
ideology, which is refuted by Sembiring (as cited by Hisyam, 2012, p. 85), Shihab and Nugroho (2008,
p. 238), in conjunction with Gunther and Diamond (2003, p. 182), perceive that the cell cadre system
is the core factor that determines PK as a “religious fundamentalist party”.

However, such positioning needs to be re-examined as Fealy further argues that the demarcation
line between “hardline” versus “moderate” Islamic parties is obscure. Fealy (2004) proposes two
major characteristics that categorise fundamentalist/radicalist188 Islam: conformist application of

186

Tomsa (2012, p. 488) employs the term “highly controversial” in positioning PKS in Indonesian
contemporary political discourse.
187
Salafi is seen as a movement to return to “pure” teaching of Islam by rigidly following religious practices
exemplified by Prophet Muhammad (Fealy, 2004)
188
Fealy (2004) argues that as the terms “radical” and fundamental” can be used “interchangeably”, he
proposes an elemental difference between radicalist and fundamentalist Islam. He argues that the difference
lies on their emphasis on Islamic spirituality and politics. He found that the focus of fundamenalism is on their
“commitment on religious teachings and practices”, whereas radicalist commitment more inclines to bringing
the religious practices to the political realm. In this regard, although the word “hardline” resembles extremism,
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Islamic teachings and practices based on the examples of Prophet Muhammad; and their
antagonistic reaction towards Semitism and Western secularisation.189 As these issues are perceived
as “fundamentally sensitive” in Islam, both camps arguably hold a similar stance but to different
degrees. Muhammadiyah, an Islamic modernist and moderate organisation, exemplified this overlap
as its former central board secretary, Goodwill Zubir, as noted by Fealy (2004), had once conveyed
his radical outlook towards the Zionist movement and Christian missionaries in his Eid-al Fitr Sermon
in 2003. However, his sermon cannot be completely perceived as representing Muhammadiyah, as
the organisation is also known for its advocacy of religious tolerance (Fealy, 2004). In other words,
this tenuous boundary marks ambiguity inside the Islamic camp. Using this as an analogy and
standpoint in re-examining PK as a hardliner affirms that the absence of Pancasila and NKRI in its
1999 platforms cannot be completely seen as connoting its reluctance (if not rejection) of adopting
the state ideology let alone immediately positioning the party as a hardline one. Similar to
Muhammadiyah’s case, as an Islamic party that stems from Islamic purification movement, PK
positions itself in the tenuous boundary dealing with the above sensitive issues with the absence of a
radical movement. Machmudi (2006, pp. 165-168) argues that this boundary is accommodated by
the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood for it perceives that “religious awareness is more
important than religious difference” and to avoid dispute any forms of Islamic religious practices
across Mazhab (school of Islamic jurisprudential thought) are seen as tolerable and permissible as
long as they still are oriented towards Al Qur’an and Hadith (the Sayings and tradition of Prophet
Muhammad).

An attempt to solidify this position can be seen in PK’s image building by assigning Nurmahmudi
Ismail, a PhD graduate from A & M University Texas, to the top position as PK’s President (Sembiring
as cited in Hisyam, 2012, p. 82; Machmudi, 2006, p. 2). Sembiring further states that instead of
electing candidates for a certain post, the party employed a system of assignment, as in Islamic
discourse being in a position equates with bearing certain mandates. Favouritism is absent in this
system, as Fealy (2008, p. xi) found, as the system is based on merit, which reflects the party’s
“internal democratic process”. Thus, in Sembiring’s view, giving the highest mandate to this
American graduate was seen as demonstrating the party’s attempt to wrap up its Islamic image with
a western nuance. This political coating was necessary as many PK’s cadres were Middle Eastern

in PK’s case, the label “hardline” attached is arguably aligned with salafi as the representative of Islamic
fundamentalism rather than radicalism, as they both more orient to purify Islamic religious teachings and
practices. However, this position needs to be re-dissected as Machmudi (2006, p. xvii) argues that PK’s origin,
Jemaah Tarbiyah (tarbiyah movement), deploys “accommodative and flexible approach” in its religious and
political praxis.
189
Fealy (2010) argues that western secularisation has been viewed as “corrupting Islam”.
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graduates, which entangles the party in a perception that PK is an extension of Middle Eastern
fundamentalist Islam. However, this branding design did not bring electoral success to PK, although
it declared itself as “partai dakwah” (Islamic predication party) with tarbiyah-based organisational
structure as its backbone. The party then reconstitutes in a slightly different name, PKS, after PK
failed to reach 2 per cent of the electoral threshold in the 1999 election. This reconstitution later
marks the party’s overt “moderate” stance in the political arena and its re-branding design.

Many scholars (Bubalo and Fealy, 2005; Machmudi, 2006; Bubalo, Fealy and Mason, 2008; Shihab
and Nugroho, 2008; Tomsa, 2012) focus their attention on PK’s transformation into PKS by assessing
the party’s consistency towards the issue of shariah implementation. Bubalo and Fealy (2005, p. 69)
argue that the transformation implicates the party in moderating its stance on the issue of shariah.
In alignment with them, Shihab and Nugroho (2008, pp. 238-241) found that the inclusion of
Pancasila and NKRI (which can also be found in Article 5 of the party’s statutes) in its 2004 and 2008
platforms signifies the party’s attempt to shift its stance from hardline to moderate one. This, as
they argue further, downplays PK’s former stance on shariah issues. Tomsa (2012, p. 490) adds that
this also signifies the party’s pragmatic and opportunist behaviours, as diluting Islamic rhetoric in its
platforms and statutes merely shows ideological inconsistency with what is inside the party’s
training manual. Based on this, Tomsa further argues, the escalation in PKS’s votes in 2004 (7.3 per
cent) or 7.89 per cent in 2009 compared to 1.4 per cent in 1999, which meant the party succeeded in
placing their three cadres in SBY’s 2004 cabinet and four cadres in SBY’s 2009 cabinet, indicates that
PKS’ ideological moderation is superficial. Shihab and Nugroho (2008, p. 248) affirms this by adding
that its superficiality can also be seen, for instance, in PKS’ stance on the Anti-Pornography Bill.
Although PKS did not initiate the Bill, the party’s support on this issue demonstrates its ideological
superficiality (if not moderation). Another indication of PKS’ pragmatic stance was when the party
formed a coalition with the Christian party, Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS) or Prosperous Peace Party,
in the 2005 gubernatorial election in Papua. This move was also conjectured as an equivocal
ideological moderation that led to the action of penetrating one of Indonesia’s Eastern provinces
with its Christian majority. However, Tomsa (2012, p. 491) also perceives this maneuver as part of
the party’s attempts to construct a reformist image. This act also produced dissent between the two
discrepant camps inside PKS, the pragmatist versus “ideologues”. The latter perceives that the
party’s inclusivity potentially endangered PKS’ idealism of Islamic purification, whilst the former
argues that prior to achieving the idealism PKS should expand its wing by opening itself up to the
non-Tarbiyah and non-Muslims. This is not only conducted to demonstrate its shifting paradigm
from an exclusive Islamic party to a moderate one, but also engineering a pretext that justifies its
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imperatives (Tomsa, 2012, p. 492; Fealy, 2010). Thus, Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 73) sum up
that PKS’ moderation indicates an act of “normalising”190 itself, as the party lies on the crossroads of
“ideological purification and political expediency”. However, framing PKS’ religious moderate
position in the framework of “normalisation” arguably suggests a perception that the party’s former
stance is abnormal, whilst at the same time, when PKS moderates its religious political stance, the
party is criticised as being pragmatic, opportunist and “less Islamic”. With this logic, this condition,
on the other hand, is simply perceived as a normal one.

PKS itself interprets its moderation as running in line with the word “keadilan” (justice) as the party’s
name indicates. In its vision and mission, the party argues that the word “keadilan” connotes a
moderate path Muslims commonly take in order to resolve any possible disputes in life. In other
words, the party equates the meaning of justice with moderation as these will lead to a balanced
system for achieving prosperity (sejahtera). At the same time, these two words (justice and
moderation) also connote a position in which one is situated not only in balancing but also acting
towards her/his two-sided self. This analogy brings the party to a position in which it places itself in
the ideological crossroads, which merely confirms its Janus face. However, as this face signifies
transition and progression, it also connotes the party’s ambivalent stance.

Machmudi (2006, p.203) argues that this ambivalence is possibly due to Islam itself. He further
states that Islam is a religion that does not segregate spiritual and secular life and PKS perceives
Islam as “the totality of rules and norms guiding the daily lives of Muslims – embracing the religious,
economic, social, cultural, and political dimensions”. In other words, not only does this connote the
inclusivity of Islam, but also more saliently demonstrates that Islam accommodates the party’s
ambiguity. Amien Rais, the former leader of Muhammadiyah and PAN, in his interview with Alfred
Stepan and Mirjam Kunkler (2007, p. 205) of Columbia University’s Centre for the Study of
Democracy, Toleration, and Religion (CDTR), affirms Islam’s inclusivity by arguing that as the source
of law, no indications in the Qur’an suggest either the establishment of an Islamic state or the
implementation of shariah. He further argues that the Qur’an offers universal guidance on morality
and ethical principles and should be treated as a reference book, instead of as a book of law.
However, Hodgson (as cited by Platzdasch, 2009a, pp. 6-7) argues that this understanding is merely
traditional, as the universal scope of shariah (encompassing “civic law such as marriage, divorce,
inheritance, penal law, and a number of religious laws and obligations”) is used to create “shariahmindedness” (political) programs. Based on this, as Shihab and Nugroho (2008, p. 242) found, PKS
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The term “normalisation” was often used by Soeharto’s government to signify his success in maintaining
law and order by repressing his political opponents.
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uses an Islamic legal maxim, amar ma’ruf nahi munkar, or enjoining good and preventing evil, to
translate shariah into neutral platforms such as “clean governance, fighting corruption, eliminating
poverty and unemployment, protecting human rights, fighting for democratisation, furthering
economic development for all people without discrimination and pursuing equality before the law”.

The following examples illustrate PKS’ ambivalent position. In line with PKS’ stance on the Antipornography Bill, the party’s support for the implementation of PerDa Shariah (shariah-based
district regulations) in Padang, West Sumatra, which was initiated by its mayor from Golkar, is seen
as contradicting the party’s inclusive image. When PKS’ elites in the parliament declined to
participate in the petition to remove PerDa Shariah (Shihab and Nugroho, 2008, p. 249), Machmudi
(2006, pp. 206-207), on the other hand, found a rather contradictory perspective on the issue at the
regional level. Machmudi further notes that PKS’ local cadres in Padang assert that PerDa Shariah
implementation needed a gradual process as implementing shariah is part of dakwah (missionary)
work, not a political commodity. By this, PKS’ ambivalent stance cannot be completely perceived as
either contradicting its ideological moderation or its Islamic ideology, as the party positions itself on
a tenuous boundary, as discussed earlier.
Machmudi (2006, pp. 195-202) found PKS’ modus operandi in revising the image of shariah191 as part
of the party’s re-branding. PKS attempts to expand the meaning of shariah by not referring solely to
Islamic jurisprudence but more by positioning it as part of Islamic predication (dakwah). PKS
employs the strategy of propagating and inculcating Islamic way of life not by using a traditional topdown approach, but more by penetrating the private sphere of its constituents so that the urge to
understand and implement shariah becomes a necessity, instead of enforcement. The party’s knitcell religious system is expanded from university students to the smallest unit of society in the
family. Hamayotsu’s ethnographic research (2011, pp. 971-991) found that PKS’ welfare machines,
such as its national task force (People’s Welfare or Kesra), woman’s wing organisation (Pos Wanita
Keadilan or Women’s Justice Station) and NGO coalition (women’s welfare association or Salimah,
Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu (JSIT Indonesia) or Indonesian Network of Integrated Islamic School
and Rumah Zakat or House of Zakat (Islamic tithe), become the supporting structures that can forge
the constituents’ “collective allegiance and party-mass linkage”. They provide welfare services such
as free healthcare, free maternity clinic, immunisation for children, book donations, “mobile”
libraries for children, single mother empowerment training, women’s trainings on baby healthcare
and nutrition, catering and sewing, microfinance services, youth development training programs,
191

Shariah has been perceived and confined as a political entity that is conjectured to lead Indonesia into a
theocratic Islamic state.
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and shariah-based cooperatives. In order to keep the allegiance intact, they impose “communal
responsibility” (Hamayotsu, 2011, p. 987) in its microfinance services, known as Koperasi Syariah
Serba Usaha Salimah (KOSSUMA) or Salimah Multi-business Shariah Cooperative. This communal
responsibility is translated as a condition under which a recipient of a loan from KOSSUMA has the
obligation of not only paying for her/his membership, but every member in the group also has equal
responsibility to manage the loan.

However, if we examine this whole scheme more closely, we will find that it signifies PKS’ act of
depoliticising day-to-day (philanthropic) activities in order to achieve the party’s goal, i.e. expanding
its constituency by reaching the underprivileged rural voters. This strategy of indirect marketing is
needed as the process to construct a solid allegiance requires habituation. As these services are
regular, people will perceive them as part of their habits. This also forges a doxic relationship
between the party’s cadres and the constituents. Furthermore, as this is part of dakwah, the cadres
will perceive their services as “religious duty” (Hamayotsu, 2011, p. 985). This means that their
services are beyond religious rituals as their day-to-day services reflect moral propagation that
needs to be nourished and maintained. The constituents, on the other hand, will perceive this
indirect moral inculcation as part of their faith. Thus, violating the allegiance means betraying their
faith. By this, shariah is gradually indoctrinated. This also makes PKS’ lack of capital, such as money
and prominent figures, mere glitches.

In order to surmount the problem of the absence of the party’s prominent figure, PKS relies on its
institutional strength to run its programmatic actions as part of the party’s day-to-day practices.
Below is Hidayat Nur Wahid (PKS’ former president) and Didik J. Rachbini’s caricature in the 2012
gubernatorial election of Jakarta province that illustrates such practices:
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Source: Didik J. Rachbini Blackberry’s display picture

As part of the campaign’s visual aids, Hidayat and Didik depicted the party’s practices in the form of
a caricature. Among Jakarta’s acute problems, such as mass transportation, dense population,
flooding, pollution, and crime rates, they chose to concentrate on handling the mass transportation
and pollution problems in Jakarta as represented on the caricature. This caricature uses the image of
trees, skyscrapers, rail-based MRT (Mass Rapid Transit) and buses as its background. The image of a
thin vertical line in the caricature which separates the main green image with the gloomy image
depicting Jakarta’s congested traffic demonstrate the past and future condition of the capital city.
The presence of Hidayat and Didik on the green image connotes that these two candidates (number
four on the list) are the figures that can realise the change Jakarta needs. The cartoon character
behind them on the image endorses this visual claim, stating that these are nationalist populist
figures (tokoh nasional yang merakyat) who are concerned with people’s needs. Not only does this
linguistic expression plausibly acknowledge the claims Hidayat and Didik make, but more
importantly it shows that they perceive themselves not as the representative of the Islamic party,
but as more nationalist in this context. However, Hidayat’s statement (“this is the time for Jakarta
led by santri”) when he visited his constituents at pasar kaget Koja (traditional market at Koja),
North Jakarta192, affirms that Hidayat and Didik also represent the Islamic party. During his visit,
Hidayat argued that the claim he made (santri should lead Jakarta) would revive the glory of the
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See Muftisany. (2012, June 27). Hidayat: Saatnya Jakarta Dipimpin Santri (Hidayat: it’s time Jakarta led by
santri). Retrieved from http://www.republika.co.id/berita/hidayat-didik/berita-hidayatdidik/12/06/27/m69p36-hidayat-saatnya-jakarta-dipimpin-santri.
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city’s romantic past as Fatahillah, the city’s founder, was a santri. In short, presenting this ideological
ambiguity in the framework of surmounting Jakarta’s acute transportation and pollution problems as
Hidayat and Didik’s (read: PKS’) programmatic actions reflected in their display picture, becomes one
of the branding tactics these PKS’ cadres employ to capture Jakarta’s urban voters. However, this
dual identity failed to win them the gubernatorial seats.

Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) or National Mandate Party
The analysis of PAN’s branding is centred on its image as an inclusive Islamic Nationalist party. This
image was constructed in 1998 as PAN became the electoral vehicle for Amien Rais, its former
chairperson, who was also well-known as the architect of the 1998 Reform movement. However,
unlike the nationalist parties such as PD, PDI-P, Gerindra and Hanura, PAN’s reliance on its
charismatic figure is not as strong as them. Its reliance on Amien Rais gradually diluted as Amien
failed in his Presidential candidacy in 2004. However, this does not mean that Amien lost his
privileged position and influence in the party, as he is perceived as the founder of this party. Based
on this, the discussion of PAN’s branding is firstly focused on Amien Rais’ image as its former leader.
Amien Rais is known not only for his success in building his image as a reformist religious nationalist
figure, but that also he represents a dual position which later leads to the contestation between
Amien versus the Islamic faction and Amien versus the nationalist faction. Secondly, the discussion
moves to focus on PAN’s image in post-Amien Rais chairmanship.

Founded by fifty national figures in Jakarta on 23 August 1998, PAN was led by Amien Rais, the
former chairperson of Muhammadiyah (1995 – 1998) with the spirit of cooperation among religious
adherents (Assyaukanie, 2009, p. 192). Baswedan (2004) classifies PAN as a secular inclusive party
which not merely promotes pluralism, and Muslim aspirations, as stated in the party’s platform 193,
but also accommodates non Muhammadiyah and non-Muslim members. Ananta, Arifin and
Suryadinata (2004, pp. 6-8) agree with Baswedan’s classification of PAN and add that due to the
party’s ideology (Pancasila) and Amien Rais as the former chairperson of Muhammadiyah, PAN is
perceived as both Islamic and secular with a non Java(nese) base, except for Yogyakarta, his political
base. However, Firmanzah (2010, pp. 122-128) and Denny J.A (2006, pp. 25) categorise PAN as an
Islamic party, despite PAN’s claim to be an inclusive party.

Before discussing PAN’s image as an inclusive party, an investigation into its historical and political
background is needed, as it shows political fragmentation inside the Islamic faction. This
193

See Platform PAN. [n.d]. Retrieved from http://pan.or.id/index.php?comp=home.detail.16
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fragmentation, at the same time, connotes that the same ideological root they have (Islam) does not
guarantee a harmonious partnership in the political arena. The inception of PAN was largely reliant
on Amien Rais’ persona, as previously noted. Originating from the political aspiration of many prodemocratic activists and also of Muhammadiyah members to establish an inclusive political party
during the 1998 Indonesia’s political transition, PAN was established to capture both Muslim and
nationalist voters. With the objective to attain support from these voters, PAN brought Amien Rais
to prominence as the figure that was able to narrow the gap between nationalist and Islamic camps,
or in Stepan and Kunkler’s language (2007, pp. 214-215), the figure behind “inter-religious
cooperation and multi-religious pro-democratic coalition”. Such credit was given as Amien was
perceived as a successful figure that could unite people across religions and mobilise them as
people’s power to fight against Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998.
However, prior to PAN’s establishment, the activists of tarbiyah movement194 approached Amien
Rais in order to forge a coalition, when the political situation in Indonesia was in a state of “chaos”.
Sembiring, the former President of PKS, (cited in Hisyam, 2012, p. 80) recalled that in order to unite
Indonesian Islamic society (ummat), they asked Amien Rais as the representative of Muhammadiyah
to forge a joint faction under one political roof, PPP, as they both shared the same political roots of
Masyumi195. He rejected the offer as it would make him lose his reformist “neutral” image. Amien
perceives his image and popularity as symbolic capital that represents public acknowledgement of
his political achievement. However, Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 64-67) views Amien’s positioning as his
way to distance himself from his former political affiliates196. In a Bourdieuan lens, Amien’s former
social and cultural capital was perceived as inhibiting factors for him to realise his political ambition
to be President. Amien Rais (cited in Stepan and Kunkler, 2007) affirms this by indirectly arguing that
a differentiation marker between PAN and PKS (read also: DDII) lies in their stance towards the issue
of shariah implementation. PAN does not see the need, let alone urgency, to implement shariah, as
it endangers Indonesia’s pluralism. By this, Assyaukanie (2009, p. 98) argues that PAN (Amien Rais)
endorses the RDS (Religious Democratic State) model which sees that the role of the state is to
protect all religions. Rejecting secularism is seen as exigent, not by means of implementing shariah
as it potentially imperils inter-religious harmony. Conversely, from the viewpoint of PKS’ objective of
gradually implementing shariah, PKS is arguably seen as making a close association with Mohammad
194

Mietzner (2009b, p.273) elaborates that these activists represent not only PK, but also Masyumi-based
parties such as PPP and defunct Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star party).
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Muhammadiyah dominated Masyumi (see chapter four).
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Plaztdasch (2009a, pp. 64-65) notes that Amien once declared himself and his fellow DDII’s associates as
“Natsir-ists”. This indicates his personal political devotion and attachment to Natsir’s teachings, as he was DDII
board member since 1993.
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Natsir’s (Masyumi’s) IDS (Islamic Democratic State) model, instead of a theocratic Islamic state
model, as it perceives that Islam is compatible with democracy, and that gradual indoctrination of
shariah will make Indonesian people understand the essences of this Islamic law. However, in
alignment with Assyaukanie’s view (2009, p. 188) of perceiving Yusril Ihza Mahendra’s, the
chairperson of defunct PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang or Crescent Star Party), and Deliar Noer’s, a
prominent political analyst, stance towards the gradual implementation of shariah in Indonesia197
becomes an indication of their closeness to the liberal Muslim intellectuals who support the model
of Liberal Democratic State. Thus, not only does it affirm PKS’ position on the tenuous boundary of
the ideological crossroads, but that also attest to the ideological differentiation of PAN and PKS.

Returning to Amien Rais’ image as a reformist “neutral” figure, this image was arguably tarnished by
Amien’s own actions as the architect behind Megawati’s loss in the 1999 Presidential election198, at
the time people perceived Megawati as the symbol of resistance towards Soeharto’s regime (see
PDI-P section) and Amien Rais as the motor of the Reform movement. Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 269270) notes that Amien put his symbolic capital at stake when he agreed to join the Islamic coalition
proposed by PPP politicians, Zarkasih Noer and Faisal Baasir, to impede Megawati’s path to the
Presidency. Mietzner (2009b, pp. 260-261) notes that the initiation came as her party rejected a
power-sharing scheme proposed by the Islamic faction and her potential coalition partner if she
were to become the President. PDI-P’s rejection was due to the party’s confidence that they were
able to dominate the Parliament as the party obtained 33.78 percent of votes in the 1999 election.
Megawati’s party had to pay a heavy price for its pride as Amien Rais decided to confront
Megawati’s camp by establishing a Central Axis group that could unite all Islamic Members of
Parliament’s (MPs) voices. Her camp had to admit that they were outnumbered. Platzdasch (2009a,
p. 50) argues that Zarkasih Noer and Faisal Baasir’s initiative to forge a joint coalition was proven to
be an astute strategy that Megawati’s camp did not expect. Their preference for Amien Rais to
Hamzah Haz, PPP’s former chairperson, as the figure that could unite and mobilise the Islamic MP
voices was due to the fact that Amien Rais’ image was more saleable to the MPs. In contesting
Megawati’s image, Amien followed the dominant perspective that questioned Megawati’s Islamic
credentials and intellectual capacity. However, his political move reveals his duality. Being in the
position as the one who mobilised Muslim MPs, Amien could no longer retain his neutral image, as
197

Assyaukanie (2009, p.188) notes that they both perceive that the application shariah is not necesasrily in
the form of Islamic legal framework per se as shariah can be translated into codes and its insertion to the
national law will transform the codes into positive law.
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As discussed in chapter five, the 1999 election employed similar electoral systems as in Soeharto’s era,
where the legislative members elected the President. In this election, Amien succeeded in becoming the
chairperson of People’s Consultative Assembly, although PAN merely obtained 7.1 percent of votes at the
national level.
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his actions demonstrated his pragmatic side. From the viewpoint of Islamic faction and Megawati’s
Islamic nationalist opponents, this pragmatism was beneficial as it led to the group’s domination in
the Parliament (and later the cabinet). By this, Amien should also be able to restore his image in
front of his former Islamic allies – a thorny mission that seems to be irreconcilable.

On the other hand, the person who benefited from this contestation was Gus Dur of PKB (Partai
Kebangkitan Bangsa or Nation Awakening Party). Gus Dur was seen as the figure that could
represent both factions as he was seen as an Islamic figure with nationalist inclination. Gus Dur’s
ambiguity easily puts him in the position of penetrating both Islamic and nationalist factions.
Mietzner (2009b, pp. 261-263) argues that Gus Dur had predicted and anticipated where the Central
Axis’ scenario began and ended. Gus Dur’s stance towards Megawati was largely due to PKB’s
modest number of votes in the election. However, when Megawati gave no commitment to Gus Dur
as the reward for their coalition, Gus Dur sought alternatives and accepted the offer of the former
chairperson of Muhammadiyah to him. At this stage, Amien Rais’ offer can arguably be perceived as
a symbol of a truce that potentially ended Muhammadiyah and NU’s perennial disputes (see chapter
five). However, Gus Dur had a different interpretation. He did not perceive the offer as a gift, let
alone charity, from Muhammadiyah or other Islamic parties, which in return put him in political
debt. As Mietzner (2009b, p. 262) notes, Gus Dur would rather perceive his success as a matter of
being politically astute. By simply putting himself in the ideological crossroads of representing an
Islamic party, PKB, whilst siding with Megawati’s nationalist party, and patiently waiting for the
Islamic faction to take actions against Megawati’s vanity, Gus Dur perceived himself as deserving of
the Presidency. This shaky Islamic coalition brought temporary benefit to the Islamic faction as Gus
Dur’s “rainbow” cabinet (consisting of many parties) lasted briefly, as Gus Dur kept reshuffling his
cabinet members. Gus Dur was then impeached on the basis of allegations of “financial misconduct”
(Mietzner, 2009b, p. 265) known as Buloggate and Bruneigate (see chapter five).

The aftermath of Gus Dur’s impeachment revealed a possible indication that underlay the
relationship (if not a covert conflict) between PAN and PK(S). PK requested Amien Rais not to
nominate himself as the candidate for Megawati’s Vice President as it would exacerbate conflicts
between NU and Muhammadiyah, which would potentially fragment the Islamic faction (Sembiring
as cited in Hisyam, 2012, p. 112). The choice then fell to PPP’s (former) chairperson, Hamzah Haz,
whom Gus Dur discharged a month after Hamzah’s appointment in Gus Dur’s Cabinet. The choice of
Hamzah who has a NU background, arguably succeeded in mitigating the indictment of
Muhammadiyah’s (PAN) involvement in “sacking” NU’s former chairperson.
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The 2004 Presidential election also reveals another indication of PAN and PKS’ unstable relationship.
Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 61) argue that not only did PKS pragmatist group’s preference for
supporting Wiranto in the 2004 Presidential election, which was largely based on the involvement of
Wiranto’s son-in-law as PKS’ cadre, bring about internal conflict within PKS, but also tarnished the
party’s relationship with PAN. Mietzner (2009b, p. 277), however, perceives PKS’ support for
Wiranto as the way PKS (read: the pragmatist camp) repaid their debt to this “red and white”
General in protecting KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia or United Action Front of
Indonesian Students), an organisation established by tarbiyah movement activists in March 1998.
Amien Rais (cited in Stepan and Kunkler’s, 2007, p. 213) affirms this and perceives that PKS’ abrupt
declaration to support him that was enunciated in the silent week of the 2004 Presidential election
was only a “half-hearted” one. Based on ICG’s (International Crisis Group) report in 2003, Mietzner
(2009b, p. 273) argues that Amien Rais’ loss in the Presidential election was mainly due to the
absence of the Islamic parties’ support for him as Amien had declined forming a Masyumi-like
coalition under PPP’s roof with PBB and PK. In addition to this, his actions in impeding Megawati’s
path to the Presidency in the 1999 election were seen as violating his own nationalist image.

Nonetheless, PAN retained its dual image in the 2009 elections. As the party merely obtained 6.01
percent of votes at the national level, the party decided to join PD’s coalition in supporting SBY and
Boediono as SBY’s new running mate. This coalition is reinforced by the marriage of Hatta Rajasa’s
(PAN’s current chairperson) daughter, Siti Ruby Aliya Rajasa, with SBY’s youngest son, Edhie Baskoro
Yudhoyono, PD’s Secretary General, on 24 November 2011. However, this can be seen as neither
rectifying nor solidifying the party’s image for the marriage also signifies the strategy the party (read:
Hatta Rajasa) deployed to stay in the mainstream of Indonesian polity.199

As a political branding in the 2009 election, PAN claimed that the party would be the locomotive of
the “education for free” program and allocate 1.5 trillion rupiah from the national budget to help
underdeveloped villages. Using 5 per cent celebrities out of a total of 672 legislative candidates, PAN
aimed to reach 15 per cent of the national votes with the slogan “Hidup adalah Perbuatan” or “Life
is Deed”, (Firmanzah, 2010, pp. 128-129, 242-244). However, approaching the 2014 election, PAN is
deploying similar political branding strategy as the nationalist parties – thus fetishising its prominent
figures. On its official website, PAN declares that one of the strategies they are deploying for the
199

As for PD, this wedding ceremony was expected to divert public attention on numerous corruption scandals
by some PD’s elites such as Muhammad Nazarudin, Angelina Sondakh. Edhie Baskoro and Anas
Urbaningrumare also alleged to have involved in these scandals (see PD’s section).
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2014 elections is to reinforce its image through its current chairperson. The following billboard
exemplifies such a practice:

Source: Author’s collection

As the visual reading pattern starts from left to the right, Hatta Rajasa’s billboard seems to firstly
accentuate the party’s logo as it is situated on the left hand corner below the slogan “berbakti untuk
negeri, mengabdi tiada henti, terus bekerja untuk kemajuan bangsa” (devotion to the country, serve
relentlessly, continue to work for the progress of the nation). Next to the logo is the word
“merakyat” (literary means populist), written in the red ink to contrast with the slogan. Below
“merakyat” is the phrase “menunaikan amanat rakyat” (fulfilling people’s mandate). If we read the
word and the phrase as a continuation we will find a linguistic expression of “[Hatta Raja] is a
populist figure who fulfils the people’s mandate”. An alternative interpretation in reading the word
“merakyat” is to treat the word as the abbreviation of “me-rakyat” which is equal to “menunaikan
amanat rakyat”. Hatta Rajasa’s smiling image appears in the right hand corner occupying one eighth
of the billboard. Behind him is the country’s waving flag with the blue colour backdrop as the
billboard’s background. Below Rajasa’s image is his full name along with his academic title (Dr stands
for Doctor200 whereas Ir stands for Engineer) and his Islamic identity (H which stands for Haji or hajj).
The letter “M” following the title “Hajj” most possibly stands for his full name Muhammad Hatta
Rajasa, as many Indonesian Muslim people abbreviate their first name of Muhammad (following the
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He obtained the title Doctor as the De Nitra University in Slovakia rewarded him the title of Doctor Honoris
Causa. An honourary degree, not a PhD.
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name of Prophet Muhammad) simply as “M”. His position as the chairperson of PAN is written below
his name.

The reinforcement of Hatta Rajasa’s image on this billboard is conveyed by presenting his image,
along with his nationalist commitment to dedicate himself to serving the country and continuing to
work for the nation’s progress. However, his pledge seems to speak for itself as there is no visual
supporting evidence for his pledge, although he further defines himself and the party as populist
(merakyat) in fulfilling the people’s mandate. The lack of this authentic visual setting of place (Holt,
2004) on this linguistic-heavy-loaded billboard merely dilutes the intended message the party’s
chairperson attempts to disseminate: he is a Muslim inclusive party leader that pledges to dedicate,
serve, and work for the country’s development if he is elected in the 2014 Presidential election.

If we examine this billboard closely, we will find that Hatta’s billboard does not use any visual
attributes to denote his Islamic identity. He merely employs a faint linguistic attribute “hajj” to
connote his Islamic credentials. As earlier discussed, the title hajj has not only been exploited
politically to connote a high degree of piety and social status but also been employed as a notion to
signify religious political attachment. At this stage, the act of reinforcing PAN’s chairperson persona
is largely reliant on demonstrating the nationalist side of the party’s chairperson. Hatta also
reinforces this indirectly in his biography written on his personal website (http://hattarajasa.info/profile/biography/41)201. By juxtaposing his first name, Hatta, with the name of one of
the country’s founding fathers, Mohammad Hatta, in the opening paragraph of his biography, the
party’s chairperson attempts to correlate his reputation with Mohammad Hatta’s. Furthermore, the
employment of Soekarno’s image and political jargon in the opening scene of Hatta’s advertisement
video entitled “Kemerdekaan Pejuang Masa Kini 2012” (Freedom of Today’s Warriors 2012)202,
which can be found on PAN’s official website, solidifies such an endeavour. In short, like PKS, PAN
accentuates its nationalist characteristics as its political commodity, whilst ostensibly diluting its
religious image.

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or United Development Party
As noted in chapter five, the establishment of PPP was due to the enactment of Soeharto’s coercive
policy (Law no 3/1975) to fuse political parties based on their ideological orientation. PPP was
officially established on 5 January 1973 with Islam as its ideology. However, Soeharto’s coercive
201

See Biografi (Biography). [n.d]. retrieved from http://hatta-rajasa.info/profile/biography/41
Kemerdekaan Pejuang Masa Kini 2012 (Freedom of Today’s Warrior 2012)[Video]. [n.d]. Retrieved from
http://pan.or.id/
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decree that obliged all political parties to incorporate Pancasila as the sole ideology (asas tunggal),
made PPP alter its ideology from Islam to Pancasila. It produced political anxiety, especially at the
elite level (Haris, 1991; Mandan, 2009). In the post-Soeharto era, PPP decided to return to Islam in
order to capture its traditionalist voters and to regain their trust. PPP is also perceived as a nonJavanese Party (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata, 2004, pp. 367-368), although this party has a close
bond with Javanese-based traditionalist Islamic organisation, NU. With these characteristics, the
discussion of PPP’s political branding follows the critical junctures in the background of the party’s
establishment, the party’s position in Soeharto’s era and its re-branding in the Reform era.

As mentioned, PPP’s establishment stems from the Soeharto’s government scheme to simplify the
political system by requiring all parties, including the Islamic one, to merge. PPP was then
established as the fusion of the Islamic parties in Soekarno’s era (Parmusi, PSII, Perti and NU). In
alignment with the contestation of the modernist versus traditionalist groups inside the now defunct
Masyumi (see chapter five), these four parties, which once were parts of Masyumi, also represent
this contestation. NU represents the traditionalist group whilst the three other parties represent the
modernist ones, as they, especially Parmusi, have a close connection with Muhammadiyah203. As
Soeharto required that these adversarial parties fuse, the fusion merely reinforced the
fragmentation inside the Islamic faction. In short, not only does PPP become the symbol of the state
repression towards Islamic faction, but it also represents the shaky relationship between these
parties.

The coercion stemmed from the government’s perception of Islam as a political threat, especially
after Masyumi’s mutiny against Soekarno’s regime. Moreover, the multiparty system Soekarno
inherited was also seen as a threat to political stability. Thus, in response to the provision number
XXII/ 1966 issued by Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) regarding the restructuring
of the political system in Indonesia, Soeharto’s government drafted a Bill requiring simplification of
political parties. Under this compulsion, the Islamic parties decided to fuse themselves despite their
reluctance to merge. Hakim (1993, pp. 48-50) notes that the voices of dissent came from both
traditionalist and modernist camps. As NU gained 58 Parliamentary seats, which made this party the
second largest party after Golkar in the 1971 election, NU’s elites perceived the Bill as representing
Soeharto’s actions in emasculating NU’s strength. Thus by merging itself with other Islamic parties,
they perceived that these actions merely marginalised NU’s position in the political arena. Similar
voices of dissent also came from Parmusi, PSII and Perti. At first, PSII and Perti refused to obey the
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Parmusi’s prominent figure, Mintaredja, was known as Muhammadiyah’s activist.
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requirement. However, when Soeharto succeeded in placing Anwar Tjokroaminoto as the
chairperson of PSII, both PSII and Perti were co-opted onto the fusion. On the other hand, in
response to the fusion, Muhammadiyah officially declared its political dissociation from Parmusi, as
the party merged with its rival, NU. These four Islamic parties finally agreed to fuse themselves
under one political umbrella, named PPP. Hakim (1993, p. 52) argues that the name of the party,
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party), was chosen not to directly signify the
party’s Islamic nature, but more to represent the unification of the Islamic parties. They managed to
consolidate and produced the party’s statutes, programs and organisational structure.

Notwithstanding its success, PPP’s internal consolidation did not efface the traditionalist and
modernist camps’ rift. Platzdasch (2009a, p. 48) argues that the existence of “double executive”
(Central Board and President plus two Advisory Boards) implicates the internal friction between
modernist (Parmusi) and traditionalist camps (NU). Although Hakim (1993, p. 50) found that NU
elites dominated the Executive and Council Boards, Platzdasch further notes that since the time of
its establishment up to 1998, NU cadres had never occupied the seat of PPP’s chairmanship. With
this internal conflict, PPP hardly produces the political agenda that completely represent the Islamic
parties’ solidity. For instance, the government’s coercive decree on “asas tunggal” (sole ideology) in
1983-1985 to all parties was perceived differently by traditionalist and modernist camps.
Assyaukanie (2009, pp. 104-106) and Hefner (2000, p. 167) note that NU is the first organisation that
accepted the state ideology, as it perceives that Pancasila is not contradictory to Islam for they both
share similar moderate notions and are seen as complementing each other. This acceptance is
important in defining NU’s political position, as Hefner (2000, p. 89) argues, that not only does this
represent NU’s support for (Pancasila) pluralism but also shows NU’s “empirical reconceptualisation
of Muslim politics”. On the other hand, compared to NU’s political astuteness in quickly
reconceptualising its notion of Islamic moderation in responding to Pancasila pluralism,
Muhammadiyah firstly showed its intransigent stance. However, as Assyaukanie (2009, p. 107)
notes, Soeharto’s attendance at Muhammadiyah’s Surakarta congress in December 1985 marked a
shifting perspective in the organisation, especially when Muhammadiyah eventually perceived
Pancasila as the “best model of polity”, as it does not lead to de-Islamisation. With these discrepant
reactions from the modernist and traditionalist camps inside PPP, the party positions itself in
ambiguity. Radi (1984, pp. 151-152) found PPP’s ambiguous stance in responding to the People’s
Consultative Assembly’s (MPR) provision number II/MPR/1978 regarding Pancasila’s five principles
(Eka Prasetya Pancakarsa/Pedoman Penghayatan Pengamalan Pancasila (P4) or Guidance for
Understanding and Practising Pancasila) as the sole guideline to interpret the state ideology. PPP’s
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1984 statutes declared the party’s support of Pancasila’s indoctrination through P4 programs.
However, in practice, PPP’s elites opposed the attempt. Hakim (1993, pp. 69, 76) notes that they
(NU-affiliated elites) decided to walk out of the parliamentary meeting during the MPR Special
Session in 1978 discussing P4, whilst the Parmusi and PSII-affiliated elites chose to stay in the
chamber. This means that the PPP’s elites not only contradicted the party’s ideological blueprint as
the representation of their internal consensus, but also signified ideational and behavioural
inconsistency in practising the party’s political agenda.

However, Platzdasch (2009a, p. 47) argues that the aim of Soeharto’s ideological coercion was to
suppress any formal political expression in relation to shariah implementation. This made PPP, as a
single Islamic party at that time, mask its Islamic identity under Pancasila. Platzdasch (2009a, p. 47)
found that the masking had been conducted in two ways: firstly, by combining Pancasila and Islam
as the party’s ideology in 1973; secondly, by placing Islam as a mere attribute to Pancasila in 1979.
Su’aidi (1999, p. 80) calls this stage the situation where in the party was caught up in a “double”
ideological basis. In 1984, PPP had to alter its party’s logo from ka’bah to star, as the image of ka’bah
was perceived as connoting Islamic-heavy-laden visual expression that Soeharto’s government
repressed. As discussed in chapter five, although this visual coercion represents the political
emasculation of PPP, the choice of a star impotently maintained the party’s branding of its cardinal
religious characteristic.

In the Reform era, PPP decided to re-brand itself by returning to the use of ka’bah as its logo. In
Islamic discourse, ka’bah is perceived not only as a sacred square monument at the Haram mosque
of Mecca but more importantly also as the direction towards which Muslims face during prayers as it
represents the “House” of Allah. By using this sacred religious symbol, PPP equates itself as the
representation of the Islamic “house” for all the Islamic parties. This means that PPP attempts to
resuscitate its former image as the political umbrella that represents the romantic past of Islamic
parties’ unification. Hamzah Haz, PPP’s former chairperson (1998-2007), as cited in Platzdasch
(2009a, p. 136), argues that the party’s image resuscitation does not necessarily turn PPP into a
sectarian party as the party’s inclusive characteristic is maintained. However, such a rhetorical
statement has never received a response from non-Muslims, as Platzdasch further notes, that in the
last fifteen years non Muslims have never become members of PPP.

Returning to the image construction of PPP as the “house” of all Islamic parties, Suryadharma Ali,
PPP’s current chairperson, (as cited by Setiawan, 2012), states that this “house” welcomes all Islamic
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parties, except for PAN and PKS. Surydharma Ali further perceives PAN and PKS not as Islamic
parties. This act of alienating PAN and PKS can be seen as twofold: ideologically and pragmatically.
Ideologically, the alienation stems from PPP’s perception of seeing PKS’ Islamic doctrine as different
from the mainstream Islamic strands in Indonesia. Platzdasch (2009a, p. 180) affirms this by arguing
that PKS’ strong attachment to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood differentiates PKS from PPP’s
Indonesian Islamic strands, which are dominated by NU and Muhammadiyah. However, as the trace
of Muhammadiyah can also be found in PAN, PPP’s actions towards PAN possibly stems from Amien
Rais’ rejection of joining and leading PPP in 1998. Furthermore, the different political stances of
these three parties vis-a-vis shariah arguably contribute to this (covert) contention. When PPP
positions itself as “a firm shariah defender”204(adopting Platzdasch’s term, 2009a, p. 183), both PAN
and PKS do not support this. Instead, they perceive PPP’s stance as unrealistic. As discussed earlier,
PAN and PKS position themselves in a pragmatic mode. PAN rejects the idea of implementing
shariah in Indonesia as it will endanger Indonesian pluralism, whilst PKS holds a different perspective
that shariah should be implemented gradually. PKS also rejects being positioned as upholding the
idea of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia as the party (formerly) supported the idea of
adopting the Madinah Charter205 in Indonesia (Assyaukanie, 2009, p. 194).

Although PPP claimed to defend the Jakarta Charter and wanted to implement shariah programs as
its main political commodity, the party did not completely concentrate its campaign on Islamic
issues. Accenting the economic, education and health issues such as reinforcing the “Usaha Mikro,
Kecil dan Menengah” (UMKM) program or Micro, Small, and Middle Scale Enterprises, “education
and public health services for free” program, PPP expected that these programs would be saleable
(not only for Muslim voters), beside its continuous fight for the draft of Halal Assurance Law, Custom
and Tradition Law, and Islamic banking. The slogan “Bangkit Bersama Untuk Perubahan” or
“Together Revive to Make a Change” wraps up the campaign (Firmanzah, 2010, pp. 244-245).
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The party wants to insert the Jakarta Charter’s seven famous words “with the obligation to live according to
Islamic law for the Muslims” in the amendments of the 1945 Constitution.
205
Prophet Muhammad employed the Charter as a constitution that guarantees religious pluralism in
Madinah, Saudi Arabia. The reference to Islam, let alone the Quran and Hadith, was absent, as the Charter
contains the right and freedom of the citizens to maintain their religious personal belief with an absolute
obligation to defend the country from the outside intruders (Assyaukanie, 2009, pp. 164-165).
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Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) or Nation Awakening Party
Founded in July 1998, PKB cannot detach itself from Gus Dur’s figure as one of its founding fathers. It
claims to be inclusive, pluralist, humanist, religious, nationalist, and non-sectarian.206 Since PKB
received tremendous Islamic support from NU, the largest Muslim organisation mainly in Java, PKB is
seen as the representative of the Islamic Javanese party, notwithstanding the fact that the party
adheres to Pancasila (Ananta, Arifin, Suryadinata, 2004, pp. 6-8). This inclusive characteristic is
arguably influenced by Gus Dur’s image as a “humanist, liberal and moderate” Muslim politician
(Marks, 2010), who once governed the country with his “managerial inadequecies” (Barton, 2001, p.
275). Thus, the discussion of PKB’s branding primarily focuses on the image of its founding father,
especially in relation to his conception of Pancasila pluralism. It can also be argued that Gus Dur
used PKB as his electoral machine to reach the Presidency.
Gus Dur’s ideals of pluralism echoed widely, especially when NU207 officially accepted Pancasila as
its sole ideology. For NU (Gus Dur) Pancasila is not a matter of ideology that unites Indonesian
plurality as it accommodates the cultivation of religious tolerance, democracy, egalitarianism, and
human rights. Bush (2002, pp. 119-160) found that when NU decided to withdraw from PPP in 1984
under a movement called “kembali ke khittah 1926”208, this marked a political reconciliation with
Soeharto’s regime. Soeharto perceived that NU’s attempts to develop civil society discourse by
promoting pesantren209-based community development programs emasculated the organisation’s
resistance towards his government. NU’s official declaration of adopting Pancasila as its ideology
reinforces the organisation’s attempt. Hefner (2000, p. 168) argues that Gus Dur’s appointment as a
delegate from Golkar in the parliamentary session signifies Soeharto’s warm response to NU’s
maneuver. This marked a honeymoon period210 between NU and Soeharto’s government. However,
Bush (2002, p. 143) argues that the decision of declaring its adoption of the state ideology is not
without political “profiteering”. She further found that NU’s decade long oppositional stance
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See Mabda’ Siyasy Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa. [n.d]. Retrieved from http://www.dpppkb.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=331&Itemid=57
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Gus Dur headed the organisation in 1984-1998.
Roughly speaking, the word “kembaIi” (return) indicates a political retreat in which NU returned to its
former form a socio-religious mass organisation, embracing its 1926 guidelines.
209
Literally means Islamic boarding school. Mun’im (2010, p. 62) found that one of Soeharto’s maneuvers in
controlling pesantren is conducted by the standardising its curriculum, 70 per cent general subjects while 30
per cent the religious ones. However Hikam (as cited by Bush, 2002, pp. 173-174) argues that albeit the
government’s intervention, pesantren as a social institution becomes the embryo of Indonesian civil society.
210
The period ended in 1990s as Soeharto approached NU’s counterpart, Muhammadiyah elites, in order to
establish ICMI. Gus Dur then called ICMI as a sectarian organisation (Hefner, 2000).
208
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towards the government had made NU suffer politically and economically. Thus, this political move
is intended to gain political and economic capital.

Aside from NU’s reconciliation with the government, Bush (2002, pp. 168-169) also found the
employment of the civil society notion in NU’s discourse indirectly signifies an attempt to reinforce
its different stance from Muhammadiyah or the tarbiyah movement, for instance, in perceiving
Indonesian civil society. The modernist camp often uses the phrase “masyarakat madani” to
connote this civility. However, as the word “madani” has a close reference to the society bound by
the Madinah Charter (see PPP’s section, fn. 207), this, in NU’s perspective, shows the modernist
camp’s attempt at paralleling Indonesian civility with Madinah civility. The modernist camp
conceives civil society and government as two inseparable entities, while NU perceives civil society
as having “critical autonomy” over the government (Bush, 2002, p. 171). Bush further found that
behind their different angles in developing the discourse, both camps share a similar ideal that their
efforts in promoting civil society should be based on “fostering values of tolerance and pluralism”.
This act of fostering is expanded into supervising acts towards the government.

As the acts of supervision need a formal political institution, NU cadres then felt the need to
establish a party that could accommodate their political aspirations. With NU’s clerics blessing, PKB
was established and Gus Dur became the first chairperson. Gus Dur’s image as a pluralist figure was
maintained and adopted as the party’s prime characteristic. This can overtly be seen in PKB’s
document entitled Mabda Siyasy (ideological principles), in which words that represent Islamic
orientation such as “Allah” are absent. Instead, the party uses a neutral expression of “God Almighty
One” to indicate its religious stance which resonates with Pancasila’s first principle. However, this
does not mean that the Islamic nuance is completely missing. The (Arabic) Islamic expressions such
as the Islamic legal maxim (amar ma’ruf nahi munkar or enjoining good and prohibiting evil),
religious bond (ukhuwah diniyah), national bond (ukhuwah wathoniyah), and humanistic bond
(ukhwuah insaniyah) are present as connoting the party’s religious identity. However, as these
expressions are used in a non-religious political context, this document arguably represents the
party’s neutrality. The absence of Islamic unifying phrase such as “ukhuwah Islamiyah” (Islamic
bond) in the document also reinforces the construction of neutrality.

This branding strategy is also used by PKB’s Muhammadiyah-affiliated rival, PAN. However, as
Assayukanie (2009, p. 143) argues, the elemental difference between Amien Rais’ notion of religious
tolerance and pluralism vis-a-vis the state with Gus Dur’s lies in the issue of the “religion-state
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relationship”. Amien inclines to support the view that the role of the government is to protect all
religions, whilst Gus Dur perceives that the state should be segregated from religions as it potentially
interferes in religious matters which belong to the private domain. In other words, following Nur
Cholish Madjid, a prominent Indonesian liberal Muslim activist, people should be able to distinguish
“what is essentially religious and what is not” (Assyaukanie, 2009, p. 147). With this disposition,
during his tenure as a President, Gus Dur was noted as making several contentious yet inclusive
political moves. For instance, Gus Dur’s attempt to establish diplomatic relations with Israel
attracted widespread criticism, especially from his Muslim counterparts such as PKS211 (Damanik,
2002, p. 297). His policy in giving the same opportunity for the Acehnese (as the East Timorese) to
hold a referendum in order to end human rights abuses by the Military also attracted severe
criticism, especially from the Military camp. However, his acknowledgement of Confucianism as one
of the state’s official religions and his endorsement of Indonesian Chinese to celebrate Chinese New
Year helped to reinforce his pluralist inclusive image. Siboro (2004) also notes that Gus Dur used this
image to attract Indonesian minority groups to vote for PKB during PKB’s 2004 campaign. He
brought with him PKB’s legislative candidates, such as A.B. Susanto, a Catholic Chinese Indonesian
and a Catholic Maj. Gen. (ret) Ferry Tinggogoy as proof that PKB represents a secular nationalist
party, despite the party’s affiliation with Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation.

However, this image-building needs to be re-dissected. Despite the fact that PKB is greatly
influenced by Gus Dur who promoted the secular-exclusive view, he did not dissolve the Ministry of
Religion in his administration (1999 – 2001), as many NU elites occupied the strategic positions in it.
PKB did oppose the formal adoption of shari’ah but still inclined to an Islamic agenda such as the
Basic Law of Religious Justice in 1989 (Law no. 7) and the Compilation of Islamic Law in 1991
(Presidential Instruction no. 1). Along with Golkar, PAN, and PKS, PKB also endorsed the National
Education System Law no. 20, 2003 that required that religion be taught as a course at school
according to the student’s religion.212 Thus, it can be argued that positioning PKB (Gus Dur) means
positioning their pragmatic political actions.

PKB’s pragmatic actions no longer have tremendous leverage at the national level as in Gus Dur’s
era. Prior to the 2009 Election, PKB was busy tackling internal conflict. Gus Dur decided to withdraw
and leave PKB to his nephew, Muhaimin Iskandar. Firmanzah (2010, p. 246) contends that the
211

U.S former ambassador, Paul Wolfowitz (2010) notes, that Gus Dur almost became the adherent of Said
Qutb and Hasan al Banna school of thought, the founders of PKS-affiliated organisation in Egypt, as he was
attracted to their writings. However, his encounter with Aristotle’s writing, Nichomachean Ethics, changed his
view about humanism.
212
See Baswedan (2004) and Assyaukanie (2009).
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conflict between Gus Dur’s rival camp, Hasyim Muzadi and Gus Dur’s allied camp, Muhaimin
Iskandar, triggered the decline in PKB’s votes to 50 per cent in the 2009 legislative election despite
its simplistic, obscure political programs such as “easy and comfortable access to public services”
and “prospering the people” programs. The slogan “Membela yang Benar” or “Defending the Right
One” indirectly claims that Muhaimin’s camp is the right one.

Political Branding Comparison between the Nationalist and Islamic Parties
As the state ideology, not only does Pancasila function as the ideological umbrella that guards and
protects Indonesian plurality, but it also allows the synthesis and contestation of the nationalist and
Islamic strands through the framework of Pancasila’s socio-nationalism. Soekarno coined and
propogated this nationalism which contains Indonesia’s unitary principle, i.e. gotong royong (mutual
assistance) as the essence to achieve the nation’s harmony (kerukunan). Within this framework,
Pancasila is thus perceived as a set of open-ended principles that accommodate the cultivation of
(religious) ideological tolerance. This tolerance resides in the form of a willingness to accept
differences, especially in Pancasila’s family principle and collectivism underscoring it. As discussed,
these principles are substantially influenced by the disposition of Pancasila’s founding fathers (read:
the (Javanese) paternalistic culture). Fetishising the prominent figures, thus, becomes a norm as the
leaders are mostly positioned as patrons. By this, the Indonesian political arena becomes the site
where the fame of the patron’s image is sanctioned as the instrumental basis of the party’s
branding.

The deployment of this branding strategy between the nationalist and Islamic factions is not
completely different in manner. Compared to the Islamic faction, the level of nationalist camp’s
fetishising their key figures is arguably higher than the Islamic one. This is most probably due to the
clientelism (Pancasila’s) paternalistic principles entail, which makes the branding of these parties’
key figures favourable. This fetishising becomes a common normative form in their politics of image.
For instance, the practices of clientelism during Soeharto’s administration made his electoral
machine, Golkar, deeply interlocked in the gusti-kawula pattern. However, this does not mean that
Golkar would vitiate due to Soeharto’s downfall since Golkar relished the political privilege during
Soeharto’s tenure, which means this party has a more solid institutional base compared to other
parties. Golkar still maintains this patronage system by invariably depending on its chairperson’s
figure. These figures present themselves in dual image construction – nationalist and Islamic – for in
Pancasila discourse such construction is permissible. Golkar’s claimed ideological position as stated
on their statutes and platforms (the nationalist one) does not impede their figures to be in the

165

tenuous boundary of ideological crossroads in representing their public image. Golkar does not need
to explicitly state that Islam is an identifying attribute of its ideology (Pancasila), as Pancasila opens
itself to ambiguity. In short, the flexibility in the image construction is practicable as Pancasila allows
such praxis.

Gerinda and Hanura seem to adopt this pattern as they both represent the electoral vehicles of
Golkar’s former elites. A faint difference can be percieved from their actions in forming a coalition
with other parties that arguably share similar political platforms. For instance, Gerinda and PDI-P
coalition becomes a differentiaton marker that distinguishes themselves from Golkar, Hanura and
PD. Not only does their coalition indicate that they plausibly construct and attach themselves to a
similar nationalist image that heavily orients to Soekarno’s socio-nationalist conception, but that
also it signifies that Gerindra’s inclination towards PDI(-P), Soeharto’s Golkar “old” opponent,
arguably reflects a degree of resistance as Gerindra’s central figure, Prabowo, was sacked by
Golkar’s former elite, Wiranto, at the demise of Soeharto’s regime.

However, Gerindra’s inclination does not indicate the same degree of political attachment to
Soekarno as PDI-P. PDI-P’s attachment represents more a political perpetuation of Soekarno’s
dynasty than a mere ideological attachment to Soekarno’s teachings. Megawati’s image-building is
constructed by reinforcing that a strong ideological attachment needs a living descendant to solidify
that the party’s adoption of Soekarno’s teaching comes, in fact, directly from Soekarno’s eldest
daughter. With this tie, PDI-P claims itself as the (sole) party that truly represents Soekarno’s ideals
of wong cilik.

Similar ideals are seemed to be also employed by Hanura (read: Wiranto). The branding of this
party’s patron circulates not only around his populist image, especially when he ate wong cilik’s
staple food, nasi aking (see chapter seven), that represents his compasionate side for the wong cilik,
but more importantly also the inculcation of his image as a retired General who successfully
maintained security order during 1998’s political chaos. His decision not to accept Soeharto’s
“unconstitutional offer” of power transfer to him instead of his Vice President, Habibie, became the
highlight of his image-building, as it represents a “politically-correct” decision. This, however,
contradicts his image as the former Army’s Commander-in-chief who was perceived as responsible
for the massacre of East Timorese during its referendum. Wiranto’s populist and “politically-correct”
images are reinforced by his attempt at demonstrating emotive associations through pledges as
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represented on his billboard. However, Golkar’s fragmented support for Wiranto, as the party’s
Presidential candidate, made this General establish his own party, Hanura.

As for PD, this party appears to adopt a similar branding strategy as Golkar, Hanura, Gerindra, and
PDI-P, especially in the form of fetishising its key figure. The process starts from PD’s reliance on its
patron, SBY. Using the organisational structure (which is centered on SBY) as the medium to cement
PD’s institutional dependency on its central figure connotes the party’s vulnerability (if not
fallibility). The branding then continues, reinforcing SBY’s image as a moderate figure who presents
himself as a nationalist Muslim retired General with a strong Javanese background. Representing
Islamic and Nationalist factions as well as showing his military side with Javanese civility, SBY
succeeds in representing an all-inclusive image package as the form of his politics of image.

In a Bourdieuan lens, not merely does this fetishism connote the positioning of the key figures’
image as an asset to gain public acknowledgement (symbolic capital), but it also indicates a
contestation of the figures’ images that leads to a capital transaction. For instance, when NU under
Gus Dur’s leadership decided to adopt Pancasila, this was arguably perceived as a way in which the
organisation transacted by way of adopting the ideology whilst gaining economic and political capital
from Soeharto’s government. At the same time, this action indicates that this ideological adoption
reflects not only the process of ideological reification but also the commodification of Pancasila.
Thus, NU’s appreciable symbolic capital was transacted with the economic and political capital the
organisation lacked.

This also demonstrates that the ossification of the parties’ ideological position, as stated on their
statutes and platforms, cannot be seen as an indication of the parties’ inflexibility in positioning
themselves in the ideological crossroads. Their ideational and behavioural practices demonstrate
that these maneuverings indicate not the ideological transposition, but rather political ambiguity as
well as ambivalence, for in Pancasila discourse such praxis is permissible. For instance, PPP and PKS,
as the parties that officially declare Islam as their ideology, cannot consistently stick to represent
themselves as Islamic exclusive parties. Not only does this exclusivity merely ossify their identity
construction that impedes the expansion of constituency, but that also it constrains them to be in
the tenuous boundary of the ideological crossroads. Thus, by also claiming that their political
practices are characterised by Pancasila’s pluralist and inclusive principles, the attempt in expanding
their constituency can be perceived as largely based not on the ideological challenge (if not
contestation), but more on the political expediency.

167

In order not to be trapped in a position as exclusive Islamic parties, PKB and PAN’s political branding
are constructed by way of encapsulating their inclusive religious nationalist image. However, as PKB
and PAN affiliate with NU and Muhammadiyah respectively, this alliance reveals that the branding of
these two inclusive (Islamic) parties are not simply directed to support political aspiration of their
members or to expand the number of their constituents. These two main goals do not represent
political ends of NU and Muhammadiyah (PKB and PAN), as history records that political amalgam
between these two Islamic largest organisations in Indonesia in one political roof, PPP, merely
reinforces the contestation of traditionalist versus modernist camps inside the Islamic faction.
Similar inclusive pluralist branding used by PKB and PAN are deployed not only to compete for the
share of the “cake of political power”, but also arguably to demonstrate which is gaining more public
acknowledgement (symbolic capital) vis-a-vis the plausibly indissoluble ideological rivalry
(traditionalist versus modernist Islam) of the organisations they affiliate with.

Thus, to conclude, in a Gramscian lens, the Indonesian political arena demonstrates that in order to
attain the hegemonic position, a fluid dynamic coalition needs to be forged based on the marriage of
convenience. This marriage reflects a system of alliance which is deployed not simply to capture and
expand the contituencies or demonstrate political appeals to attract the constituencies. Rather, this
system demonstrates that the nature of political and religious characteristics in Pancasila-based
nation-state permits the act of shifting to middle ground in order to secure consent which reflects a
collective (political) will, or “hegemony” in Gramscian term. Within this framework, not only do the
party leaders’ billboards represent the image of their personalities and/or moral ideals that signify
subjective conception of their political disposition, but that, the billboards also potentially fall into
reflecting mere rhetorical statements, which ostensibly represent the leaders’ inclination towards
the middle ground.
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PART IV
READING THE NARRATIVES OF THE CANDIDATES’ BILLBOARDS
Introduction
Part IV discusses the reading of political branding of the legislative candidates in the 2009 legislative
election as reflected on their billboards. This reading demonstrates that not only do the billboards
represent the image construction of the candidates, but also shows that the candidates cannot
dissociate themselves from the ideological ambiguity prevalent in Pancasila discourse. As discussed
in chapters four, five, seven and eight, this dissociation is arguably due to the fluid and dynamic
situation in Indonesian politics that demonstrates religious political alliances and that renders the
fluidity of ideational and behavioural practices of the parties. In this light, these reading practices
will concentrate on examining the ways the candidates construct their images that signify their
ideological orientations towards the Islamic and Nationalist strands.
The descriptive analytical account discussed in Parts II and III cannot be merely treated as
supplementary archival documents that elucidate and/or control the reading of the candidates’
billboards (or in Barthesian term “anchorage”), but are more importantly a text that represents the
nature of the cultural/political practices of “represented participants”213 (Kress and van Leeuwen,
1990, 2006) on the billboards. This descriptive account can stand by its own as it demonstrates the
complexity of ideological contestation and synthesis in the Indonesian political arena. However,
although this can be treated as an ostensible separate case study that is closely connected to the
billboards, this separation cannot be perceived as denoting the absence of the inter-dependence of
the texts. These reading practices require an intertextual reading as the texts and images intimately
engage in the same frame of reference of cultural/political practices. In this sense, O’Toole (2011,
pp. 3, 5, 23, 121) argues that although treating the reading practices of the billboards as an
independent entity suggests our dependence on our eyes to work for the reading, this “extra-textual
knowledge” (the descriptive analytical account) provides us with a “con-text”, which functions as the
“pre-text” prior to our reading of the billboards, in order to produce the “post-text”. This, as Kress
and van Leeuwen further (2006) argue, would keep the totality of the billboard’s “coherence” intact.
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Kress and van Leeuwen (1990, 2006) argue that productive and receptive communication activities
(speaking, writing, reading and listening), without exception, involve two related participants: interactive and
represented participants. The former denotes a direct interactive relation between the interlocutors (the
writer and the reader, the TV anchor and the viewers, etc.), whereas the latter denotes an indirect relation as
the participants become the topic of the discussion in the interaction.
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However, this textual coherence does not circumscribe the possibility of conducting discrete analysis
of, for instance, the visual text and later moves to the verbal text. Such analysis, argues O’ Toole
(2011), is permissible as the visual text itself is a self-contained grammatical text. M.A.K Halliday
(1978, p. 192) contends that grammar does not signify codes of communication; it, rather,
represents the “resource of making meanings”. Hodge and Kress (1988), Kress and van Leeuwen
(1990, 2006), van Leeuwen (2005), and O’Toole (2011) tailor Barthesian semiotics and Halliday’s
systemic functional grammar into social semiotics. Not only does this mode of analysis address the
visual and verbal texts, but, more importantly, it also demonstrates the complexity behind and inside
the story lines of the billboards. This does not mean that the sole employment of Barthesian
semiotics or Hallidayian functional linguistics “impotently” demonstrate the complexity. This
theoretical combination shows that not only does the code of the language the candidates use in
constructing their public image on the billboards connect with the social situation the billboards
foreground, but also demonstrates that the grammar of the visual text is congruent with the verbal
one. The interplay of the visual and verbal texts on the billboard will also demonstrate the
inadequacy of visual and linguistic capital.
I adopt Kress and van Leeuwen’s (1990, 2006) and O’Toole’s (2011) analytical procedure in
examining the language of the candidates’ billboards as street-level museum artefacts (Gudis, 2004).
Adopting Hallidayean metafunctions (see chapter three), O’Toole (2011) suggests that the practices
of looking at the billboards deals with these three metafunctions, i.e. representational (ideational),
modal (interpersonal) and compositional (textual) functions. Kress and van Leeuwen (1990, 2006)
and O’Toole (2011) assert that the realisation of these metafunctions on the billboards can be seen
from the symmetrical arrangement of the represented participants on the billboards (ideational), i.e.
the narrative themes, facial expression, gestures, actions, clothing; the gaze of the represented
participants, the framing, the light, the scale (interpersonal); colour relationship and pictorial space
(textual).
Within this framework, Part IV is organised into two main chapters. The first one discusses the
reading the candidates’ billboards from nationalist faction whilst the second one considers the
Islamic faction. The reading comparison of the nationalist and Islamic factions will be incorporated in
the second chapter. The analysis of each billboard214 will encompass these three metafunctions.
However, as these metafunctions are dependent on each other, the analysis is conducted not by
segregating the ideational, interpersonal and textual elements as separate classificatory or
independent entities, but by directly connecting them into one single framework as they all appear
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Two billboards are used to represent each party.
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at both the denotative and connotative levels of reading practices. Synthesising these elements into
one reading reinforces the significance of the billboards’ own right to refer visually to the discursive
practices in the political world, or in Mirzoeff’s (2002, pp. 3-8) terms, the billboards act as “the
metaphor of verbalizing the enormity of what had happened”.
The last section of the second chapter in this part will compare and contrast the branding pattern of
the nationalist and Islamic parties. I argue that this will show that the same register variables of the
visual and verbal texts in the billboard genre do not simply signify that the interplay of the
represented participants (tenor) in the language played (mode) demonstrates the same social/visual
actions take place (field) although they plausibly connote similar political branding objectives. This is
due to the ideological ambiguity prevalent in Pancasila discourse that enables the candidates to
construct their image in conjunction with the parties’ identity. At the same time this also liberates
them to construct a flexible image frame, for instance, deploying religious attributes in their
nationalist image construction or vice versa.
However, as noted in Part I, prior to conducting the analysis, we need to be aware of the fact that
the candidates do not have sufficient experience in presenting themselves directly to the public. This
is due to the election laws prior to the current ones (especially the amendment of law no. 10/2008
article 214) that merely allowed the parties to campaign. These constraints on publicity imply a poor
level of public recognisibility for the candidates, especially the new ones. In order to gain
recognisibility (if not yet popularity), most of the candidates concentrate on presenting a close-up or
medium shot profile pictures of themselves on their billboards. Thus, this plausibly makes checking
the visual elements become the first priority in the discussion. However, the focus on the visual text
does not necessarily imply that the verbal elements cannot dominate the billboards. This mode
shows that not only does the candidate rely more on the linguistic aspects, but also signifies the
candidate’s disposition in choosing to accentuate these aspects as the medium in defining her/his
identity.
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Chapter Nine
Reading the Candidates’ Billboards of the Nationalist Parties
This chapter discusses the reading of the candidates’ billboards’ narratives from the nationalist
parties. It aims to examine the scope the candidates’ billboards express their political
(nationalist/Islamic) dispositions. This reading will demonstrate textually how the candidates from
the nationalist faction position themselves in the ideological polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and
Javanese/non-Javanese strands on their billboards. This is conducted by tracing the signifying
practices of the visual and verbal attributes of their billboards.
This chapter is organised into five main sections based on the five nationalist parties. Each section is
divided into two sub-sections. I will compare and contrast the image construction of the legislative
candidates of the same party at the end of each sub-section. This is conducted by concentrating on
the dominant visual/verbal elements of the billboards.
Partai Demokrat (PD) or Democratic Party
Munadi Herlambang’s Billboard

Source: author’s collection

Examining Munadi Herlambang’s billboard for its metafunctions (ideational, interpersonal and
compositional functions), we need to divide this billboard into three vertical frames. These frames
represent the visual “modality”215 Herlambang uses in order to engage the spectators in looking at
his billboard, such as the image of SBY, the national flag, the way Herlambang smiles to the camera,
and the party’s official blue colour. SBY’s image as the party’s central figure, who frames the
215

Kress and van Leeuwen (2006, pp. 155-156) defines visual modality as textual cues in form of motivated
(not arbitrary) signs. These cues determine the credibility and reliability of what is inside the text.
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narrative line of Herlambang’s nationalist image, occupies the first frame. The second frame is filled
with the verbal text starting from Herlambang’s slogan, a declarative statement which illustrates the
way he promotes himself (muda (young), objektif (objective), tanpa prasangka (without prejudice))
and most importantly the procedural text that denotes the ways to vote for him. The third frame
captures his smiling image.
From the left hand side of the billboard, SBY emerges as the person who lifts his right hand as if to
give instructions. Not only does this connote Herlambang’s visual tactic in deploying SBY to project
his image (see chapter seven), but it also shows how this party’s paternalistic figure frames
Herlambang’s nationalist image by way of showing himself as an authorative figure as the lifting
hand can be perceived as connoting an authorative, militaristic style. At the same time, this hand can
also be perceived as the vector that builds the interpersonal relation between the billboard and the
spectator as it metaphorically “hails” the spectators to read Herlambang’s voting procedures. At this
stage, not only is this lifting hand needed so that it resonates with the procedural verbal text of the
billboard, but it also shows Herlambang’s disposition in constructing his image by way of affirming
the authorative quality of SBY. However, the degree of his authorative militaristic style is challenged
by his own image construction as soft Javanese militaristic leader. This conveys multi-accentuality
(Volosinov in Hartley, et al, 2002, pp. 150-151) as the image of SBY’s lifting hand represents an
inversion of militarism, especially when it collides with SBY’s soft power image (see chapter seven).
In other words, this hand represents a site of struggle between this retired General’s militaristic
firmness and rigidity on the one hand and Javanese subtlety on the other. Instead of negating these
two notions, this collision produces a preferable combination of characteristics as Nugroho (2009)
found that SBY’s corporeal body had been fetishised, especially when his fans perceive his corporeal
body as connoting sensuality (see chapters two and seven). Thus, this dialogic interaction enhances
the capacity of SBY’s hand (also read: corporeal body) to signify multiple meanings depending on the
circumstances of its social relation.
Besides the image of his lifting hand, SBY is also depicted gazing indirectly not at the spectators, but
at a blank spot (as his image is off the eye-level). This visual distance, as Kress and van Leeuwen
(2006, p. 120) argues, shows “a sense of disengagement”. Thus, when Herlambang uses this image
to support his intimate nationalist image construction by smiling at the spectators (on the third
frame), SBY’s image, on the contrary, attenuates this intimacy.
Returning to SBY’s militaristic image, much research has investigated his soft-image and militaristic
construction. As discussed in chapter seven, they all revolve around arguing that the politics of
image of the current Indonesian President has been circulated around his image as a Javanese
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“gentle” patron, the way he governs the country, and his deployment of so-called soft power. For
instance, Haris (2008) argues that SBY constructs his image as a charming President who cannot
detach himself from his gentle characteristics in governing the country. In alignment with Haris,
Kingsbury (2005, p. 20) argues that this gentleness reflects SBY’s disposition in adopting the Javanese
normative behavioural form of halus (refinement)”, such as “patience, detachment, resignation and
respect” (Geertz, 1993, pp. 52-53). As discussed in chapter seven, besides the subtleties of his
characters, Haris (2008), Mietzner (2009a) and Sukma (2010) point out the punctilious side of SBY in
utilising crucial moments, such as the global economic crisis, to amplify his image. SBY forged social
welfare programs, such as direct cash assistance program for the poor (Bantuan Langsung Tunai),
compensation for fuel price hikes and schooling allowances that, in Haris’ (2008, p. 230) view,
merely reinforce people’s dependency on the government. However, such programs contributed to
his re-election in 2009. Mietzner (2009a, p. 4) notes that the programs boosted SBY’s popularity
from 25 per cent in June 2008 to 50.3 per cent in February 2009. SBY sees his own image as
representing soft power. Such a claim was made especially when Utoyo (Indonesian Rolling Stone
magazine, volume 5, 2005 edition) interviewed him about the connection between his musicality
and the present political condition. This image construction is reinforced when he gave a speech at a
dinner reception held in Washington DC on 25 May 2005 by USINDO (The United States-Indonesia
Society) stating his accentuation of the Javanese gentle characteristics – patience and tolerance – as
the soft power symbols that enable him to captivate the public. In this sense, not merely does the
deployment of SBY’s corporeal body on Herlambang’s billboard connote the patron’s sensuality, but
also signifies the metaphor which indicates the modus operandi of correlating Herlambang’s image
with SBY’s Javanese “soft” masculinity. At the same time, the utilisation of SBY’s body as visual
capital can be seen as twofold: it implies the submissive code, especially when Herlambang visually
defines his disposition through SBY. Secondly, the condition can be reversed. Herlambang’s passivity
cannot be seen as representing a submissive action per se. If he wins a ticket to parliament, he will,
without exception, support SBY’s administration. This creates mutual dependency between SBY and
Herlambang on the visual level. By this, the symbolic mutual exchange occurs. However, at the same
time, this also implies Herlambang’s lack of recognisibility by depending largely on SBY’s image.
Ajidarma (2009) argues that Herlambang’s dependence on SBY’s image is communally accepted, for
in the paternalistic culture such a notion is allowed to reinforce the transmision of SBY’s
charisma/sensuality as the paternalistic party’s figure to Herlambang.
Moving on to the second frame, this frame is opened by Munadi Herlambang’s slogan “Young,
Objective, Without Prejudice” to illuminate his personal qualities. However, this Secretary of Youth
and Sport Department of PD does not provide sufficient visual/written signs to support his claimed
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qualities, except for his age. This insufficiency stems from the absence of the authentic visual setting
of place (Holt, 2004) to support the party’s/Herlambang’s “distinctive” ideology which influences the
billboard’s visual credibility. He merely provides the procedures to vote for him, his number on the
ballot paper, the tick sign, his mobile number for sending SMS text messages and his personal
website. The inclusion of the mobile number and website signifies open access for the public to
reach Herlambang and connotes his quality as an open-minded person that can cope with input and
critics. The voting procedure occupies almost half of Herlambang’s billboard which is positioned
centrally. It indicates that he wants to remind the viewers about the new voting procedures216.
However, at the same time it represents his agitation for his electability.
Nonetheless, if we undertake a close examination of the second frame, we will find that this frame’s
focus is not completely dependent on the way Herlambang conveys his declarative slogan (berjuang
untuk rakyat, muda, objektif, tanpa prasangka or fight for the people, young, objective and without
prejudice), but more on bringing the spectators to vote for him as the procedural text is positioned
centrally on the billboard. This occupies three quarters of the second frame. The instructive rubric
(cara memilih saya or the procedural steps to vote for me) is written in the capital white letters,
which becomes the central point of this frame (and also the billboard), as it indirectly commands the
spectators to read the steps that follow the rubric. The action verbs in the procedure (pilih (choose),
buka (open), cari (find), and cawang (tick)) are deployed to direct the spectators’ eyes to read the
name of Munadi Herlambang as the legislative candidate who represent East Java I constituency.
Yellow is employed as the colour not to signify the Indonesian (nationalist) code of prosperity (see
chapter five), but to accentuate Herlambang’s position as the candidate.
Furthermore, to reinforce this objective, Herlambang uses a rectangular box containing his
candidacy number and full name which appears as an additional frame that trespasses the imaginary
demarcation lines of the first, second and third frames. This box encapsulates the goal of the voting
procedure and functions as the cardinal focus of Herlambang’s image construction. His other name,
Munadi Muchayat, appears in the brackets below the box. Not only does this indicate that he wants
people who know him by this name to vote for him, but it also represents his demonstrative act in
introducing his nickname to the public so that a visual/linguistic familiarisation can be constructed.
At the same time, if we examine this closer, we will find that this “linguistic” familiarisation
demonstrates Herlambang’s reliance (not merely on SBY) on the social and political capital his father
(Muchayat) has. Muchayat was known as the former Vice President of Mandiri Bank’s
216

the government amended the voting mechanism from perforating the ballot paper by using a nail in the
previous elections with the tick sign. It was perceived as a breakthrough in the 2009 Elections to differ itself
from the 2004 elections.
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Commissioner, the largest Bank in Indonesia in terms of total assets and the former Deputy in the
State-Owned Enterprises Ministry. The inclusion of Muchayat in the bracket does not indicate
Herlambang’s attempt to subordinate his father’s reputation as he needs to “borrow” his father’s
“good (?)” name in order to reinforce the level of public recognisiblity towards him. This can be seen
from the recent corruption case regarding the construction of National Athlete’s School, Hambalang.
As the Deputy Secretary of Youth and Sport in PD, the son of Muchayat and the Commissioner of PT
Dutasari Citralaras (the subcontractor of PT Adhi Karya, the company that won Hambalang’s tender
from the Youth and Sport Ministry), Herlambang is alleged to have been (in)directly involved in
arranging a scheme for amending the financial budgeting proposal of the school construction from
single to multi years. He is alleged he utilised his father’s power in influencing Agus Martowardojo,
the Minister of Finance to make such an amendment.217 Not only does Herlambang’s alleged
involvement indicate the extent of his dependency, but this also indirectly demonstrates this ruling
party’s modus operandi in strengthening and securing its social, economic and political networks.
Returning to the way Herlambang constructs his image on his billboard, his deployment of the action
verbs (choose, open, find, tick) which are followed respectively by the nominal groups “kartu suara
berwarna kuning” (yellow ballot paper), “kertas suara” (ballot paper), “tanda gambar partai
Demokrat no. 31” (Democratic Party’s logo number 31), and “no. 5 nama saya” (my name on
number 5), lead not only to Herlambang’s full name. At the same time, this voting procedure
represents Herlambang’s mild instruction to the spectators as he represents the one who has
appreciable capital. The inclusion of Herlambang’s academic titles (S.T. and M.A) following his name
reinforces such an attempt as his academic titles not only illuminate his academic qualities but also
indicate his cultural capital. This denotes his academic capabilities in handling the technological (S.T
denotes a bachelor degree in engineering) and social/humanities issues (M.A connotes his academic
quality of handling the social/humanities issues). At this stage, Herlambang uses this linguistically
heavily loaded modus operandi in his nationalist image construction.
His image emerges on the third frame of the billboard. Situating his own image in the last frame,
which occupies merely one third of the billboard, arguably dilutes the significance of his presence on
the text. He appears in a personal way, smiling to the spectators while wearing the party’s blue 218
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see Firdaus (2012, February 4) “KPK Panggil Munadi Herlambang terkait Hambalang [KPK Summons Munadi
Herlambang Regarding Hambalang]”. Tribune News.com. Retrieved from
http://www.tribunnews.com/2013/02/04/kpk-panggil-munadi-herlambang-terkait-hambalang
and Desyana (2012, June 11) “Daftar Keanehan Proyek Hambalang [List of Hambalang Project’s Oddity]”.
Tempo.co. Retrieved from http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/06/11/063409851/Daftar-KeanehanProyek-Hambalang).
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Dienaputra (2011, p. 183) notes that PD defines its official blue colour as representing peacefulness,
confidence, optimism, and resoluteness.
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jacket. The donning of this jacket reinforces his nationalist inclination besides his reliance on SBY to
represent his nationalist characteristics. At the same time, the jacket becomes the code that
represents the party’s nationalist-religious characteristics as stated on its statutes. The party’s logo is
crafted on the jacket with the red and white three pointed star that symbolises the party’s religiosity
(see chapter five) and nationalist orientation (the red and white colours are associated with the
Indonesian national flag that connotes the nationalist spirit, especially during independence). The
flag is positioned as an entity that relates SBY’s medium shot picture on the first frame to
Herlambang’s image on the third frame. This is needed to bridge this spatial proximity so that the act
of image transference can be smoothly conducted. At the same time, this also defines Herlambang’s
“reception regime” (Hodge and Kress, 1988, p. 55) which connotes his heavy reliance on SBY’s
image. Thus, in order to dilute this reliance, Herlambang positions SBY’s image above the eye-level
of the spectators and positions his own close-up image at the eye-level in order to construct a visual
intimacy with them. However, as the intimacy is constructed by espousing SBY’s “authoritative”
image, this arguably dilutes the intimacy itself. He failed in his candidacy.
Norbaiti’s Billboard

Source: http://sangattaku.multiply.com/photos/album/3/caleg_in_action#photo=7

If we read Norbaiti’s billboard horizontally, we will find that her billboard has two main vertical
frames. The first frame represents the image of SBY and his wife along with the nominal groups of
democracy, religion, education, health and prosperity, whilst the second one is dominated by
Norbaiti’s close-up, smiling image. The red and white “curtain-like” prop behind her resonates with
Indonesian national flag. However, examining Norbaiti’s billboard leads us to prioritise the linguistic
aspects of her billboard as it appears as the most intriguing factor that leads to the obscurity of
Norbaiti’s slogan and the degree of her visual literacy. However, this does not mean that the visual
text does not speak a thousand words. Her close-up picture defines her ideological stance as her
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dress connotes her religious identity (Muslim)219. Also, the presence of SBY and his wife, Kristiani
Herrawati Yudhoyono, as the two party’s key figures, signifies her reliance on their popularity to
support her image-building.
As mentioned, the first frame depicts the image of SBY and his wife harvesting rice. Unlike
Herlambang’s billboard that uses SBY’s hand as the vector to captivate spectators’ attention, SBY
and Kristiani Yudhoyono’s image cannot be perceived as helping Norbaiti to build visual
interpersonal relation with the spectators, as their gaze is directed at the rice, instead of facing the
camera. Adityawan (2008, pp. 118, 209) found that not only does this harvesting image signifiy a
close resemblance with the similar image of Soeharto and his wife harvesting rice as the symbol of
Soeharto’s regime’s success, especially when Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) rewarded
Soeharto a gold medal for Indonesia’s success transforming its position from the biggest “rice
importer to self sufficiency”, but also indicates the same mode SBY and his wife use in perpetuating
Soeharto’s Javanese mode of branding as the father of developmentalism. He argues that in
reinforcing this image, one of the modes Soeharto deployed was through inculcating his feudal
Javanese image as gusti who appeared in all forms of his ministries’ campaigns delivering their
programs and achievements (including the image of Indonesia’s capacity to efface its status as the
biggest rice importer). This ubiquity connotes that this success cannot be realised without the
guidance of a leadership figure (Soeharto), who represents the code of Javanese power which lies
centrally in the hand of gusti. Adityawan (2008, pp. 209-300) further argues that the substitution
from Soeharto to SBY can be perceived as a “negative propaganda” that terminates Soeharto’s
feudal image as SBY’s soft image contradicts Soeharto’s authoritarianism. However, we cannot
completely perceive this paradigmatic alteration (from Soeharto to SBY) as a negative one as the
resemblance of their image construction also connotes the perpetuation of Javanese paternalistic
image construction. This substitution is highly important as in Javanese culture the role of gusti is to
protect and maintain the order (Adityawan, 2008, p. 114). Thus, perpetuating this paternalistic
image means preserving the image that SBY as Indonesia’s current President also brings prosperity
to the people. In this sense, by incorporating this image, Norbaiti visually demonstrates her
inclination towards the New Order’s Javanese conception of prosperity and welfare as the image
harvesting the rice represents Indonesian agrarian symbol of welfare (kesejahteraan) and prosperity
(kemakmuran). No visual/written signs are found on the billboard referring to Norbaiti’s conception
of democracy, religion, education and health situated below the image of SBY and Kristiani
Yudhoyono.
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Further discussion about Norbaiti’s hijab (or jilbab in Indonesian term) in contrast to the other form of this
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What is also interesting about SBY and his wife’s image is that they appear on the billboard of a
candidate representing the constituency in the Outer Island (East Kalimantan). Not only does this
indicate that the perpetuation of Javanese values have deeply penetrated and been internalised in
the non-Java region(s), but it also exemplifies the visual practice of inculcating this Javanese
paternalism. In this sense, Norbaiti not only functions as PD’s candidate, but she also represents the
one who arguably endorses the perpetuation of SBY’s image as a Javanese leader (gusti).
In order to dissect the role of Norbaiti’s presentation, we need to relate these to the slogan she
deploys which is situated on the top of her billboard. A vertical reading technique of the linguistic
text is needed. Norbaiti uses the party’s blue colour on her slogan “Bersama Kita Bisa Mari Kita
Wujudkan Organisasi yang Selama ini Tertunda” (Together We [can?] [Let Us] Realise the LongAwaited Organisation). As discussed, Dienaputra (2011, p. 183) notes that the party perceives this
colour as the representation of its core values (optimism, confidence and resoluteness). The
employment of this colour on Norbaiti’s billboard signifies a visual subservience to the party’s core
values and also her disposition in framing her slogan within these values. The English translation of
this slogan is slightly modified as the slogan itself contains an obscure idea of what Norbaiti attempts
to achieve. Norbaiti does not provide a main verb which follows the modal verb “bisa” (“can”)220,
which results in pausing the reading of her slogan. She then continues her slogan by simply adding
that her aim is to realise a long-awaited organisation. This nominal group (“the long awaited
organisation”) seems to have no linguistic or visual reference on the billboard. However, a close look
at the billboard reveals that Norbaiti most probably uses a faint symbolic correlation that
corresponds to her aim, i.e. the party’s logo (situated at the top right hand corner). This logo
provides us with a clue to decipher the meaning of the adjective “long-awaited”. As this adjective
modifies the organisation (PD?), we need to return to the moment when PD was established.
PD was established as SBY’s electoral vehicle as the result of his disappointment at his loss of his
nomination as a Vice President in the 2001 MPR Special Session (see chapter seven). Having realised
that he needed an electoral vehicle that could take him to the seat of Presidency, SBY waited
patiently whilst arranging a strategic political scheme, especially when he became Megawati’s
Minister for Political, Social and Security affairs. At this stage it is most probable that the adjective
“long-awaited” corresponds with SBY’s patience in attaining his political goal. Thus, by supporting
Norbaiti’s nomination, the voters also help SBY realise his goal, i.e. continuing his Presidential term
to 2014. However, this reading practice reveals an oddity of the slogan itself. The correlation of the
nominal group “the long-awaited organisation” with PD merely signifies an act of attaching the party
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with the quality behind the adjective phrase “long-awaited”. As the party has been established since
2001, Norbaiti’s invitation to the voters to (together) realise the organisation (PD) in 2009 sounds
“clumsy” (if not blundering). In other words, this also leads to the reading: supporting Norbaiti
means supporting her “clumsy conception”.
If we continue this vertical reading, we will find that Norbaiti’s accentuation of the elements her
organisation emphasises, i,e, democracy, religion221, education, health and prosperity. However, as
these elements are also situated at the bottom left hand corner next to her profile picture and
below SBY’s and Kristiani Yudhoyono’s image, the practice of horizontal reading shows that the
elements possibly indicate the fields she wishes to develop once she succeeds in her candidacy. The
elements’ position also shows that we cannot correlate them with the actions SBY and his wife show
on their image. Harvesting the rice connotes visual irrelevancy with democracy, religion, education,
health and prosperity. The only faint correlation between the action of harvesting and Norbaiti’s
fields is with the notion of prosperity. In other words, Norbaiti as the legislative candidate from East
Kalimantan province (she puts this statement of identification at the top of her own name) merely
presents linguistic clumsiness and visual irrelevancy that fatally led to her billboard’s discredibility.
Moreover, instead of asking the spectators to support her, Norbaiti delivers her gratitude (“terima
kasih anda telah bergabung bersama, Kaltim maju rakyatpun makmur” or “thank you for joining
[us?], Kaltim develops people prosper”) as the symbol of her recognition for the spectators’
participation in developing the East Kalimantan province.
The second frame features Norbaiti’s smiling image. Compared to the first frame, her smiling, closeup image successfully invites the spectators to gaze at her profile picture. Her red lips correspond
with the red colour of the national flag. However, we cannot perceive that her lips’ colour correlates
with the nationalist conception of bravery as represented by the red colour of the national flag as
her red-coloured lips simply represent a cosmetic application. No visual/written indication connotes
Norbaiti’s nationalist courage. In this sense, her red smiling lips on her close up picture cannot be
perceived as luring the spectators’ eyes as it merely signifies her attempt to visually establish an
intimacy with the spectators.
Below her smiling image is a rectangular box framing her full name along with her number on the
candidates’ list. Unlike Herlambang, she does not use this sub frame as the central point in her
image branding as she only uses it to capture and introduce her name. When Herlambang uses a
different colour to accentuate his position as PD’s candidate representing his constituency, Norbaiti
221

I need to change the translation of the word “religius” (literally means religious) with religion, as the word
“religious” does not belong to the group of nouns she uses.
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uses white capital letters embedded on her profile picture in order to identify herself as the
legislative candidate representing the East Kalimantan constituency. Her choice of colour contrasts
with the black colour of her Muslim dress. However, when these white letters meet Norbaiti’s white
shirt inside her blazer, some letters appear to be absent as the colour of her white shirt absorbs
them. This connotes the degree of her visual literacy. She failed in her candidacy.
Herlambang’s Image versus Norbaiti’s Image
If we compare Norbaiti’s and Herlambang’s billboards, we will find a slight difference in the similar
construction of these two PD’s legislative candidates’ images. Their billboards arguably affirm the
glorification of SBY as the paternalistic figure. However, behind this similarity we can find that this
difference lies in the way Herlambang accentuates SBY’s soft militaristic image, whereas Norbaiti
fetishes SBY’s image as a Javanese leader (gusti) in their publicity. What is also interesting to note
from this difference vis-a-vis the polarisation of Javanese/non Javanese dichotomies is that
representing an East Java constituency, Herlambang chooses not to deploy SBY’s image as the
Javanese leader (gusti), whilst Norbaiti deploys this notion to support her candidacy in the East
Kalimantan constituency. Not only does this visually aver the omnipresence of Javanese influence in
the Outer Island (East Kalimantan), but it also ostensibly demonstrates the un-necessity of iteratively
reinforcing SBY’s Javanese image in Java. However, if we relate this to Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi’s
finding (2012) that this ethnocentric element merely functions as a constant variable in influencing
the voters’ behaviours and preferences, we will find that the utilisation of SBY on Herlambang’s and
Norbaiti’s billboards indicates not completely a nugatory visual practice, but a visual “reference”
that indicates the similar “esprit de corps” of these candidates to PD’s patron.
At the same time if we relate SBY’s image on these billboards to the Islamic/Nationalist polarisation,
we will find that both Herlambang and Norbaiti are more inclined to present SBY as a nationalist
figure. Norbaiti then fills this empty side by donning jilbab. Herlambang chooses not to include any
Islamic element on his billboard. However, this cannot completely be seen as Herlambang’s way to
distance himself from PD’s religious identity.

PD’s branding is heavily laden with nationalist

characteristics with Islam as supporting characteristics (see chapter seven). In this sense, we cannot
fully perceive Herlambang’s image as a nationalist figure completely deviating from the party’s
ideology, as this ideology arguably inclines more to the nationalist side (see chapter seven).
Furthermore, the domination of PD’s official colours (dark and light blue, red and white) reinforces
the candidates’ nationalist construct (see chapter five).
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Partai Golkar (Golkar Party)

Source: author’s collection

Analysing Santoso’s billboard, we need to divide this billboard into three horizontal frames. The first
frame features the slogan of this Golkar’s candidate as the main represented participant. He uses
the relating verb “butuh” (need) to relate the participant “kami” (we) as the carrier of the attribute
“synergy” for the purpose of keeping the ummat222 (“untuk membangun ummat”) united (jangan
bercerai berai). Deploying the relational process in the slogan, Santoso relates the carrier “we” with
the attribute “synergy”, which results in the equation of we = synergy. This equation implies
Santoso’s invitation to the spectators for them to be willingly involved in the realisation of the goal
of uniting the Indonesian Islamic community under one group (the Santoso’s?). In this sense, due to
Santoso’s important role in ICMI223 (as one of its chaipersons), the noun “group” connotes his
attempt to hail the spectators to join his group. This hailing act, or in Althusserian term
“interpellation,” signifies both the act of addressing the spectators as part of the group (represented
by the pronoun “we”) and the act of forging collective allegiance to Santoso’s group. With this social
and cultural capital, Santoso invites the Indonesian Islamic community to join him as he represents
both Islamic (ICMI) and nationalist (Golkar) factions. Moreover, the deployment of the slogan in the
largest font compares with the other expression which occupies one third of the billboard and
indicates that Santoso relies heavily on written expression to transmit the message.
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The noun – ummat – denotes the Islamic comunity, in this case in Indonesia.
Kingsbury (2005, pp. 12, 80) and Crouch (2010, pp. 131-136, 178) note that ICMI was established in 1990 as
Soeharto’s think tank to face the growing influence of the Catholic General LB. Moerdani.
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This relational process is realised on the second frame by showing Santoso’s smiling close-up image.
The presence of Santoso, along with the four cartoon characters, can be perceived as connoting a
symbolic attributive process (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006, pp. 105-113). His preference for
deploying cartoon characters to describe the slogan instead of an authentic (non-cartoon character)
possibly attenuates its visual credibility, for the characters represent the neutral symbols of the
Islamic community as they merely possess a faint correlation with the ummat itself. However, this
faint correlation does not efface the status of the cartoon characters as the vectors that build
interpersonal connection between the spectators and the billboard. Santoso’s gaze reinforces such
attempts as his gaze and smile invite the spectators to project their understanding of the actions the
four cartoon characters conduct as his.
This projection is also realised by deploying the image of human hands arranging the puzzle as the
image background in order to signify that the effort to build synergy is controlled, so that
musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus) to unite the ummat (in order to reach
kerukunan or social harmony) are achieved within the framework of Golkar. This also suggests
Golkar’s nationalist notion of mufakat that reinforces the pattern of gusti-kawula in Pancasila.
Kingsbury (2005, p. 50) argues that mufakat is not synonymous with “the open airing of differences
of opinion”, but rather implies the subservience of social norms guided by gusti as the patron. In this
sense, in O’Sullivan’s, et al. (1994, pp. 124-125) terms, the functionalist notion as reflected in
Golkar’s name (Golongan Karya or Functional(ist) Group), operates by smoothing over conflict as
gusti functions to control the operation of the Pancasila-based democratic principles the party
upholds, i.e. musyawarah and mufakat, in order to maintain the party’s equilibrium, effectiveness
and efficiency of its constituent parts. This control is conducted by performing practical actions that
represent the party’s cohesion (equilibrium) as reflected on its logo (see chapters five and seven).
Golkar’s logo, the banyan tree and the adjoined rice and cotton, represent the Pancasila principles
of the unity of Indonesia and democracy through deliberation and consensus. At this stage, the logo
signifies the glorification of practicality as the modus operandi, which means the function of each
division in the party primarily operate to fulfil the party’s pragmatic goals.
Golkar’s position as the “catch-all” party (see chapter seven) opens the opportunity for its legislative
candidates to adopt any ideological values as long as it resonates with the party’s vision and mission.
As the representative of the “catch-all” party and one of ICMI chairpersons, Santoso’s billboard
deploys Islamic symbolic attributes in the form of the noun “ummat”, Islamic attire (baju koko and
peci), and his socio-political roles in Islamic society. As discussed, the deployment of the noun ummat - in his slogan accentuates Santoso’s political disposition towards Muslim voters. It is very
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important for Islam to build synergy within the nationalist framework of Golkar. This politicking is
reinforced by his close-up appearance in wearing the white baju koko (the Muslim male shirt which
is usually worn to go to the mosque) and a black peci (a male Muslim cap). Peci used to be perceived
as one of the pieces of attire for the Muslim man to wear whilst praying. It has now become one of
the pieces of national attire to be worn in state ceremonies, which, according to Ajidarma (2009),
reflects the wearer’s socio-moral status. Below his smiling image is Santoso’s identity labels which
indicate his social capital (the pioneer of TPA or the educational spot for children to study Al Qur’an;
the counsellor of BKPRMI or the Indonesian Mosque Youth Communication Board; Chairperson of
ICMI) in order ostensibly to convince the Islamic/ nationalist electorates to vote for him.
At the bottom right of the third frame, he invites the spectators to vote for him on election day for
he represents the one who cares for the mosque, the Muslim children, Pesantren (Islamic boarding
school) and struggles for the ummat aspiration. The invitation signifies taking the position of
developing Indonesian Islam. This politicking also demonstrates the obscurity of polarisation
between the nationalist and Islamic strands. Representing the nationalist party, Santoso cannot
dissociate himself from his Islamic credentials. Joining Golkar, a strong-institutional-nationalist party,
is arguably seen as a smart way to catch all Muslim voters (santri and abangan). With this social and
cultural capital to catch the santri voters, Santoso can easily captivate the abangan Muslim voters as
he represents the whole package of Islamic images with Golkar as his electoral machine.
Santoso also provides the ballot paper dummy and the tick sign on his number on the right bottom
hand corner of the third frame. The one eigth portion of the dummy in Santoso’s billboard indicates,
not the insignificance of the new system to be disseminated but moreover demonstrates his selfassurance in his electability for he was known as the most popular parliament member from 2004 to
2009. However, his billboard does not include any signs that indicate the written expression of
uniting the ummat. Santoso succeeded in his candidacy.
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Achmad Daeng GS’ Billboard

Source: author’s collection

Reading this visual domination brings us to concentrate not on the reading technique from left to
right, but on its horizontal frames. However, as the size of Daeng’s portrait occupies almost half of
the billboard, the analysis is firstly focused on the second frame depicting Daeng’s picture along with
his affiliated organisations’ logos and the party’s logo and later moves to the third frame featuring
his full name and constituency. I will analyse the first frame by concentrating on Daeng’s slogan
written at the top of the billboard using smaller letters compared to the other verbal text. However,
this does not mean that I will treat the analysis of each frame as discrete as the elements of these
frames are interrelated.
Looking at Daeng’s billboard, the spectators are engaged with his soft gaze and smile, as these
vectors are situated at eye level. Wearing a white shirt with a turban around his neck and a black
peci on his head, Daengs presents himself as a pious Muslim legislative candidate from Golkar. As
discussed, not only does peci represent the code of religiosity as well as nationalism, but also
connotes the socio-moral status of the candidate. Wearing these attributes (turban and peci), Daeng
reinforces his Islamic credentials as well as socio-moral status in his image construction. However,
this turban does not merely act as a code that represents the degree of Daeng’s piety although many
(Indonesian) Muslim clerics wear this clothing, especially during their missionary endeavours. His
deployment signifies the modus operandi Daeng uses to expose the degree of his piety. Moreover,
his wearing this turban around his neck can be perceived as not only adding the cosmetic (besides
peci) attribute for his Islamic branding, but also representing his act in cultivating his religious image,
as he deploys it along with the title (H.) or hajj in front of his name.
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Representing this code, Daeng’s pictorial act demonstrates a similar branding strategy to his fellow
Golkar’s candidate, Priyo Budi Santoso. However, unlike Santoso who reinforces his religious identity
with the support of his roles in ICMI, Daeng frames his religious image construction by using Golkar’s
wing organisations’ logos, i.e. Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong (MKGR), Angkatan Muda
Pembaharuan Indonesia (AMPI) or Indonesian Renewal Young Generation, and Pemuda Panca
Marga (PPM), situated above the rectangular box denoting his full name. Ryter (2001, pp. 143, 148)
found that these wing organisations not only represent the party’s activities in empowering its
young candidates224, but also their political practices demonstrate the internal political rivalry,
especially between AMPI and PPM with Golkar’s other affiliated organisation, Pemuda Pancasila
(the Youth of Pancasila) headed by Yapto Soerjosoemarno, Soeharto’s wife’s distant cousin and a
(former) hoodlum. AMPI and PPM were established to counterbalance Yapto’s influence in
dominating Indonesian gangsters (if not “underworld”). AMPI and PPM were linked and supported
respectively by Soeharto’s former loyalists, Abdul Gafur and Soeharto’s former son-in-law, Prabowo
Subianto. In this sense, Daeng’s deployment of the organisations’ symbols not only dilutes (if not
damages) his own religious image as the symbols contradict his religious pictorial act, but also leads
to the reading that choosing Daeng also means supporting these organisations. In short, as these
symbols represent Daeng’s social and cultural capital, their deployment on the billboard imperils his
nationalist religious image construction.
However, this does not stop Daeng from continually reinforcing his dual image. He continues this
visual politicking by positioning the party’s logo parallel to the image of his head covered with peci.
This parallelism arguably defines his attempt at positioning himself in ideological ambiguity, as this,
at the same time, connotes symbolic amalgamation of the Islamic and Nationalist strands into one
corporeal body. Unlike Priyo Budi Santoso, who accentuates his religious image as the core element
in his image branding, Daeng uses Golkar’s nationalist attributes, including its wing organisations, to
support his image-building. Not only does the employment of the party’s logo (banyan tree and the
adjoined rice and cotton image) as the background of his profile picture signify the reiteration of
utilising Golkar’s nationalist emblem, but that also demonstrates his actual orientation, albeit the
symbolic amalgamation. Thus, the plethora of Golkar’s nationalist visual signs on his billboard
224

Ryter (2001, pp. 126-127, 137-138) found that the meaning of “youth” (pemuda) had been exploited,
especially by Soeharto’s regime. The first significant deployment of this signifier was when it was deployed as a
code under a pledge known as Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge) that represented Indonesian’s nationalist
youth resistance against the colonial Dutch in 1928. Ryter further notes that this “revolutionary nationalism”
was then shifted in the late Soeharto’s era into a single loyalty to the government (read: Soeharto). This
shifting resulted not only in the removal of university students as well as teenagers from the “youth”
classification as Soeharto’s regime constrained them to be involved in political practices, but that, it also made
Soeharto’s former electoral machine (Golkar) full with “rather aged pemuda” (Ryter, 2001, p. 127), such as
Daeng.
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signifies that he uses the Islamic attributes as a mere cosmetic cover that beautifies his image
construction. The party’s colour (yellow) which dominates Daeng’s billboard reinforces such a
construction.
As noted, the third frame constitutes a rectangular box in which his full name is written and a
declarative statement of the regions (Surabaya and Sidoarjo) he represents which are positioned
below the box. Like Herlambang, Daeng puts this box right below his close-up picture. This
positioning signifies an act of underscoring his name as it becomes the cardinal point of his image
construction. At the same time, this frame also shows visual dependency on this verbal text in order
to illuminate his close-up image as without this text it is probable that the spectators would not
recognise him. However, this does not mean that effacing Daeng’s image and largely depending on
the verbal text successfully transmits the intended message of his billboard. In other words, this
dependency signifies the insufficiency of public recognition towards his achievements and/or
identity. The absence of the information whether he represents himself as the regional or national
legislative candidate aggravates this situation.
This visual aggravation continues as Daeng seems to attenuate his own slogan as it appears as an
insignficant element as the small font he uses in the first horizontal frame of his billboard suggests.
The black colour he uses to frame his slogan cannot be seen as reflecting his attempt at accentuating
his own slogan as he gives a derisory portion to the slogan. This arguably damages his image-building
as the slogan denotes not only Daeng’s political jargon, but also a short catchphrase that can make
people remember him easily. This slogan occupies less than one eighth of the billboard and contains
cliche-ridden political jargon (berkarya bagi bangsa, bersatu membangun negeri or work for the
nation, unite [Indonesian people] in order to build the country). Although Daeng uses action verbs to
illustrate his political aims in the slogan (“work” and “unite”), no visual/written signs support this
claim. In this sense, not only does this make his slogan empty rhetoric, but it also suggests that
deploying Daeng as the sole visual agent in delivering this slogan indicates his visual and linguistic
illiteracy as the deployment of symbolic attributive process at the visual level to demostrate the
material actions of the verbal text proves to be inoperable. He failed in his candidacy.
Santoso’s Image versus Daeng’s Image
The core element in the image construction of Santoso and Daeng lies in the way they present
themselves as Islamic figures. Santoso presents himself in an all-inclusive Islamic image package
within Golkar’s inclusive (functional(ist)) framework. On the other hand, Daeng constructs his image
within the contestation of nationalist (represented by the logos of Golkar’s wing
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organisations)/Islamic (represented by his Muslim apparel) strands. At this stage, Golkar’s
ambiguous/inclusive/functional(ist) framework is interpreted in a quite loose manner. However, we
cannot make a direct assumption that a complete accentuation of Islamic/nationalist elements on
the candidates’ billboards of the nationalist/Islamic parties at the visual practical level (as in the case
of Santoso), or in Schwedler’s term (2006) the consistency between the ideational and behavioural
actions, guarantee the candidates’ success with their candidacy. As Mietzner (2009a) and Mujani
and Liddle (2010) argue, the candidates’ prior achievement and performance become the core
influential factors (see chapter seven).
Unlike PD’s legislative candidate (Norbaiti) that perpetuate Golkar’s former patron’s (Soeharto)
image, Santoso’s and Daeng’s billboards visually affirm their (Golkar’s) detachment from Soeharto.
The absence of JK’s image as the party’s patron in 2009 on Santoso’s and Daeng’s billboards
reinforces this dissociation. In this light, when PD’s candidates position their patron as the
embodiment of the party’s ideology (see chapter seven), Santoso and Daeng frame Golkar’s
nationalist characteristics by iteratively deploying the logo of Golkar (Santoso) and the logos of
Golkar’s wings organisations (Daeng). The similar deployment of the party’s official colour reinforces
this nationalist image construction.
PDI-P
Djarot Saiful’s Billboard

Source: author’s collection

Seeing Djarot Saiful’s billboard at first glance, the spectators will be directly engaged with the way
Saiful gazes and smiles at the camera. These vectors become the elements that build the visual
“conviviality,” or in the Kress and van Leeuwen’s terms (1990, pp. 20-21; 2006, pp. 42-43), the
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interpersonal function of the text. This “conviviality” is reinforced by his philanthropic act of handing
a basket of star fruit to a peasant woman. This visual narration occupies the second horizontal frame
of Saiful’s billboard. The analysis will start from investigating this visual text then move to the first
and third frames denoting Saiful’s slogan and full name as the legislative candidate at the national
level. However, this procedure does not treat the visual and verbal elements of the first, second and
third frames as separate entities as they are interrelated. The left to right reading technique is
deployed in analysing the second frame.

Prior to reading the second frame, it is important to look at the different compositional colours
Saiful uses on his billboard. These colours are used in framing his philanthropic pictorial act on the
second frame that suggests colour resonation as well as a “blockade” of PDI-P’s official colour. Not
only does this also indicate a framing segregation of the main frame (the second frame) from the
first and third frames, but this framing dimension also attests that Saiful’s philanthropic act operates
within the PDI-P’s politics of colour. The party often uses the phrase “memerahkan” (make [the city
or other location] red) as all the party’s candidates and sympathisers use, without exception, redcolour clothes during the campaigns. This uniformity suggests that red is used as a code that signifies
not only a cultural construction in associating red with PDI-P but also the party’s demonstration of
power. In other words, this framing indicates that Saiful’s visual narration is controlled by PDI-P’s
secular nationalist framework as the party’s colour and logo suggest (see chapters five and seven).

Returning to the second frame that denotes the philanthropic act of this former mayor of Blitar, we
will find that Saiful’s image in presenting a basket of star fruit to an old peasant woman represents
his slogan: the leader’s task is to enrich the people, not to make them suffer. He smiles towards the
camera while handing the fruit to her. She stares at him smiling and accepting the gift. Not only does
this material process connote a transactional process between Saiful as the actor and the peasant
woman as the beneficiary of this act, but it also signifies the perpetuation of hierarchical power
relation between gusti-kawula in Pancasila discourse. Instead of showing the act of picking the fruit
together, Saiful’s act in handing the fruit as a gift connotes the Javanese priyayi paternalistic action
in which gusti helps to prosper kawula. This plausibly embodies Pancasila’s fourth democratic
principle (“popular sovereignty arrived at through deliberation and representation”). This can be
seen from this portrayal which occupies half of the billboard that accentuates Saiful’s actions as the
representation of PDI-P’s democratic ideals, which is in line with the party’s logo of the buffalo’s
head (the fourth principle of Pancasila). However, as this authentic portrayal also signifies that Saiful
is fully aware that presenting this pictorial act to spectators will not merely promote himself as the
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legislative candidate who is concerned with people’s prosperity, but also perpetuates his image as
the one who successfully developed the star fruit business for the local people of the middle-low
class in Blitar. This portrayal resonates with the party’s slogan – the grassroots’ party – for it
demonstrates the philanthropic act of helping the poor people which connotes Saiful’s real action to
visually materialise PDI-P’s platform, “prospering the people”. In this sense, not only does Saiful’s
pictorial act signify visual reinforcement of the vertical relation between gusti-kawula, in which
kawula perceives gusti as a transcendent symbolic figure, but it also demonstrates the way he, as
the party’s elite225, transcodes this hegemonic relation into visual language and exploits it for his
image construction. At the same time, we cannot completely perceive Saiful’s act as connoting
ideological exploitation at the visual level, as this can also be seen as signifying his act of
demonstrating his success as Blitar’s former mayor. Thus, this portrayal suggests that without having
to include verbal rhetoric indicating his promise to bring prosperity, Saiful freezes his success in
bringing prosperity to the people of Blitar in this visual scene.

This scene also demonstrates the perpetuation of PDI-P’s politics of colour as Saiful’s red and white
striped poloshirt rhymes with his nickname (Djarot), his number on the candidates’ list, slogan and
the first and third frames. In Indonesian nationalist discourse as represented in the national flag’s
colours, white is perceived as representing the purity and sacredness of the national struggle,
especially against colonialisers such as the Dutch, whilst red connotes the nation’s courage against
colonialism. In this sense, Saiful’s poloshirt connotes the incorporation of these nationalist symbols
into his corporeal body. Furthermore, if we relate the utilisation of white colour on his nickname,
candidacy number and slogan on the first frame, we will find that this colour application reflects
Saiful’s attempt in positioning his name, candidacy number and slogan as sacred entities. This
application is important, because if we compare this with the black colour Saiful uses for his full
name which also resonates with the black colour of the party’s logo and number, we will find an
obscure meaning discrepancy between white and black. Dienaputra (2011, p. 183) notes that PDI-P
perceives black as the colour that represents the party’s honesty and sincerity in struggling for
grassroots’ aspiration, whilst white is seen as connoting the purity of the party’s political conscience.
Not only does this indicate PDI-P’s attempt to attenuate the stark difference of this binary
opposition, but this attenuation also suggests the party’s obscure interpretation as the meaning of
honesty and sincerity heavily correlates with the meaning of purity. This politics of colour then
continues as Saiful uses yellow, which resembles the colour of the star fruit, to denote his candidacy
(written on the third frame). In this sense, Saiful equates his candidacy with prosperity (represented
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Saiful’s watch also distinguishes his status from the peasant woman.
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by the yellow star fruits), as choosing him means bringing similar benefits as those the Blitar people
had when he became their mayor. This politicking also connotes a visual transactional process of the
second and third frames.

What is also interesting to note on the third frame is the inclusion of the title hajj in Djarot Saiful’s
image that signifies his political disposition towards Islam. Although Saiful’s Islamic nuance does not
present as being as conspicuous as Santoso’s, Saiful’s title indicates his Muslim identity that joins the
so-called secular nationalist party. As a linguistic attribute, the title haji merely signifies the status of
Saiful’s Muslimness that faintly connotes the degree of his religiosity. As discussed in chapter seven,
the title “haji” in Indonesia is seen either as representing one’s socio-moral status or the degree of
piety. Thus, like any other candidates who attach this title in front of their names, the deployment of
this title on Saiful’s billboard connotes that he places himself in the midst of ideological ambiguity as
this religious code becomes a fundamental element to captivate the Muslim grassroots.

Like Santoso, Saiful does not include PDI-P’s key political figure on his billboard (Megawati
Soekarnoputri) for they are both aware of their popularity at the national level (for Santoso) or the
regional level (for Saiful). However, the absence of Megawati’s image on Saiful’s billboards does not
indicate the absence of Soekarno-ism as reflected in Megawati’s image (see chapter seven). This
shows that Saiful’s dependency on the patron’s image is not as heavy as Herlambang. As the former
successful mayor of Blitar, Saiful believes that his image which demonstrates his philanthropic
activities sufficiently represents the party’s platforms as a “wong cilik” or grassroots’ party.
Megawati’s presence on his billboard as if to supervise a philanthropic act is seen as unnecessary. In
other words, the second frame is seen as representational in framing the party’s platform –
prospering the people which relates to Soekarno’s Marhaenist concept (see chapter four). No
correlation can be made to suggest whether the absence of Megawati’s (and/or Soekarno’s) image
influenced the success of his candidacy. Saiful failed to enter Parliament.
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Suzie Effiendriaty and Luwih Sintoekwasito’s Billboard

Source: author’s collection

The spectators’ visual engangement on Suzie Effiendriaty and Luwih Sintoekwasito’s billboard is
arguably similar with Saiful’s as the gaze of Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito constitutes a “semiotic
code of picture” (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1990, p. 20) that captures the spectators’ attention. In
addition to their gaze, the red colour saturation on this billboard also contributes in building
interpersonal relationship between the spectators and this billboard. However, unlike Saiful’s
billboard that successfully represents a visual “conviviality” due to the visual authentic portrayal,
Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s billboard cannot arguably (if not completely) be perceived as
bringing this same atmosphere of “conviviality”. Their close-up portraits, which occupy three
quarters of the billboard, represent a symbolic attributive process, as their image signifies the
identity construction of these PDI-P’s legislative candidates. They become the carrier (the bearer) of
the party’s logo which connotes Soekarno’s Marhaenist conception. However, this symbolic
attributive relation dilutes itself as their slogan (Pastikan Kami Pilihan Anda..! Or Ensure [Yourself]
that We are Your Choice..!) merely shows an effete concept in supporting the patron’s socialist
conception as it simply represents a request to choose them.
However, if we conduct a close examination of this slogan which is framed at the top of the billboard
and occupies one fifth of the billboard (the first horizontal frame), we will find that the exclamation
mark in the slogan indicates not the urgency for the spectators to vote for Effiendriaty and
Sintoekwasito, but more a mild order for the spectators to assure themselves first before casting
votes for them. Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s billboard provides visually re-assuring devices in the
form of religious (Islamic) attributes indicating their Muslimness – headscarf (in this case kerudung),
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peci, baju koko, female Muslim tunic, and turban on the second horizontal frame. Smith-Hefner
(2007, pp. 390, 414) and Hamdani (2007, p. 8) asserts that kerudung represents a code of Islamic
piety for traditionalist Javanese women. They argue that this “loose-fitting headscarf” which allows
“the women’s neck and hair to be visible” has shifted into a new type of veiling like the one that is
worn by Norbaiti (see Norbaiti’s billboard). This veiling no longer completely holds the status of
representing the traditionalist Islamic attributes of Javanese women as it has developed into
connoting Islamic resurgence as well as the code of democratic reform (especially against Soeharto’s
authoritative regime that banned the use of veiling at schools and government offices) and later
shifted to commodification of this Islamic attire. As noted in chapter five, the early phase of
Soeharto’s tenure marked state repressive actions towards Islam as Soeharto perceived Islamic
practices as a political threat. This was due to Soeharto’s political disposition in forging close
affiliations with Christian and abangan bureaucrats (Hamdani, 2007, p. 1). However, as Smith-Hefner
(2007, p. 397) notes, the 1991 regulation (SK. 100/1991) issued by the Department of Education and
Culture regarding the official annulment of the veiling ban at school signified Soeharto’s changing
attitude towards Islam in 1990s in order to face his Christian political opponents. Smith-Hefner
further notes that hijab (or “jilbab”) played its significant political role in 1998 as it protected Muslim
(student) activists from the “threat of violence” during prodemocracy demonstrations against
Soeharto’s regime. Thus, at this stage not only does the wearing of kerudung by this female PDI-P’s
candidate reflect Effiendriaty’s Islamic democratic political stance, but it also becomes the signifier
of her act of distinguishing her religious nationalist notion (which is heavily influenced by her
Javanese cultural background) from other nationalist parties such as PD (represented by Norbaiti).
Compared to Norbaiti’s jilbab, Effiendriaty’s presentation of her neck and hair indicates a debatable
conventional view of aurat226 which reflects a range of different perspectives from “liberal,
moderate to conservative and radical” (Millalos, 2007, p. 297). Largely drawing his arguments from
Indonesian liberal Islamic proponents such as Ulil Absar Abdalla, Hamdani (2007, pp. 178-183)
argues that the orthodox Muslim definition of aurat vis-a-vis the donning of jilbab needs to be
recontextualised as this precept does not signify a “definitive, clear, and firm indication of the divine
ruling”. Hamdani found that the donning of jilbab merely perpetuates the adoption of Arabic culture
in Indonesia, as it represents the pre-Islamic practices that signified Prophet Muhammad’s political
efforts in eliminating social classes as the demonstration of wealth by Arabic female elites often
delivered by the exhibition of their finest jewellery on their bosom and clothes. In addition, Shibab
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Rinaldo (2008, p. 24) and Smith-Hefner (2007, p. 399) further assert that aurat is conventionaly defined as
female body parts (except for their face and hands) which are prohibitted to be shown publicly as they
potentially invite the male gaze.
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(as cited by Hamdani, 2007, p. 178) argues that no definite indications227 are found in the Qur’an and
Hadith (the sayings of Prophet Muhammad) regarding religious obligations to wear veils in the public
sphere. Notwithstanding this fact, the wearing of veils either a tight one as Norbaiti does or a loose
one as Effiendriaty does, is seen as a sign of liberating women from unequal social treatment as the
Arabic history in Prophet Muhammad’s era suggested. This also signifies the act of disciplining the
body as the manifestation of their religious profession. At the same time, as the veil also represents
an act of resistance towards Soeharto’s regime or in Smith-Hefner’s language (2007, p. 398) a
religious sign of “pro-democratic reform”, the deployment of this visual symbolic attribute
(kerudung) demonstrates the differentiation technique Effiendriaty employs to connote herself and
PDI-P‘s political stance in the Reform era. Furthermore, as kerudung also connotes the Indonesian
traditionalist attire (compared to Norbaiti’s modernist jilbab) that is usually worn by Javanese
Muslim women, Effiendriaty also exhibits her disposition in positioning herself in the politics of
veiling in Indonesia. Thus, if we compare the visuality of Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito (who wears
peci, baju koko, and turban), we will find that this visual juxtaposition between these female and
male PDI-P’s candidates shows that their Islamic attributes not only represent their Islamic religious
stance at the personal level but also indicates their technique of branding by using these attributes
to support the secular nationalist image of PDI-P.
The visual support operates as the Islamic attributes are also used on the third horizontal frame,
which contains Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s rectangular boxes denoting their names as the
legislative candidates at the regional level (for Effiendriaty) and at the national level (for
Sintoekwasito. The different colours (light blue and yellow) are applied respectively in contrasting
their candidacy (DPRD Jatim Dapil I for Effiendriaty) and (DPR RI Jatim Dapil I for Sintoekwasito). This
colour difference does not connote differentiation technique in their identity construction. However,
a faint difference is found as Sintoekwasito adds the statement of “alias H. L. Soepomo SW, SH.,
M.Si”. As the letter (H. or haji) in front of his name connotes the socio-moral status of this secular
party’s candidate, his wearing of baju koko, peci and turban (which is similar to branding design of
Santoso and Daeng) reinforces his religious image. This also connotes the degree of Islamic “piety”
(if not propriety) between Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito, as the Muslim attire Effiendriaty wears (in
contrast to Sintoekwasito) signifies a loose Islamic conception of her Muslimness. Like Daeng,
Sintoekwasito deploys these Islamic attributes to construct an ostensible Islamic image. They failed
in their candidacy.
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The indications are merely indeterminate (Hamdani, 2007, p. 178)
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Saiful’s Image versus Sintoekwasito’s and Effiendriaty’s Images
The stark difference between these three PDI-P’s candidates lies in the way they concoct the party’s
(secular) nationalist characteristics. They deploy different strategies in framing this nationalist
image. Presenting himself as the figure who upholds Pancasila’s notion of ekonomi kerakyatan,
Saiful presents himself as a Javanese condescending figure (gusti) who successfully brought
prosperity to Blitar’s people (kawula) during his tenure as Blitar’s mayor. He does not put too much
emphasis on religiosity on his billboard as the party he is representing is a secular one. However, the
act of showing one’s religious side/identity is still seen as imperative. Thus, by simply incorporating
the religious title “haji” before his name on the billboard, Saiful demonstrates his Muslimness.
Conversely, in order to fill in the religious “cavity” in PDI-P’s image, Sintoekwasito and Effiendriaty
choose to don Muslim attire. However, they forget to accentuate the “wong cilik” ideology as they
are busy constructing their Islamic image. This is reinforced by the fact that they merely deploy PDIP’s logo (buffalo) as a sole visual attribute to represent their position as the candidates of this “wong
cilik” party. Not only does this make their billboards represent more the Islamic side, but it also
indicates that Sintoekwasito and Effiendriaty’s disposition in seeing the Islamic attributes as a more
saleable element compared to the nationalist ones. In this sense, this ostensible contradiction on
Saiful’s and Sintoekwasito and Effriendriaty’s billboards attests to the ambiguity of PDI-P’s
ideological framework as a (secular) nationalist party.
However, if we relate this ambiguity with the absence of PDI-P’s central figure in the party’s
(Javanese) paternalistic discourse, we will find that fetishising Soekarno-ism is not demonstrated by
directly deploying Megawati’s and/or Soekarno’s images on their billboards. What they accentuate is
the glorification of Soekarno’s nationalist ideals in the form of material actions (Saiful) and the
(ineffective) use of PDI-P’s logo (Sintoekwasito and Effiendriaty). This is then reinforced by the
deployment of the party’s official colour which is perceived as connoting the nationalist notion of
bravery. In this sense, although Saiful, Sintoekwasito and Effiendriaty represent East Java
Contituencies, arguably, they do not completely allow themselves be co-opted in PDI-P’s Javanese
paternalistic notions.
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Gerindra
Haryo Seno’s Billboard

Source: http://www.pawargo.com/2009/03/parade-baliho-caleg-ponorogo-part-1.html

Looking at Seno’s billboard, the spectators’ attention will be directly engaged with the sharp gaze of
Haryo Seno. His gaze, which is positioned on the left hand side of the billboard, becomes the
element that catches the spectator’s eye along with the red colour saturation. These elements
become the factors that construct an interpersonal relation between spectators and Seno’s
billboard.
This billboard can be divided into two vertical frames. The first frame captures Seno’s image with his
slogan above his image and the party’s logo and number on the top left hand corner. Haryo Seno
was the legislative candidate from Gerindra representing Ngawi, Magetan, Ponorogo and Trenggalek
constituencies. He is depicted wearing a reddish-coloured shirt which resonates with the red colour
of the national flag. Not only does the red and white saturation on his billboard show that Seno is
circumscribed by the framework of the party’s official colours (see Gerindra’s logo), but also
represents his branding tactic in exploiting these colours in order to project the nationalist
associative notions of bravery and purity of the national flag to frame his own image. This is needed
to frame his slogan “Maju Membangun Bersama Rakyat” (“[Let Us] Move Forward to Build Together
[the country?]”).
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However, no visual authentic signs support this slogan except for the rising fist of Prabowo Subianto
(on the second frame), the key party’s figure and a retired military General, which faintly indicates
the nationalist spirit of building the country with Gerindra/Haryo Seno. He deploys the same slogan
as the party’s, “towards change for the betterment”, which indicates the absence of his “distinctive”
platform. He merely illuminates that such a change can be established within the framework of
Gerindra which employs Garuda, the national emblem to illuminate Pancasila. Gerindra uses the
upper part of the bird, the neck and the head, to ostensibly represent the holistic notion of
nationalist identity. The inviting word “let us” fails to arouse the spirit to build the country because
the invitation sounds plain with the absence of supporting visual signs. It appears parallel to
Prabowo’s image which indicates the existence of vertical communication of the party’s central
figure with the public. The message loses its meaning as the close-up shot of Seno occupies almost
half of the billboard to introduce Seno without attempting to disseminate his personal program
within the framework of the party’s platforms. The billboard merely introduces Seno as the
newcomer in the political arena.
As a newcomer, Seno correlates his image with the party’s patron, Prabowo Subianto. Prabowo’s
image appears in the right hand corner while Seno’s image lies under Prabowo’s but dominates the
billboard. Juxtaposing his image with Prabowo’s merely shows his lack of recognisibility as a
politician and indicates that Seno is trapped in the dominant (Javanese) paternalistic discourse (see
chapters six and seven). This paternalistic pattern is reinforced by way Seno positions the ballot
paper dummy with the tick on his number, not simply to remind the voters of the new election
system, but to illustrate the way he positions himself towards the party’s patron. This dummy’s
position (vertically below Prabowo’s image and horizontally next to Seno’s image) indicates its dual
functions. Firstly, it represents visual evidence of the voters’ support for Haryo Seno. Secondly, this
evidence vertically reinforces Prabowo’s role as Gerindra’s patron as well as the (indirect)
beneficiary of the voters’ actions as choosing Haryo Seno means expanding Gerindra’s (Prabowo’s)
power, which makes Seno, at this stage, a mere visual pawn. However, this power relation does not
connote an absolute visual subjection. We cannot simply perceive that Seno’s image under Prabowo
demonstrates a self-conscious-act of subordinating himself, as he realises that his lack of public
recognisibility can be boosted by attaching Prabowo’s image on his billboard. He uses only one eigth
of the billboard’s portion to present this regimist Islamic military figure (see chapter seven). By this,
although he visually positions himself lower than Prabowo, the domination of his close-up image
suggests that he positions Prabowo’s image as a mere supporting visual device to gain public
recognisibility. At the same time, this merely reinforces his visual reliance on Prabowo to accelerate
his nationalist image. He failed to enter the House of Representatitves in Senayan.
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Suhardi’s Billboard

source: http://iklanpolitik.wordpress.com/category/gerindra/

Seeing Suhardi’s billboard, the spectator’s attention will be firstly engaged with the presence of
Prabowo Subianto, which is situated on the left hand side. Unlike Seno who deploys Prabowo’s
image as an additional visual attribute, Suhardi uses Prabowo as an active participant who is
involved in the visual material action of shaking hands. This action denotes an interaction between
Suhardi as the main actor and Prabowo, who functions not as the beneficiary, but as the patient (in
Hallidayian term) or the one who is affected by this action. However, although having to function as
patient in Suhardi’s billboard visual grammar, Prabowo’s presence represents the one who visually
endorses Suhardi’s pictorial act – lifting his left hand to the spectators as if waving. This waving hand
can also be perceived as a sign of him returning the spectator’s call and smiles to them whilst
shaking hand with Prabowo. This interpellative act connotes the spectators’ symbolic
acknowldegement of his image construction with the use of a paddy field as the visual background.
The paddy field becomes an important marker of place as Prabowo is known as the chairperson of
HKTI (see chapter seven). This marker of place ostensibly resonates with Suhardi’s slogan written in
Javanese language “Dahar Telo, Ganyong, Garut, Kangge Sehat, Pinter lan Mandiri” or “Eat Cassava,
Yam, Taro will Make [You] Healthy, Smart and Independent”. However, as these type of root crops
do not correlate with paddy, the use of this authentic visual setting of place can be perceived as
irrelevant in supporting Suhardi’s slogan. This irrelevance arguably stems from Soeharto’s
“developmentalism” ideology (see Norbaiti’s billboard) that solely frames the word “tani” (in this
context “growers”) with the paddy field. This meaning condensation ostensibly indicates an
arbitrariness which causes visual irrelevancy on Suhardi’s visual text. However, this association no
longer connotes arbitrariness as its meaning directly refers to Soeharto’s ideological framework. In
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other words, this visual irrelevance reflects a motivated sign as part of Soeharto’s successfully
framing this notion of Javanese prosperity.
Nonetheless, this slogan connotes Suhardi’s political campaign of utilising cassava, yam and taro as
the mediums to penetrate the grassroots. Promoting these foods as alternative nutritious staple
food, besides rice, seems to be parallel with what Minarto in tabloid SinarTani228 website found that
the nutritional value of cassava is greater than rice. Thus, not only does the slogan signify the
paradigmatic replacement of rice, but also suggests that through this slogan Suhardi contests
Soeharto’s long-term inculcation of his agrarian ideology that rice is the main nutritious staple food
for Indonesian people (see Norbaiti’s billboard section). By this, Gerindra’s current chairperson’s
slogan connotes, not his support of the party’s eight progammatic socialist (read also: ekonomi
kerakyatan229) platforms (http://partaigerindra.or.id/8-program-aksi-partai-gerindra)230 as one of
these programs emphasises the opening of two hectares of agricultural land for the production of
rice, corn and soy, but, more importantly, his personal propaganda contesting Soeharto’s
homogeneous notion of prosperity with the ostensible help of Prabowo’s presence endorsing this
action. In short, the contradiction of Suhardi’s slogan with the party’s platforms means that the
authentic visual portrayals (which include a series of photos depicting his participation in
empowering the farmers situated on the third horizontal frame) on his billboard fail to support
Suhardi’s personal political aims. Thus, we cannot also perceive Suhardi’s shaking hands with
Prabowo as connoting political endorsement as his slogan contradicts Gerindra’s platforms. This
appears visually as Suhardi’s political hocus-pocus.
Another important aspect to note in his slogan is the deployment of Javanese language.
Representing the central Java V constituency means Suhardi deploys Javanese language instead of
Indonesian. Not only does this technique capture the addressees but that also connotes his
disposition in promoting the use of local language as his fundamental medium in propagating his
slogan in order to penetrate the grassroots. Drawing this as an indication of Suhardi’s ethnocentric
inclination would be a serious misreading as there is no indication on Suhardi’s billboard that
connotes the glorification of Javanese culture, except for his use of Javanese language in illustrating
his slogan.
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See the article entitled Kandungan Gizi Singkong bisa lebih Besar Dibandingkan Beras or the nutrition of
cassave may be greater than rice, retrieved from http://tabloidsinartani.com/kandungan-gizi-singkong-bisalebih-besar-dibandingkan-beras.html
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As arguably the embodiment of ekonomi kerakyatan (see chapters six and seven).
See Eight Program Aksi Partai Gerindra (Eight Action Programs of Gerindra). [n.d]. Retrieved from
http://partaigerindra.or.id/8-program-aksi-partai-gerindra
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Delivering this Javanese slogan, Suhardi wears not traditional Javanese costume but the party’s
official uniform, which visually distinguishes his appearance from Prabowo. Prabowo wears a white
shirt whereas Suhardi wears Gerindra’s uniform along with his name tag hanging loosely around his
neck. This different clothing arguably marks their hierarchical status, although the colour of their
shirts does not speak much about the power relation between Suhardi as Gerindra’s chairperson and
Prabowo as the party’s patron. The uniform Suhardi wears connotes his activism in the party whilst
Prabowo’s white shirt represents him as the party’s patron as he becomes the symbol of the party’s
struggle. Suhardi does not choose to present Prabowo’s image in his military uniform, as it will revive
the patron’s former image as a regimist (Islam) militaristic figure (see chapter seven) which
potentially harms the objective of Suhardi’s image construction.
This image construction is then reinforced with the slogan “Pemimpin Baru Haluan Baru” or “New
Leader New Course”, which is positioned on the top of the billboard. Relating the nominal group
“new leader” to Suhardi and Prabowo’s appearances cannot be read as an attempt to segregate
Suhardi from the patron’s image. This does not denote a reference of choice as Prabowo’s presence
is to support Suhardi. Thus, with the projection of Prabowo’s nationalist image, Suhardi transforms
himself as a new nationalist leader that can bring Boyolali, Surakarta, Klaten and Sukoharjo to a new
course, i.e. empowering these regions to be “independent” with the production of alternative staple
food (Cassava, Yam, and Taro). The inclusion of his academic titles (Prof. (Professor), Dr. (Doctor), Ir.
(Engineer), and M.Sc (Master of Science) connotes his attempt to convince the spectators of his
ability to realise what he promises on the billboard. This politicking failed to bring Suhardi into the
House of Representative in Senayan.
Seno’s Image versus Suhardi’s Image
The discernible similarities and differences between Seno’s and Suhardi’s billboards lie in the
deployment of the patron’s image and the utilisation of Gerindra’s official colour. They both deploy
Prabowo’s civilian image in a quite different way. Seno uses Prabowo as the figure that is positioned
parallel with his slogan invoking the nationalist spirit to build the country together. This is reinforced
by the dominant red colour to accentuate this nationalist notion. Moreover, to reinforce the party’s
nationalist notion, Seno uses Gerindra’s logo (Garuda) to cement this invocation. This needs
Prabowo’s civilian (read: resilient) image as Prabowo’s image as a (regimist) militaristic figure
potentially damages the invocation as well as Seno’s nationalist image building.
In alignment with Seno, Suhardi accentuates Prabowo’s image as HKTI’s chairperson to support his
ekonomi kerakyatan programs. However, as discussed earlier, his slogan which represents his target
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of the agrarian sector contradicts the party’s agrarian sector. In this sense, as Prabowo is arguably
perceived as the embodiment of the party’s ideology and possibly the one that determines and
endorses the party’s programs and actions, Prabowo’s presence potentially damages Suhardi’s
image. This is due to the contradictory agrarian sector Suhardi choses to emphasise. This also means
that the use of paddy field as the background on his billboard becomes a marker that reinforces the
contradiction. Instead, the field reinforces Prabowo’s image as HKTI’s chairperson. Moreover, the
absence of religious visual/verbal attributes on Seno’s and Suhardi’s billboards reinforces the party’s
nationalist/secular stance albeit Prabowo is seen as a regimist Islamic figure (see chapter seven).
Hanura

Source: author’s collection

Like Haryo Seno’s billboard, Dosy Iskandar Prasetyo’s billboard adopts a similar tactic in his politics of
image. From the left hand side on the first vertical frame of Prasetyo’s billboard, we can see the
smiling image of Wiranto, the retired General who was the former commander of the Armed Forces
in Soeharto’s era. The retired General’s smile is very important in his image for it is a strategy to
soften his stern military face, which would then dilute not only Wiranto’s military rigidity but also
the party which claimed to gain much support from the military camp. As discussed in chapter seven,
not only is Wiranto’s militaristic image built on the contestation of the nationalist “red and white”
versus the regimist Islamic “green” military factions (Wiranto versus Prabowo), but also behind his
stern military face, Wiranto also possessed Javanese political subtlety as he learnt to use this device
from his former patron, Soeharto, especially in arranging a political strategy to secure his position
after Soeharto’s resignation (see chapter seven). No visual sign is found to indicate Hanura’s patron’s
militaristic image, as the use of Islamic attribute, such as peci along with batik shirt, successfully
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dilutes his military rigidity at the visual level. As frequently noted, the use of peci signifies the
exploitation of this Islamic code that connotes the socio-moral status of the person who wears it.
However, when Soekarno (as cited by Adams, 2011, p. 61) declared that peci did not merely
represent one’s religiosity as it became one part of the national attire to differentiate Indonesian
people from the Dutch coloniser, Wiranto’s use of peci together with a batik231 shirt reinforces his
nationalist image instead of the religious one. However, this does not make peci lose its status as the
bearer of the Islamic code, as peci is employed along with the title hajj (H.) in front of Wiranto’s
name. Thus, by combining the nominal group “Jenderal TNI (Purn)” or Indonesia’s national Armed
Forces retired General before the title hajj, Prasetyo frames the party’s patron’s image by fusing the
nationalist and Islamic notions into one corporeal body.
Furthermore, the circular frame which delineates Wiranto’s image above the ballot paper dummy
indicates not Prasetyo’s attempt to control the patron’s image to prevent Wiranto’s visual
domination, but more importantly represents Prasetyo’s branding technique in equating Wiranto’s
image with the party’s logo. This parallelism is highly important as the voters need to remember that
choosing Hanura (Prasetyo) means supporting Wiranto. The party’s logo (an arrow)232 which signifies
the linear thinking structure is positioned next to Wiranto’s image. The logo appears to be flowing
and connotes the waving horizontal pattern to indicate the party’s target progress movement (see
chapter five). The light brown colour which resonates with the colour of the soil becomes the marker
of the party’s target (read: arrow, see chapter five). However, the real target is absent due to the
absence of the authentic visual setting of place on the billboard that resulted in the visual
discredibility to demonstrate his/the party’s “distinctive” platform: the economic reform and cheap
but good education.
However, although Hanura’s logo is present at three different spots (on the ballot paper dummy;
next to Wiranto’s circle frame; and on Prasetyo’s party uniform), it is the gaze and smile of Prasetyo
that engage the spectator’s attention and thus becomes the vector of his billboard. His smile is also
intended to rhyme with Wiranto’s smile. This smile which connotes friendliness ostensibly softens
the party’s strong-willed slogan (see chapters five and seven). Prasetyo’s close-up portrait
represents a symbolic attributive process in that Prasetyo becomes the carrier of the symbolic
attribute “Hanura’s nationalist image” resulting from the image projection of Wiranto’s image to the
party. The image of bright light surrounding Prasetyo’s body indicates a “halo” effect around his
231

The batik shirt represents the (nationalist) notion of Indonesia-ness as UNESCO acknowledges batik as the
world heritage cloth from Indonesia. The acknowledgement is off high importance to Indonesians as Malaysia,
the neigbouring country, often claims Indonesian traditional art as its own.
232
The party stated in KPU’s website that the party’s logo is the arrow shape which inscribed the name of
HANURA (see chapter five).
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corporeal body that plausibly connotes his attempt at creating a “transcendent” (if not sacred)
effect, as this appears along with party’s strong-willed slogan. Presenting this “transcendent” notion
is important to exhort spectators to perceive him as the figure that can embody the (party’s) divine
conscience (kesadaran illahiyah, see chapter seven).
This ostensible visual “divinity” needs the support of religious attribute, in this case in form of the
title hajj in front of Prasetyo’s name. However, this tactic seems to lose its strength as the absence
of Islamic attributes for Muslim males such as peci, baju koko and turban attenuates the
demonstration of Prasetyo’s religious (Islamic) nationalist identity. Like most candidates, the
rectangular name box below his name represents the accentuation of his billboard in demonstrating
the tactic of borrowing nationalist and/or religious images from Wiranto in order to construct his
identity as the legislative candidate at the national level representing Surabaya and Sidoarjo
constituency. Although he failed in his candidacy, he succeeded in becoming the Secretary General
of Hanura.
Agoes Suryadjaja’s Billboard

Source: author’s collection

Unlike Prasetyo, Agoes Suryadjaja does not rely on Wiranto’s image. The absence of Hanura’s
patron’s image marks this party candidate’s confidence of his recognisibility (if not yet popularity), as
he believes that the inclusion of his role as the 1998 solidarity activism is sufficient to make voters
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choose him. Suryadjaja’s reliance on this visual/cultural capital can be seen on the black frame (in
contrast to white background colour) situated on the bottom of his billboard underscoring his visual
appearance. However, no visual sign is found in supporting Suryadjaja’s claims as an activist. The
absence of the authentic visual setting of place dilutes Suryadjaja’s image construction as his
billboard merely represents the symbolic attributive process in which Suryadjaja becomes the main
participant (the carrier) that solely bears his claim.
What is also interesting to note on his billboard is the linguistic domination, especially on the first
vertical frame. This frame occupies almost three quarters of his billboard featuring the ballot paper
dummy which dominates this frame. Suryadjaja’s dummy functions not only as the visual attribute
that supports Suryadjaja’s image construction as the legislative candidate at the regional level, but
also as the visual accentuation. The dummy merely illustrates Suryadjaja’s candidacy number on the
candidate list. He uses the branding technique of using dots to metaphorically “disallow” the
existence of his fellow Hanura candidates as the presence of their names would damage his image
construction. However, a close look at this dummy reveals the difference between Suryadjaja’s
techniques in presenting his name with other candidates. When most candidates use a rectangular
name box as a frame to accentuate and underscore their image construction, Suryadjaja perceives
that the presence of his name on the ballot paper dummy sufficiently illustrates his profile.
However, he does not position his name as the linguistic element that underscores the image
package. Instead, as mentioned, he frames and underscores his image package as the social and
political activist using a black-coloured frame that trespasses the first and second horizontal frames
of his billboard.
Besides this dummy domination, Suryadjaja’s slogan “Agoes...Agoes...Agar Esok Lebih Baik” or
“Agoes...Agoes...in order to have better tomorrow” which trespasses the domain of the second
frame indicates a hailing act as the first two words “Agoes...Agoes” suggests a name-calling. This
represents the way Suryadjaja builds a linguistic interpersonal approach with spectators by
demonstrating his first name that arguably dilutes the formality of Indonesian cultural greeting
expressions such as “Bapak” (Mr.) or “Ibu” (Mrs.) preceding one’s name. However, this linguistic
dilution holds a temporary status as the second line (“Agar esok lebih baik” or “in order to have
better tomorrow) modifies Suryadjaja’s name calling. This line denotes that the deployment of his
first name (Agoes) is used as an abbreviation (Agar esok lebih baik) that linguistically defines the way
Suryadjaja constructs his identity. This technique demonstrates Suryadjaja’s attempt at “herding”
the spectator’s gaze by deploying visual and verbal equation of Suryadjaja’s visual image with the
verbal text of his slogan. This visual “herding” continues as the third line of this first horizontal frame
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signifies that after perceiving Suryadjaja’s image as the embodiment of future betterment (“in order
to have better future”), the eyes of the spectators are then escorted to the procedural rubric to vote
for him. The blue font colour in the rubric “ambil surat suara warna biru” (“take the blue ballot
paper”) indicates a mild order to the spectators to choose him by firstly taking the blue paper and
ticking his number on the ballot paper on the election day, as his dummy indicates.
Another important visual aspect on Suryadjaja’s billboard is his smiling, close-up picture. As
discussed, not only does his smile function as the visual vector that constructs visual “conviviality”,
but it also represents that the sole appearance of Suryadjaja as the main participant in the visual text
represents the utilisation of a symbolic attributive process at the visual level. This type of process
illustrates the objective of Suryadjaja’s branding. The use of the party’s light brown jacket along with
his tie resonates with the party’s official light brown colour which is perceived as representing the
party’s wisdom in order to realise the nation’s independence and prosperity.233 The white
background colour is perceived as representing Hanura’s sacredness of bearing the people’s
mandate. Thus, embodying these colours, Suryadjaja attempts to construct a nationalist image that
embodies the one who is willing to work for the nation’s future betterment.
At the same time, the colour deployment also suggests not merely that the party institutionally
constrains the meaning of its official colours, but it also shows us that Suryadjaja’s image-building is
operated within this framework. No religious signs are found in Suryadjaja’s billboard. He failed in
his candidacy.
Prasetyo’s Image versus Suryadjaja’s Image
The difference between the image building of Prasetyo and Suryadjaja lies in the deployment of
Wiranto’s image. Although Wiranto’s image does not dominate Prasetyo’s billboard, his reliance on
this patron’s image is arguably self-evident. This can be seen from the way he deploys Wiranto’s
civilian image as the marker to reinforce his nationalist image. At the same time, as Wiranto is seen
as the embodiment of Hanura’s ideology (see chapter seven), Prasetyo’s employment of the party’s
slogan on his billboard reinforces this reliance. By this, it can be argued that Prasetyo is completely
co-opted into Hanura’s nationalist (paternalistic) framework as he does not include any visual/verbal
complementary (if not prime) elements as his “signature”. He simply immerses himself in Wiranto’s
(Hanura’s) image as a retired Javanese military General. Wiranto’s donning of batik and peci along
with his smile and the title “haji” on his name arguably represents a visual act of attenuating his
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stern Military image. At the same time, this also arguably represents his resilient image as a good
Indonesian Muslim civilian.
In contrast with Prasetyo, as a former 1998 activist who fought against Soeharto’s government in the
May riot, Suryadjaja, a Sino-Indonesian legislative candidate, does not include Wiranto’s image on
his billboard as he is confident that he gains sufficient level of prominence as the 1998 activist.
However, this exclusion cannot be seen as solely signifying Suryadjaja’s personal confidence. As
Wiranto was known as the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces in 1998 who declared that the
Army would protect Soeharto’s family after the resignation, Suryadjaja’s act of becoming Hanura’s
legislative candidate can be seen as a way of showing to the public that Wiranto’s camp (versus
Prabowo’s, see chapter seven) was the right one. However, this act needs a further re-examination
as the possibility behind Suryadjaja’s candidacy could derive from the result of political lobbying.
Whatever the reasons behind this, his candidacy connotes the way he positions himself within the
party’s nationalist framework without necessarily co-opting into a complete glorification of Hanura’s
patron image at the visual level.
To sum up, the candidates from the nationalist faction position themselves in the ideological
ambiguity of Islamic/Nationalist and the imperceptible ethnic (Javanese) strands. A closer
examination of these billboards shows that the ideological contestation of Islamic/Nationalist
dichotomies (represented from the presence of the parties’ paternalistic figures on the candidates’
billboards) arguably derives from the perennial political intrigue between the nationalist parties’
central figures (SBY, Megawati, Wiranto and Prabowo), especially at the end of and during the post
Soeharto era. As discussed in chapter seven, Soeharto used his military confidants, Wiranto and
Prabowo, as his pawns in a dual strategy – Wiranto in the “red-and-white” (nationalist) military
camp and Prabowo in the green (Islamic regimist) military camp – to secure his power. Instead of
securing his position, this strategy brought about a rebound effect on Soeharto. Wiranto’s and
Prabowo’s thirst for power as well as their conflict of interest (see chapter seven) arguably
contributed to putting Soeharto’s position and power at stake. Soeharto’s resignation seemed to
aggravate the conflict as Wiranto succeeded in making Habibie (Soeharto’s successor) oust Prabowo
from his position. Wiranto’s failure in nominating himself as Megawati’s running mate before the
1999 election did not make him lose leverage on the military. Wiranto then succeeded in securing
his position as the Chief Commander of the Army in Gus Dur’s administration.234 During his time as
the Army Chief Commander in Gus Dur’s era, Wiranto ousted SBY and Agum Gumelar (the potential
candidates for his replacement) from the military, as he realised that his relationship with Gus Dur
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Megawati’s camp had to admit the Islamic camp’s (the Central Axis Group) manuever in making Gus Dur the
President after her camp refused to make a political compromise with the Islamic camp.
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had deteriorated (see chapter seven). Wiranto then utilised Golkar as his electoral vehicle in order to
win the Presidency in the 2004 elections. Two years after his loss in the 2004 Presidential election,
Wiranto established Hanura. As for Prabowo, his return from Jordan arguably marked his political
resilience. He then left Golkar in 2008 and joined Gerindra – the party that was constructed by his
brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo and Fadli Zon, his long-time ally – as Prabowo’s electoral vehicle.
As for SBY, he resigned from his post as the Minister of Political and Security Affair in Megawati’s
government in 2004 and decided to actively engage in PD (the party that was long prepared as his
electoral vehicle to win the Presidency (see chapter seven)).
As history taught them that the ideological/political contestation cannot be seen as simply reflecting
the segregation between good and evil. They all realise that presenting themselves as the
embodiment of the inclusive, democratic, nationalist and religious notions of Pancasila is not only
imperative but more importantly also saleable. They perceive that Pancasila’s notion of harmony
(equilibrium) achieved by upholding the mutual assistance/sharing burden (gotong royong),
deliberation (musyawarah) and consensus (mufakat) notions found its best “actualisation” in the
form of embracing both nationalist and Islamic strands (not necessarily to the same degree) within
the framework of (Javanese) paternalism. Within this, the system of representation in the nationalist
candidates’ image construction operates under this ideological subjection at the visual level. The
next chapter will examine the candidates’ billboards from the Islamic faction in order to see the
depiction of the candidates’ positions and dispositions at the visual level in Pancasila discourse.
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Chapter Ten
Reading the Candidates’ Billboards of the Islamic Parties
This chapter aims to explore the scope with which the candidates’ billboards from the Islamic faction
express their dispositions towards the polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/nonJavanese strands in the Indonesian political arena. This is conducted by reading the billboards’
narratives as signifying practices. The visual and written attributes the candidates use on their
billboards will textually demonstrate their dispositions in Pancasila discourse.
This chapter is divided into five main sections. The first four sections discuss the candidates’
billboards from PKS, PAN, PPP and PKB whilst the last section compares the reading practices of the
candidates’ billboards from the nationalist and Islamic factions. Each section comprises two subsections. I will conduct a reading comparison of the billboards of the same party at the end of every
sub section.
PKS
Hidayat Nur Wahid’s Billboard

Hidayat Nur Wahid’s Billboard

Gudang Garam International’s Billboard

Source: http://www.kaskus.us/showthread.php?t=3928768

This billboard can be divided into two vertical frames. The first one denotes the slogan “Rakyat
Punya Selara” (The People Got the Taste) with an imperceptible background image. The second one
denotes a clearer picture depicting several men in a rescue mission. In analysing this billboard, I will
firstly concentrate on the second frame as it gives us clearer information of the participants involved
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in this rescue action which takes place in a flooded area. This reading will reveal the associative
connection between the written slogan on the first frame with the rescue action on the second
frame which is interrelated with the dark blue frame at the bottom of this billboard.
This is the billboard that depicts Hidayat Nur Wahid’s (the former chairperson of People’s
Consultative Assembly in 2004-2009 and the legislative member from PKS) humanitarian activities.
As this billboard does not provide any information regarding Wahid’s status as the legislative
candidate, we cannot directly perceive it as Wahid’s medium to promote himself as the legislative
candidate. However, it appeared during the campaign period. Wahid’s billboard merely captures his
image from a slanting angle to show that it focuses more on presenting his seemingly altruistic
action in helping the flood victims rather than facing the camera. He is depicted wearing a white cap
that covers his facial expression. He is seen looking at a group of men helping the flood victims and
giving his thumb-up to them, while sitting on a rescue boat holding an oar. This action signifies
Wahid’s attempt to encourage the volunteers who were helping the flood victims. However, this
also affirms the hierarchichal power relation between him as the “gusti” and the group of men as
the kawula. These volunteer activities signify the nationalist spirit of gotong royong (mutual
assistance/sharing burden, see chapter six) of this Islamic party. Wahid’s presence seems more like
an inspection of PKS’ candidates’ voluntary works.
In order to reinforce this construction of nationalist identity, Wahid is depicted wearing a black and
white batik shirt and a life vest. With him are two male volunteers who wear long-sleeve black Tshirts, three male volunteers who wear short-sleeve black T-shirts, one male volunteer who wears a
white T-shirt, and one male volunteer who wears no T-shirt. As discussed earlier, batik represents a
nationalist notion of Indonesia-ness. Wearing this type of clothing means this prominent PKS’ figure
represents more his nationalist side than his Islamic side. Moreover, the black and white colours that
dominate their clothing cannot be perceived as merely connoting the contestation between good
versus evil (as in the case of PDI-P), as the party frames the meaning of white as reflecting the
party’s cleanliness and purity, whilst black is perceived as representing aspiration and certainty
(Dienaputra, 2011, p. 171). Thus, representing these two colours at the same time connotes the
party’s attempt to demonstrate visually that their humanitarian actions are based on the Islamic
legal maxim: amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (enjoining the good, preventing the evil, see chapter eight).
In this sense, the party offers a counter-narrative of not referring to the presence of black and white
as solely connoting a binary opposition between good versus evil, as it controls the meaning of these
official colours by relating them to a construction of the party’s nationalist (and/or Islamic) image.
The party wants the spectators to perceive that this is a “pure” humanitarian action which reflects
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the party’s “real” response to people’s suffering. This also represents the way the party materialises
the people’s aspirations, and thus, makes this billboard become visual evidence that will assure the
spectators of their amar ma’ruf nahi munkar platforms (see chapter eight).
However, a closer look at this image reveals that the male figures dominate the billboard. This
arguably reflects, as Rinaldo (2008) found, a labour division between PKS’ male and female
candidates, in which both parties agree235. Women are absent from this conspicuous voluntary visual
scene which occupies almost half of the billboard. One female figure appears solely and covertly as a
student wearing a white headscarf in the imperceptible background of the slogan (the first vertical
frame) which shows Wahid as gusti surrounded by kawula when visiting the location. Wahid’s
“philanthropic” action affirm the constructed segregation of the social, cultural and political roles of
males/females and gusti/kawula in Indonesian patriarchal society.
Nonetheless, if we compare the first and second frames, we will find that the plausibe focus of this
billboard is on the second frame. However, if we examine this one closely, we will find that the focus
mainly lies in fetishising Wahid as gusti, as the first and second frames are connected by the same
thematic action, i.e. reifying Wahid’s “philanthropic” action (which positions him as gusti) as the
political commodity. This commodity becomes the “business” visual sample that exemplifies the
party’s abilities in ostensibly bringing “beneficence” for the people. This sample is wrapped up by
the presence of Wahid inspecting the work of PKS’ cadres in this philanthropic action (the second
frame). This inspecting event continues with Wahid’s presence in a location, possibly nearby the
flooded area. He is depicted surounded by school students and most possibly the flood victims in the
first (imperceptible) frame. The imperceptibility of this frame does not connote the insignificance of
Wahid’s action although this frame is then covered by a slogan (“Rakyat Punya Selera” or “The
People Got the Taste”). Instead, this cover arguably makes the spectators see that Wahid’s action is
mere publicity gimmickry.
This construction is framed by imitating the cigarette’s ad “Gudang Garam International”, the
survivor version (see Gudang Garam International’s billboard). As mentioned, Wahid alters the
cigarette’s slogan “Pria Punya Selera” (The Man Got the Taste) into “Rakyat Punya Selera” (The
People Got the Taste). The product’s logo and name “Gudang Garam Internasional” is altered in the
logo and the name of the party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party). In the middle
of the first and second frames of Wahid’s billboard lies the party’s slogan: Clean, Caring,
Professional. This slogan is deployed to illuminate the qualities of PKS’ candidates. The typical
government’s warning attached at the bottom of the billboard for cigarette advertisements is
235

See the elaboration of this in the analysis of Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah’s billboard

210

altered into the people’s warning that choosing PKS will result in the prosperity of the people, the
progressive development of the country, the annihilation of corruption and increasing pride in the
nation and state. The word “warning” which connotes negative attributes is transformed into a
positive one as Wahid transforms it into the medium to propagate the party’s mission. However, the
mere direct correlation we can associate with the party’s platform, i.e. clean governance, is the
employment of the phrase “the annihilation of corruption” which does not match with the visual
signs the billboard provides. He succeeded in his candidacy.
Kharisma, Adik Al Fajar and Azizah’s Billboard

Source: http://yohanesss.multiply.com/photos/album/334/Aneka-baliho-caleg-di-Yogyakarta

This billboard features three PKS candidates at the same time. Starting from the left hand side, the
images of Kharisma, Adik Al Fajar and Azizah appear consecutively. Reading these three images
brings the spectator’s attention to focus on the spatial distance between these male and female
candidates. This distance signifies a visual gender segregation, which connotes the party’s
disposition which arguably derives from an adoption of Arab’s (Islamic) culture (Hamdani, 2007, p.
10). The white curtain inside mosques exemplifies this cultural adoption as in reality Indonesian
males and females are actively interacted without this “metaphorical” curtain. However, Rinaldo
(2008, pp. 28-29) found that PKS seems to inherently adopt this gender segregation which can be
seen from, for instance, the separation between males and females candidates during their rallies
and the prohibition of males and females shaking hands. By this, the spatial distance between Azizah
and Kharisma and Fajar reinforces this practice as their distance visually connotes the segregation. In
Hodge and Kress’ (1988, p. 55) language, this distance represents a “proxemic statement” in which
this visual proximity connotes a gender marker which defines not merely gender segregation and
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labour division but also the party’s “specific reception regime”. In this sense, this distance becomes a
metaphoric visual marker that segregates the roles of men and women in PKS’ Islamic discourse. In
contrast to Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s billboard where visual distance between these PDI-P’s
candidates does not exist albeit they appear wearing Islamic apparel, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah’s
visual distance is very important to be displayed as it represents the ideological bound of the
candidates within the party’s Islamic discourse.
Rinaldo (2008, p. 28) further reinforces the party’s gender segregation as male candidates control
“the intellectual and ideological work of the party”, whilst the social and cultural realms such as
family and education are handled by the women. This labour division arguably resonates with the
pattern Soeharto used in constructing the regime’s notion of femininity in which women play their
significant roles in supporting their husbands by joining Dharma Wanita (see chapters five and
seven), a wing organisation of KORPRI (Indonesia’s Civil Servants Corps). Their main duty was to help
propagate Golkar’s platforms through counselling programs regarding family and education. This
labour division cannot be seen as completely undermining the roles of women as if to trap them into
dealing exclusively with the subjects of domestic welfare. Through this means, women penetrate the
private sphere of their constituents, a propaganda strategy which forges a durable ideological
attachment, especially when it is conducted consistently and effectively. PKS’ women embrace this
pattern without resistance for, as Rinaldo (2008, p. 32) notes, PKS women believe that “men and
women have different main tasks, but that they ultimately are both judged and valued equally by
Allah”. In other words, the visual distance on the billboard does not completely subordinate
women’s labour (as the presence of Azizah appears parallel as Kharisma and Fajar), but it more
represents female Muslim self-conscious acceptance of this metaphorical distance, even though
men’s and women’s spheres, without exception, overlap. Rinaldo further asserts that not only does
the party’s division of labour resonate with Soeharto and derive from the fact that most of PKS’
female candidates were brought up during Soeharto’s era, but this division is also perceived as not
contradicting the (party’s) Islamic precepts.
Returning to the visual image of these three candidates, their outfit also marks the party’s
perspective on how PKS’ women frame their corporeal bodies in jilbab. In contrast to Kharisma and
Fajar’s images which feature them wearing the party’s uniform, Azizah’s image does not seem to
enjoy similar outfit as PKS’ men. PKS’ women wear a modest, white jilbab to connote not only their
obedience towards this (debatable) religious obligation, but this obedience also demonstrates a
collective moral precept in disciplining their bodies. The party’s modest style of jilbab with a simple
white colour (compared to Norbaiti) distinguishes Azizah (also read: PKS’ women) from other veiled
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Muslim women. Rinaldo (2008) found that not only does this element mark a class distinction, but
this distinction also represents “a collective pious identity” as all female PKS’ candidates perceive the
donning of jilbab as connoting their fulfilment of this “religious obligation”. Moreover, Rinaldo
(2008, p. 29) also found that this donning act also represents their resistance towards Soeharto’s
“gender ideology” that restricted them in disciplining their bodies as Soeharto perceived this as part
of political Islamic practices.
Besides the resistance in the politics of women’s clothing, the politics of colours becomes an
important visual element that needs to be analysed. The first horizontal frame uses the violet colour
which frames the name of the city as their constituency. The second frame uses red and white
colours which resonate with the colours of the national flag (situated above these candidates’
images), golden yellow colour that dominates the billboard and the black and white colours of
Kharisma and Fajar’s clothes. The black-coloured frame illustrates Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah’s
candidacy as the legislative candidates at the regional level (Yogyakarta). I begin the visual analysis
by firstly focusing on the dominant colour of golden yellow, black and white colours of the
candidates’ uniform and the red and white colours on the second frame and later move to the third
and first frames. As the dominant colour, the colour of golden yellow functions as one of the vectors
(besides the way Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah gaze and smile) that establishes interpersonal relation
between the spectator and the candidates. This interpersonal relation is built through projecting the
notion of prosperity as the golden yellow colour suggests (see chapter five). This indicates the
candidates’ reliance on how this colour transfers the notion of prosperity as the image of golden
yellow paddy also appears on the background to reinforce this notion. By this, instead of
accentuating the notion of sacredness through the use of white colour, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah
accentuate the nationalist notion of prosperity (see chapter five) in their image. However, this does
not mean that they dilute the party’s notion of sacredness as white appears on their uniforms236.
Covering their bodies with white connotes the act of concealing their identity with
purity/sacredness. This purity then visually “converses” with the colour of white of the national flag.
This visual “conversation” indicates the creation of colour equation (also relation) in which the
notion of purity/sacredness of this Islamic party operates in the same way as the nationalist ones.
However, if we look at the use of red and white colours from a “high” angle, we will find that these
colours constitute the nationalist code that attaches to Fajar’s vest. In short, instead of using peci,
baju koko, and turban to reinforce their Islamic identity, Kharisma and Fajar deploy the party’s logo
to speak for their religious identity and use the symbol of the national flag on their vest or jacket to
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indicate their nationalism. Thus, at this stage, without having to exploit the use of clothing and
nationalist symbols, these candidates construct their religious identity with a nationalist nuance.
Besides the colours of golden yellow and white, black emerges as the second dominating colour of
Kharisma and Fajar’s uniform. In contrast to PDI-P in perceiving black as the symbol of sacredness,
PKS regards this colour as representing certainty and aspiration, as earlier mentioned. This different
interpretation reflects not simply the ideological difference between these nationalist and Islamic
parties, but connotes more how they control the ostensible “arbitrariness” of their official colours,
such as black. As noted, black dominates the third frame which illustrates Kharisma, Fajar and
Azizah’s candidacy, the area they come from (Danurejan), and the party’s logo at the bottom left
hand corner of this frame. In illustrating their candidacy, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah use white to
connote the sacredness of their roles (as the legislative candidates) and the party’s number at the
bottom left hand corner and black (which connotes certainty and aspiration) to frame this
sacredness. The golden yellow is also used to indicate the prosperity of the area they come from. A
close examination of these colours’ saturation reveals that they represent the projection of the
party’s logo which frames the way Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah construct and promote their identity
through their billboard as a “mobile” advertising medium (Gudis, 2004). As for the colour of violet
which appears on the first frame, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah simply use violet as the background
colour saturating the frame which denotes the name of the province (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta).
Furthermore, no written slogan is found except for the party’s slogan “bersih, peduli dan
profesional” or “clean, caring, and professional”. This indicates the candidates’ reliance on this
slogan to project the party’s constructed qualities to them. At the same time, this absence also
suggests their campaign programs’ obscurity, as they simply show their close-up pictures which
indicate a construction of intimacy (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1990, 2006) represented through a
symbolic attributive process. Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah become the carriers of the party’s slogan
and active participants in the party’s Islamic discourse. This politicking failed to bring them into the
regional House of Representative.
Wahid’s Image versus Kharisma’s, Fajar’s and Azizah’s Images
The dominant elements that distinguish the image of these three PKS’ candidates are gender, colour,
and clothes. From the element of gender, these two billboards demonstrate the act of segregating
PKS’ males and females. This can be seen from the degree of visual proximity between Kharisma,
Fajar and Azizah and the obscure appearance of a female school student on Wahid’s billboard. Not
only do these indicate a visual marginalisation of these female characters, but also the visual
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proportion given to the male characters to be overtly and actively engaged in PKS’ amar ma’ruf nahi
munkar discourse (see Wahid’s billboard). The appearance of Azizah in the same frame as Kharisma
and Fajar, which plausibly negates this marginalisation as it connotes the act of equalising men and
women, can be perceived almost in a similar way as the appearance of the female student. The
student appears as the sole female character in the first frame, as when she appears in the second
frame, she arguably disturbs the philanthropic act of PKS’ male cadres (see Wahid’s billboard). In this
sense, the significance of her position and role at the visual level are defined by her function as a
supporting participant who seemingly receives Wahid’s help in the first frame. In a similar light,
Azizah’s spatial distance also indicates a similarly marginal position. However, for Azizah, her
marginal position seems to be an indefinite one as she appears in parallel with the male candidates,
Kharisma and Fajar. In this sense, the visual marginalisation of PKS’ female characters on these two
billboards is an indeterminate one as an equal right is given to PKS’ women (such as Azizah) to
nominate themselves. At the same time, as earlier discussed, Azizah’s spatial distance also connotes
the party’s construction of femininity which segregates the tasks and obligations of males and
females (see Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah’s billboard).
From the perspective of colours, the stark difference between their billboards lies in the different
dominant colours they use. As noted, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah deploy PKS’ official colours to
indicate that they are nationalist Muslim candidates, whilst Wahid uses a blood-red colour to signify
his nationalist stance. This difference connotes the loose manner in deploying the compositional
element of colour as Wahid’s billboard cannot be perceived as completely complying with the
party’s colours code. However, although Wahid’s blood-red colour does not fully align with the
nationalist notion of bravery (as represented by Indonesia’s national flag), Wahid’s billboard
arguably connotes similar notion of “bravery” as his billboard imitates the cigarette ad (Gudang
Garam) that signifies masculinity. Thus, arguably, within this framework, it is not surprising to find
that Wahid gives a minor portion to the female student on his billboard. At the same time, this also
demonstrates that Wahid chooses not to completely deploy the party’s colours (like in the case of
Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah) as imitating the ad means adopting the popular publicity campaign that
its spectators are conversant with. Not only does this arguably minimise the “distance” between him
as a candidate and the spectators/voters, but it also traps him in the similar masculinity discourse of
the ad.
Returning to the third dominant element, i.e. PKS’ candidates clothes, we will find that their
similar/different attire position them as both Islamic and nationalist figures. As mentioned earlier,
Kharisma and Fajar wear PKS’ official vest and jacket whilst Azizah wears a modest white jilbab in
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order to connote their nationalist and Islamic stances. Wahid deploys a different strategy to
reinforce this dual image. He wears batik, cap, life jacket, and peci (on the first frame), abstenting
the presence of PKS’ official clothes’ atrributes. In this sense, compared to colours, clothes become
the marker that arguably attenuates the rigidity of the party’s ideological attributes.
PAN
Ahmad Firdaus’ Billboard

source: http://www.kaskus.us/showthread.php?t=3928768

This billboard can be divided into two vertical frames. The first one features a close-up image of
Ahmad Firdaus holding a gun, whilst the second one features a series of pictures capturing PAN’s
former chairperson (Soetrisno Bachir) and his political activities. However, as Bachir’s pictures are
presented in a series of small vertical pictures, we cannot clearly see who is represented in this
series except for the first picture featuring Bachir’s close-up image. The verbal text (Fans 7) above
these pictures indicates the way Firdaus perceives and positions them vis-a-vis his own image on his
billboard. Prior to analysing this further, we need to return to Firdaus’ image as he emerges as the
first represented participant on the left hand side of the billboard. Dissecting his image will later
demystify the connection between the first and second frames. The way he gazes and poses holding
his gun become the vectors that engage the spectator’s attention to his billboard.
Ahmad Firdaus was the former provincial legislative member of Banten (1999-2003). He was also
known as a former TKI, an Indonesian migrant worker in Saudi Arabia. He worked in data entry in a
hospital, then moved to the pharmacy division, and later worked in a printing company. Dissatified
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with his income, he joined an NGO called Fostaki (a forum for TKI) which later brought him in as the
chairperson of PAN in Banten237. He transforms himself into James Bond (by wearing a black tuxedo
and holding a gun) who declares war on corruption, stupidity and poverty (the use of pistol signifies
this attempt). The association is merely made due to Firdaus’ number on the ballot paper (no. 7)
which resonates with 007. His interest in how CIA and MI6 (CIA’s counterpart in Britain) allegedly
intervened in the debatable G30S PKI/Communist incident238 inspires him to “become” the British
secret agent, James Bond, in order to achieve his political goal as the legislative member who wants
to eradicate corruption, stupidity and poverty.
However, Bond is never created to eradicate those three things. Thomas (2009, pp. 32-39) argues
that the story-lines of James Bond’s films represent “a distorted circus-like” reflection that narrates
historical changes of the world order from the “internationalist [the old Bond films] to globalist [the
1990s and 2000s Bond films] paradigm”. Thomas found that the shifting of this paradigm is in line
with the contemporary perspective of the so-called “political correctness” in which the political
agencies such as UN, IMF, and even CIA and MI6 are possibly (if not allegedly) in complicity with
global capitalist crimes, such as inciting coup d’états in so-called third world countries. Relating this
phenomenon with what Firdaus wrote in his blog about the possibility of CIA intervention in toppling
Soekarno’s administration through the 1965 G30S PKI incident, leads us to see that Firdaus’
transformation as a British secret agent arguably indicates a bizarre contradictory action. However,
what Firdaus wants to emphasise is not in the way he lets himself be co-opted into this
contradiction. He seems to see himself as a contemporary Bond that will retaliate against these
“crimes” by adopting Bond’s “maverick exceptional qualities, such as “legal standards, democratic
decision-making and transparency to the public” (Thomas, 2009, pp. 32, 39). These qualities distance
Bond from the ambiguous stance of those agencies (read: Bond’s employers) as they are often
perceived as representatives of the world order. At the same time, these agencies cannot escape
from their political interests which often trap them in the complicity of, for instance, the
aforementioned coup d’états.
Returning to Firdaus’ adoption of Bond’s qualities, this adoption is arguably an absurd one, as the
visual transference of these qualities cannot be simply conducted by wearing Bond’s tuxedo. The
absurdity continues as what seems to be the basis of Firdaus’ visual transformation is not only on his
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See Firdaus Mantan TKI Jadi Ketua Fraksi PAN DPRD Banten. (2011, January 1). Retrieved from
http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/3731-firdaus-mantan-tki-jadi-ketua-fraksi-pan-dprdbanten.html.
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See Firdaus, A. (2006, January 8). Ketika Dunia Pers Ditunggangi CIA [When CIA Utilised Press]. Retrieved
from http://indonesia-berjuang.blogspot.com/2006/01/ahmad-firdaus-ketika-dunia-pers.html
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fondness for this Western (imperialist?) hero’s characteristics, but also his abomination for the
agency Bond represents (MI6).
What is also interesting is to note from this visuality is that it demonstrates the ways in which
Firdaus resists and translates Bond’s films as the so-called global product penetrated Indonesia.
These responses reflect, as Chapman (2001, p. 14) and Thomas (2009, p. 34) argue, the success of
Bond films that have been watched “for half a century” by “at least half of the world’s population”.
By this, it can be argued that seeing Firdaus’ billboard means seeing the mechanism of how this
Islamic inclusive party’s legislative candidate interprets and positions himself in the so-called
globalised phenomena of James Bond.
Besides James Bond, he also attaches a small image of Afatar239(sic) and puts it between PAN’s logo
and his own trademark (Firdaus 007 Bond). Incorporating this Nickelodeon cartoon character’s
image, Firdaus attempts to reinforce his heroic quality as Avatar is seen as the representation of the
Last Airbender who has to learn to master three other different elements (water, fire, and earth),
besides the element of his tribe (air), in order to preserve the world’s equilibrium. This visual
reinforcement cannot be perceived as having overt correlation with the image construction of the
Islamic inclusive party240 he represents and James Bond. Firdaus simply deploys this Avatar’s image
to reinforce his image construction as the candidate who has the heroic (cartoon) abilities to
eradicate corruption, stupidity and poverty as his verbal slogan suggets (“Korupsi..?, Kebodohan...?,
Kemiskinan...?, Perang...!!!!” or “Corruption...?, Stupidity...?, Poverty...? War...!!!!”). Lasswell (2005)
contends that Avatar represents the synthesis of Asian influences such as Japanese anime, Chinese
Kung Fu, Korea, Indian Yoga. This makes its deployment on Firdaus’ billboard arguably contradict the
Western (imperialist?) character Firdaus adopts when he presents himself as James Bond.
Firdaus then continues masking his identity by concocting an Islamic touch to his image. As an
Islamic theology graduate, he includes one of Al Qur’an verses, Al Kahfi 107, under his name as his
attempt to indirectly describe himself. He capitalised the words “sesungguhnya” or the truth,
“beriman” and “beramal sholeh” or “faithful, pious and do good works according to Islamic values”
and “Firdaus” (his name which means heaven). Relating those words implies that Firdaus attempts
to define himself as the person who has those qualities written in the holy Quran. Associating
himself with James Bond, Avatar, and the Qur’an verses not only affirms his obscure, yet fluid
identity, as the legislative candidate who represents himself as the (British) Pious Muslim secret
agent, but also demonstrates that pastiche is Firdaus’ tactic which unfortunately dilutes the visual
239
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The Legend of Aang the Last Airbender, a Nickelodeon’s cartoon series.
See chapter eight for the elaboration
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credibility of his image as a PAN candidate. He is trapped within the spiritual and heroic codes within
the billboard “supernatural” lighting.
Returning to the second frame that captures a series of Soetrisno Bachir’s images and his political
activities and a label (Fans 7) attached above Bachir’s series of images, this frame demonstrates how
Firdaus positions himself in the hierarchichal power relation between him as the party’s candidate
and Bachir as the party’s (former) chairperson. The “Fans 7” label indicates that Firdaus perceives
the presence of Bachir’s images functions as the visual evidence of the party’s support (Bachir as his
fan) by way of not showing his subordinate position241 vis-a-vis PAN’s former chairperson, which
indicates his challenge towards the concept of gusti-kawula. By this, he believes that he has
sufficient social capital as he was the former provincial legislative member of Banten, and thus, the
presence of Bachir’s image merely complements his heroic image. However, this visual
complementary seems to lose its status as Firdaus positions Bachir’s series of image vertically. This
vertical axis, as argues Kress and van Leeuwen (2006, p. 140), connotes “an insurmountable
determinism” which visually defines the power relation between Firdaus and Bachir. In this sense,
presenting Bachir’s images vertically indicates that Firdaus is caught in his own attempt to present
an equal relation as in reality his position as PAN’s functionary was under Bachir’s chairmanship.
Firdaus failed in his candidacy.
Charles Honoris’ Billboard

Source: author’s collection

Reading Honoris’ billboard attracts our attention to engage in the way Honoris sees us – the
spectators. The way he smiles and the phosphorescent light as if appearing from his back make our
eyes first meet with his close-up picture. The use of black as the background colour seems to be
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That he is reliant on Bachir’s image.
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chosen not to completely undermine the compositional value as the phosphorescent light seems to
be centrally projected onto his image. This makes our vision focuses on this visuality.
Reading Honoris’ image, we need to focus on his close-up image although the reading technique
from left to right makes our eyes firstly encounter the national flag as the billboard’s background.
Honoris is known as a Sino-Indonesian legislative candidate from an inclusive Islamic party, PAN. His
active role in this party becomes the proof of the party’s inclusivity. As the representative of PAN,
Honoris wears a dark blue shirt which resonates with the party’s official colour. Dienaputra (2011, p.
183) notes that this party’s official colour is associated with the dark blue sea and sky which connote
freedom and democracy. Thus, by wearing this official coloured shirt, Honoris represents himself as
the carrier of the attributes of freedom and democracy. This also connotes his main role in the
symbolic attributive process of his billboard’s visual grammar.
Another interesting element of this billboard is the phosphorescent light which results from the
electric light projected onto the upper part of Honoris’ body. This arguably creates a “halo” effect
around this corporeal body. As this halo is usually used in sacred drawings to accentuate the
sublimity of transcendental figures, this light on Honoris’ body is arguably intended to produce a
similar effect. Similar to Prasetyo, this projection onto Honoris’ corporeal body signifies his attempt
to make him into God’s representative in disseminating freedom and democracy. In this sense,
Honoris synthesises the Western (Christian) notion of transcendence in framing the (Islamic)
inclusive party’s notion of freedom and democracy. The way to materialise these can be seen from
his actions, especially during the campaign when he conducted an essay-writing competition in
order to catch people’s attention and meet their aspirations. One of the winners in this competition,
M. Subchan Sholeh242, suggested Honoris implement the Grameen model243 in order to empower the
grassroots. What is interesting from Honoris’ action is not whether he is willing to strive for this
model244 to be passed into law if he succeeds in his candidacy, but on the way he catches people’s
aspiration, which reflects the democratic notion.
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See Subchan, M. (2009, May 23). Surat untuk Wakil Rakyat [Letters to Legislative Members]. Retrieved from
http://ayahaan.wordpress.com/2009/05/23/surat-untuk-wakil-rakyat/#more-423
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This model is adopted from Grameen bank system developed by Muhammad Yunus, the winner of the
Nobel prize in 2006 from Bangladesh. Yunus empowered the Bangladesh’s grassroots not through training, but
lending the women soft loans without collateral as (Bangladesh) women were perceived as more adaptive
than men in restoring the family’s financial condition. He perceived that giving them “the fishing rod” without
the bait would be a useless attempt. The western perspective in seeing the root of poverity derived from the
people’s lack of skills and education was challenged, as when the fresh money was given, they would think of
ways to pay off their debts, so that they could borrow some more money.
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Abu Rizal Bakrie, the current chairperson of Golkar, adopts this model as part of his long-term political
campaigns before the 2014 Presidential election (see chapter seven).
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Moving to Honoris’ written slogan “Ijinkan Saya Mewakili Anda” or “Allow Me to Represent You”
situated right under his image, this slogan does not reflect his platform, as it appears as a polite
persuasive statement. Presenting this request along with his portrait, Honoris seems to forget that
this politicking needs visual supporting evidence to convince the spectator prior to making their
decision. Instead of presenting this, Honoris uses the national flag to reinforce his nationalist stance.
However, this attempt seems to visually dilute itself as the black-coloured background absorbs the
red and white colours of the flag. The white font used in his number (eight) with a red tick
penetrating the number cannot substitute for the fading colours of red and white of the flag.
However, we can read this as connoting Honoris’ attempt at representing that the white font of his
name and his candidacy number somewhat represents the purity of his effort in becoming a
democratic legislative member, whilst the red tick sign faintly connotes the bravery of the voters to
transfer their aspirations to him.
Examining Honoris’ use of font, we also need to compare the font size Honoris uses for his slogan
and name. He uses smaller font in denoting his role as the legislative candidate at the national level
representing East Java province I (Surabaya and Sidoarjo) from PAN (the party’s logo is situated at
the bottom right hand corner) than his name and slogan. This indicates that he wants the spectator
to focus on his portrait rather than his candidacy, so that they are familiar with him prior to casting
their votes for him. Honoris failed in his candidacy.
Firdaus’ Image versus Honoris’ Image
The distinctions between these PAN’s candidates lie in the elements of clothes and the presence of
PAN’s chairperson on their billboards. Unlike Honoris who dons a neutral blue shirt to connote his
stance as an Islamic inclusive party’s candidate, Firdaus wears a Bond-like tuxedo. Not only does this
difference represent the way they translate the inclusivity of PAN, but it also signifies their
disposition. Honoris uses PAN’s official colour as the code that indicates his democratic inclusive
stance. As discussed, the way he catches people’s aspirations through an essay writing competition
arguably exemplifies a democratic mechanism – a quality that he wants to attach to his corporeal
body. Besides this democratic notion, Honoris also shows us his inclusive disposition that his religion
(Christian) and Chinese descent do not impede him in becoming the legislative candidate of an
Islamic inclusive party. At the same time, Honoris’ billboard reinforces PAN’s inclusivity. Within the
party’s Islamic inclusive framework, Honoris deploys the “halo”-like light on his billboard to connote
the visual immersion of Christianity (see Honoris’ billboard).
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Conversely, Firdaus, an Islamic theology graduate, interprets the democratic and inclusive notions of
PAN through transforming himself as James Bond along with the citation of one of the Qur’an verses
that denotes his name. As noted, the adoption of Bond qualities on Firdaus’ billboard signifies his
position as well as disposition in perceiving Bond as the representation of a political maverick who
seemingly upholds “truth” and “justice”. However, we cannot perceive Bond as the representation
of democratic figure, as although he is constructed as the secret agent protagonist of the Western
countries, his shifting image from “cosmopolitan” to “street smart, pragmatic and alienated” figure
(Thomas, 2009, p. 38) distances Bond (read: Firdaus) from the inclusive democratic notions (of the
party). Instead of filling in the gap, Firdaus reinforces his religious side by espousing the Qur’an
verse. Not only does this represent his disposition, but this disposition also connotes his (singular)
way attesting PAN’s inclusive religious democratic notions.
Another interesting aspect from these distinctions is the presence of PAN’s chairperson image on
these billboards. As discussed, the presence of the parties’ central figures indicates the reliance as
well as the glorification of the paternalistic culture which is arguably influenced by Javanese values
(see chapters four, six and seven). However, this notion cannot be seen as a rigid (if not ossified)
cultural element as the espousal of the parties’ central images on the candidates’ billboards cannot
be simply deduced from, for instance, the polarisation of Javanese/non Javanese dichotomies. As in
the cases of Firdaus and Honoris, representing the region of Sundanese culture, Firdaus employs the
image of Soetrisno Bachir in his publicity. On the contrary, representing East Java I constituency,
Honoris chooses to appear solely absenting the presence of PAN’s chairperson. In this light, this
visual difference connotes a loose interpretation of this dominant paternalistic culture.
PPP

source: http://ikang-marissa-info.blogspot.com/2009_04_01_archive.html

Marissa Haque was the former legislative member of PDI-P during Megawati’s era. In the 2009
Assembly election she chose to join PPP as the candidate. She translated the party’s platform
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(“education and public health services for free”) into her distinctive platform, “prioritize early
childhood education”, which also becomes Haque’s slogan on the billboard. No visual sign indicating
her candidacy appears. She seems to be busy introducing herself to the public, for her billboard
merely presents a close-up shot of her smiling and the ballot paper dummy as the visual text. Her
pose can be read as twofold: it was unnecessary for her to introduce herself because she possesses
sufficient social and cultural capital as an actress/celebrity. However, it was also necessary because
the public knows her as the former legislative member of PDI-P, the nationalist/secular party. The
billboard reintroduces her newly taken position/identity/disposition so that the former
nationalist/secular label from her previous party can be detached. Haque’s statement on her
website (http://www.marissahaque.net/political/) reinforces her shifting to the Islamic party (PPP)
as she regards it as the answer to her prayers after fasting for 40 days prior to her decision,
especially when seven parties proposed that she become their candidate.
The image is placed on the left hand side which indicates her visual awareness of reading the visual
pattern (from left to right). She places the slogan at the top of the billboard using the capital letters
in a larger font compared to the font she uses in the statement accenting her identity as the
legislative candidate representing the PPP for West Java 1 Region (Bandung and Cimahi). The
statement is positioned in the middle of the billboard that bridges her profile image with the dummy
image. Albeit the larger font and the position of the slogan indicate Haque’s emphasis on early
childhood education, the accent loses its credibility because Haque does not provide any (authentic)
visual attributes to support her claimed priority. Her track record in developing early childhood
education is also relatively poor due to limited publications of her dealing with this issues compared
to the news of her rivalry with the current Governor of Banten or her dispute concerning her
doctoral degree with her fellow celebrities. To resonate with the Islamic nuances of the party, she
wears a green headscarf, includes her hajj title and faces the camera from a slanting angle, smiling.
Not only do these vectors become the elements that build the interpersonal relation between the
spectators and Haque’s billboard, but they also function as representing a symbolic attributive
process of what Haque presents on her billboard. For instance, Haque uses a light green colour to
resonate with the party’s official colour (green) which connotes Islamic prosperity (see chapter five).
As Kress and van Leeuwen (2006, p. 229) note, green reflects a soothing atmosphere on the
billboard, Haque’s sole presence in her green Muslim attire connotes that not only does she become
the carrier of this soothing construction, but she also represents the notion of PPP’s Islamic
prosperity as her image is bound up with the party’s framework. Her smile towards the camera
reinforces this construction. Furthermore, like any other candidates who socialise the new voting
rule on their billboards, Haque provides the ballot paper dummy which is placed on the right hand
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side of the billboard and accentuates her name and number on the ballot paper with the tick sign
beneath her image. Haque failed to reach Parliament.
Damin Sada’s Billboard

Source: http://www.kaskus.us/showthread.php?t=3928768

Looking at this billboard makes our eyes directly engage with the images of these three figures.
However, the smile that completely captures our eyes is the smile of “Bang Obama” or Barack
Obama. No smiles are seen from the other two figures (Bang Damin and Bang Osama) although the
three of them are depicted putting their palms together indicating a peace agreement. Besides
Obama’s smile and presence, the red peci and male Muslim tunics of Bang Damin and Bang Osama
constitute the elements that create “intimacy” that suggests an interpersonal relation between the
spectators and the billboard as discussed earlier.
Prior to conducting a left-to-right reading, it is interesting to examine the use of informal greeting
expression on the verbal text “Bang Obama”, “Bang Damin” and “Bang Osama” as they are used to
address these “focal” figures on Damin Sada’s billboard – Barack Obama, Damin Sada and Osama Bin
Laden. The use of this informal expression is arguably intended to symbolically dilute “political
conflict (if not rift)”, especially between the United States of America (Barack Obama) and extremist
Islam of Afghanistan (Osama Bin Laden) at the visual level. Damin Sada, Indonesia’s legislative
candidate from the Islamic party (PPP), becomes the one that is able to reconcile this violent conflict.
Their “peaceful” visual encounter on Damin’s billboard metaphorically indicates the material action
of putting together Obama’s and Osama’s palms with Damin’s palm on the top of them. This,
without doubt, invites the spectators to smile as what Damin presents visually is a mere
reconciliation facade. However, this visual “laxity” cannot be conceived as simply ridiculing the
image of Damin as the peacemaker which leads to Damin’s self-embarrassment. He uses this
visualisation to metaphorically construct his “distinctive” quality, compared to the other candidates
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from Islamic parties, as a peacemaker. He wants the spectators to conceive him as the candidate
that is able to reconcile any horizontal conflicts.
In order to reinforce this image construction, Damin and Osama wear a similar Muslim white loose
surplice-like garment whilst Obama wears a gray suit. This different clothing arguably connotes
ideological and political differences as Obama’s suit represents Western notions of modernity,
whereas their surplice-like clothing connotes religiosity. The similar clothing that Damin and Osama
wear indicates an Islamic religious resemblance which visually positions Obama as the other. This
positioning does not put Obama in visual subordination, because Damin positions Obama’s image at
the left hand side of the billboard, which makes the spectators’ eyes firstly engage with his
appearance prior to Damin and Osama. Their different clothing also negates the subordination as it
signifies Damin’s disposition in perceiving the ideological/political conflicts between extremist Islam
and the USA. However, the significance of Obama’s image arguably dilutes itself as his presence is
controlled by Damin, the initiator of Obama and Osama’s (false) reconciliation. Obama’s grins
towards the spectators while making the peace agreement connotes either the happiness or
friendliness of this US President as he is depicted falsely reconciliated with extremist Muslims in
favour of Damin. In short, this visualisation not only connotes a facade, but also a political utopianist
comedy which reflects Damin’s disposition in utilising this political religious conflict in order to
construct his religious image.
Returning to the religious resemblance between Damin and Osama, the surplice-like clothing can be
perceived as connoting a differentiation marker between Damin’s Islam (Indonesian Islam) with
Osama (Middle Eastern Islam). As discussed in Parts II and III, Islam in Indonesia is heavily influenced
by Pancasila. Not only does this state ideology represent Indonesian nationalist habitus, but it also
contributes to giving a local (traditional) nuance to Indonesian Islamic discourse. Thus, when Osama
is depicted wearing turban on his head and having a long beard245, Damin appears wearing a red peci
and turban around his neck. As peci becomes the entity that represents both the religious as well as
nationalist identity of Indonesian people, Damin’s use of peci and turban visually differentiates the
form of Islam adhered to by Damin and Osama.
However, the red colour of Damin’s peci seems to correlate with the red-coloured name of Obama.
At the same time the green colour of Osama’s name resembles the green-coloured turban of Damin.
This colour similarity suggests that as red is collectively perceived as representing the nationalist
notion of bravery, it correlates with Damin’s audacious action in reconciling Obama and Osama. As
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Many Muslim clerics perceive that keeping a beard as the manifestation of Muslim’s adherence to follow
Prophet Muhammad’s daily practices (sunnah).
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for green, this colour is perceived as representing calmness, peacefulness and (Islamic) prosperity
(see chapter five). Bearing these two colours on his body, Damin presents himself as having the
bravery to reconcile the red (read: courage) Obama with the green (read: calm) Osama. Thus, based
on this colour association, Damin visually challenges the perception of positioning Osama as an
extremist as the green colour contradicts this image. Conversely, the attachment of the red colour to
Obama’s image signifies the Western (USA) courage (if not audacity). By this, Damin visually offers us
a counter-narrative of challenging the occident’s perception (if not hegemony) of Islam in this visual
comedy of manners.
This comedy is framed in his slogan “Damin itu Indah” or “Damin is beautiful”. The use of his own
name on this slogan indicates a visual attempt of demonstrating that his name even carries a
peaceful meaning. This can be seen if we treat his name “Damin” as an abbreviation of “DAMai Itu
INdah = DAMIN” (“Peace is Beautiful”). In this sense, he puns his own name to reinforce his quality
as a peacemaker. Damin’s notion of peace is then framed under a blue-coloured sky as the
billboard’s background. The mixture of blue and white which saturates the action of reconciliation
indicates the significance of this action. This visual circumstance of place reinforces the utopianist
notion of this political comedy of manners. Damin also uses parallelism between the party’s logo and
his slogan to reinforce his notion of peace on the first horizontal frame. Furthermore, as the party’s
logo uses ka’bah as the symbol of Islamic unity (see chapter five), paralleling this symbol with
Damin’s “peace” notion shows that this “peace” construction operates within the party’s Islamic
unitary framework. Damin then underscores his image construction as a legislative member
representing West Java using a rectangular box containing his name and number. He failed in his
candidacy.
Haque’s Image versus Damin’s Image
Representing PPP, Haque and Damin deploy different branding strategies. They present themselves
as Islamic figures with a different political agenda. Haque accentuates the written attributes in
expressing her slogan/program, i.e. prioritising Early Childhood Education, with the absence of the
authentic visual attributes. This absence dilutes the credibility of her program/billboard, although
her presence alone on the billboard suggests her popularity as a celebrity. Her green-coloured jilbab
and Muslim dress reinforce her new political stance as the candidate of an exclusive Islamic party.
Haque’s current stance arguably represents the shifting of her ideological stand from a secular
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nationalist party to an exclusive Islamic party after Megawati and her husband, Taufik Kiemas,
sacked her from PDI-P.246
When Haque chooses to present her image as a celebrity as well as a politician, Damin chooses to
demonstrate a political comedy of manners that visually demonstrates Damin’s attempt in becoming
a “peacemaker”. By this, Haque’s and Damin’s different strategy not only produces different results
but also indicates the deployment of a different branding approach in constructing an element of
“conviviality” on their billboards. Haque follows PPP’ Islamic attributes rigidly, such as the party’s
official colour, the ballot paper dummy and the green Muslim dress and jilbab. Damin comically
plays with this code of practice by employing the blue-coloured sky as the dominant colour and
translating the Islamic code into a scene that connotes a comedy of manners.
PKB
Soleh Hayat’s Billboard

Source: author’s collection

H. Sholeh Hayat is the current legislative member at the provincial level (East Java) under the law
and governance commission. He represents PKB and emphasises the greenness and calmness of
Surabaya (the capital city of East Java province) as his slogan. From the left hand side, the logo of
PKB appears a little insignificant since it merely occupies less than one eighth of the billboard which
makes Hayat’s image a little less than convincing to represent the pluralist, inclusive, democratic
246

See Fawzi, M.H. (n.d). Marrisa’s political activities. Retrieved from http://www.marissahaque.net/political/.
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notions represented by PKB’s logo. The billboard focuses on Hayat’s smiling, close-up image. He puts
his campaign slogan on the top using a smaller font than his name which indicates that Hayat
accentuates his persona rather than his program. His slogan does not resonate with his role in
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the biggest Muslim organisation in Indonesia with (East) Java as its main
base, as the coordinator of law and as Rukyah Hilal. Possibly, the greenness and calmness of
Surabaya as the slogan was chosen because they matched with PKB’s Islamic green colour. The
relating verb “songsong” or “welcome” indicates the informative (rather than persuading) statement
that the public will have, or welcome, the greenness and calmness of Surabaya by his coming to the
House of Representatives at the provincial level. The indirect statement also represents Hayat’s
humble/diffident (?) tactic in communicating his program. He labels his role in NU with the word
“identity”. Like most legislative candidates, Hayat puts his name and the identification label as the
legislative candidate under his profile image. Albeit Hayat’s billboard does not provide the authentic
visual setting of place to support his distinctive platform, Hayat gains sufficient social and cultural
capital as NU’s public figure at the provincial level. He succeeded in his candidacy.
Muh. Takdir Faiz’s Billboard

Source: http://sangattaku.multiply.com/photos/album/3/caleg_in_action#photo=20

Muh. Takdir Faiz’s billboard can be divided into two vertical frames247. The first frame denotes Faiz’
close-up profile picture that is positioned on the left hand corner of this billboard. This positioning
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Faiz’s billboard cannot be seen in discrete analyses of vertical or horizontal frames. However, as the vertical
reading involves the interaction of the party’s logo and Faiz’s number (the content of the second horizontal
frame), discrete analysis of this frame arguably produce the same result as the vertical ones. By this, the
horizontal reading is seen unnecessary.
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makes the eyes of the spectators directly engage with his smiling image along with his thick
moustache and soft eyes. This visual engagement is reinforced by the turquoise background colour
in which the logo of PKB is printed. The image of PKB’s stars encircles the globe as the background
brings the association of brightness close to him. The image of nine stars encircling the globe as seen
on the party’s logo represents the symbol of its nine ideological values: freedom, justice, truth,
honesty, populism, equity, simplicity, balance and brotherhood (see chapter five). However,
although the party perceives their nine stars as representing its nationalist stance, the visual
correlation of these stars with Pancasila’s star that connotes religiosity (see chapter five) can be
perceived as connoting a visual parallelism of these nationalist notions with the religiosity. In this
sense, by utilising these stars, this regional legislative candidate of Kutai Timur regency attempts to
correlate with PKB’s nine nationalist/religious values to his image. By adopting the
nationalist/religious visual symbols of PKB, Faiz represents himself more as a nationalist figure who
bears the party’s logo (situated on the top right hand corner of the billboard) which indicates the
party’s position as an inclusive nationalist party with Islam as its important identifying character (see
chapter eight). In order to represent the party’s ambiguous identity, Faiz wears a dark blue suit and a
striped tie instead of baju koko, surplice-like clothing, peci and turban which contradicts his fellow
PKB’s candidate, such as Sholeh Hayat who deploys Muslim attribute (peci) to reinforce his religious
identity.
This nationalist construction is reinforced by presenting a slight colour difference in the party’s green
colour and a turquoise background colour. The green colour of PKB indicates Indonesian (Islamic)
prosperity (see chapter five), whilst Faiz’s turquoise cannot be completely seen as connoting the
same reference. His use of turquoise detaches Faiz from the party’s Islamic visual framework. By
this, although the stars and globe appear similar to PKB’s logo, the turquoise he presents arguably
damages the notion of PKB’s prosperity, as the party uses green to connote the notion. This then
potentially damages Faiz’s image construction as he does not completely adhere to the party’s visual
framework.
Returning to the billboard’s frame, the second frame denotes his candidacy number (seven) printed
in red along with a big white tick sign which appears behind his number. Although Faiz does not
include the image of Indonesia’s national flag, the use of red and white colours can still be faintly
interpreted as connoting bravery and purity similar to what the flag suggests. Faiz’s red-coloured
number connotes his courage in becoming a legislative candidate representing constituency I of East
Kutai regency, whilst the white tick sign signifies the purity of the voters’ action in voting for him. At
this stage, the deployment of red and white can be perceived as twofold. Firstly, not only does it
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connote Faiz’s attempt to encode his candidacy number using the colour red, but the encoding also
indicates the transferring process of colour through projecting the conventional nationalist
connotation of red, not to his corporeal body, but to his number. Secondly, he associates the voter’s
actions of choosing him as the desired result from the spectator’s decoding process with the colour
white. Thus, Faiz wants the spectators to feel that choosing him reflects the purity of their political
decision. In this sense, this process demonstrates that although the projection of the nationalist
notion of bravery is directed to his number, this does not completely dilute Faiz’ nationalist image
building. However, the attachment of this “bravery” notion shows a faint correlation to the
nationalist strand, albeit Faiz wears a formal suit to reinforce his nationalist and modern image.
The deployment of the red colour continues as he uses this for his full name in the statement about
his candidacy (that he is East Kutai regency’s legislative candidate) and his slogan. The use of a
similar technique of reading the deployment of red for his full name and candidacy arguably
produces the same result. However, this deployment temporarily ceases as Faiz deploys a blue
colour to ask for the spectator’s support (“Mohon Doa Restu dan Dukungannya” or [I beseech your]
blessing and support”) prior to his slogan. In the nationalist parties’ discourse, the colour of blue is
often associated with peacefulness, freedom, democracy (Dienaputra, 2011, p. 183). Thus, this
deployment connotes the way Faiz conveys his political request. Moreover, the noun “blessing”
reinforces Faiz’s cordial way of seeking support as this connotes that he places himself as a humble
politician seeking the spectator’s approval. In this sense, he perceives himself not in an equal
relation with the spectators as he is aware that without the voter’s support he cannot succeed in his
candidacy. In Bourdieuan lens, this demonstrates Faiz’s lack of symbolic capital. At the same time,
this type of request can easily be found in Indonesian wedding parties, such as when the guests
enter the site of the wedding, they are usually greeted with a similar request (“mohon doa restu” or
“[we beseech your] blessing”). Thus, this similar expression arguably makes his billboard sound like a
“marriage proposal” in which he seeks the support of voters to choose him, not as a future bride,
but as a legislative candidate who will fight for their aspirations.
This “marriage-proposal-like”politicking continues with the deployment of the red colour in his
slogan “Kalau ada Saudara, Kenapa Harus Pilih Orang Lain”. Translating this slogan is not an easy
task as the pronoun “saudara” usually functions as a formal greeting expression to address the
interlocutors. Translating “saudara” into “brother/sister” will cause a misunderstanding as it does
not fit the slogan itself. Thus, we cannot translate this slogan into “if we have you, brothers/sisters,
why should we choose someone else”. This difficulty arguably stems from the slogan itself. The
meaning of Faiz’s slogan in Indonesian is awkward (if not funny), as when the word “saudara” is
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intended to solely refer to Faiz instead of the spectators as the visual “interlocutors”. This ostensible
reference to Faiz derives from the clause “kenapa harus pilih orang lain” or “why should we choose
someone else” following the clause “kalau ada saudara” (“if [we have] you, brother [Faiz]”). Thus, in
order to make this linguistic reference sensible, the spectator should be the one who utters the
slogan. By this, Faiz seems to mute his own billboard from speaking, as when it speaks the word
“saudara” will refer to the spectators instead of Faiz. In short, Faiz’s linguistic inadequacy damages
his billboard’s visual credibility.
Nonetheless, this visuality also demonstrates that what Faiz accentuates on his outdoor advertising
medium is the way he wants the spectators to know him personally. This intimacy is constructed not
only through the deployment of his close-up image but also in the appreciable size of the font he
uses in denoting his name compared to the other written expressions. His sole presence on the
billboard in a close-up image connotes a symbolic attributive process he uses to assure the
spectators that he is the nationalist candidate representing the Islamic inclusive party. He failed in
his candidacy.
Hayat’s Image versus Faiz’s Image
The distinctive elements of Hayat’s and Faiz’s billboards lie in the deployment of PKB’s official
colour, clothes and the absence of the party’s central figure. Their billboards arguably use a similar
narrative pattern in accentuating their images as the Islamic nationalist figures by way of
representing themselves as the sole participant who seeks support/blessing from the spectators.
Using turquoise colour which belongs to the same family resemblance as PKB’s green colour, Faiz
differs himself from his fellow candidate, Hayat, who adopts the party’s official colour to connote his
slogan, i.e. “the greenness and calmness of Surabaya”. Faiz’s use of turquoise to support his obscure
slogan (“if we have you (?), why should we choose someone else”) proves to be a failure as the
colour and slogan arguably violate PKB’s code of practice as they fail to present the party’s inclusive
stance.
On the contrary, as discussed, Faiz’ use of a formal suit seems to reinforce the inclusive image as his
suit arguably represents more nationalist and modern notions compared to baju koko, surplice-like
clothes, peci and turban. However, compared to Faiz, the combination of suit, peci and batik Hayat
wears reflects more PKB’s inclusive stance as a nationalist Islamic party. Moreover, the absence of
the party’s central figure on these billboards reinforces the perception that the reliance of the
Islamic parties (in this case PKB) is not as heavy as the nationalist ones. Representing Java region and
Outer Island (East Kalimantan) respectively, Hayat and Faiz do not deploy the image of Gus Dur
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and/or Muhaimin Iskandar (PKB’s current chairperson), although the party is known as an
Islamic/nationalist Java-based party (see chapters five and seven).
Comparing and Contrasting the Candidates’ Billboards of Nationalist and Islamic Factions
In comparing and contrasting the image-building of the candidates from the nationalist and Islamic
factions, we need to focus on the dominant elements of the billboards, i.e. the participants, the
ideational process represented on the billboards, the visual markers of place, and the technical
elements which connote the candidates’ ideological orientation, such as colours and clothing
attributes. These elements do not merely appear as the recurring elements but also as the ones that
define the genre of the billboards’ narrative texts through the deployment of repetitive codes in the
plot lines (Hartley, 2002, pp. 96-97). The participants (tenor) define the power relation in the social
actions (field) that are represented by the part of language (mode) on the texts (Bernstein as cited
by Martin and Rose, 2008, pp. 18-19). These register variables (tenor, field and mode) along with the
technical elements define the scope of the billboard genre or system of orientation. The ideational
process is realised not merely in terms of linguistic devices such as the nominal groups and
circumstance of place, but also in the visual representation of material actions and the symbolic
attributive process. The focus in comparing and contrasting the candidates’ billboards are on the
nature of the tenor involved in the billboards and move to the (visual) language variable (mode), i.e.
the dominant ideational process of the billboards, and the represented field variable, i.e. the
markers of place depicted on the billboard. The colour and clothing elements reinforce the
candidates’ ideologically ambiguous positions.
As implied in chapter eight, the nationalist parties are more reliant on their key figure’s image
construction than the Islamic ones. This is arguably due to the paternalistic characteristic of
Pancasila which influences the way the candidates from the nationalist faction construct their image
by espousing the images of their party’s paternalistic figures to support their nationalist image
construction. Not only does their visual reliance connote the hierarchy of power between the
candidate and the party’s key figures, but also indicates the perpetuation of the Javanese power
pattern of gusti and kawula. The candidates need the image projection of the key figures as they are
aware that juxtaposing their image with the parties’ leaders means co-opting the leaders’ symbolic
capital as theirs. However, this does not completely mean that all candidates are reliant on their
party’s central figures. The absence of the key figures on their billboards, as in the case of Saiful,
neither connotes nor dilutes the insignificance of Megawati Soekarnoputri. As discussed, Saiful does
not need Megawati’s presence to support his popularity for he was well-known as the former
successful mayor of Blitar. Another factor that arguably leads PDI-P candidates to exclude
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Megawati’s presence from their billboards is that Megawati’s secular image might damage the
frame of their religious (Islamic) image on their billboards. This can be seen from Effiendriaty and
Sintoekwasito’s billboard as they accentuate their religious Islamic image under PDI-P’s (secular)
nationalist framework (see chapters five and seven). In this sense, the inclusion of Megawati’s
image248 contradicts Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s donning of Muslim apparel. At the same time,
this absence can also be perceived as adhering to Soekarno’s nationalist ideals which are conducted
not solely by presenting Megawati’s/Soekarno’s images as the translation of these ideals can also be
in form of visual/verbal material actions (see Saiful’s billboard). On the other hand, the absence of
Golkar’s central figure does not connote the party’s negation of the paternalistic values (if not
culture), as Golkar keeps demonstrating this reliance (see chapter seven) but not necessarily in the
form of presenting the patron’s image along with the candidates as Santoso’s and Daeng’s billboards
suggest. As for PD, Gerindra and Hanura, these nascent nationalist parties arguably adopt similar
paternalistic values as they become the electoral vehicles for the parties’ patrons.
On the contrary, the espousal of the party’s key figure on the Islamic faction’s billboards is seen as a
mere complementary visual device. This can be seen, for instance, from Firdaus’ billboard as he
marginalises Soetrisno Bachir’s image, the former PAN chairperson, as Firdaus positions himself as
one of his fans. This detachment shows not the negation of the pattern of gusti-kawula in the Islamic
faction but the futility of fetishising their charismatic leaders’ image. However, in maintaining the
gusti-kawula conception, the Islamic candidates use supporting figures (such as the PKS’ male
volunteers, male and female school students on Wahid’s billboard) not fully as minor interactive
participants, but as intermediary elements (or in Hallidayian term “modal devices”, O’Toole, 2011, p.
14). Not only do they help in building intimacy or interpersonal relations between the spectator and
the billboards, but they also represent the visual hegemonic relation between the party’s elites and
the grassroots. If we relate this fetishism with the polarisation of Javanese/non Javanese strands, we
will find the irregularity of the deployment of the patrons’ images on the candidates’ billboards. This
is due to the fact that the candidates deploy these images regardless of whether they are
representing the contituencies in Java or in the Outer Islands. At this stage, this reinforces Mujani,
Liddle and Ambardi’s finding (2012) that the ethnocentric element is a constant variable (see chapter
one).
Returning to the element of participants on the billboards, the other supporting participants, such as
the old peasant woman, cartoon characters (such as Avatar), Barack Obama and Osama bin Laden
are used in the material actions (except for Avatar) to illuminate the candidates’ image construction.
248

Megawati restored her image by wearing red kerudung. This image can be seen, especially on the (party’s)
billboards during the Islamic religious celebration such as Eid-al Fitr.
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These figures are deployed to illuminate the candidates’ ambiguous ideological orientation as the
candidates exploit them by way of positioning them as the elements that represents both the
nationalist and Islamic strands. Their supporting roles on the billboards reflect not merely the labour
division between gusti and kawula, such as in the cases of the old peasant woman (Saiful’s
billboard), the male volunteers and the school students (Wahid’s billboard), but also the practices of
how the party’s elites frame their success (read also: their power and authority).
However, their interaction does not indicate that the material actions become the dominant
ideational process, as fourteen billboards use a symbolic attributive process in introducing the
candidates. This can be seen as the candidates mainly use their close-up pictures to represent
themselves as the sole carrier of the nationalist and/or Islamic attributes in their image construction.
In this sense, not only do their close-up images represent the “visual intimate modality” (Kress and
Leeuwen, 2006, p. 149), but this modality element also demonstrates that the candidates position
themselves as the sole carrier of the nationalist and/or Islamic attributes in their image construction.
This dominant ideational process is arguably aligned with the fact that the candidates did not have
sufficient experience in introducing (if not yet promoting) themselves on the billboards as they were
not allowed to promote themselves prior to the 2009 legislative election. However, we cannot
completely perceive this insufficiency as the underlying factor which foregrounds the candidates’
lack of visual literacy as this mode also reflects the candidates’ disposition in constructing their
(ambiguous) image. In this sense, the symbolic attributive process can be perceived as reflecting the
mechanism the candidates deploy to project their self-(political)-interest and transforms it into
collective vested interest as they perceive themselves as the carriers of people’s aspirations. This
projection dilutes itself, especially when the candidates use the symbolic attributive process at the
visual level which contradicts the dominant material actions represented on their written slogan.
This reinforces the quality of their visual and linguistic literacy which damages their image
construction.
Returning to the ambiguous image construction, the candidates also deploy visual props such as
clothing to connote their ideological orientation. The candidates from nationalist and Islamic
factions use Muslim apparel such as peci, baju koko, surplice-like clothing, turban, kerudung, jilbab,
and Muslim tunics to reinforce their religious identity. Not only does the donning of this Muslim
apparel, such as kerudung and jilbab, represent Muslim females’ degree of piety by disciplining their
own bodies, but it also becomes the markers that obscure their nationalist inclination. At the same
time in order to reinforce their nationalist image, the candidates wear the party’s jacket, poloshirt,
shirt, batik shirt, formal suit, and tuxedo. The “neutral” (non religious) attire reinforces the
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ideological obscurity as they are also used to connote the nationalist orientation of the candidates
from the Islamic faction.
However, if we examine the candidates’ clothes in a macro lens, we will find that from all the clothes
the candidates wear, the tuxedo becomes a distinctive differentiation marker (see Firdaus’
billboard). Not only is this due to the associative relation between Firdaus and James Bond, but that
the tuxedo also indicates the notion of elitism. This means that Firdaus’s attachment of this notion
to his corporeal body represents his cultural/political disposition which connotes the predilection of
this former legislator of Banten province. However, Firdaus’ predilection does not merely indicate
his predisposition, as this, at the same time, demonstrates how Firdaus places himself in the
globalisation discourse the Bond films represent (Thomas, 2009). In this discourse, the nation is seen
as “one unit of analysis among many in a political and cultural network” (Thomas, 2009, p. 36). This
means that the system of power relation is no longer seen as a centralised one, as the world is now
defined by the complexity of transnational corporations/organisations/companies/institutions that
operate across the borderlines of nation, state and culture in the new global capitalism (Negri and
Hardt, 2000, 2004). By this, as earlier discussed, as the agencies Bond representing cannot detach
themselves from the complicity of intervening in the status quo of the so-called third world
countries vis-a-vis the socio-economical/political interest of these transnational corporations, Bond’s
contemporary character cannot be easily escape from this association. However, as Thomas further
argues, Bond represents “a globetrotting elite who benefits from the political bureaucratic
infrastructures of the nation state”, whilst at the same time conceives himself as a self-legitimated
agent who is above those infrastructures. In this light, Firdaus presents us a similar comedy of
political manners as Damin’s as the transference of Bond’s cosmopolitan qualities to his image
merely produces an absurd visual allegory.
Returning to the candidates’ Muslim apparel, their deployment does not merely connote the
candidates’ religious identity let alone the level of their piety. The deployment of these religious
attributes along with the nationalist one, such as Wiranto’s use of peci and batik on Prasetyo’s
billboard, represent the codes of nationalism as well as religiosity as peci has a dual role as it is an
attribute which represents Indonesian Islam, and at the same time Indonesia-ness. In this sense, peci
becomes the signifier of an active struggle as its meaning has shifted from connoting Indonesian
Islamic religiosity, through the nationalist code of resistance to colonisers, to the official code of
Indonesian national identity (see chapter seven). Unlike peci, batik does not signify the Indonesian
religious side. As discussed, it represents the nation’s struggle for its cultural pride as Malaysia,
Indonesia’s neighbouring country, arguably often “hijacks” (if not claims) Indonesian traditional arts.

235

Not only does UNESCO’s acknoweldgement of batik as a world heritage cloth from Indonesia
reinforce the sense of Indonesia-ness but also arguably leads to indirect recognition of Javanese
ethnocentrism in Indonesia as batik originated from Java. Thus, peci and batik connotes multiaccentuality as the represented participants who wear them interact in their social relation which
opens up the potential of the proliferation of meanings and also the capacity of multiple meanings’
struggle (Hartley, 2002, p. 150).
This capacity also makes colours into technical “modality” elements (Kress and Leeuwen, 1990, p.
61, 2006, pp. 160-161) that reinforce the candidates’ positions to be in alignment with the party’s
ideological orientation. At the same time this colour association also demonstrates the mechanism
of how the parties frame their official colours as they are deployed not as arbitrary signs but
motivated ones in illuminating the candidates’ image construction. For instance, PDI-P frames black
as having a close (instead of a contradictive) relation with white, i.e. honesty and sincerity, whilst
PKS frames black as having positive attribute as white, i.e. certainty. This mode of framing shows
that this association demonstrates the “motivated” quality of colours as signs which reflect the way
the party sets up (controls) the meaning of its official colours so that they resonate with their
ideological orientation in their signifying practices. However, this does not mean that these practices
conceal meaning contestation as they challenge the conventions of binary opposition, such as black
versus white (good versus evil). In this sense, these colours function as the supporting component
that illustrates the synthesis as well as contestation of ideological polarisation in the candidates’
image construction. Their motivated characteristic does not circumscribe the candidates to be in
ambiguous idelogical positions.
The candidates’ billboards represent the ambiguous position of Islamic and Nationalist candidates
(read: the parties). The candidates need to demonstrate a strong attachment towards both the
nationalist and Islamic orientation. They cannot represent themselves as the nationalist or Islamic
figure per se in order to capture Muslim and Nationalist voters. Their positions as the candidates of
the Nationalist or Islamic strands do not put them in an ossified situation for in the position-taking
process they can flexibly adopt Islamic and nationalist notions as a symbolic exchange within the
framework of demokrasi Pancasila. The billboards also show the (in)consistency of the candidates in
resonating with the party’s platforms and slogans which is possibly due to the contestation in the
politics of image between Islamic/nationalist camps that obscures the candidates’ ideological
orientation. The Islamic and nationalist attributes on the billboard fail to construct an identity myth
in their political branding.
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The billboards of the nationalist camp demonstrate that Pancasila as the nationalist ideology is
frequently presented along with the parties patrons’ images, which in themselves can be interpreted
as representing the nationalist notion of Pancasila. However, the patron’s images on the candidates’
billboards represent not a complete glorification of the paternatislic pattern of gusti-kawula but
more that their image projection reinforces the pretext of the ideological ambiguity as the leaders
perceive themselves representing both nationalist and Islamic strands. This fetishism holds a
transient status as when the candidates feel that the leaders’ image arguably damages their visual
image construction, they will not include the leaders’ image on the billboards.
Similar to the nationalist faction, the billboards of the Islamic parties also represent the obscurity of
the ideological polarisation. Although the billboards are heavily loaded with the use of Islamic
symbolic attributes such as peci, baju koko, turban, kerudung, jilbab and the citation of Qur’anic
verses (as part of the candidates’ paralanguage), the ways in which the candidates deliver the
message of their programs seem not to overtly connote an Islamic way. For instance, the dress code
of Ahmad Firdaus and Hidayat Nur Wahid do not represent their religiosity. Firdaus transforms
himself into an Indonesian James Bond whilst Wahid casually wears a short-sleeve batik shirt, black
trousers and a white cap. However, unlike the Muslim male dress code, the female Muslim dress
represents more religious rigour, although kerudung is perceived as representing a loose
(traditionalist) religious attribute. The female Muslim candidates wear them to reinforce their
religious inclination without diluting their nationalist disposition. In this sense, the donning of
Muslim apparel does not completely represent the candidates’ ideological orientation.
Thus, the image construction of the nationalist and Islamic parties operates ambiguously. They both
seem to adopt similar ideological values as they realise that capturing Indonesian voters is as difficult
as dividing santri and abangan. Although Indonesia is known as having the biggest Muslim
population of any country in the world, the Islamic characteristic of the dominant Muslim group (see
chapter seven) does not allow the polarisation to operate as two distinctive poles as if absenting the
ideological overlap between these two camps. In this overlap, the ideological contestation occurs
which leads to the ambiguous position of the parties and the candidates’ branding.
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CONCLUSION
The amendment of election law no. 10/2008 article 214 marked the emergence and profusion of the
legislative candidates’ politics of image, especially in the 2009 legislative election. This amendment
annulled the system in which the parties determined the candidates’ ranking number on the ballot
paper. At the same time, this amendment liberated the candidates from the “imprisonment” in
which they were not allowed to produce individual promotion and/or publicity. They could not
expose their identity as they were co-opted in the framework of the parties’ image construction. In
this sense, this amendment not only dilutes the party’s oligarchy, but also makes Indonesia’s political
arena (represented by the candidates’ billboards) as a site where the candidates’ images are
constructed, contested and transacted.
Billboards became one of the preferable outdoor advertising mediums candidates used in
constructing their image. The ubiquity of the candidates’ billboards during the 2009 elections
indicated this preference as the billboards dominated Indonesia’s rural and urban landscapes. At the
same time, this also represents the candidates’ state of political euphoria. This can be seen from the
compelling and titillating ways the candidates constructed their image on the billboards in order to
lure the spectators (read: voters). The challenge the candidates faced using this outdoor advertising
medium was not regarding the limitation the billboard placed on the intended meaning. It rather lies
in the spectators’ rapid mobility which prompted the candidates to make eye-catching billboards.
These “eye-catching” qualities are then translated into numerous interesting and comic ways.
However, a close examination of these qualities demonstrates that the operations of these image
constructions were framed on the same ideological basis, i.e Pancasila. Pancasila, as the state
ideology, functions not only as the basis which defines Indonesian politics, but also as the ideological
framework that controls the mechanism of the candidates’ image construction. These functions
work as Pancasila is perceived as the ideological embodiment of cultural conformity in multicultural
Indonesia. However, as Reeve (1985) found, this utopianist ideal was largely influenced by its
founding fathers’ (Javanese) cultural dispositions, especially Ki Hajar Dewantara, Supomo and
Soekarno. These founding figures found that the cultural resemblance of all ethnic groups in
Indonesia lies in the paternalistic system (Somantri, 2006) which resonates with Javanese
hierarchical paternalistic system of gusti and kawula. Adityawan (2008) asserts that Soekarno
adopted this paternalistic pattern as he perceived his role as the first President synonymous with the
symbolic serving function of a Javanese king (gusti) (as the father) in nurturing the people (kawula)
(or the children). Using the principle of kekeluargaan (collectivism/family-ness), Soekarno
transformed this paternalistic notion into a socio-nationalist concept, in which the collective interest
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of the family/society/nation is above the individual. In this sense, Soekarno ostensibly controlled the
authority of gusti as valuing the collective interest is represented through the operation of gotong
royong (mutual assistance/sharing burden) which becomes the basis of Pancasila’s democratic
principles and the embodiment of social justice. Musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat
(consensus) reinforces this controlling attempt. Mohammad Hatta (non Javanese), one of the
founding fathers of Pancasila, brought this concept into the Indonesian economic system of mutual
cooperation (ekonomi kerakyatan). He found that, besides the paternalistic culture, this cooperation
also represents the cultural conformity of Indonesian village life and became the basis of economic
principles in Pancasila discourse. In contemporary Indonesia, this system arguably proliferates in
clientelism which positions the patron as the central figure. The presence of this figure on the
candidates’ billboards perpetuates this paternalistic system.
Besides this paternalistic system, Pancasila is also characterised by the logic of “neither-nor”
(Somantri, 2006), which becomes the basis of its inclusivity. This logic can be seen in Pancasila’s first
principle which accentuates the element of twin toleration as religiously essential. This means that
the state guarantees religious tolerance among different religions without religion attempting to
dominate the state. In this sense Pancasila becomes the ideological determiner that neither leads
the country to theocracy nor reconstitute it as a secular nation. Not only does this first principle
acknowledge religious freedom and tolerance but it also becomes the bastion of this inclusivity (also
read: ambiguity)249.
This inclusive characteristic is needed, especially in controlling the understandable and indissoluble
ideological friction between nationalist and Islamic factions, which historically stems from the
exhortation of the Islamic faction that wanted the initial draft of Pancasila’s first principle of the
Jakarta Charter to function. In order to control this friction, Soekarno then fused the contesting
ideologies of nationalism, Islamism and later communism adhered to by the four major parties
PNI250, PKI, Masyumi251 and NU under the concept of NASAKOM (nationalist, religion (Islamic) and
communist) within paternalistic ‘Guided Democracy.’ Soekarno dissolved Masyumi as he perceived
this party as the one that orchestrated a mutiny against his administration.
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The candidates from nationalist faction translated this religious inclusivity by donning religious (Islamic)based attire on the billboards. Whilst the Islamic candidates, especially the male ones, liberated themselves
from this religious-loaded attire. This is done as they want the spectators to perceive them as embodying both
camps.
250
The nationalist PNI was seen as the political embodiment of Soekarno’s nationalist concept, which was later
perpetuated by Megawati’s (Soekarno’s eldest daughter) PDI(-P).
251
Plaztdasch (2009a) argues that Masyumi tradition plays a major role in influencing the current Islamic
parties, such as PPP, PKS, PAN.
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As Soekarno’s guided democracy and NASAKOM failed to resolve this ideological friction, Soeharto
exerted an authoritarian strategy in muffling the opposition groups. First, he used the so-called PKI’s
coup against Soekarno’s administration as a pretext to justify the government’s action in positioning
communism as an ideological and political threat. Soeharto then annulled the operation of
Soekarno’s ostensible “legacy” of a multiparty system as he perceived this system as the one that
imperiled the nation’s stability. In so doing, Soeharto fused the nationalist and Islamic parties under
PDI and PPP and utilised Soekarno’s initiated functional(ist) group, Golkar, as his electoral machine.
Soeharto’s relunctance in positioning this group as a political party marked the government’s
subterfuge in distinguishing Golkar from the nationalist PDI and the Islamic PPP. This difference was
delineated by the functionalist (pragmatist? yet unitary?) banner of developmentalism as Golkar’s
(read: the government’s) central platform. This was conducted in order to divert people’s attention
solely to the country’s development. Under this banner, Soeharto transformed Pancasila as a
monolithic doctrine in the form of ideological uniformity through P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan
Pengamalan Pancasila or Guidance for Understanding and Practising Pancasila) programs. He
framed Pancasila’s five inclusive democratic principles as the basis of his authoritarian regime’s
version of democracy. At this stage, Pancasila was mystified in order to arguably construct “panIndonesian-ism”. This mystification seemed to meet its end in the aftermath of Soeharto’s downfall.
However, in the post-Soeharto era, especially during the current administration of SBY, this
mystification has been resurrected and proliferates in the form of politics of image. The ideological
friction which marked the segregation of nationalist and Islamic factions gradually becomes obscure,
especially when each faction adopts the ideological values of its adversary (Platzdasch, 2009b). This
process is highly important as it represents the shifting of the (winning) parties to the middle
ground. In this sense, not merely does this lead to the obscurity of the polarisation but it also
demonstrate the political attempt of synthesising the Islamic and Nationalist strands. This attempt
arguably positions the parties in the tenuous boundary of the ideological crossroads. The
establishment of the nationalist parties’ religious (Islamic) wing organisations exemplifies this
positioning. The nationalist and Islamic parties’ fluid coalition in the government or the cartel system
(Ambardi, 2009) reinforces such praxis. In a Gramscian lens, this praxis is not merely aimed at
expanding the constituencies as this is conducted to secure collective consent in order to be in a
hegemonic position. In a Bourdieuan lens, this positioning signifies the “objective agreement
between subjects (consensus)” which results in “the domination of one party over the others
(symbolic violence)” (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 165-167). However, in the cartel system this domination is
not exercised in the form of ideological competition as it is largely based on the collusive practices.
Through these, they obtain and secure the resources provided by the state. At this point, the modus
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operandi of this consensus ostensibly reflects the futility of this factional/ideological
classification/polarisation. However, at the same time, their legitimacy is attained from ideological
competition/contestation through the use of political instruments to express the ideology, political
programs and actions, such as the billboards.
Expressing the ideology and political programs, the candidates’ billboards represent the ideological
contestation and synthesis of the Islamic/Nationalist strands circulated in the Pancasila-based
political arena. Bourdieu (1991, pp. 169, 190) argues that this textual representation merely signifies
the “euphemised form” of the magnitude of the ideological contestation and synthesis. This means
that the textual analysis of the billboard from his perspective arguably reduces the significance of
this magnitude. However, the billboard, as the cultural/visual artefact that represents the ideological
production252, signifies not only a euphemised form but also the candidates’ political dispositions as
it is the product of the candidates’ political articulation. As the disposition operates beneath the
level of consciousness and is structured by past circumstances, such as history, the examination of
the candidates’dispositions cannot be detached from Indonesia’s political historical practices
governed by Pancasila-based dispositions (habitus). In other words, these entities operate based on
this relational mode. Thus, the analysis of the operation of cultural and political elements that
foreground the candidates’ dispositions is coupled with the textual analysis of the billboards for they
are interrelated by the same cultural/political reference. However, this does not mean that the
billboard is completely incapable of representing the candidates’ dispositions textually. The analysis
of the candidates’ dispositions by referring to the ostensible “external” (read: political/cultural)
elements outside the candidates’ billboards reinforces the representation of the candidates’
dispositions on the textual level.
Returning to the textual analysis, the three main elements of the billboard’s genre, i.e. the purpose
or the social function of the billboard, its generic structure, and the dominant lexico-grammatical
feature of the billboard, show that the function of the candidate’s billboard is not simply to
introduce and advertise the candidates and propagate their slogan and platform. The billboard
becomes the medium in which their political image is constructed, contested and transacted in order
to gain public recognisibility (symbolic capital). The ideological markers in the form of visual and
linguistic capital on the textual level are reified as a commodity which will be later exchanged or
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Examining the ideological production requires scrutinising the circuit of how these billboards are produced,
consumed and regulated. However, as this research focuses on the reading of the billboards’ narratives which
reflect the candidates’ dispositions, further studies are needed to investigate this circuit of culture (Du Gay,
Hall, et. al 1997)
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transacted, especially during voting. In this sense, the operation of this symbolic exchange is
deferred as the transaction has to be carried out in the correct moment.253
Prior to the symbolic exchange, the generic structure of the billboard shows that the billboard’s
narration mainly involves the interaction of the represented participants (the candidates and the
party’s paternalistic figures254) which is mostly situated in the absence of the authentic visual setting
of place. This reduces the level of visual credibility of the candidates’ billboards (read: image). The
main participants are portrayed mostly in their close-up and medium shot pictures. This means that
not only do the candidates show a visual intimacy but it also suggests the operation of the relational
process as the dominant lexico-grammatical feature in the grammar of the visual and verbal texts.
This dominance indicates that the candidates define themselves by relating their visual presentation
with other visual/verbal attributes in order to construct the image of Nationalist and/or Islamic
figures. The position of the material or action process as the second dominant grammatical feature
indicate the level of the candidates’ visual/linguistic literacy as the effective use of this process
reinforces the candidates’ image-building. In other words, the absence of the candidates’
“authentic” visual action represented on the billboard dilutes their image credibility.
Besides these features, the supporting visual attributes such as the dominant colours, clothing and
other props define the candidates’ (fluid) position. The dominant colours demonstrate the
visual/ideological constraint as the candidates are bound with the colours the parties use to
construct the identity difference, especially among parties of the same faction. The dominant red
and white colours, which resemble the national flag used by the candidates from nationalist and
Islamic factions, represents that they all have the same nationalist dispositions within the framework
of Pancasila’s Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) in nation-state building.
When the dominant colours indicate political constraint (as the candidates need to represent
themselves free from ethnocentric orientation), the clothing they wear arguably liberates them from
this sole orientation. This gives them freedom to construct their image as Nationalist and/or Islamic
figures. This reinforces the obscurity of the candidates’ political stance which resonates with the
fluidity of the parties’ identity construction. Such practices are permissible in Pancasila discourse not
only because this state ideology opens itself to ambiguity but these ambiguous (read: inclusive)
characteristics also represent the collective utopianist goals of this nation amidst its cultural plurality

253

As the focus of this reaserch is not on this moment, a further study is recommended to investigate the
transaction process and its results.
254
As noted, the presence of the party’s key figures represents the operation of the (Javanese) paternalistic
culture at the visual level.
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and fragmentation. This ideological “flexibility” in Pancasila arguably stems from Javanese culture
which positions tolerance as its essence (Kingsbury, 2005).
The system of representation operating on the candidates’ billboards demonstrates that the
candidates’ dispositions are defined by the discursive formation of how the dominant group
arguably controls the ideological meanings in Pancasila. However, as this ideology lies in the power
relation between nationalist and Islamic factions, this control does not represent a complete
domination of one faction over the other, as they agree to bind themselves in the consensus in order
to be in the hegemonic position. In a Gramscian lens, the ideational conflict (read: friction) in
Pancasila discourse signifies the unstable historical bloc and becomes the basis of ideological
struggle. In this sense, the candidates’ billboards as the cultural/visual artefacts become unstable as
they represent the socio-cultural product of this political articulation.
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